SPLM Northern Sector: Genuine representation or token participation?

SPLM Northern Sector: Genuine representation or token participation?

By Dr. Elwathig Kameir

July 10, 2010 — 1. During the past three years, I wrote a series of articles that dwelt on the Vision of the New Sudan and the call of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) for building the Sudanese citizenship state, and the Movement’s strategies for translating this “theoretical” concept into reality whether at the federal, or regional level in southern Sudan. The conclusion reached in these contributions was that the actual political practice of the SPLM following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), particularly after the departure of its historical leader in late July 2005, carried many indicators of the Movement’s observed retreat from the Vision it had been preaching for more than two decades. Furthermore, it has abandoned the struggle for achieving the ultimate objective of realizing the country’s unity on new bases preferring separation and the establishment of an independent state in the South. I also underlined in these writings the disillusionment of the northern members of the SPLM, and all its supporters in the north, who had pinned their hopes on the Movement to lead the process of the long-awaited change by moving forward the post-CPA situation (dubbed by the late SPLM Chairman as the “minimum New Sudan”) for achieving voluntary unity. In a nutshell, it seems as if the SPLM has substituted or replaced the Vision with the CPA and its literal implementation, thus withdrawing into a cocoon, waiting for secession of the South, instead of taking it as a drawing board, which in reality is all that it is, in achieving its declared objective of achieving the Sudanese citizenship state! Indeed, The CPA incorporates several aspects of the New Sudan Vision. Although it is essentially a political compromise between the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP), the CPA provides us with the required framework for the continued pursuit of the objective of the New Sudan through purely political means as opposed to the pre-CPA combination of political and military methods. Thus, the leadership of the Movement is obliged, both politically and morally, to subject the issue of reconciling the objectives of self-determination and New Sudan (unity on new bases) to serious dialogue and open discussion inside its institutions due to a mixed blend of objective and subjective factors (The Imperatives of Internal Dialogue: The SPLM and Returning to the Drawing Board. Sudan Tribune, 23 December 2009).
2. This brief presentation addresses the institutional and organizational dimensions of the SPLM, in particular the status of the “Northern Sector” in the SPLM’s organizational structure, and the representation of northerners in the Movement’s leadership, as well as in the executive branch of the government, which further testifies to this leadership’s unwavering intention of establishing the independent state of the South. What prompted me to dwell on this subject is the news of anger, confusion, and resentment, among the SPLM leaders in the Northern Sector following the NCP’s rejection of the SPLM candidate from the Sector for the position of State Minister at the Ministry of Labor (Al-ahdath News Paper, 16 June 2010). At that moment, I realized that these leaders apparently did not notice or scrutinize the clear writings on the wall since the convening of the SPLM Second National Convention in May 2008. What they failed to see is that northerners, in the eyes of the Movement’s leadership, did not effectively participate in the armed struggle phase of the liberation process, except for a few who joined the SPLA/M on individual basis, a precondition for acquiring advanced positions in the leading organs of the Movement or in the executive branch. Thus, had it not been for the engagement of the grassroots in the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessana in the armed struggle, leaders from these two regions would not have been represented in the Movement’s leadership and the executive, or supported by the leadership of the SPLM to achieve the right to “Popular Consultation”, the minimum level in the ceiling of their expectations! The general elections amounted to a golden opportunity for the leaders of the Northern Sector to secure a comfortable win in the general elections, thus both impose their presence in the leadership of the SPLM and ensure a number of seats in the legislative and executive organs of the state. However, they squandered this valuable opportunity by boycotting the elections (for actually deeper reasons than what is publicly disclosed, representing merely the tip of the iceberg, meanwhile the real motives have remained trapped in the chests of the Sector’s leaders), therefore they found themselves outside the game occupying the role of spectators rather than active players. Indeed, they neither took up arms nor gathered votes!

THE SECOND SPLM NATIONAL CONVENTION:
A LOST OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSFORMATION!

3. A lot of water has passed under the bridge since the signing of the CPA as far as the organizational and institutional aspects of the SPLM are concerned. Most importantly, the SPLM has gained large numbers of members and supporters in the various states of Northern Sudan, including in Darfur. These are supporters whose minds and hearts have become captivated by the New Sudan Vision. The unprecedented reception of the late leader on 8th July 2005 is the best witness for this surge in favor the SPLM. Meanwhile, the SPLM ventured into developing its organizational and institutional structures in the process of its transformation from a military and regional movement into a national political entity in the context of the transition from war to peace. The holding of the Second National Convention in May 2008, fourteen years after the first one, left the doors wide open for the participation of SPLM members from all the states in the north, the Northern Sector being represented by one third of the convention’s members totaling over one thousand five hundred.

4. The Convention presented a long awaited opportunity to which the movement’s grassroots, especially supporters of unity whether northerners or southerners, aspired in order to participate in a serious and transparent dialogue on the critical issues related to the evolution of the movement and its transition from a military-based organization into a political party, that can lead economic, social and cultural transformation, and achieve the country’s unity on a new bases, all this in the shadow of a general discomfort due to the ambiguity in the position of the leaders of the movement regarding the unity of the country.

