Darfur Joint Force: A Tough Mission

By Hussein Arko Menawi

If common sayings reflect human experience and put us in a crystal picture that expresses facts and describes them, the below common saying best describes the situation in Darfur after the exit of UNAMID

A well-known Arabic proverb says; ” ألقاه في اليم مكتوفاً وقال له إياك إياك أن تبتل بالماء”
The semantic translation of the proverb is;
” He has tied him up and thrown him into the water and warned him not to get wet”

Untimed exit

UNAMID exited Darfur after ten years of trying to provide security and peace in the region.  During this period, the United Nations spent more than the annual budget of Sudan, comparatively, with much less outcome than the amount it spent for the mission. The notable achievement in this period was that throughout the ten years the mission had managed to closely monitor the situation on the ground and regularly submit periodic reports to the United Nations, while the human rights violations in Darfur did not improve, and in some cases, the situation was worse than it was before the arrival of the UN mission. The United Nations ended its tasks in Darfur before peace was achieved in the troubled region of Darfur and even before the parties reached a comprehensive peace or had any alternative peace force on the ground.  Of course, there is no comparison between the capabilities of the United Nations and any other force in making peace in a vast and war-torn region like Darfur.
In this hazardous situation, the negotiating parties in Juba worked hard to find an alternative formula to fill the vacuum by putting in place an idea of a joint force that could replace the United Nations force in the region. To meet the goal, a practical step was taken by the parties. The parties have agreed upon an idea of ​​a joint force consisting of the Sudanese army, the armed forces of the Movements and the Rapid Support Forces.
The idea itself was just an attempt by the parties to address the challenge left by the UN mission, but in reality, the nature of the force to be formed is not free from major problems. In addition to the funding gap, also the elements of the joint force used to be enemies on the conflict ground in Darfur which is very difficult for them to play an effective role before passing through stages of well-thought-out security arrangements.
The joint force also needs capacity building so that it can accommodate the complexity of the peacekeeping process in a hostile atmosphere of tribal society like that of Darfur, and this will only be done with considerable international support on the ground, which means that the United Nations still has to afford the task of a capacity building for these forces, and this is the least role that the United Nations can provide for the success of the peace agreement signed in Juba. In this regard, we have to remember that the United Nations was present throughout the negotiating process in one way or another. Rather, it strongly supported the agreement through the appointment of a permanent representative of the UN in Sudan. The current role of the UN mission in Sudan is very limited. it is only for limited support purpose and monitoring of the process of the transitional government, including the peace the Juba Peace Agreement signed in October 2020. Practically speaking, the level of the United Nations presence in Sudan at present and its role in Darfur compared to UNAMID’s role raises a very important question; What is the reason behind the early UN rush out of Darfur?

Funding and anti-peace dilemma
After long and strenuous negotiations that took nearly a year, the parties to the conflict signed the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020. The security arrangements and the creation of a joint peacekeeping force were among the sticky issues in the talks.
According to the agreement, the joint peacekeeping force should have started its mission immediately after signing the agreement to avoid any security vacuum in the troubled region but the reality on the ground was that unluckily, the formation of the joint force faced real obstacles for more than a year, especially, the training and preparation of the mission until the first batch was graduated at the beginning of July 2022 amid a glimmer of hope that the new force would play a role in maintaining security or at least reducing violence in the region as a first stage.
The joint force has been delayed more than expected, not only because of the difficulties of modalities and procedures in implementing the Juba peace, but it has also delayed because of two major challenges, lack of funding and unwillingness of some parties of the transitional government to implement the Juba Peace Agreement on the ground.  Thus a security vacuum was created. As a result, there were widespread violations against civilians that led to instability and loss of lives notably in El-Geneina of West Darfur.
The idea of ​​a peacekeeping force arose in an exceptional circumstance. In the wake of the outbreak of violence in Darfur in 2003, both the United Nations and African Union decided to send peacekeeping forces to Darfur, purely African forces. Subsequently, those forces were replaced by a hybrid operation called UNAMID. Since then, even before the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement, these UN forces have managed to keep peace in Darfur with some degree of inefficiency. Though the mission of the UN force in Darfur has not met the task for which it was established, at least it was able to provide periodic reports with high efficiency and monitor the security situation on daily basis relying on the huge funding it received and the advanced equipment and capabilities that were not available to any other military force. One of the major challenges is that the joint force that is being prepared now lacks the advantage of equipment and funding which was a clear distinctive capability for the UN mission (UNAMID) during its operation in Darfur, and the absence of sufficient funding will certainly threaten the efficiency of the prospective joint force that will take over the tasks of the UN peace mission in Darfur.
According to the figures that have shown the real costs of peacekeeping in Darfur within the period 2007 to 2017, the United Nations funded the mission with an astronomical budget to achieve peace. According to information sourced from UNOCHA, the budget of UNAMID in 2007-2008 was about $1.5 billion, and this figure kept rising until 2017, the year the UN decided to reduce the mission in Darfur. Frankly speaking, for peace in Darfur to be a reality on the ground, there are two important conditions, the first of which is adequate funding for the Sudanese joint force that replaced UNAMID, and the second is that the political parties participating in the transitional government must realize that, today the top priority in Sudan is achieving peace.