A Strategy for a peaceful resolution of Darfur crisis (I)
What Should United Nations and African Union Do?
Mehari Taddele Maru
Part I of this article is a brief summary of a longer strategy paper for a peaceful resolution of the Darfur crisis. The central point of this paper is that radical changes in strategy of the UN are required to make the international efforts more fruitful in ending the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. One of such changes is the need for reframing the issues of the Darfur crisis. The second point is the need for a shift in approach: from a strategy that focused solely on Darfur, which I call “the symptom-focused approach” to “the root-cause approach”—a strategy, which looks the Darfur crisis in the whole of Sudan. Until now, the international community has sacrificed its focus on the forest (whole of Sudan) for the trees (mainly Darfur). I am of the opinion that effective solution to the Darfur crisis lies in solving the governance and related problems in Sudan. It also offers analysis of their interest; and if they will be allies or hostile to the UN and AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Sudan-Darfur (UNMIS). This is vital input in the formulation of a strategy as it considers ways for addressing the legitimate interests, provides ways to tackle those that are illegitimate, and means to remove the binding constraints. As recommendation the paper provides what the UN should consider implementing to resolve the Darfur crisis. A Strategy for the UN and UNMIS should answers the question how the UN and UNMIS should implement the peace in Darfur. The binding constraints that the UN may face in implementation of the recommendations are examined and suggestions are made on how to surmount them. The Strategy follows sequencing of strategic actions in order of priority and necessity. To give the Strategy a timeline for implementation, it has two phases on time line: Phase A: Short-term (2007-2008), and Phase B: Medium-term (2008-2011).
PHASE A: SHORT-TERM (2007-2008)
A Shift of Strategy: Reframing the Issue and Diplomatic Pressure for Global Consensus
1. Reframe the issue of Darfur Crisis as a new political strategy for the AU-UN Hybrid Peace Process
The Darfur issue has to be reframed from focusing only on the current Darfur crisis to the whole of Sudan The one effective way to end the crisis in Darfur is to ensure that the cause of Southern Sudan is observed. In a way this seeks a shift in strategy of searching for peace not only from pieces (Darfur and Southern Sudan) but also from the whole of Sudan. If the situation of Southern Sudan is not attended soon, Sudan could break into a civil war with appalling humanitarian consequences.
2. In reframing the issues tap the existing campaigns and advocacy on Darfur, this will help to pressure the GoS to accept UNMIS.
Most of the basis of resistance to the UN and UNMIS comes from Northern Sudan. Shift of focus of the international community to the whole of Sudan might prove more effective approach. The GoS is happy to keep the status quo in Darfur, as far as its power base—people in Northern Sudan accept the GoS propaganda that UN intends to dismantle Sudan unity. Hence, UN has to be able to reach out and explain its aims to the people Northern Sudanese. This is a very useful strategy to pressurize the GoS, as it neutralizes the blind support of Northern Sudanese to GoS. Since such resistance to the deployment of UNMIS (and support to the GoS) stems from ethnic security dilemma, it is very necessary for the UN to assure them that the presence of UNMIS would help Sudan to get out of the cycle of violence, and that the AU-UN Hybrid Peace Process for Sudan would be inclusive to all people of Sudan.
3. To solve the coordination problem of international diplomatic and material support to the Darfur crisis, the UN should take leading role in coordinating the on-going different peace efforts.
Coordination problem seems the binding constraint against effective international intervention to end the crisis. In Darfur only there are more than 22,000 international and local staff working to end the crisis and provide humanitarian aid. In Southern Sudan there are more than 13,000 UNMIS personnel and perhaps equal number humanitarian staff. In sum, there are more than 35000 peacekeeping and humanitarian aid personnel. This makes Darfur and Sudan in general the “World’s biggest theatre of humanitarian operations”. Coordination of US and EU efforts, coordination of AU and UN programs, coordination of international aid and humanitarian NGOs, bringing the actors such as China and the Arab League together could be sited as few examples of coordination problems. Indeed as ICG Report has pointed out disjointed and sporadic peace initiatives by varied countries such as Egypt, Eritrea, Chad and Arab League are rather causing confusion.
4. The UN should establish an AU-UN Hybrid Peace Process for Sudan
To be effective, the UN should be able to craft a strategy inclusive and capable of bringing all active actors together. The AU-UN Hybrid Sudan Peace Process has to build global consensus by bringing high profile envoys of the UN, AU, EU, USA and others such as Arab League and China together. Such inclusive approach will also save the region from having new spoilers in Sudan. It could also enable the UN and the AU to use the leverage of China and Arab League to influence the Government of Sudan. What is more, through an AU-UN Hybrid Sudan Peace Process, the UN could remove the coordination problem as it exists with several fragmented Darfur peace initiatives.
