Sudan government responsability of attack on Darfur peacekeepers
Attack on UNAMID Forces in Darfur: The Khartoum Regime is Responsible. Briefing by UN Undersecretary for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno makes clear that extremely heavily armed Janjaweed militia, Khartoum’s military proxy, attacked the UN/African Union forces in North Darfur (July 8, 2008)
By Eric Reeves
July 12, 2008 — On July 8, 2008, at approximately 2:45pm local time, heavily armed
Janjaweed militia attacked a joint police and military patrol of the
UN/African Union Mission in Sudan (UNAMID) in an area approximately 100
kilometers southeast of el-Fasher, near the village of Umm Hakibah
(North Darfur). In a firefight that lasted approximately three hours,
seven UNAMID troops and police were killed and twenty-two were injured,
seven of these critically. Ten vehicles were destroyed or taken during
the attack. Although there was initial uncertainty about the identity
of the attacking force, this uncertainty has been eliminated in the
course of a preliminary investigation. In addition to various published
reports, UN Undersecretary for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno,
offered a compelling July 11, 2008 briefing to the UN Security Council
in closed session, making a number of telling observations that point
unambiguously to Janjaweed forces as those responsible:
[1] Guéhenno told the Security Council that the attack on
UN-authorized peacekeepers “took place in an area under Sudanese
government control and that some of the assailants were dressed in
clothing similar to Sudanese army uniforms. He also said the ambush was
‘pre-meditated and well-organized’ and was intended to inflict
casualties rather than to steal equipment or vehicles” (Voice of
America [dateline: UN/New York], July 11, 2008). The peacekeepers
attacked reported seeing approximately 200 fighters, many on horses—a
signature feature of the Janjaweed (Arabic for “devil [or spirit] on
horseback”).
[2] Agence France Presse reports: “Guehenno was quoted as saying that
the ambush was designed ‘to inflict casualties and was carried out
with ‘equipment usually not used by (rebel) militias” ([dateline:
UN/New York], July 11, 2008). Separately and confidentially, a UN
official went further in confirming to this writer that some of the arms
used, including large-caliber recoilless rifles, have never been seen in
the arsenals of the rebel groups. This official said that Guéhenno, who
is retiring, had rarely been so explicit in assigning responsibility for
attacks in Darfur.
There is additional evidence that the Janjaweed—armed and in this
case almost certainly directed by Khartoum’s military command—were
responsible for the attack on 61 Rwandan soldiers, 10 civilian police
officers, and two military observers, who were returning to their
el-Fasher base after investigating the killing of two civilians:
[3] Agence France Presse reports from Khartoum on the views of UN and
African Union officials on the ground in Darfur: “Officials in the
African Union and UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur, known as UNAMID,
said on Wednesday [July 9, 2008] that suspected Janjaweed militia, who
have fought with the state [i.e., Government of Sudan], were behind the
attack that killed seven peacekeepers” (July 10, 2008).
[4] The motive for the attack has not been established, but an
assessment of who benefits from an attack of this scale and intensity
leaves no doubt as to responsibility. The rebels know full well that
this attack will make insecurity in Darfur all the greater, as UNAMID
will now pull back significantly from patrolling and investigating
operations. Some deployments of additional forces will be put on hold
because of the attack (Australia, for example, announced today that it
is suspending deployment of nine much-needed military specialists).
Some have made facile comparison of this recent attack to the attack
last September on the African Union mission base in Haskanita (North
Darfur). But this earlier attack had as its motive the taking of
weapons and supplies from an AU force that had long been perceived by
the rebels as siding with Khartoum, particularly in the exclusion from
ceasefire meetings of rebels groups not party to the ill-conceived Abuja
peace agreement. Indeed, in the case of Haskanita the attacking
rebels—not one of the major factions, but probably an ad hoc
collaboration of breakaway elements—may have mistakenly believed that
the AU post was passing on bombing coordinates for rebel positions to
Khartoum’s regular military forces.
But however irresponsible the rebels have been—and they have a
fearsome list of offenses to answer for—all the larger factions
urgently want a larger UN security presence, to protect both civilians
and humanitarians. Rebel leader Abdel Wahid el-Nur, who still has an
enormous following in the camps for displaced persons, has made such a
security presence his condition for participating in any renewed peace
talks. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Unity—with forces closest to the
location attacked—is also the most responsible of the rebel factions,
and well realizes that this attack is a disaster for the people of
Darfur.
