Our most revealing and authoritative portrait of genocide in Darfur
By Eric Reeves
January 12, 2006 — Physicians for Human Rights has just released an extraordinarily powerful and authoritative anatomy of genocide in Darfur. In its extensive field-work, detailed research, and compelling legal reasoning, the Report incinerates any remaining possibility for agnosticism or skepticism on the issue of whether ethnically targeted human destruction in Darfur amounts to genocide. Moreover, the data compiled, while not readily susceptible of extrapolation to larger populations, gives clear evidence of the overwhelming scale of human deaths and suffering in Darfur.
Most tellingly, the Report makes clear just how comprehensively the means of living for non-Arab or African populations have been destroyed:
“Physicians for Human Rights has paid particular attention to the intense destruction of land holdings, communities, families, as well as the disruption of all means of sustaining livelihoods and procuring basic necessities. By eliminating access to food, water and medicine, expelling people into inhospitable terrain and then, in many cases, blocking crucial outside assistance, the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed have created conditions calculated to destroy the non-Arab people of Darfur in contravention of the [1948 UN] ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.'”
In order to halt the genocide, Physicians for Human Rights recommends that the UN Security Council “immediately authorize a multinational intervention force in Darfur,” three times the size of the present ineffectual African Union force, and that this force operate “under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter,” i.e., with peacemaking (not merely peacekeeping) authority.
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DARFUR Assault on Survival
A Call for Security, Justice, and Restitution
From Physicians for Human Rights (Boston/Washington)
JANUARY 11, 2006
[full report available at: http://www.phrusa.org/research/sudan/news_2006-01-11.html]
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For over two years, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and their ruthless proxy militias, the Janjaweed, have carried out a systematic campaign of destruction against specific population groups, their way of life and all that sustains them. This report tells the story of Darfurian lives and livelihoods obliterated in three of the thousands of villages literally wiped off the map by the genocidal killers who also pillaged, plundered, and pursued men, women and children in an all-out assault on the very survival of a population. By delving deeply into the experiences and accounts of eyewitnesses from the villages of Furawiya, Terbeba and Bendisi, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) is adding to the mounting evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide perpetrated against non-Arab civilians in Darfur.
Other studies of the atrocities committed in Darfur since early 2003 have focused primarily, and with good reason, on killings, rape and other acts of violence inflicted during the attacks. To complement and expand upon those findings, PHR has paid particular attention to the intense destruction of land holdings, communities, families, as well as the disruption of all means of sustaining livelihoods and procuring basic necessities. By eliminating access to food, water and medicine, expelling people into inhospitable terrain and then, in many cases, blocking crucial outside assistance, the GOS and the Janjaweed have created conditions calculated to destroy the non-Arab people of Darfur in contravention of the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (hereafter referred to as the Genocide Convention).
To comprehend fully the magnitude of loss, it is important to understand the traditional way of life in the region. Located between central Sudan and the country’s border with Chad, Darfur has a semi-arid climate with limited arable land and little annual rainfall. While many of Darfur’s Arabs are nomadic herders, almost all of the region’s non-Arab residents owned and cultivated plots of land, and stored sacks of grains and seeds to survive through dry periods and occasional droughts. Almost all families owned livestock, including cows, sheep, goats and chickens; those who were better off also owned horses and camels. Animals not only provided food and transportation but were also considered disposable income and could be used in times of need to pay for necessary or unforeseen expenses, such as healthcare. Villagers flourished in a web of intricate bonds, their lives enmeshed with one another and their communities. Generations of families helped each other through difficult times, including famine and drought.
And now, on top of the death and the terror that has been inflicted on them, the majority of those who have survived have been stripped of everything they had, from land to livestock to the very social structures that bound them together.
It is also important to understand that outside of village life, Darfur is an extremely difficult place to survive. At the foot of the expanding Sahara desert, it is known for its searing heat, recurrent drought and minimal infrastructure. While Darfurians have developed complex coping mechanisms enabling them to thrive within their villages, when people are herded from their homes and chased into a land that offers little shelter from the forbidding sun and penetrating winds, no potable water and no animals for food, milk and transport, they succumb to starvation, dehydration and disease.
During three trips to the region—in May 2004, and January and July 2005—investigators for PHR collected first-hand testimony from dozens of survivors of the attacks on three villages and surrounding areas with a total population of 30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants. The three were chosen to represent the ethnic and geographical diversity of Darfur itself. Furawiya, in north Darfur, was a village with a population drawn from the Zaghawa, one of the three main non-Arab tribes in the region. Terbeba, a Masalit village, and Bendisi, a Fur village, were both located in the state of west Darfur, the latter right next to the border with Chad and the former much deeper within Sudan. Survivors of all three villages were interviewed in Chad by PHR. Heads of households were selected at random from among those who had managed to reach the refugee camps. By compiling facts, figures and detailed accounts from each of the villages, PHR developed a composite picture of massive destruction. The numerical data, while stark and compelling, is included to amplify and augment our qualitative findings and should not be taken as representative of larger populations.
From these interviews, PHR has concluded that the GOS forces and the Janjaweed engaged in the systematic, intentional and widespread destruction of a time-honored way of life, in which close cooperation and interdependent relationships among village residents were a critical means of survival. Though Furawiya, Terbeba and Bendisi were far from one another and attacked at different times, eyewitness accounts of the assaults were strikingly similar. The Janjaweed swept into the village early in the morning, usually around 6 a.m., on camels and horses and on foot. In Bendisi and Terbeba, 20 out of 34 respondents reported that the attackers yelled racial epithets, such as “Exterminate the Nuba!” [a racially derogatory term]. Government troops often followed close behind; 44% of respondents in Bendisi and Terbeba reported GOS troops in vehicles mounted with rocket launchers entering after the Janjaweed, and many respondents in all three villages reported aerial bombing of villages by GOS Antonov airplanes and helicopters. The GOS and Janjaweed shot indiscriminately, set compounds and public buildings on fire, looted homes and shops in the market, and drove survivors out of the villages, in many cases scattering families. Prior to the attacks, the 46 men and women PHR interviewed had a total of 558 people in their households. Of these, 141 were “confirmed dead”—their deaths were witnessed or their bodies found—while 251 were “killed or missing”—meaning their whereabouts were unknown. The average household size [defined as “people who eat out of the same pot”] before the attacks was 12.1; after it was 6.7.
The great majority of people PHR interviewed reported the complete loss of their livestock, farmland, homes, and all possessions except the clothing they were wearing when they fled. They reported that the GOS and Janjaweed forces either stole or killed thousands of camels, horses, cattle, donkeys, sheep, goats and chickens. They also reported the collective loss of thousands of sacks of sorghum, millet, ground nuts and other food stocks; the torching of scores of acres of prime farmland; the burning of their compounds to the ground; and the looting and theft of rugs, beds, Korans, mats, personal documents and household items.
The Janjaweed chased the Darfurians into the harsh desert, aware that this would potentially lead to death. One woman said she overheard one attacker say to another: “Don’t bother, don’t waste the bullet, they’ve got nothing to eat and they’ll die from hunger.” Many survivors wandered through the bleak landscape for weeks or months, often with infants or elderly parents in tow. They escaped death by eating wild foods growing in the desert and eventually found their way to refugee camps in Chad, where humanitarian groups established refugee camps providing basic services. Others weren’t so lucky; PHR found that many households experienced a substantial drop in size due to death and separation while making their way to Chad.
Many died during the attacks and many died afterwards, of starvation, disease, and exposure. Moreover, many deaths can be attributable to the Government of Sudan’s actions in obstructing, stealing or diverting aid and denying visas to humanitarian workers. Many Darfurians are still dying. Millions of Darfurians are living in squalid conditions in Internally Displaced Persons camps in Darfur with little assistance from the Sudanese authorities, and under security conditions that render the delivery of international assistance impossible. Another 200,000 are still living in Chad, the majority in refugee camps not far from the border. Although life as a refugee in Chad is almost certainly better than that of their compatriots inside Sudan, these people remain bereft by loss and yearning to go home and increasingly subject to insecurity largely due to competition for scarce resources in an economically and politically fragile Chad. One of these refugees, a 33-year-old mother from Furawiya told PHR investigators her story:
“After traveling for five days on foot, we finally arrived at the border. Thousands of people were scattered along the river bed trying to find shelter. We lived off berries and a little food supplied by the international organizations. They also gave us blue tarps for protection from the wind and the sand, but they didn’t work. There was a well in the wadi, but we had to share it with people from the town [Bahay] and animals too. Sometimes, I would have to wait in line all day just for one bucket of water. After two months my donkey died from not having enough food. And then my youngest child, a three- year-old girl, got sick. There were no medicines to help her. She died about a month before they moved us to the camp.”
Many previous reports on Darfur present ample evidence of genocide under Articles II(a) and (b) of the Genocide Convention, which defines the crime as the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, religious, or racial group, by (a) “killing members” of that group and (b) by “causing serious bodily or mental harm” to members of the group. PHR’s findings bolster these past claims and also illuminate Article II(c), a critical but often overlooked clause of the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as including the deliberate infliction on a group of “conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part.” This clause ensures that genocide encompasses situations in which the perpetrators do not seek to kill all members of a group immediately but instead intentionally subject them to such harsh circumstances that death would be virtually assured without outside intervention and aid. Under international law, the fact that most of those forced from their homes did not die does not mitigate the responsibility of the GOS and Janjaweed forces for their genocidal actions.
The people of Darfur must be compensated for the loss of life and destruction of their livelihoods at the hands of the GOS forces and the Janjaweed. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, which was released in January 2005, called for the establishment of a Compensation Commission to redress the rights of the Darfurian victims. While the specifics of how such a mechanism could be established would need to be decided as a part of a wider political settlement of the problems of Darfur, there are five critical elements which must be incorporated:
Restitution: The restoration of the Darfurians’ land and property, as well as their liberty, legal rights and citizenship
Rehabilitation: The provision of or access to medical, legal, psychological and other services necessary to help restore their well-being
Compensation: Monetary reparations for damage to homes, possessions and the death or theft of livestock, as well as less quantifiable damage, i.e. pain and suffering, loss of economic or educational opportunities, damage to reputation and costs required for legal, psychological or medical services
Satisfaction: An enforceable ceasefire and perhaps a truth commission or another mechanism designed to acknowledge the facts and hold perpetrators responsible
Guarantees of Non-Repetition: To enable the Darfurians to return to their land without fear that they will once again be subjected to genocidal attacks.