5. Appoint a high profile envoy for AU-UN Hybrid Peace Process for Sudan to unify and coordinate divisions among the international and national actors in the Darfur Crisis.
Such high profile envoy would coordinate all efforts; convince China and the Arab League and other individual country initiatives to harmonize their efforts with the UN and UNMIS. The envoy could request China and the Arab League to assign special envoys who would work with the AU-UN Hybrid Peace Process.
6. Ensure Effective implementation of the CPA through strong periodic monitoring and assessment by UNMIS in Southern Sudan. This is indirectly vital for the Darfur crisis to end.
7. Establish a formal institutional link to make efficient use of the existing global advocacy and campaigns and arrange The Blacklist of Companies
One of the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to the UN General Assembly was the need for “compilation of a list of foreign companies that have an adverse impact on the situation of human rights in Darfur”. It specifically called upon the General Assembly to instruct the UN agencies to “to abstain from entering into business transactions with any of the identified companies.” This indeed is inline with the recent reports and works of Prof. John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.
The Darfur Divestment and Genocide Olympic Campaigns, which are now well globalized, have already made difference. Similar to the Anti-apartheid economic pressure campaigns waged in the 1980s, these campaigns and advocacy aim to persuade companies that investing in Sudan is bad for their publicity. Sudan Divestment Task Force, one of the leading groups for divestment, has prepared a list of more than 50 companies mainly from the oil sector to be targeted for divestment campaign. As major source of revenue for GoS comes from oil, divestment in the oil sector could make the GoS to feel the pain. Already the US Ford, UK Rolls-Royce PLC, French Schlumberger Ltd, 40 US universities including Harvard and other financial groups have or they are considering pulling their money from investments in Sudan. These campaigns are not limited to developed countries but also extend to companies in South Africa, Brazil and Malaysia. The trickle and ripple effect of these campaigns will have serious effect on the revenue of the GoS. This could also be useful in setting a serious precedent on the norms on the responsibilities of state-owned transnational corporations such as Chinese and Malaysian companies on human rights.
8. Bringing China on board and use Chinese economic persuasion by putting more pressure on China through coordinated visits of the special envoys of UN, EU, AU, and US and the global campaigns and advocacy organizations.
9. The UN should assist the advocacy campaigns against the Chinese support to the GoS.
The Special Envoy should request China to attach some conditionality of the conflicts to its oil import from, and investment in, Sudan. China could be loser if Sudan slips into further crisis. It should not be difficult to convince China that its present support to the GoS is not in its long-run interest. This could have huge impact on the behaviour of the GOS. Nonetheless, a cautionary note is in order here. China pressure to GoS is necessary but not sufficient enough to make the Government of Sudan to react positively to deployment of UNMIS and Sudan to fulfil its responsibility.
10. Use the Asian Countries and Arab League Political, Diplomatic and Economic Persuasion
In this regard, I would like to emphasis Your Excellency’s vital role, as you are from Asia. Asian major Muslim countries could use their religious leverage as the Arab League could do to put political, diplomatic and economic pressure on the GoS. As the victims in Darfur crisis are mainly Muslims, they will have interest in pressurizing the GoS. Indeed apart from religion, these countries such as United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia and Malaysia have trade partnership with Sudan; they could also use their economic persuasion.
PHASE B: SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN AID AND PEACE FOR DARFURIANS
11. Deploy More 21,000 AU-UN Hybrid Peacekeeping Forces
RAND—internationally renowned security analysis firm, has estimated that in crisis like that of Darfur, security requires a ratio of 3.5 troops for 1000 people. Based on this troop per population formula—(6,000,000/1000 *3.5= 21000 troops) , UNMIS has to have at least 21000 troops in Darfur. This was similar to the original estimate of forces required to be deployed by AMIS. As there are about 7700 AMIS troops already on the ground, the UN has to deploy more at least 14000 troops for effective Peacekeeping Missions in Darfur. Quick deployment of troops is the first action that should be taken to ensure security and enabling environment to conduct AU-UN Hybrid Peace Process in Sudan, repatriation, and provision of aid.
Opportunities and Constraints for Quick Deployment
With regard to mobilizing troops for UNMIS, there are better opportunities for the following reasons:
1. The UN has peacekeeping troops already in Sudan. The UNMIS has already 10,027 uniformed personnel; supported by 851 international civilians, 2,250 local civilians and 186 UN volunteers in Southern Sudan.