As one aid worker declared in an interview with a regional reporter for
the Washington Post:
“‘It’s not being taken as just another attack,’ said one aid
worker, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he is not
authorized to speak on the record. ‘This was much bigger than anything
that’s happened before. People are quite worried about what will happen
next.’” (Washington Post [dateline: Nairobi], July 10, 2008)
However misguided rebel actions have been, however shamefully culpable
in the hijackings of humanitarian vehicles, no major rebel
faction—certainly none capable of a large-scale military
operation—has any rational motive for the kind of attack that occurred
on July 8. It is pure mendacity for Khartoum’s state ministry to
declare that, “the aim of the rebels had been to ‘destabilise the
region and prove it is not safe’” (BBC, July 10, 2008).
In fact, it is the Khartoum regime that has relentlessly delayed,
obstructed, and harassed UNAMID forces and logistics, seeking to
preserve a deadly insecurity throughout Darfur. It is Khartoum’s
regular military forces that deliberately attacked a UNAMID convoy in
West Darfur this past January (for a detailed account of this attack,
and the evidence that it was premeditated, see
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article200.html). It is the Khartoum
regime that has waged a relentless war of attrition against UNAMID, its
African Union predecessor, and the humanitarian organizations that both
peacekeeping missions were supposed to protect (the AU mission only with
a creative reading of a mandate that was severely constrained by
Khartoum).
Notably, Khartoum’s military forces have also recently suffered a
significant defeat at rebel hands. And in the perverse logic of a
genocide by attrition, an inability to defeat the rebels militarily—of
which this attack provides more clear evidence—argues for destruction
by other means, i.e., attacks on humanitarians, civilians, and
peacekeepers:
“Rebels ambushed the Sudanese army in northern Darfur and killed 157
soldiers, said a press statement issued on Saturday evening. The Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) Unity Command said its troops ambushed a
mechanical battalion from the Sudan Armed Forces in a route between
Gasat Jamat and al-Towasha near Um Kadada in North Darfur.” (Sudan
Tribune, July 5, 2008)
There is little reason to doubt the basic military claim here, though
of course no way to confirm it either. But SLM/Unity has by far the
best record for accuracy among the rebel groups, and its commanders
understand the importance of their continuing credibility. Such
continued military losses make it less likely that Khartoum will seek to
confront rebel forces directly (especially SLM/Unity), and more likely
it will stay with its policy of ethnically-targeted civilian
destruction. “Drain the swamp” by whatever genocidal means are
necessary to “catch the fish.”
CONSEQUENCES OF THE JANJAWEED ATTACK ON UNAMID
While international news attention has shifted from this
extraordinarily brutal and brazen attack on UN peacekeepers to the
impending announcements from the International Criminal Court (ICC), it
is important to realize that much will follow from the attack itself.
This is true even if, as some speculate, the attack was in some ways
timed as a response to the ICC announcements concerning the
responsibility of senior National Islamic Front (National Congress
Party) officials for atrocity crimes in Darfur. The Washington Post and
others have reported, on the basis of what seem highly authoritative
diplomatic sources, that among those for whom arrest warrants will be
sought is NIF President Omar al-Bashir, and that the charges will
include genocide and crimes against humanity.
It may very soon be impossible to sort out the consequences of the July
8 attack on UNAMID and the consequences of announcements made by ICC
Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo on July 14. Reports indicate that a
number of Security Council members and other international actors
(including the Arab League and the African Union) are lobbying Moreno
Ocampo to call off his announcement; and that failing this, some
Security Council members will seek to invoke Article 16 of the Rome
Statute in order to postpone for a year any further arrest efforts by
Moreno Ocampo. Such expediency—even if entails burying charges
against senior officials responsible for genocide and other crimes that
have now claimed some half a million lives—seems to have considerable
chance of success at the UN Security Council. But Moreno Ocampo is very
unlikely to yield to expediency; and in advance of his July 14
announcement, we may do some accounting of consequences.
In the wake of the July 8 attack, UNAMID will be forced to reconfigure
and concentrate its forces, dramatically reduce its patrol and
investigating operations, and focus more on protecting itself than the
civilians and humanitarians it is mandated to protect. Additional
UNAMID deployment of resources and personnel will slow and perhaps halt.
