Making the case for secession
By Kor Tot*
Nov 19, 2005 — The comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) like many other agreements signed before it by the government of the Sudan and the southern based rebels is vulnerable to intentional breach, hijacking, and dishonoring unless the parties to this peace accord are equally committed to the full implementation of all its provisions including, most importantly, the provision on referendum for self-determination for southern Sudan. After years of serious negotiations and mounting international pressure, specifically from the United States, the SPLM and the Government of the Sudan were able to conclude a tentative agreement that ended 22 years of civil war. Therefore, it is important to note that the vast numbers of the external forces that made the CPA a reality are one way or another serving their own national interests apart from bringing to an end one of the longest running civil war in Africa. Given the various international interests, most notably that of the United States, involved in the CPA, It is pretty much difficult to mention anything more important to the separatists campaign in the South without mentioning a well thought through secession strategy.
The U.S. policy toward Sudan is driven by the need to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation between Sudan and the U.S. apart from the pressure exerted by the evangelical Christian groups and the congressional Black Caucuses in the United States. In order to successfully fight and win its diplomatic war on terror, the U.S. government aims at Sudan, a country once regarded as the former safe heaven to the terrorist master-mind Osama Bin Ladin. One option of doing that is to bring peace to Sudan in the form of a united democratic Sudan free of inequality and injustices. While this option coincides with the late Dr John Garang’s vision of a united democratic Sudan, it fails to adequately address the concerns of the separatist campaign in the South. Even though referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan has been empathized in the CPA, there is no guarantee that it would take place without a bitter fight as that we encountered over the energy and oil ministry. So the separatists’ moments in the south should be ready to gain momentum in terms of collecting enough evidences for making their case for separation to the international community.
The de jure segregation in legal and financial institutions in Sudan that has been agreed upon in the CPA sharply contradicts with the U.S. goal of a united democratic Sudan because this segregation at the onset creates the need for separation. The United States itself experienced the idea “of equal but separate” in their school system until the idea was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in the famous case of Brown V. Board of education in Topeka, KS. Recently, there had been disagreements between the ruling National Congress Party of President Beshir and its peace partner SPLM over the classification of Khartoum as National capital. The dispute over the secularity of Khartoum, perhaps, triggered the reluctant by some senior SPLM officials to work in the Government of National Unity. Once again, the status of Khartoum as the national capital free of Islamic law is another charge the separatists’ moments in the south would use to further strengthen case.
As stipulated in the CPA, the provision on power sharing clearly outlines the quantitative distribution of power between the NCP and the SPLM as well as the other political parties in both north and south Sudan. But recent developments as well as the current structure of the Government of National Unity makes it clearer than ever before that the northern elites in Khartoum are not willing to share power with the SPLM let alone other political parties. Therefore, it is important to let our friends in the international community, particularly the U.S., know that if the Arab elites in Khartoum are not willing to share power with southerners then they are not ready to co-exist with southerners in a united democratic Sudan as they envision. Again, the power sharing issue bolsters the case for separation under any circumstances.
With the lost of the ministry of oil and energy to NCP, there is no doubt that the SPLM will have to read between lines to determine the exact dollar amount generated from the sale of crude oil for a specific accounting period. This will involve expert level of knowledge in generally accepted accounting principles on the part of the SPLM members of the newly created oil commission. If the SPLM members of the oil commission happen to be ill prepared for the job, I am afraid we will be getting 50% of 10% and not 50% of 100% of the total revenues generated from the sale of crude oil on annual basis. This further tells us that the CPA would be diminishing provision by provision and the need for secession would be growing faster and faster.
The United States of America has a firm policy of “two States solution” for solving the Arab Israeli conflict. Given the observations I presented above, the United Stated should restructure its policy toward Sudan around “two States solution” because its vision of a united democratic Sudan is already in jeopardy and needs reconsideration. And this, to my understanding, would be a great opportunity for the separatists’ moments in the south to capitalize on violations of provisions of the CPA that are already in progress to make a strategic plan for secession. If you belief the Arab elites in Khartoum are going to soften their hard-line stand against the independence of southern Sudan, you’re dead wrong. They are not going to let us go, they will be working hard days and nights to dismantle the CPA either by instigating divisions in Juba or by disregarding the CPA provision by provision. So, Mr. Kiir be on alert and to the separatists’ moments in the south, pack your diplomatic hardware and get ready for the challenge ahead.
* The author is Sudanese living Overland Park, KS U.S.A. Email [email protected]