Reparations for violence and destruction committed by the GOS forces or the Janjaweed should come from the coffers of the GOS itself; victims of crimes committed by the rebels should be compensated through voluntary contributions of the international community.
Despite the UN’s calls for a Compensation Commission nearly a year ago, the international community has taken little action to date towards the establishment of such a mechanism. The GOS has set up its own Compensation Commission, which, given the nature of the conflict and the fact that the GOS itself is one of the main perpetrators of the crimes against the Darfurians, is an insult to the survivors.
In spite of international condemnation, UN resolutions and the US government declaring that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility, the GOS and the Janjaweed continue their assault on survival. Armed attacks on civilians continue, rendering large swaths of land insecure for passage and therefore essentially uninhabitable. In the current environment, the protection of civilians, wherever they are currently living, remains paramount. The African Union force, AMIS, lacking in capacity and meaningful mandate, cannot protect these people alone. Additional international presence on the ground, complementing the AU force, will give Darfurians the assurance they need to return to their homes. Moreover, it is not premature to begin discussing the issue of reparations and compensation for the victims of these crimes. Victims need something to return to so that they can rebuild and restore their lives. Holding the GOS and the Janjaweed accountable and ensuring that the surviving non-Arab Darfurians are made as whole as possible are critical elements of any effort to foster peace, stability, reconciliation and recovery of this war-wracked region.
Recommendations include:
[I] To the International Community
[A] Peace and Security
[i] The international community should press for a UN Security Council resolution to immediately authorize a multinational intervention force in Darfur under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. This “blue helmeted” international force would supplement the AU’s current troop level of 7,000. Experts estimate that three times this amount are needed to protect civilians in the region, an area the size of Texas. Furthermore, the AU lacks a mandate and financial and logistical support to protect civilians. Without a meaningful intervention that includes additional international troops, thousands more could die and those displaced will not be able to return to their homes.
[ii] A no-fly zone should be imposed over Darfur. The presence of GOS Antonovs and helicopters above villages, whether engaged in bombardments or not, pose a major threat to the protection of civilians in camps and for those who eventually return home.
[iii] Donors must continue to provide sufficient financial and logistical assistance to the AMIS.
[iv] NATO should continue to provide logistical support and transport to the AU. This assistance should be given according to a schedule that is observed and publicly disclosed.
[B] Accountability
[i] As proposed by the UN’s Commission of Inquiry report, a Compensation Commission, with members appointed by the UN Secretary-General and an independent Sudanese body, to hold the Sudanese Government and its proxy militias, the Janjaweed, accountable for its actions should be established. The United Nations Security Council should pass a resolution mandating that profits from the sale of Sudanese oil or other commodities should be used for compensation, restitution and rehabilitation; withdrawn from the North’s profits from oil, not those of the South. Because of the GOS’ complicity in these crimes, it should have no role in the administration of reparations other than providing the actual compensation.
All intelligence held by the international community, including the US, should be made available to ICC investigators.
[C] Humanitarian Assistance
[i] The international community must continue to provide humanitarian aid—shelter, food, water, medicine—until it is safe for refugees and IDPs to return to their land.
[ii] Aid organizations must address the reports of rampant sexual assault of women and girls by implementing all possible measures to prevent such violence, such as working with AMIS to guarantee protection when they leave the camps to gather materials for cooking.
[iii] Aid organizations must provide medical care and psychological counseling to those women and girls who have been victims of sexual assault and to others suffering the effect of trauma.
[II] To the Government of Sudan and Rebel Forces
[i] GOS and the Janjaweed militias it supports must immediately cease violent attacks on civilians and their property in Darfur including military overflights aimed to harm or intimidate civilians.
[ii] GOS must cease funding and providing arms to Janjaweed militias and cooperate with AMIS in a disarmament plan.
[iii] Rebel groups must cease violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.
[iv] Internally displaced persons and refugees must not be forced to return to their homes without enforceable guarantees of security.
[v] The GOS and the rebel groups must engage in meaningful negotiations through the international processes of conflict resolution at Abuja. To bolster the current process, which is under the auspices of the AU and has seen little meaningful progress, a greater international involvement is needed. To succeed, any political solution must address the historical marginalization of Darfur as well as the intensifying competition for scarce resources.
[vi] Given its failure to adhere to UN resolutions and repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement, the GOS should not assume the scheduled leadership of the African Union in 2006.
[vii] The GOS must cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and grant investigators and other personnel unimpeded access to Darfur and to all relevant documentation.
– Eric Reeves
– Smith College
– Northampton, MA 01063
– Email: [email protected]
– Tel: 413-585-3326
– : Websitewww.sudanreeves.org