Some nations are likely to reconsider their commitments of troops or
police. Despite brave words from the African Union, it is not clear how
the force will improve on its dismal deployment record to date: not a
single new battalion has deployed since the UN formally took over the
“hybrid” mission January 1, and fewer than 300 miscellaneous
personnel have joined a force that is little more than the predecessor
African Union mission with blue helmets (indeed, in some cases the AU
green helmets have simply been painted UN blue). The “hybrid”
concept, a profoundly ill-considered concession to Khartoum, is proving
disastrous in practice.
A battalion from Egypt and another from Ethiopia were to have deployed
in March or earlier. Much of their equipment and supplies remains,
unreleased, in Port Sudan; much is stuck in el-Obeid in Kordofan.
Equipment, even if released from Port Sudan, will take two months to
transport to Darfur. Just shy of the first anniversary of UN Security
Council Resolution 1769 (July 31, 2007), which authorized UNAMID
deployment under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter—with a clear mandate to
protect civilians and humanitarian workers—virtually nothing has
changed except the color of helmets already on the ground. UNAMID is
failing, and if it does not soon gain the confidence of Darfuris, its
failure will be complete.
It will be a failure not on the part of the courageous soldiers and
police who have put their lives on the line, but of the international
community—a failure to provide UNAMID with the necessary equipment,
transport resources, logistics, and manpower. And ultimately it will
reflect a failure to confront Khartoum over its relentless, obdurate,
and deadly refusal to accept UN-authorized protection forces. This
failure goes back to August 2006, when security was still not hopelessly
compromised throughout Darfur, and the UN Security Council authorized
(Resolution 1706, August 31, 2006) a robust force of 22,500 UN troops
and civilian police. If deployed in timely and robust fashion, much of
the subsequent deterioration in security could have been avoided, and
tens of thousands of lives saved. But the sad history of the
international community is one of accommodating Khartoum’s
génocidaires, soon to be charged as such. Resolution 1706 was
abandoned by the UN Secretariat less than a month after its passage.
Because of insecurity that has grown steadily since the failure of
Resolution 1706, humanitarian organizations, both UN and
nongovernmental, face extremely difficult decisions about whether to
remain in Darfur. Non-essential UN personnel face imminent withdrawal,
as the UN has raised its security warning to the highest level (IV)
before full-scale evacuation (V):
“‘The security level has gone to phase four. That means all
internationally recruited staff who are not directly concerned with
emergency or humanitarian relief operations or security matters are
relocated,’ said [UNAMID spokeswoman] Shereen Zorba.” (Agence France
Presse [dateline: Khartoum], July 12, 2008)
Level IV security is without precedent during the time that UNAMID has
been deployed.
All US Agency for International Development personnel have been
withdrawn from Darfur. And individual nongovernmental humanitarian
organizations are in the throes of agonizing decisions about whether to
curtail further their already severely attenuated operations. The
Janjaweed assault on UNAMID, clearly countenanced (if not ordered) by
Khartoum, makes clear that security will continue to deteriorate. Some
humanitarian organizations will simply not be able to hold out any
longer. For UNAMID, rather than expanding security for humanitarians,
will now be even less likely to provide escorts or protection in more
remote locations. Already excessively cautious in escorting
humanitarian workers, UNAMID will reduce risk of further attacks by
using safer routes, greater manpower and firepower per mission—and in
many cases simply refusing to venture into volatile areas.
JUSTICE FOR THE UNAMID PERSONNEL KILLED AND WOUNDED?
