Are South Sudanese ready to coexist?
By Ohiyok D. Oduho*
August 2, 2006 — Towards the end of July 2006, local dailies, including some websites reported an alleged assault of Sudan people’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Officers Guest House (SPLAOGH) in Renk, Northern Upper Nile, by Dr. Riek Gai Kok. Dr. Gai is Advisor to the President of the Republic and head of the National Congress Party (NCP) Southern Sector.
One of these dailies that reported the alleged assault of SPLAOGH by Dr. Gai is The Citizen (TC) newspaper. It said in the following excerpt that, “Presidential Advisor on Southern Affairs, Riek Gai, took a contingent of armed men to Renk last night (July 29th, 2006,) and attempted to attack Sudan people’s Liberation Army SPLA officers in their guest house. Before he could reach the area, intelligence personnel, who had been monitoring his movement from White Nile State until he arrived Renk, intercepted him and his forces”, (TC, July 30th, 2006, p.1).
How interesting! This sounds like the Col. Paul Omoya case – that of “Attempting to assassinate the Southern Speaker” in Torit, the capital of Eastern Equatoria. A military man or any strategist who can make proper analysis on what tactic could be employed when trying to attack an enemy position would immediately realise that there is something missing in the statement above, which apparently was made by an SPLA source, in Northern Upper Nile.
Indeed, there is something missing in the statement because it has a number of contradictions that would definitely make any sensible strategic analyst to wonder! The SPLA source in Northern Upper Nile went on to say that, “The Presidential Advisor entered the area (Renk) with a motor vehicle convoy with mounted weapons and was carrying armed men without informing the authorities”, (TC July 29th, 2006, p.1).
Why should any strategist refuse to believe that this alleged assault did take place? Intelligence personnel of any government usually operate in few numbers so that they are not recognised. How could a few men of intelligence who are unrecognizable then intercept a heavily armed motorcade? Again, if at all the motorcade was already intercepted, how could it be allowed by the same intelligence personnel to proceed to Renk since it was already regarded hostile?
It has never been reported in the history of forces hostile to each other that an enemy motorcade (Convoy) is allowed to pass through a security checkpoint or intelligence personnel without being attacked or at least reported to the headquarters so that it is truly intercepted. Unless the word interception is misplaced in this context, otherwise, to intercept means to seize or stop in transit.
Nonetheless, SPLA seems to be hunting South Sudanese who do not want to join them. Otherwise, it is difficult to comprehend why most of this “attempts” are taking place, if they are at all. It has been difficult to understand exactly who does the SPLM/A want in the South. However, one thing is very clear, SPLM/A seems to be allergic (a senior SPLA officer used this word in the South-South Dialogue in Nairobi) to South Sudanese in NCP and South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), which they consider a dangerous rivals. Perhaps, SPLA and its Movement, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), should really make it clear that they do not want anybody other than SPLM/A members in the South. It is important so that the South Sudanese they so detest could keep off the South and they should be ready to face the consequences that shall accompany such a move. Trying to force people out of their habitats breads violent resistance, this violent resistance would not be the resistance of helpless people versus armed personnel, but of armed men versus armed men. The results of this resistance would be an all out conflict between every armed man and woman who is not SPLM/A in the South.
However, it is true that not all the avenues aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement to these current hostilities are exhausted. South-South Dialogue, which the SPLM/A are against, is the only viable way to address these hostilities. Even though the SPLM/A believes that the joining of Lt-Gen. Paulino Matip of SPLA and becoming its Deputy Commander-in-Chief marked the end of the South-South Dialogue. It did not, because Lt-Gen. Matip made an agreement with Lt-Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit, the First Vice-President and President of the South but not with all the forces that are not SPLA in the South. SPLM/A should identify the reasons for which the rest of the SSDF refused to follow Lt-Gen. Matip instead of arousing the appetite of their war-mongers to fight the SSDF and any armed person in South Sudan.
South-South Dialogue was originally aimed at soul-searching between the people of the South Sudan who once fought each other. In South-South Dialogue grievances emanating from the previous conflicts between the people of the South are to be discussed, a true reconciliation reached and a document that would guide the future relationship between the people of the South who at one time disagreed with each other is produced. With such a document at hand, not only the SPLM/A alone but every South Sudanese would be up in arms against anybody trying to breach the document by entertaining insecurity in the South.
However, insisting that every none-SPLA soldier or ‘militia’ as SPLM/A likes calling them must join the SPLA unconditionally seems to come from people who have paid no price for freedom at all. It means that they are encouraging, on a wider scale, another conflict in South Sudan. That obviously would be an unfortunate precedence, SPLM/A is intending to set force.
Is it possible for one to assume that the late Dr Garang was the only farsighted person and a peacemaker in the entire SPLM/A? Even this is could be true, there are those who worked with Dr Garang throughout the period of his quest for peace within the bushes of the South and Naivasha and who must have acquired some knowledge on how peace could be achieved.
However, it sounds ironic though that the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), using some of the acquired skills in conflict resolution and management from its previous experiences in Naivasha, is trying to bring peace to Uganda and in Equatoria, the most Southern part of Sudan, by mediating between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Uganda Government, while ignoring a looming conflict in the whole of South Sudan, including Equatoria. What kinds of peacemakers are the GoSS then if they cannot resolve their own internal conflicts?
Peacemaking means a serious search for forgiveness, reconciliation and acceptance to coexist with one another after conflict. Are the people of the South, under the leadership of GoSS, ready to forgive, reconcile and coexist with one another?
* The author is a columnist at the Sudan Vision Newspaper. He can be reached at [email protected].