Poor performance of Sudan’s Joint Integrated Units
By Justin Ambago Ramba
March 2, 2009 — The successive military confrontations within the ranks of the joint integrated units of the post Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Sudan that happened in Abyei, south Kordufan, and twice in the town of Malakal town clearly illustrates the fact that the least peace loving elements of the Sudanese people from both the south and north have been assigned the duty of protecting and safeguarding the one thing they hate the most and that is a peaceful south Sudan.
The CPA was signed in Naivasha in 2005 with an intension by the international community to bring an end to the sufferings of the people of south Sudan who for more than fifty years were regarded as legitimate military targets to the successive northern Arab dominated governments in Khartoum since the eve of the so-called Independence of the Sudan in 1956.
Unfortunately, but equally expected, the Sudanese themselves approached the CPA from different points of view with each group giving much stress to certain parts of the agreement without the others. The National Islamic Front (NIF), under the National Congress Party (NCP) faction of Omer al Bashir negotiated the CPA with few basic points in mind.
Firstly the (NCP) wanted to escape the post 9/11 US wrath. Secondly it want to divert its efforts to fight the new insurgence in the western province of Darfur, with a possibility of getting an assistance from the former foes (SPLM/A) when they become partners in the Government of National Unity (GoNU) in the same way that they (northern Arabs) used the black African people of the western provinces of both Kordufan and Darfur to fight the very southern rebels. Thirdly the political and military strategists of the northern Arab riveran’s intended to lure the southerners into a wealth and power sharing political settlement and then later destroy them ( SPLM/A) from within using money, corruption, instigating tribal frictions, border disputes and above all seeing an un stable government in the south by creating a constant state of insecurity..
The south Sudanese on the other hand negotiated the peace deal when they were already showing signs of war fatigue as many of the fighters had deserted the front lines ending up in refugee camps in Ethiopia , Kakuma in Kenya, whereas many even made it to very far places like the USA and Australia.
The movement was also confronted by a slowly brewing leadership crisis that started to show its effects at different levels as regional sentiment started to creep within the ranks. The fighters as well as well as the politician begun to reorganise secretly but sometimes openly as either being from Equatoria, Bahar el Ghazal, Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, Latuka…… etc.
To complicate things even the more, some opportunistic politicians who were on the Khartoum payrolls and have now taken up positions as Presidential Advisors in the Sudan, immediately took advantage of surfacing differences within the SPLM/A to advance their agendas. They intelligently exploited the situation and put in all their weights fuelling up general unrest in vast areas of the south which culminated in the Rumbek Conference. .
To some southern Sudanese the agreement merely meant wealth and power sharing. Unfortunately the wealth sharing here only took place between the NCP and the SPLM/A political leaderships, and this can be witnessed in the undisputable huge wealth accumulated by the politicians and their cronies within this very short period of time that started from 1st July 2005. In less than four years in office many south Sudanese politicians and senior guys in uniforms have stunning enough made up to millions of dollars and that is a record breaking event in a region classified as one of the most underdeveloped in the African continent.
Whereas for the power sharing protocol, it is no surprise that it as well went the same way. It is power sharing between the Jaalien, Danagla, Shaigia in the north and the Dinka and Nuer in the south. This is the most apparent part of the CPA and none of it has ever happened by chance though some of us may be naively tempted to think so.
To legalize the six years of tribal forces building in the Sudan, the in articles in the CPA, stressing that the Unity of the Sudan should be given a chance and be made attractive, was over exploited and it nevertheless gave the biggest blow to the fragile and selfishly guided agreement as it promoted corruption and impunity in both the GoSS and the GoNU.
Other issues like the 2011 referendum to decide the future political status of south Sudan, though a cornerstone to the CPA whereby the south Sudanese masses for the first time in their long struggle were able to see a light of freedom and national independence at the end of the tunnel, yet the official stand of the SPLM has become officially tied to its peace partner the NCP where they both work to advocate for a united Sudan. However paradoxically all pointers are saying that if ever the referendum is held it will more than likely favour the succession of the south, given the current state of affairs..
Strategically the NCP has used some parts of the CPA to maintain its grips on the SPLM. First is the Institution of the Presidency, as it is no secret that many south Sudanese have come to the accept the bitter reality in which the southern view points on all vital issues never found their way to light whenever channelled through this sensitive and most powerful Institution in the country.
Secondly, the NCP’s monopoly and complete control of the Federal ministries of Finance and that of Petroleum and Mining has left it (NCP) solely to decide how much funds are released to the GoSS and when, enabling them to use the philosophy of “ Starve your dog and it will always follow you, ” in an attempt to make southerners to favour living under the Arab colonialism as opposed to voting for succession , thus holding the aspirations of the southerners for an independent state as a hostage.
The third element in the power game is the formation of the Joint Integrated Units (J.I.U) which are joint military units formed from the former combatants of the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces (S.A.F) of al Bashir which fought each other in the two decades war between south Sudan and the Khartoum government.
Recently the J.I.U which was meant to be a nucleus to a new Sudanese army should the south opt for unity with the north, has clearly demonstrated how delusional were the people who prescribed to this idea especially those who represented the south in the agreement. They either knew that it won’t work, but in order for SPLA to retain its fighters separately during the six years interim period, thus evading the absorption into a united Sudanese army, and to get to this they might have reluctantly accepted the formation of such a non operational military unit.
While to other groups, be them from the south or the north the J.I.U presents an opportunity to dominate the future military institution in the Sudan if the south wishfully votes for a united Sudan in the 2011 plebiscite, a dream widely shared by the minority, yet vocal supporters of the “ New United Sudan” vision of late Dr. John Garang.
At a time that all the above arguments rightly converge into the power sharing ego of all the most power hungry Sudanese warlords, the Islamic oriented NCP of al Bashir strategically is using J.I.U for spying on the SPLA and possibly carrying out clandestine and subversive operations in the south meant to create a constant state of widely spread instabilities especially in the south-north border areas.
In order to maximise their declared and undeclared political harvests, both the SPLM and the NCP resorted to their traditional ways of handling matters of security by exploiting their joint presence in the J.I.U and thus unintentionally rendered it non operational and purposeless.
As things went by, the very SPLM that emerged after the Rumbek conference as a more unified movement that is bent to adopt democratic values, yet following Dr. Garang’s untimely death sooner than later did every thing reverted to the pre-conference position and it was quite apparent that change was actually happening in the movement, but whether for the best or the worse, that was left for time to tell.
The new SPLM/A leadership that emerged had itself hijacked again by the Presidential Advisors who supervised every structuring of government units to the appointment of people to public positions including the military that were largely influence by the new ethnically motivated lobby groups. This is clearly painted in the composition of the J.I.U where ever they exist in southern Sudan.
Power which leads to wealth and visa versa was still much to be contested in the post CPA south Sudan, a region where there existed dozens of black African south Sudanese tribal militia’s allied to Khartoum in its fight with the southern dominated SPLM/A .
But however later under the CPA, all militia groups were emerged with either the Sudan armed Forces (SAF) or the SPLA and it was where the tribal militia chose to go that decided the situation on the ground especially in many parts of the Greater Upper Nile region.
Though following the ascend of H.E Salva Kiir Mayardit to the leadership in the south, he initiated the south to south dialogue which resulted to the mergence of most of the militia groups from the Greater Equatoria, Bahar el Ghazal, and Upper Nile into a unified SPLA which is also the only legal army in south Sudan besides the JIU.
Unfortunately not everything went the same way with some southern tribal militias. This is especially true with Major General Gabriel Tang Ginye’s militia that had been an independent but also like others allied with Khartoum during the long war. After the CPA, Tang’s militia was formally absorbed into the SAF. But what followed was that this newly absorbed former militia fighters were ostensibly assigned to take the SAF‘s quota of the equal representation in the JIU.
Following the recent fighting which took place in Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile state where it has been confirmed that 60 died and 100 wounded with undetermined number of displaced people highlights how vulnerable the CPA has become.
