Why SPLM gets it wrong, and why NCP misses the whole point
By Nyuol Justin Yaac *
Aug 21, 2006 — Sudan’s nefarious history — typified by Arab domination and Islamic hegemony — coupled with the many dishonored agreements has nurtured a negative, disdainful southern gaze.
In pursuit of equality: the southerners led by Dr. John Garang, Kerubino Kuanyin, Akuot Atem and others formed a politico-military wing, the SPLM/A. This was to be the main conduit for southerners to vent out their frustrations through a political platform, in the hopes of changing Sudan’s history forever—hence the term “new Sudan.”
After a grueling 22 years of military confrontation, it however became apparent to both sides that the war is unwinnable by either side through the barrel of a gun; but rather, a negotiated solution.
So, on the 9th, of January, 2005, after a decade of negotiations, the late hero, Dr. John Garang de Mabior together with his northern counterpart, Field Marshall Omer Hassan el Bashir stood by the podium at Nyayo stadium and heralded to the entire world the conclusion of what the New York Times calls the “deadliest conflict on the African continent.”
It was at this moment that exaltations became a leitmotiv among friends and foes alike. These deep sentiments of exhilaration were reinforced seven months later, with the arrival of the SPLM’s first one hundred men delegation to the nation’s capital, Khartoum: this sense of happiness was finally cemented by the subsequent arrival of the man himself, Col. John Garang, to the nation’s capital, after a 22 year hiatus—a peace statement of its own. Sadly unexpected, after a mere three weeks incumbency as Sudan’s first vice-president and president of the south; the charismatic leader, Dr. John Garang, perished in a sudden, mysterious helicopter crash along the Ugandan-Sudan border.
This nauseating news triggered a seismic backlash among southerners, and just like world political history proves, incase of any threats or suspicious acts within your political bureau, you may want to begin by pursing your political rivalry; the southerners acting like any other civilized group does, responded by prodding the Khartoum regime. Also in search of cursory answers, the southerners responded by taking the streets and violently demonstrating, when no satisfactory answers were provided. In guise of public order, the incompetent Khartoum police force tried to squash the cataclysm by applying skewed and unjust means; it was this aggression between supporters of the movement and agents of public control that culminated to the intractable maelstrom that ensued.
Contrary to world opinion, that a colossal political vacuum was left in Sudan’s politics, the SPLM prescient than thought, quickly rallied behind Garang’s right hand man, the tact, Lieutenant Salva Kiir Mayardit, by electing him as the main face of the SPLM. Meanwhile the courageous widow, Mrs. Rebecca Garang, urged the frenzied southerners to calm, and stay the course her husband had set forth, a gutsy move that was desperately needed at a moment the south lacked a vigilante.
A convivial stern loyalist to the cause, and one of the few within the movements’ hierarchy with an outstanding, impeccable record; President Salva was supported by the southern horde who also regained their machismo in learning Salva was the successor to the father of modern day South Sudan. A few days into his presidency, after being elected by default, President Kiir Mayardit, announced to the people of Sudan that the SPLM was nothing but “a vehicle with no reverse gear,” a statement that scored him a political bonanza more than it cheered the ambience, that statement unwittingly became his yardstick, and a jargon that he would later be gauged with.
Although, the passing away of the hero disrupted the existing schedule, the GoSS was finally and successfully formed a few months past its due date. It was at this moment that the SPLM dealt a severe blow. The NCP, more sinister than a horse that thanks its master by kicking him, thanked the SPLM by double-kicking it by seizing both the Economic and Energy & Mining portfolios, a move that caused incensed not only among the southerners but also among IGADD and its friends. The SPLM was internally and externally pressured by its supporters not to allow such a move be taken by the NCP, even if it meant going back to war; however, the SPLM more committed to peace than its partners, compromised one of its essential principles for the sake of peace. While this passiveness was viewed by others as a positive response from the movement, in Khartoum, it was however construed as a weakness within the movement. This bold move was ominous of deeds that would follow.
At the signing of the last protocol in Naivasha: leaders from both sides attested to the fact that the CPA was not concluded out of the will of the signatories, but rather as a result of external pressures and coercion. That statement alone elicits the reason why Khartoum is not addressing the critical, pressing issues, such as the Abyei Border Commission (ABC), the lethargic implementation of the provisions in the CPA, the termination of funding and logistical support awarded to proxy militia groups and the LRA. Despite Khartoum’s convincing explanation for this dilatory response; in the south, these discrepancies are perceived as signs of Khartoum trying to torpedo the CPA, while abrogating itself from responsibility and blame. With no political leverage to compel the NCP to stick to the CPA, the SPLM is left watching at bay hoping that the regime in Khartoum will change its mind, and while the SPLM waits and hopes for that to happen, its losing public opinion day by day.
While the SPLM is left speculating on its next step, and the NCP having recognized its failure to annihilate the movement externally, they (NCP) have since switched tactics by pursuing a more effective and precise trajectory—internal obliteration of the movement—a role bequeathed to a group known as the “enemies from within” as Mr. Kiir likes to calls them.
Eighteen months have elapsed since the signing of the CPA, and while the public still anticipates peace progress, behind the scenes, a vicious dog fight ensues between the peace protagonists over the implementation and interpretation of the peace provisions. This impasse has led many to question the integrity of the NCP, as well as the aptitudes of the SPLM. But, as legitimate as the questions are, the answers are labyrinth. Why? Because on the one hand the NCP has a philosophy, but lacks a vision and a strategy; and, on the other hand, the SPLM has all the above tenets, but lacks the mechanisms of extrapolating and institutionalizing them; but, what’s more interesting is the fact that neither side respects or is willing to use its partners possession for the overall good of the nation. And it’s this incongruence between the latter and the former that has caused furore in the public domain.
More damning, is the fact that surrogate political parties are exploiting the public’s discontent for their political gains, a move pertinent to multi-partyism, but in the situation of present day South Sudan, not only is the political machinery inchoate, but also is a concerted effort needed from all Southerners for the overall goal of the south, so what multi-partyism does at this juncture is a diversion of the southern plight, while what southerners solemnly need is a solution to their predicament. Even though multi-party advocacy is healthy for democracy, in the Sudan and particularly in the south, southerners ought to be cautious of how and when to form this parties, because at a time that the country needs each and every southerner, formation of surrogate political- parties could be a complicity to the old, conventional method of “divide and rule.”
In one of his best speeches, Col. Garang said, “Before we move forward, we need to go back,” but today, if one looks at the conditions of the CPA and aligns them to what transpires on the ground; most are left wondering: as Sudanese, did we really move back far enough to garner enough momentum to push us forward? But, since this can only be verified in 2011, the present Sudan needs to trust leaders who can look beyond the horizon of self interests—regardless of north/south preferences— to lead and direct them towards the light at the end of the tunnel.
* The author is a Sudanese, currently residing in Canada; he can be reached at [email protected]