Interview with Pagan Amum, Secretary-General of the SPLM
17 July 2006 (JUBA) — Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) that ended 21 years of civil war between north and south Sudan, the establishment of the new interim constitution on 9 July 2005 formally marked the beginning of a six-year interim period. At the end of that phase, in 2011, a referendum will determine whether southern Sudan will remain part of a united Sudan or become independent.
IRIN spoke to Pagan Amum, Secretary-General of the SPLM and former member of the SPLM negotiating team for the CPA, about progress in implementing the peace agreement, the impact of the untimely death of the movement’s leader, John Garang, in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005, and the prospects for peace in southern Sudan. Below are excerpts of the interview in Juba.
Question: What is your assessment of the CPA after the first year?
Answer: The CPA has largely been implemented. A new constitution has been adopted, translating the CPA into the basic law of the country. Also the constitution of southern Sudan and the constitutions of the states have been drawn up on the basis of the CPA.
The Government of National Unity has been formed, the SPLM got 28 percent of the seats, the NCP 52 percent and other parties the remaining 20 percent. Many of the commissions have been formed, different institutions have been created, the parliaments have been formed – the national parliament and the parliament of southern Sudan – new budgets have been approved, so we are living in a new system, a new situation, where there is peace, largely, in the south.
There are very serious aspects of the CPA that have not been implemented and they constitute critical aspects that could result in the entire CPA collapsing – and peace also collapsing – and the resumption of war.
These are, for example, the non-implementation of the Abyei Protocol and the report of the experts that draws the borders of the Abyei area [the Abyei Boundary Commission’s Report, that demarcated the north-south border in the disputed oil-rich area]. Again, after one year of the interim period, the Abyei issue is still unresolved.
Another problem is the [demarcation of the entire north-south] border. The border commission was supposed to be convened during the interim period but until now it has not started its work, delaying the implementation of the CPA.
A third example is in the oil-money transfers. The south is supposed to get 50 percent of the oil. The south is getting that 50 percent but the calculations are in doubt, because the south is not participating in the management of the oil industry. So the south only receives what the National Congress [Party] decides: ‘This is 100 percent, and this is how we divided it, so this is yours.’ So that is a problem and it has to be corrected.
And there is one critical problem that is also a violation of the CPA: the continuing support for other militia groups in southern Sudan. Specifically, to Ismael Kony’s troops in Jonglei, Gordon Kong in Upper Nile, Tom Al Nour in Western Bahr El Ghazal, and other smaller groups in eastern Equatoria; remnants of the EDF [Equatoria Defence Force].
The SPLM and the NCP have been in talks. We held a meeting last June in Khartoum and discussed all these issues and many others, to ensure the CPA is implemented and to avoid going back to war. And [to ensure] that the relations between the NCP and the SPLM develop in a direction that is strengthening their partnership to bring about a comprehensive peace in the country and a proper transition to democracy. Those meetings created a forum for dialogue between the NCP and the SPLM, which had been non-existent. We will be meeting again, next month.
Q: And did the talks in Khartoum solve any of the four problematic aspects of the CPA you identified that have not been implemented so far, such as Abyei?
A: We have discussed and we have agreed on how best to resolve this problem. We can solve this problem, first and foremost politically, by discussing the obstacles facing the NCP, which prevents it from implementing the report of the Abyei Boundary Commission. It would be good if we managed to remove those obstacles. If we fail to reach a political agreement, we may resort to the court or arbitration. But of course if all that fails, we will go back to war.
The [north-south] border commission has been established and has held two meetings, but because of some logistical obstacles it has not been able to do its work. We hope it will happen soon. It will be a more administrative and technical exercise [than the Abyei border demarcation]; looking at historical records and finding markers in the field – translating maps into reality. But the location of oil fields and agricultural schemes [straddling the border] might bring up issues of economic interest or greed.
Q: Disarmament, not just of militia, but also of armed civilians in general is a key issue for stability in southern Sudan. There were major clashes during the disarmament process of the Lou Nuer in Jonglei state. Although more communities seem to be willing now to hand over their weapons voluntarily, youth groups in particular still seem reluctant to give up their weapons as they fear other communities that have not yet been disarmed might settle old scores or steal their cattle. What has been the progress on this issue?