2. There is AMIS on the ground in Darfur (with more than 7700 troops), if it’s logistical constraints alleviated; it would mean that 1/3rd of the required troops are already deployed and with some local experience in Darfur.
3. Many African countries such Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Kenya have announced their willingness to contribute more troops as far as the expense and other financial requisites are fulfilled by the UN.
4. Muslim countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, and Malaysia could be easily convinced to contribute troops which might make the deployment much easier as the GoS will be much willing to troops from these countries.
5. Countries like France, Germany, Canada and Netherlands, individually if possible, and as NATO members, if necessary, could provide military leadership and high technology military reinforcement to UNMIS. The army of these countries are not overstretched or under public pressure fatigue.
Three Major Constraints
There are three main constraints for quick deployment of UNMIS troops: difficulty to mobilize troops in short time, insufficient financial and logistic commitments, and lastly and most importantly resistance from the GoS. At present, many western countries such as US, UK, Spain, and Italy have overstretched army. France too have peacekeeping troops in several African countries but could be good source of troops and logistic. It is necessary to prioritize recruitment of troops from non-US and UK military personal as their presence could draw terrorists to the region. To solve financial and logistical commitments problems, the UN should work with EU, USA, NATO and Scandinavian countries. The Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir has repeatedly proposed a UNMIS with limited number and weak or almost meaningless mandate. This proposal should be rejected totally as limited number of troops and mandate are the two most reasons why the AMIS failed to be effective.
12. Fallback Option in case the GoS resists deployment of AU-UN Hybrid Force
If the strategies proposed above are implemented, the resistance from the GoS to UNMIS deployment is expected to wane away. However, if the GoS continues to resists, threat of sanctions, and military interventions should be fallback option. Hence, if cooperation of the GoS is impossible, then Economic Sanctions, No-fly Zones and Military Intervention are necessary as last resort options.
13. UNMIS should establish Camps and Carve-Out Security Zones for Protection of Civilian
The second specific action of UNMIS once deployed is to establish Camps and Carve-Out Security Zones for Protection of Civilians and repatriates. UNMIS should immediately establish major carve-out islands of security that could serve to conduct inclusive peace conferences peacefully, protection of civilians and provision of humanitarian assistance. Such security zones should be no-fly zones, and no operation areas for the GoS and rebel groups.
14. Protection of Civilians and Safe Repatriation of Refugees and IDPs
The protection of, and provision of humanitarian assistance to, civilians in the Security Zones under the UNMIS is the third measure necessary towards full-fledged peace process. This is vital step towards a peaceful resolution of the Darfur crisis. To be more specific, with more than three million of the Darfurians away from Darfur and in IDP camps, it would be very difficult to conduct a peace conference that could end the crisis.
15. Conduct a Broad and Inclusive Peace Conference in Darfur to Ensure Ownership and for Inclusive Security
There are three major factors requiring a serious consideration by the AU-UN Hybrid Peace Process to avoid failures similar to that of the DPA. First, the DPA was not owned by its main beneficiaries—the Darfur People. Second, the common Darfurians were not consulted, and DPA was negotiated in far away places. Traditional and religious leaders, civil society, Darfurians in Diaspora were not invited to provide their input. Third, one of the most binding constraints for the Darfur peace process has been the heavy reliance on the rebel groups. According to Reporter without Borders the civil society including the press in Sudan are the “forgotten actors” in the resolution of the crisis. Such broad consultations in Darfur are possible only if security and humanitarian aid is provided in Darfur. Hence, this is fourth measure dependent on the above mentioned actions.
16. Guarantee security to the Arab population of Darfur and Sudan
For this strategy to be successful it is very important to remove security dilemma ethnic communities in Darfur such as the Arab-Sudanese might have. Inclusive consultation is vital for inclusive security. The UN has to guarantee security to the Arab population of Darfur and Sudan. Inclusive security for all ethnic communities would help creating a popular support base for UNMIS and sustainable peace. Many in the Janjeweeds consider themselves as victims of conspiracy of the GoS and other forces like Libya in being dragged to this conflict. Regardless of the truth of such claim of victimization of the Janjeweeds, it is necessary to reach out the Afro-Arab Darfurians so as they could feel secure in future peace settlements. Real or perceived ethnic insecurity in Darfur or to that matter in Sudan could disrupt meaningful and sustainable peace in the region.
*The writer has served as Legal Expert at African Union Commission. He was also the Director for University Reform at Addis Ababa University. He holds MPA from Harvard University, M.Sc from University of Oxford and LLB from Addis Ababa University and was a fellow of Ethno-political Conflict Studies at University of Pennsylvania. He can be reached at [email protected]