France – Very short of options in Chad
By Christophe Ayad and Jean-Dominique Merchet, Liberation
April 14, 2006 — After Cote d’Ivoire, will France become trapped in the Chadian hornet’s nest? The military, who have the best vantage point, admit they are “disturbed and worried.” And with good reason. As France continues its via crucis in Abidjan and will have to send in troops to monitor the proper conduct of the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, one of France’s main strongholds in Africa is teetering.
French soldiers are well acquainted with Chad. Without going back as far as the feats of Leclerc’s Column, they have frequently fired on various “rebel” groups – people still remember the kidnapping of ethnologist Francoise Claustre (1974-1977) by Hissene Habre. During the 1980s an outright war in the air was waged by the Libyan Army, which occupied the north of the country.
Since then Chad has been basically an airbase in the heart of Africa. Within the framework of Operation Epervier, France has a major deployment in Ndjamena. First and foremost, a runway that can accommodate heavy transport aircraft. It is what airlines call a hub, from which French forces can be sent out to the countries of the region. In an area where the roads are bad, if not nonexistent, air power makes it possible to monitor wide tracts of land. France has six Mirage F1s, an in-flight refuelling plane, three Transalls, and three helicopters in Ndjamena. There are a total of 1,200 military personnel in the country.
These are substantial resources, but what policy do they serve? Since the trauma of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 France has been unsure what to do. Beyond the protection of its nationals (1,500 of them in Chad, and 200,000 throughout Africa,) who sometimes need to be evacuated urgently, should the Africans be left to resolve their conflicts among themselves? This was the line advocated by Balladur, then Jospin, which resulted in a gradual disengagement and the invention of the “Recamp” concept (reinforcement of African peacekeeping capabilities,) which seeks to support African armies so that they can take over from French troops.
Should we on the contrary intervene on a large scale to prevent states from lapsing into chaos and massacres? This was the change of course decided on by [President] Jacques Chirac and — then Foreign Minister — Villepin in September 2002, with the decision to intervene in the Ivorian crisis. Four years later, Operation Licorne continues there, and nothing has been resolved. What is to be done in Chad? Apart from Chirac’s staunch political support for Idriss Deby, Paris yesterday defined the limits of its engagement: its soldiers will not oppose the rebels unless they directly attack French interests. This is not an abandonment, but an “amber light.”
Apart from the future of the French contingent in Chad, France has much to lose from Idriss Deby’s possible departure. Like the former Eyadema in Togo, Congo’s Sassou Nguesso, or Gabon’s Omar Bongo, Deby is one of the last “good soldiers” in French Africa. Having been trained and brought to power from Sudan’s Darfur – back then! – by France’s services, he has always been cooperative and contributed his own phalanxes, both brutal and efficient: in Brazzaville in 1997, when a push was need to topple Lissouba in favour of Sassou; and in the Central Africa Republic in 2003, when it was necessary to get rid of the irksome Patasse. But, having depended on a single man, Paris now sees itself very short of options in Chad.
To read the original text in French, please go at: Coup dur pour la Françafrique.