The Islamists’ Current Target Bank: Controlling the army with a racist agenda
The Stance of the Revolutionary Forces on the question of the army
By Yasir Arman
1. The current debate on the army:
The current debates on the army these days are as tricky as a rooster trying to sleep on a rope. The public anger toward the army didn’t arise from thin air; it is a result of the army leadership’s stance on the December Revolution, the coup, and the ongoing war. However, a reasoned discussion about the armed forces is necessary. The military is an institution of the state, while the Islamists are a political movement. The army is broader than the Islamic Movement. Thus, the errors of its leadership and the crimes committed in its name should not deter us from distinguishing between the Islamists and the army. It is essential to untangle the theoretical, intellectual, and political confusion regarding the army and avoid falling into the mutual deception between the army’s leadership and that of the Islamic Movement, whose alliance is a marriage of convenience that has an expiration date.
2. The SPLM’s experience and the stance on the army:
In 1988, I joined the SPLM’s media team in Addis Ababa. The SPLA radio played a crucial role in delivering its political message. At the time, several things bothered me, with the most significant being the viewing of the Sudan armed forces as a monolithic “enemy army” and the failure to acknowledge SPLM casualties as martyrs. My leftist analytical background, which I still use, led me to a different understanding of the military. I decided to engage in a direct dialogue with Dr John Garang about the class and social structure of the Sudan army and its different political influences, as well as the need to recognize the fallen SPLM heroes as martyrs, publicly given their full recognition. When I raised these issues with Dr. Garang during a Sunday meeting at his home in Addis, we had an in-depth discussion that lasted several hours. Politics with Dr. Garang was always like a fast-paced game of ping-pong, full of great insights. Dr. Garang, a thinker, an intellectual, a former army officer, and a left-leaning academic, had a profound understanding of the state’s superstructure and social systems.
We concluded that the military is a complex entity with intricate class and social dimensions. There is a distinction between the interests of senior, junior and non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The army is influenced by the social and political conflicts around it and is not an isolated island. We agreed that this reality should be reflected in our political rhetoric and SPLM media strategy, avoiding considering the army as a monolithic bloc. Dr Garang continued to provide me with information via phone and the SPLA’s signal unit, especially after I became the SPLM’s official spokesperson for 15 years. We often intercepted and analyzed military signals. Among our media engagements with Sudan’s Armed Forces was the famous “Waat Debate” on SPLA Radio in 1990 with a force that was heading to Bor, led by the late Brigadier General Abdel Aziz al-Nur, a nationalist who later joined the opposition against the Islamist regime.
Today, we must prevent the Islamists from driving the army in a racist and ethnic direction—this is a key objective of theirs. If unchecked, it will lead to the collapse of the army, further fragmentation of Sudan, and an increase in violence and crimes. These days, the National Congress Party’s Islamists are particularly targeting Darfur—its human resources and ethnic tensions—aiming to turn it into a hotbed of ethnic conflict, much like their previous tactics in South Sudan. At this stage, they have mobilized top leaders like Ahmed Abbas in Sennar and Ibrahim Mahmoud in Port Sudan, along with their old guards, such as Karti and Ali Osman. They are sniffing the winds of power, not the winds of heaven, with their wide presence from Sudan to Turkey full of internal contradictions.
3. A war without a centre:
The current war is distinct because its leadership is not centred in Khartoum, the historical seat of power. Unlike the previous wars in the rural areas of Sudan, this war began by displacing millions, killing many, seizing their properties, and disrupting institutions in the heart of power. However, the absence of the centre doesn’t mean the absence of its mentality.
4. The army’s roots and its role in power:
The origin of Sudan’s Armed Forces dates back to the 1898 invasion by the British, making it one of the oldest and most complex institutions. Its complexity deepened with the Islamists’ takeover of its leadership in their 1989 coup. The army predates the 1956 state, which, despite its many flaws, is preferable to the 1989 regime and the current quasi-state born out of the April 15 war.
The Islamists regime continuously integrated the army’s top leadership into the ruling political and economic elite, linking their interests to the regime. However, viewing the army as a monolithic bloc under Islamist control is incorrect. Over three decades, the Islamists have fragmented the army through purges, dismissals, and executions. Still, they never fully trusted it, hence creating militias and parallel armies to guard against coups and their inability to wage wars in rural areas against Sudanese nationalities with legitimate demands.
The anger toward the army’s leadership is justified and understandable. But this frustration should not cloud our vision or analysis. The Islamists used the army as a tool to crush the December Revolution. Without the army, the Islamists are too weak to suppress the revolution. They seek to control the armed forces, even though today’s military is not what it once was. Their only hope for returning to power lies in riding on the back of the army, despite the contradictions within their marriage of convenience.
We should not be deceived by the Islamists’ propaganda portraying the army as the military wing of the Islamic Movement. While they love to exploit the army, they also fear it. This is evidenced by their social media attacks on the army’s leadership whenever it distances itself from their schemes. The issue of the army is far from settled, and we need a sharp analysis to expose the Islamists’ deceptions. A balanced discourse on the army is crucial, even as its leadership repeatedly aligns itself with the Islamists in their attempts to crush the December Revolution.
5. The power struggle – Sudan Army (SAF) vs Rapid Support Forces (RSF):
The best option for the alliance between the army and the Islamists is to weaken and trim the wings of the RSF, making it a junior partner. The refusal to negotiate, including the Geneva platform, stems from the RSF being more powerful than a junior partner should be. Both the army and the Islamists—two separate entities, not one—are working towards a military campaign that will reduce the RSF to a minor partner within an authoritarian regime hostile to the December Revolution. The relationship between the army and the Islamists is fraught with contradictions and ambitions, heightened by the war and the state’s weakness. Yet, both sides realize the necessity of their alliance for political and military reasons.
We, the democratic forces and the December Revolution’s supporters, must keep a cool head and reason about the army issue. We must reaffirm our stance on building a single professional army that reflects Sudan’s diversity and the completion of the revolution’s tasks as prerequisites for sustainable solutions. We must avoid extremist positions on the army or falling into the trap of the Islamists, who are intent on destroying the revolution through ethnic and racial incitements, as well as through violence and the manipulation of religion. Additionally, we should also analyze the contradictions among the Islamic movement while welcoming the Islamists who are taking a stance against the war.
6. Rebuilding the army in the aftermath of the revolution:
The December Revolution did not leave the army untouched. It had an impact on its ranks. The army is not an isolated island from the revolutionary climate. Despite the leadership’s flaws and the deep-rooted issues of the state, the army remains an institution that must be rebuilt as part of a state-building project. Our country needs a single unified army, and we must end the Islamists’ state capture and hijacking of institutions, particularly the military.
The December Revolution started the process of freeing the army. However, its biggest mistake was taking a defensive approach after the sit-in was dispersed, rather than an offensive one, to dismantle the Islamists’ state capture. Their continuous sabotage, including their influence inside and outside the army, remains a major challenge.
Even in the midst of this war, we must analyze the army’s composition and acknowledge its importance as an institution that can be rebuilt; we should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. The Islamists’ war must be exposed relentlessly while maintaining a balanced discourse on the army. Not everyone who supports the army is against the December Revolution. Ordinary people associate the army with the survival of the state and the need to end the war. This requires a calm, deep discussion with our people, without accusations of treason, and we must learn from the experiences of Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq without falling into the Islamists’ trap.