South Sudan unity is still fragile
By Chuol Wan Luot*
Nov 16, 2005 — It was a simple and proven recipe for escalating the conflict in the South. If this scenario is repeated now, the fragile progress that has been made in two months of relative cooperation between SSDF and SPLM/A will disintegrate immediately. The broad optimism over the recent formation of GOSS and GONU hides a number of major obstacles. The end of the late John Garang’s leadership has not ended, at least so far, the emergence of another tribal conflict. The hopes for unity in the South have remained theoretical, at least so far, and Salva Kirr will really run a tribal government, even in the absence of serious opposition from SSDF.
But it is much too early to declare that the South is benefiting from the CPA or unity. Salva Kirr was a core member of the SPLM/A’s “old guard,” and his leadership reflected John Garang’s tribal shadow. During the formation of GOSS and GONU, Salva Kirr repeated the standard phases that will block any compromise with SSDF.
Nevertheless, the differences in tone between Garang and Salva sound and look programmatic. Although he hasn’t embraced “Dinka to born to rule,”and incitement toward the SSDF, Salva Kirr promoted the killing of the Nuer officers in the SPLM in 1991. He has criticized Garang’s policy of disunity and conflict with the SSDF, albeit for programmatic rather than moral reasons, but the real test for Salva Kirr has yet to begin, the potential for conflict remains high and the success of CPA cannot be guaranteed.
If there is going to be significant movement toward peace and unity among Southern Sudanese, Salva Kirr will need to dissolve the GOSS without delays. The GOSS is supposed to be a government of nation unity in the South, but many Southern Sudanese will retain a cynical view of Salva Kirr as tribalist and dictator. In reality, the chances of achieving peace in the foreseeable future to 3-11 are close to zero.
Conceptually, tribalism is unlike communism. Under communism, ideology evolved into a façade, but among the Dinka, tribal hatreds toward Nuer run very deep. While some Dinka Southern nationalists have spoken up against the destructive policy of Garang and Salva in favour of compromise and mutual acceptance, these voices are isolated and there is no evidence they will gain strength in the next decade, or even the next generation.
Furthermore, limited unity, in whatever form it might eventually come to Southern Sudan, is no guarantee of moderation and compromise. One year after the CPA, South Sudan is a battlefield, and there is little evidence of the emergence of reconciliation based on the rule of law.
Transformation to democracy might take generations, and, in the meantime, the power of tribal extremism and motivation will continue. As a result, although the strategy of democratic evolution is appealing, it constitutes a huge risk with very limited hope of success.
In other words, the outcome of the formation of GOSS remains Salva Kirr’s least bad choice and most unrealistic option. This strategy makes the north more apt to divide the South and makes it more difficult to implement the CPA.
In other words, now, years later, even if the conflict were to suddenly stop, and formal links between SSDF and SPLM officials were fully restored, there is no foundation for societal transformation on which to build a realistic peace process. Among Southern Sudanese, the environment of optimism, support for compromise, and belief in mutual respect that fostered the CPA has vanished. Also, the SPLM’s tribalists make resuming of South-South Dialogue difficult and it has no chance of success.
As a result, after the emotion cools and rationality returns, unilateral tribalism is still the only game in the town of Juba.
* Chuol Wan Luot, is a member of South Sudan Democratic Forum and a member of advisory to General Paulino Matip, the SSDF Chief of Staffs. He is also M.A student in Conflict Studies at St. Paul University Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Email:
[email protected]