Musa Hilal: Minister of Offense
By Eric Reeves, The New Republic online
February 1, 2008 — On February 27, 2004, in the Tawilla area of North Darfur, 30 villages
were burned to the ground, over 200 were people killed, over 200 girls
and women raped (some by up to 14 assailants at a time, in front of
their soon-to-be-murdered husbands and fathers), and 150 women and 200
children were abducted. The man who directed this atrocity–and many
others of similar barbarity–was Musa Hilal, the most notorious of the
Janjaweed militia leaders who have done the genocidal bidding of
Khartoum’s National Islamic Front regime for the past five years. The
U.S. State Department has publicly identified Hilal as one of six
figures most responsible for the Darfur genocide; Human Rights Watch has
labeled him the central Janjaweed leader in atrocity crimes. The brutal
attack in Tawilla was part of a systematic campaign by the Janjaweed
militias, including those led by Hilal, to “change the demography of
Darfur and empty it of African tribes,” as Hilal explained in a memo
sent to his commanders and to Khartoum’s intelligence services.
And so it follows that Musa Hilal has been appointed to an important
position within the Khartoum regime. Hilal now serves as senior advisor
to the Ministry of Federal Affairs, which coordinates the regime’s
relations with outlying regions of Sudan as well as with the country’s
myriad tribal groups. It works closely with the Interior Ministry to
guide most of the government’s major economic and military decisions.
The position is designed to help Hilal consolidate his authority
throughout Darfur, allowing him to wield the power of Khartoum in
controlling the decisions by, and incentives for, Arab groups
contemplating joining–or defecting–from Khartoum’s
counter-insurgency campaign. While he holds this position, he is still
subject to U.N. sanctions for his previous atrocities and will very
likely be charged with numerous crimes against humanity by the
International Criminal Court (ICC) when its prosecutors announce their
next set of indictments in the coming weeks.
Why would Khartoum make an appointment guaranteed to incense the
international community, however impotent that ire may prove to be?
There can hardly be any doubt that the regime takes grim pleasure in
offending Western human rights sensibilities. Take the example of Ahmed
Haroun, the former State Minister of the Interior. Since being indicted
by the ICC for numerous crimes against humanity in Darfur–including
publicly directing the Janjaweed to “kill the Fur” tribespeople in
the ravaged Mukjar area of West Darfur–he has served as the State
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs; sits on a Khartoum-appointed
commission to investigate human rights abuses in Darfur; and functions
as the regime’s liaison with the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID). It is difficult to say which of these appointments is the most
grotesquely ironic.
But Hilal’s appointment is more about Khartoum’s internal strategy than
it is a jab at the sensitivities of the international community. In a
critical development over the past year, Arab tribal groups–even those
such as the Mahamid clan to which Hilal belongs–have become deeply
disaffected with the Khartoum regime. Many Arab tribal groups, though a
minority in Darfur, have provided soldiers for Khartoum’s genocidal
violence. They have been paid primarily in the form of booty from
villages they have destroyed, and have counted on the “changed
demography” that Hilal encouraged as a way of sustaining their nomadic
way of life. But Arab groups are increasingly feeling that they have
been betrayed by Khartoum–in particular, that the land they have been
promised has gone to too few. The vast majority of African villages have
been destroyed, and there is little left to loot. So, while the majority
of Arab groups have attempted to stay neutral in the conflict, all now
suffer from the consequences of the scorched-earth policies that have
been central to the regime’s tactics in confronting the rebellion.
As a consequence, some Janjaweed have simply left the genocidal
campaign, attempting to resume their former lives or make their way as
bandits; others have actively switched their support to the rebel
groups. It was precisely to stanch these losses that Hilal was
appointed. Khartoum well knows that if their Arab militia allies
continue to changes sides–and they give strong evidence of doing
so–then military control of any but the major towns of Darfur will be
impossible. To Khartoum, the situation is a military problem, so they
have appointed a military man to solve it.
Armed struggle, however, may not be the most pressing concern for
civilian Darfuris. This fall, the harvests across Darfur were
disastrous, and as the broader agricultural economy continues its
collapse, markets that once thrived and defined the economic geography
of Darfur no longer exist; the traditional opportunities for bartering
and trade have been largely lost. A way of life that was in key respects
symbiotic has been destroyed. Tens of thousands of displaced Africans
from Darfur are predicted to migrate to camps for displaced persons in
the coming months–not for security, as has been the case, but for food.
Many within the nomadic Arab populations will inevitably follow.
The appointment of a military man like Musa Hilal will do nothing to
address these humanitarian concerns, which currently pose the greatest
threat to civilians throughout Darfur, African and Arab alike. On the
contrary, years of concerted violence have turned vast regions of Darfur
into wastelands that are unable to sustain anything resembling the
previous agricultural economy. This is Khartoum’s unspeakably grim
“genocide by attrition.”
To be sure, there may be little reason to believe that Hilal will be
able to re-enlist the support of the Arab tribes who have made up the
Janjaweed militias. In fact, the Northern Rizeigat, to which Hilal’s
Mahamid belong, have little influence among Arab groups in southern
Darfur, with which they have clashed violently in recent months. So
Hilal constitutes Khartoum’s bid for a kind of savage insurance policy
on the success of its genocide.
Though the appointment of a war criminal like Hilal to serve as the
regime’s liaison with the various populations of Darfur is certainly
reprehensible, the decision is more significant as an illustration of
how viciously desperate the regime’s grip on power has become.
Khartoum is frantically trying to undermine UNAMID’s efforts to bring
humanitarian aid and restore peace in Darfur. Hilal–the most ruthless
and powerful of their Arab militia allies in Darfur, the most skilful in
mobilizing Arab support for Khartoum’s genocidal endeavor–is one of
the last cards they have left. At the same time, domestic political
pressure on Khartoum appears to be rising in all quarters. The
appointment of Hilal is part of the regime’s last desperate attempt to
complete the Darfur genocide before domestic and international pressures
have any chance to bring about regime change.
Eric Reeves is a professor at Smith College and author of “A Long
Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide”