Have peace partners given up in the unity of Sudan

By Paul Bor Gatwech

February 2, 2009 — The Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and National Congress Party (NCP) have become the most politically and militarily influential parties of the Sudan at the moment. Both parties have immense and massive followings across the country given the fact that they are legal custodian to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with executive responsibility to implement its provisions. In fact, the CPA has secured them direct command and control over the only two armed forces of the Republic, SAF and SPLA, in addition to other state security apparatuses, offering them exclusive power to manipulate or maneuver any political situation in the country depending on their calculations or miscalculations.

The CPA is a document successfully negotiated to resolve Sudan stagnated socio-economic and political problems amicably through democratic transformation. This democratic transformation means nothing less than initiation of massive development and equal share or redistribution of resources especially to the marginalized parts of the Sudan that could possibly succeed only if aggressively adopted as a policy by the government during the interim period. In fact, it is just the realization of peace dividends for those who suffered most in the prolonged protracted conflict of the Sudan. Thus, the major theme given to the CPA as a document by its negotiators was to make unity “attractive” by distributing resources and power equally to all the people of the Sudan within the interim period of six years. Failure to share resources, distribution of power equally and conduct of rapid development to the marginalized regions by both parties, according to late SPLM Chairman, amounts to collapse of the Sudanese state.

One could therefore ask whether unity looks attractive now after 4th Anniversary of Comprehensive Peace Agreement or not. Whether if the Sudanese state shall still exist after the 6th Anniversary of CPA? And if Sudan disintegrates, who is to be blamed? Whether if Sudan would be better off disintegrated? Many are intriguely asking whether if the two leading parties, SPLM and NCP, are still working to unite the country or have given up?

Are the two parties profoundly convinced that the Sudan is a country that can never unite and therefore working to entrench their influences in their respective regions in prospect to creating new nations out of Sudanese state fragments? Do SPLM and NCP intentionally coalesce now to disintegrate Sudan given political decisions and policies they have executed since the signing of CPA? The purpose of this article is to briefly answer these questions by examining events, policies, actions, attitudes and roles played by Sudan’s CPA partners, SPLM and NCP on a guise to explore their failures or successes in making Sudan’s unity “attractive”.

After historic signing of CPA in Nairobi, SPLM have to move its headquarters to Khartoum. SPLM late Chairman swiftly sent a team of trusted Movement veterans from his headquarters in New Sudan to Khartoum to conduct prior assessment and political organization that consequently establish party offices and structures.

This strategic move was then proceeded by triumphant landing of late Chairman in Khartoum International Airport jubilantly welcome by around 4 to 6 million Sudanese, an indication that Sudan wants to be new. But then within a fortnight, all the vigor, hope and political splendid that emanated from late Chairman arrival in Khartoum dwindled when he miraculously and tragically vanished on the mountains bordering Uganda leading SPLM to retreat not only in vision but also in philosophy and strategy. SPLM has to painfully retreat to Juba to conduct its businesses leaving Khartoum to NCP and other northern opposition parties. However, though, some of its leaders pressed hard to keep presence in Khartoum until present. And this episode was the most significantly devastating event for SPLM vision of creating a new Sudan that could make unity attractive to Sudanese people coupled with the precedence or emergence of leaders who never believe in movement’s long political philosophy championed by the late Chairman.

One should, therefore, wander whether it is at this junction that SPLM started reverse gear from unity of the Sudanese state. Or if SPLM is just frustrated with complexity of its partner in CPA implementation forcing it to focus most on southern issues than Sudan problems?

Firstly, to evaluate and examine all these precedence, it is important to note that the main power base of SPLM since 1983 were southerners who are 99.99% separatist because of how the north has become conspicuously untamed animal to share anything with. This tendency of southern patriotism has never metamorphosed though cleverly maneuvered by late SPLM Chairman during the struggle until time of his death. Of course few comrades from the south who were very close to late Chairman picked up the idea of changing the system in Sudan as the only lasting solution than liberation of one piece of the country. I presumed this is what kept SPLM at the helm of Sudanese political arena after demise of late Chairman or else it could have mutated into Anyanya I and II type movement straight away. In fact, these few comrades in the SPLM from the south continued steering the boat towards solving Sudan problem for once and for all rather than pursuing policies of southern disintegration from the north even after the demise of late Chairman. Unfortunately enough, though, their voices gradually become barren and isolated, unrealistic, unachievable, and a political madness due to intense pressure from the south and NCP pessimistic view on the so-called “making unity attractive”. If at all there are few individuals from SPLM hierarchy who would want to make Sudan united, why couldn’t NCP embrace that idea? Is it expensive for ruling party NCP to develop the south, Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Niles, Abyei, Darfur and the east to make Sudan unity attractive than resorting to forceful unity as it envisages? If not expensive at all, why then does the ruling party NCP just engage in military buildup rather than developing the marginalized regions during the interim period? Does NCP purposely intent to unite Sudan through force as it used to do or it has just lost hope to convince anyone at all through equal share of resources?

Of course not only NCP in the north, but SPLM also in the south is pursuing the same tactic of military buildup. Could it be a gesture to keep peace or a preparation for a future war by defensive SPLM?

It seems to be a tit for tat for the two parties indicating that they have purposely abandoned the theme of CPA: making unity attractive. In fact, it is being rumored that even President Bashir one time advised SPLM Chairman Kiir to abandon the agenda of ‘making unity attractive” because it is unacceptable to Southerners. According to President Bashir, southerners will never vote for a united Sudan even if NCP (northerners) develop the south to the level of first world in which he concluded with a nagging question: why would the north waste time and resources to build the south while the verdict is crystal clear?

So what then is NCP planning to do now if it is conspicuously convinced that there is nothing on this earth to do to attract the south for unity? It is also rumored that if SPLM pursues anything in northern territory, Bashir and his cronies often warn SPLM to retreat to the south arguing they have abandoned it for them. Could somebody conclude that the issue of Sudan unity and all its connotations are buried with Dr. Garang and thus both the NCP and SPLM have found new partnership of keeping themselves in power for the remaining two years and then disintegrate the Sudanese state peacefully? Is Bashir badly waiting to kiss friendly good-bye to Kiir on 9 July 2011? And have the SPLM and NCP secretly coalesced to disintegrate the Sudan due to their collective failure to guide it towards a new dawn of hope, prosperity and independence? For if SPLM is chasing NCP away from the south while NCP is chasing SPLM from the north in terms of partisan politics, then one could conclude that the country is secretly disintegrated and the agenda of unity is completely dead.

The next argument on reason behind the failure of CPA partners to make unity of the Sudanese state “attractive” is that they see it in different lenses. NCP sees unity of the Sudan in the lenses of sovereignty and Arab nationalism. According to NCP, Sudan must unite only if it maintains status quo: its current identity as an Arab state with Islam as a state religion. Any body contradicting with this principle violates the sovereignty, national identity and statehood of Sudan according to NCP. And that is why I always argue that NCP political ideology is threatened most by those who preach new Sudan ideology than southern self-determination. NCP hates much “new Sudanist” than “southern separatist”. For NCP, it is better for the south to go alone than attempt to change identity of the Sudan into a different image. This is evidently manifested by how much NCP hates comrades like Pagan Amum, Mensur Khalid, and the likes who preach about Sudan transformation into a free, democratic and united country. They would rather like to hear about old ideas such as self-determination for southern Sudan and other regions for they know that it doesn’t threaten their existence as a party or political entity. And more funny enough is that, NCP or any other northern political party, will name the northern fragment of the Sudanese state “the Sudan” even if the southern fragment is gone, believe me or not. So there will be the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of south Sudan side by side. But ask why would it be that way?

On the other hand, SPLM sees unity of the Sudan in the lenses of equality, freedom, and progress contradicting greatly to NCP political philosophy. According to SPLM, Sudan must be new to avoid become many through democratic values in the system of the government. SPLM insists that Sudan is an African state with no state religion; state and religion must be separated; and there must be equal share of power and resources across the diverse peoples of the Sudanese state. SPLM believes that Sudan’s diversity and richness with different ethnicities, races, languages and religious beliefs is an opportunity that must be utilized to promote its greatness in the world. In fact, one could argue that the most economically, socially and politically powerful countries of the world are the most culturally and socially diverse ones.

But NCP sees this diversity as a threat to its Islamic ideology. NCP and all other northern parties are more comfortable when they see Sudanese putting on similar attires, consuming the same food and worshiping God only in one fashion. And therefore a unity that has connotation of change to current status of the Sudan is not an attractive unity for the NCP.

In concluding, there is strong evidence in the trends of events, actions, and policies of the two CPA partners, SPLM and NCP, that they have deviated from Sudan unity provided for in the CPA due to their failure to reconcile their conflicting visions. They have agreed to disagree on the principles of Sudan unity, and agreed to make it “unattractive” for the people of the Sudan. And in fact it doesn’t matter how much SPLM and NCP cherishes the existence of Sudanese state reflected in their political manifestoes, their failure to reconcile their visions to promote democratic transformation in the Sudan amounts to coalition towards disintegration of the Sudanese state. Both SPLM and NCP should focus on effective implementation of the CPA than unilateral pursuance of their respective visions, which do not necessarily make Sudanese people free from war and poverty. Without CPA, their visions remain significantly antagonistic ideologies that can never be reconciled. And for Sudanese state to survive, the Sudanese people and their respective parties must not only unite under their races, nor religious beliefs or ethnicities, nor political ideologies but under their strong desire for freedom and justice.

* The author holds Bachelors of Science Degree and now studies Masters of Politics and Policy in Deakin University-Australia. He is reachable at [email protected]