Disarmament with Development – An Open Memo to Kiir

TO: Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Government of South Sudan

FROM: Peter Ajak*

RE: Disarmament with Development in Southern Sudan

December 1, 2006

During the Sudanese civil war it was understandable for local communities and civilians to bear arms because insecurity was high. The tribal and inter-clan conflicts were heightened, as the Sudanese Government attempted to divide the rebels via its promotion of ethnic conflicts among Southern communities. During this epoch, the rebel movement, Sudan’s People Liberation Movement (SPLM), was incapable of protecting all Southern Sudanese. In 2005, the Sudanese Government and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) – granting Southern Sudan autonomy and right to choose either secession or unity at 2011 referendum. In line with the agreement, the SPLM formed the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and became the governing body of Southern Sudan.

However, weapons remain omnipresent in Southern Sudan, making reconstruction and development difficult. The ubiquity of guns has increased the number of gangs and bandits and boosted the frequency of gun violence, lawlessness, and organized crimes. The victims of these gun-related assaults have thus far included ordinary citizens, Non-Governmental Organization workers, directors of foreign firms participating in the reconstruction of Southern Sudan, GOSS officials, traders, and the United Nations soldiers monitoring the agreement.

Several months ago, your august Government rightfully decided that disarmament was necessary to maintain the law of order and accelerate the development of Southern Sudan. Hence, a top-down disarmament mechanism was implemented, starting with the disarmament of Dinka-Bor community in April 2006. However, this strategy has caused serious unintended problems. The disarmament of Dinka-Bor left the community vulnerable to attacks by other tribes in the region. In June 2006, Nuer-Lou, an armed tribe in Southern Sudan, attacked Dinka-Bor, killing a number of people and raiding hundreds of cattle. The same thing happened in August and November when Murle, another armed community, attacked Dinka-Bor, killing a total of 50 people. Therefore, we need a new and fair disarmament strategy that would restore faith in the GOSS and provide equal protection to all communities in Southern Sudan.

POLICY OPTIONS

Option 1. The Status Quo:
The GOSS has the option of continuing its current policy. There are a lot of tribes in Southern Sudan and the GOSS can proceed in disarming them, one after another. The current policy, a top-down approach, does not give much choice to the community being disarmed, as it is a forced disarmament. Those who refuse to disarm risk confrontation with the GOSS.

Option 2. “Guns for Bicycles”:
The second option would be to offer people incentives so that individuals can voluntary disarm. The “Guns for Bicycles” incentive was first implemented in Democratic Republic of Congo, where it had a high success rate. The GOSS has the option to implement a similar policy in Southern Sudan. In line with the policy, a person receives a bicycle for every gun he brings. Hence, no specific communities are targeted since the policy is implemented nationwide. The GOSS would be responsible for providing the bicycles and transporting them to the disarmament centers, where exchange for guns would take place.

Option 3. Development-Oriented Disarmament:
The third option for the Government of South Sudan would be to implement development oriented disarmament with participation of tribal leaders. The GOSS contractors would build infrastructure such as schools and hospitals if a community capitulates its guns. Once the deal is agreed upon, the community leader would be responsible for collecting all the guns from his community. As the guns are collected, the GOSS would start building the promised infrastructure. When all the guns from that particular community are collected, the GOSS would deploy its troops around that community in order to provide the community with protection. The GOSS troops would remain there until the surrounding communities, particularly the rival ones, are disarmed. If a community leader fails in collecting all the guns, the GOSS would be forced to arrest the individuals perceived as obstacles to the process. If the community leader attempts to cheat the GOSS by submitting only a portion of guns instead of every gun, then the GOSS would punish that particular leader.

EVALUATION/ASSESSMENT

Option 1. The Status Quo:
This option delivers without monetary cost to the GOSS. The GOSS does not need to pay anything except salaries to its soldiers. However, it costs GOSS a lot in other ways. First, it demonstrates that the GOSS has failed in its role as the protector of communities in Southern Sudan. Additionally, it makes confrontation between the GOSS forces and local communities imminent. Many communities have learned from what happened to Dinka-Bor and they would not give up their guns without a fight, unless their protection is guaranteed. The option also gives armed communities incentives to attack the disarmed communities since they know that they would win. Such attacks between the communities further damage the image of GOSS. As this policy is implemented, tribal conflicts would become a daily event in the region.

Option 2. “Guns for Bicycles”:
This option gives people reason to disarm. Guns are good for nothing except shooting. In a region with no infrastructure, transportation is very difficult. Thus, everyone would want to have a bicycle, decreasing the number of guns. Since Southern Sudan is trying to recover from the war, bicycles would help by making mobility easier. Those who do not want bicycles could sell them and use the money for something else. Therefore, this policy not only encourages disarmament, but it also promotes development.

However, this policy has acute limitations. Granted, it gives people incentives to surrender guns, but it also gives people incentives to rob other people for their guns. This unintended consequence may lead to more bloodshed and turmoil. Gangs and criminals can organize and rob people of their guns, which they could then submit for bicycles while holding onto their own guns. Likewise, tribes and clans can participate in the same game. Thus, tribal wars and chaos may elevate to a new level. Also, corrupt government officials can recycle the GOSS guns for bicycles, and later sell the bicycles. Thus, we may experience a vicious cycle at which no one would disarm until the GOSS runs out of money.

Option 3. Development-Oriented Disarmament:
This option also gives people motivations to disarm at a communal level. The tribal leaders are very powerful and revered in Southern Sudan. Hence, if they fully endorse an agreement, the chances of success are very high. This option actively includes the tribal leaders in the disarmament process and offers them reasons to disarm. The GOSS would need to do its part with competence so as not to give the tribal leaders reasons for mistrust. Since Southern Sudan lacks schools and hospitals, this policy provides the best scenario for building them. The option also provides protection to the disarmed communities.
However, this policy also has limitations. The GOSS may experience a manpower constraint since the disarmed communities would need protection until the other communities are disarmed. As such, the GOSS should commit itself to disarming the rival communities first. The success of this policy also depends on financial support from the GOSS. The GOSS may not have enough resources to build infrastructure in every community in Southern Sudan, given other things it has to provide.

RECOMMEDATION

The best policy option for the Government of Southern Sudan is option three. Although it has weaknesses, it limits the risk of confrontation between the GOSS and the tribes. The option provides protection and stability, while contributing to the development of Southern Sudan. Every community in the region needs schools and hospitals and it is a responsibility of the GOSS to provide them. Whether the communities disarm or otherwise, the GOSS would eventually have to provide these services. Since Southern Sudan has the option to secede in 2011, both disarmament and development are crucial for the region. Thus, this option executes both disarmament and development with efficiency. It is only when the guns are removed and the violence contained that Southern Sudan can move forward in its quest for greater development.

* Peter Biar Ajak is graduating senior, majoring in Economics with dual minors in Mathematics and Political Science at La Salle University. He can be recahed at [email protected]