However just probing a bit beneath what is in the news, many blunders and counter blunders can be exposed to the public. The media has persistently painted the fighting in Malakal to have taken place between the SPLA and the Tang militia, something completely denied by the Khartoum based SAF spokesman.
The argument is that no such a militia exists after they were formerly absorbed into the SAF ranks. He also said that General Gabriel Tang Ginye is no longer a militia leader, but rather a General in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).
In other wards what happened in Malakal on February 2009 if analysed per the new post CPA definitions is a fight between the fighters belonging to the JIU who differed on whether to arrest Major General Tang as ordered by H.E Salva Kiir Mayardit, the First Vice President of the Sudan and the President of south Sudan in connection to his (General Tang’s) role in the 2006 killings where more than 150 people lost their lives as or not.
It is here that the delicateness of the situation begins to unfold and clearly reveal itself, because if HE Salva Kiir, the second man in the power hierarchy of the Sudan can only give orders to the SPLA and the SPLA half of the JIU, then it leaves him powerless in dealing with the SAF nor the SAF half of the JIU and the reverse is true with Omer al Bashir and Ali Osman Taha. This clearly leaves the Sudan as a country without a national army as SAF gets its orders from the NIF/NCP while the SPLM gets it’s from the SPLM.
This controversial situation which has so far showed its nasty presence in Malakal town more than twice within a period of two years leading to the loss of lives in hundreds, and including millions worth of properties as well as threatening to revert the Sudan back to a north / south military confrontation needs to be given a special attention unless its being intentionally manipulated for party gains by the two CPA partners.
The implications of all the above revelations do to some extent explain why HE Salva Kiir is constantly having difficulties at the Presidency and how the NCP views the GoNU as its own domain to the extend that the southern ministers in the Federal government are made to feel as outsiders .
The President al Bashir entirely relies on his advisors from the NCP when it comes to policies pertaining to those ministries occupied by ministers from the south, and this can be clearly seen in the ministry of Foreign Affairs.
As for H.E. President Kiir and General Gabriel Tang Ginye, both men are caught up in the dark side of the CPA. Unless both of them come to deal with the whole issue in a more rational way, much southern blood will continue to be spilled each time they confront each other based on former loyalty lines.
It is no secret that those who died in the Malakal incidences were all south Sudanese. But let us not rush to the conclusion based on mere assumption that those who fought and continue to fight on the Khartoum’s side are doing it only for money’s sake otherwise we might fail to capture the bigger picture of the political set up..
We better investigate our court yards thoroughly lest we miss a thing which might have triggered the recurrent conflicts within our people, how minor it may be.
We as south Sudanese are much involved in tribal motivated politics to the extend that the central issues which affect us jointly have in many occasions taken very low positions in our lists of priorities as we are constantly at each others necks.
Now that Major General Gabriel Tang Ginye remains the central figure in both of these sad Malakal incidences and as it clearly become that any time the General is in Malakal lives are being lost. No community under the rule of law can allow such events to go on indefinitely and unquestioned. What happened in Malakal town was completely unimaginable and if any thing it is a naked manifestation of a scrambling State in a war of contradictions with itself.
The highest security order in the nation of Sudan must take these Malakal insecurity events more seriously than ever before. This is most likely to be the beginning of yet another very long journey into the demise of the CPA and at the least the vicious cycle on insecurity will continue to hang over the whole Upper Nile if not plunging the entire south Sudan into a wider state of chaos and complete lawlessness.
This issue has to be addressed at the level of the Presidency if at all that this high office is actually there to represent the interests of the citizens. All those who are behind the recurrent Malakal bloodbaths must be brought to book , rule of law must reign and above all the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) must be urgently tarnished and polished into a real disciplined national military force that should consolidate peace in the country as expected per the CPA , rather than being in the heart of the recurrent insecurities and unrests that are noticed to be spreading like wild fires all over the south Sudan lately.
The author of this is article is a Sudanese doctor living in the UK and can be reached at: [email protected].