A: There is ongoing dialogue and we are also involving other actors. The government of southern Sudan asked the SPLA to disarm civilian populations. This has been obstructed in the area of Lou, exacerbated by the interference of other groups who incited the people and who even brought more arms into the hands of people, which led to the unfortunate death of SPLA forces in particular, estimated at about 300 soldiers.
It is bigger than any of the previous battles. But the SPLA has a force in the area and dialogue has been continuing. That was the only incident. It was one single day – then there were tensions the following days. Otherwise the disarmament before and after has been very peaceful. People discussed disarmament and resolved to give the monopoly of coercion and force only to law enforcement agencies so that they are able to protect the civilian population.
Most of these guns are used by civilian populations to hurt each other and for cattle rustling and many lives are lost in the process – that is the problem. So, now, after that incident, there is more dialogue so that we achieve peaceful disarmament. We are looking into ways and means to do that.
Small arms are a big problem, but it is not just a Sudanese or a southern Sudanese problem; it is a regional problem. Civilians are armed in Uganda, in Kenya, in Ethiopia.
Q: Are talks going on with Ismael Kony, leader of the Murle militia in Pibor in Jonglei?
A: Yes, we are in discussions with Ismael Kony. He has been offered a seat in the parliament – on an SPLM ticket. We have been talking to him about joining the SPLA – his forces could go into the SPLA. The talks are still going on between the two groups. There is no hostility, so far, between all these [militia] groups and the SPLA.
They have missed the deadline for Other Armed Groups under the CPA [militia groups were supposed to join either the SPLA or the Sudanese Armed Forces by 9 January 2006]. That in a way was a violation of the CPA, but we need to foster the situation. According to the CPA, they should be disarmed by force, but that is not our intention at this stage.
Q: Are the commissions, established under the CPA, functioning well?
A: Many of the commissions are functioning, others are not; others have yet to be established. One very important commission that is not functioning is the National Petroleum Commission. There is disagreement between the NCP and the SPLM about how it operates and its mandate and powers and its capacity to establish independent technical mechanisms and secretariats.
Q: Is the lack of SPLM involvement in the management of oil part of the problem?
A: That is one part of it, yes – although the NCP has recently agreed to respect that it is important for the SPLM in the south to participate in both the management of oil in the oil fields, oil production, exploration, transportation and sale and in the calculation of the oil revenues. It was agreed and the SPLM is now working to put together teams of experts on this issue. It would be a mechanism under the Petroleum Commission.
Q: What has been the impact of John Garang’s death?
A: The death of late chairman John Garang de Mabior was a national tragedy. His death has affected very seriously the entire process of transition. The loss of John Garang was a big blow for the SPLM and the Sudan as a whole. More forces that are anti-CPA became more emboldened to attempt to renege on the CPA or to prevent its implementation. But the SPLM has done all it could to manage that crisis and that transition as a whole in a way that makes us continue with the mission left by our late chairman and [take it] to its logical conclusion: that is the transition of the country to democracy, the transition of the country over an interim period of six years and ensuring that the people of southern Sudan will decide their own future, choosing whether to form their own independent state in southern Sudan or adopting the system as it is now – a quasi confederate arrangement within the northern state.
Q: What are the key challenges facing the government of southern Sudan [GOSS]?
A: The GOSS faces the challenge of developing its capacity, the delivery of public goods, and especially security for the citizens of southern Sudan. The GOSS needs to create a secure environment for its citizens to be able to engage in rebuilding their lives. The GOSS also has the challenge to develop its capacity to deliver social services and build the infrastructure necessary for that delivery and for economic development and growth. So the development of capacity is the critical challenge facing the government.
The GOSS is starting from zero so it is like a situation where a child is born and is required to run a marathon immediately. It cannot fail to run the marathon, it cannot fail to deliver the services and it must win. Otherwise the people will not see the difference compared with the time they suffered, when they were denied freedoms, when they were denied all the opportunities to build their lives; that is the main challenge.