Even as many at the UN seem prepared to abandon the ICC at its moment
of greatest need, we hear various calls for “justice” in the wake of
the attack on UNAMID—both at the UN and from international actors who
are actually working to undermine the efforts of the ICC. The UN
Security Council has condemned the attack in “the strongest possible
terms,” and “call[ed] for the perpetrators to be brought to
justice” (Security Council statement, July 9, 2008). But members
of the Security Council now know, because of UN Undersecretary
Guéhenno’s authoritative briefing, that the “perpetrators”
are Janjaweed militia—armed, recruited, and often directed by
Khartoum. Indeed, the most notorious Janjaweed leader, Musa Hilal, was
earlier this year brought into the NIF regime to coordinate efforts to
regain the cooperation of disaffected Janjaweed militia, especially in
North Darfur where the attack on UNAMID occurred (see my analysis of
this appointment at The New Republic,
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article202.html). It is a grim irony
indeed that some of the very members who call disingenuously for
“justice” on this occasion are actively working to subvert the
pursuit of meaningful justice by the ICC.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in a moment of similar disingenuousness,
has called on Khartoum “to do its utmost to ensure the perpetrators
are swiftly identified and brought to justice” (Statement of the UN
Secretary General, July 9, 2008). But not only is the Khartoum regime
itself ultimately responsible for the actions of the “perpetrators,”
the regime has gone out of its way to make clear it feels no
responsibility in the wake of an attack by its militia proxy. Rejecting
Ban’s demand, the regime’s foreign ministry spokesman Ali al-Sadiq
declared contemptuously:
“‘The peacekeeping forces in Darfur are under the umbrella of the
United Nations and the African Union…the responsibilities of the
government [of Sudan] are limited to cooperate and to coordinate with
North Darfur authorities.’” (Sudan Tribune, July 10, 2008)
Such contempt is the hallmark of all Khartoum’s responses to
international efforts to bring the Janjaweed under control. Although
the regime has promised on many occasions to disarm this fearsome weapon
of mass destruction, it has never taken a single step to do so. Some
argue glibly that the regime simply cannot control the monster it has
created. But the rejoinder must be that we can’t know because the
regime has never made the slightest effort to do so. Moreover, in the
brutal scorched-earth campaign north of el-Geneina (West Darfur) this
past February, Khartoum’s regular military forces again worked
hand-in-glove with the Janjaweed, killing hundreds of civilians and
displacing many tens of thousands. All evidence, including the
appointment of Musa Hilal, makes clear that Khartoum continues to regard
the Janjaweed (now recycled into various paramilitary guises) as an
essential weapon in its genocidal counter-insurgency war.
Nor is there any reason to believe that a commitment made now to
control or disarm the Janjaweed would have any meaning. Khartoum made
its first promise concerning the Janjaweed over four years ago (July 3,
2004, Khartoum), in a “Joint Communiqué” signed by then-Secretary
General Kofi Annan and senior NIF officials, who “committed” to
disarming the Janjaweed. This and subsequent “commitments,”
including those within the spineless security protocol of the Darfur
Peace Agreement, have meant nothing. Nor has the posturing of the
international community impressed Khartoum. On July 30, 2004 the UN
Security Council “demanded” (Resolution 1556) that the regime disarm
the Janjaweed and bring its leaders to “justice.” This “demand”
has, over the course of four years, also meant nothing, encouraging
Khartoum to believe that all UN “demands” and pronouncements are
vacuous. It is all too apparent that when it comes to the Janjaweed,
the UN considers “justice” a perfunctory matter—the subject of
expedient exhortation, not serious action. And so it is with the
present politically convenient demands that “justice” be sought for
the victims of the July 8 attack on UNAMID.
THE FUTURE OF UNAMID
Last November, Undersecretary Guéhenno asked the essential question,
one that inevitably answered itself:
“Do we move ahead with the deployment of a force that will not make a
difference, that will not have the capability to defend itself and that
carries the risk of humiliation of the Security Council and the United
Nations and tragic failure for the people of Darfur?”
The force and urgency of the question have not diminished; indeed, with
the July 8 attack on UNAMID the question is not only posed anew, but we
have been given to see just how close to “tragic failure” we are.
Without the most urgent and robust support of UNAMID—in the coming
weeks, not months—Darfuris will lose all hope. Many already have.
With enormous human consequences, operational humanitarian organizations
will be forced to abandon Darfur. The question before the international
community, the question forced by Guéhenno’s stark assessment, is not,
“How will we respond if Khartoum takes the ICC announcements badly?”
Rather, the real question is—as it long has been—whether the
international community is willing to put serious, consequential
pressure on Khartoum to end its war of attrition against UNAMID,
humanitarian organizations, and the more than 4 million civilians
dependent upon humanitarian assistance.
Failure is on the very near horizon.
* Eric Reeves is author of A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide. He can be reached at [email protected]. www.sudanreeves.org