Q: Is the international community doing enough?
A: I’m afraid not. The international community definitely is committed to the people of southern Sudan and to supporting the GOSS and they have made a lot of pledges and have even established [a joint donors’ office] to oversee the process of making true these pledges, which is a good development, but until now, nothing has happened.
A year after the CPA was signed, you can say there is a list of public goods required of the government [that] has not been delivered; the capacity of the government is still impaired, there is a lot that the international community will have to do, there is a lot that they also need to change, in terms of the way they work – particularly the World Bank. You cannot come with bureaucratic procedures and try to say that we have to do this. We will develop the procedures as we go; as we deliver. But not wait until we have learned the procedures.
Q: Are these structural issues or just growing pains?
A: I think the situation is new and unique. Every place, every country, every transition is unique. People need to learn how best to operate within those conditions. You cannot bring textbooks to manage many different realities. You cannot force reality to fit the theories that are in the heads of certain people.
Q: How is the situation in Darfur affecting southern Sudan?
A: I would say that Sudan is a country that is going through a very critical transition, a very dangerous transition. In fact Sudan is at a very big risk of collapsing as a state if we fail to manage this transition properly and if we fail to widen the covered area of peace for the whole country. We must find ways to solve the problem of Darfur, by ending the marginalisation of the people of Darfur and giving them all the powers to govern themselves and equitable powers to share in the governance of the country as a whole.
The attempt by the Khartoum elites to hold on to power must come to an end. The people of Darfur, just like the people of southern Sudan, have the right to govern themselves and have the right to government according to the size of their population. Their share must be based on that, they must have the right to share in the wealth too. That is the main problem – marginalisation. The insecurity that is caused by the Janjawid is a secondary problem. The ruling elites in Khartoum are using the Arab tribes to destabilise the African tribes as a way of counter-insurgency. When there is peace this will come to an end. And then we proceed to conduct reconciliation among the various groups in Darfur so that they can live together and find common objectives so they can manage their differences in a peaceful manner.
Q: The SPLM is a member of the Government of National Unity. Do you feel it’s doing enough? Is the SPLM pulling its full weight at the national level?
A: There have been observations and even criticism about the perception that the SPLM has not played its expected role in the national politics, in the resolution of the conflict in Darfur and in many other things. Well, the SPLM has been going through a transition itself: we lost our leader last year, that destabilised us a little bit, we tried to maintain course, we did succeed to manage the transition, many people expected the SPLM to disintegrate with the death of our late chairman; that did not happen. Many people expected the SPLM would have serious problems of unity; that did not happen. Many people thought that even the interim period would not happen with the death of the late chairman; what happened was the contrary. So if people are disappointed that the SPLM has not done the things expected from it, that could be true. But we are trying; we are trying to assume our responsibility.
The SPLM is a catalyst in the Sudan to bring about democracy. The SPLM has a vision that provides a solution to all the problems of Sudan; particularly the problems of civil war caused by the marginalisation of the people at the periphery of the country, as instituted by the minority groups that have ruled the country since independence. Our vision provides a solution for that. Our declared objective as a movement is the creation of a democratic, just, new Sudan. A country or a state, a system that will be based on the equality of all citizens regardless of race, gender, or religion and a country that will belong to all Sudanese as equal stakeholders – that is our vision, that is our programme.
But the SPLM has been a liberation movement and a resistance movement. We are now required to transform ourselves into a strong political party that is capable of providing leadership to the Sudanese people towards achieving these objectives.
I recognise that the SPLM is weak organisationally and we need to correct this. The SPLM has not reached every hut and every heart. We are just an organisation coming out of war, we need to train our cadres and change tools. In the past we used politics, but mainly waged the liberation war. Now, we need to engage in politically competitive processes.
So these are all challenges we are facing and we are working to address our weaknesses so that we eliminate them and build on our strengths so we are able to meet the expectations of our people, the people of the region, as well as the international community. People should stop criticising us; they should assist us. Criticism is just not enough. They talk, talk – that will not help. Help us to do it better; that is important.
(IRIN)