5. The ultimate objective (and expected outcome) of the 2nd National Convention was to achieve: a strong, united and rejuvenated SPLM with a clear vision, that set the correct path/direction, and that articulated the necessary program and policies necessary for the realization of the vision. In a nutshell, a Movement that is capable of competing in and winning the forthcoming elections. These were the issues that constituted the main tasks and challenges facing the Movement during the interim period, which should have topped the working agenda of the Convention.

6. Contrary to expectations, however, the agenda of the Convention and its outcomes proved disappointing. The Convention was successful in settling the internal power struggle in an amicable and democratic fashion and was able to preserve the Movement’s unity and consolidate its leadership, in addition to endorsing the constitution. However, notwithstanding the consensus on the vision of the New Sudan and though the Manifesto was passed by acclamation, yet the Vision was not translated into strategies, or detailed programs and policies, that could guide daily political activity and on which the Movement’s electoral manifesto or program could be based. Until the writing of the present paper, none of these documents has been circulated for discussion and dialogue, nor has the National Liberation Council (NLC) been convened to approve them.
7. On the other hand, developing appealing programs and policies will be a futile exercise without paying equal attention to “organizational renewal” in terms of strengthening SPLM structures and institutions corresponding to the new post-CPA political realities. Building a robust organizational structure for the SPLM at the national level, therefore, is an imperative in order to address the profound challenges that the Movement is facing. Yet, this is an added failure of the National Convention, which has not attracted due attention even after the adjournment of the Convention. Thus, maintaining the sectoral organizational structure (the Northern Sector and Southern Sector), in light of the observed shortcomings and inadequacies, especially problems of coordination, definition of terms of reference for each sector, and relations with the newly established National Secretariat, including the skewed representation of the Northern Sector in the leadership structure, deserves immediate attention and resolution thereon.

8. Even after the passage of more than two years since the holding of the Second National Convention, the main feature of the Movement’s political practice lies in the absence of institutional decision-making processes, even going as far as violating the constitution, which was approved by the Convention itself, as if the document is nothing but a mere reference for power structure at the expense of substantive issues, organizational renewal, and the challenges of transformation. Perhaps the appointment of the SPLM Secretary General and his deputy for the Southern Sector as ministers in the regional government, in blatant violation of Article (4), Chapter IX, of the Movement’s Constitution stands as testimony to the supremacy of the executive branch (the Article explicitly states “the Secretary General, Deputies to the Secretary General, National Secretaries and all Secretaries of other levels shall be full time officers of the SPLM”). Thus, the Secretary General had to resign from his position, as minister for Cabinet Affairs in the Government of National Unity, when he was appointed to lead the Movement’s National Secretariat. However, it is obvious that the clout and influence of the SPLM as a political organization has started to wane in the context of the transformation of the SPLM from a liberation movement to a ruling political party. This development has, in turn, led the SPLM leaders and cadres to renounce organizational work in preference for “migration” to seats in government and the executive, positions which essentially hold the keys to power and wealth!

9. The SPLM grassroots and supporters of the country’s unity among northerners (ethnically and geographically) and southerners harbor many questions searching for answers, and find themselves helpless, and feel embarrassed in responding to the endless queries of both friends and foes about the position of the Movement on issues of unity and separation, self determination and the referendum. These followers have, therefore, become mostly skeptical and suspicious, if not overwhelmingly convinced, that some of the Movement’s leaders are intent on pulling the south towards secession, and devising measures for that end behind their backs and outside the framework of the SPLM constitutional institutions, without a shred of political or moral deterrent! Perhaps, the non-convocation of the NLC, for more than two years following the adjournment of the National Convention in May 2008, a body which represents the Movement’s parliament entrusted with approving its strategies, programs, and policies, stands to clearly vindicate the separatist trend amongst the SPLM leaders. (Ironically, some of these leaders justify and attribute their secessionist leanings to the failure of the NCP in rendering unity “attractive”, as if the Movement from the outset did not suspect the hidden agenda and separatist intentions of their partner! Therefore, did that suspicion alone change the course of unity the SPLM was charting? If so, why now and not earlier? What made things worse and consolidated the concerns and misgivings of the “northerners” in the SPLM is the nature of their representation in the Movement’s leadership and the executive branch, particularly in the federal government. In June 2008, immediately following the National Convention, I wrote an exhaustive memorandum to the leadership in which I explicitly stated all these concerns, without receiving any response or feedback to-date!

THE NORTHERN SECTOR: MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION OR A THEATRICAL DRAMA?

10. The definition of the Northern Sector of the SPLM is not synonymous with the geographical concept of northern Sudan, as the sector embraces the 13 states of the north, with the exception of the Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, and Abyei, which organizationally form part of the Southern Sector. The sector, or northerners, are represented by the ratio of 1 to 2, i.e. the equivalent of one third, in the National Convention, the supreme political body of the organization. They are equally represented with the same percentage in the NLC, however, without applying the same ratio in the composition of the Political Bureau (the leading executive organ), as they are represented by 4 members only out of a total of 27. It seems that the only plausible explanation for this paradox is the northerners’ lack of a fighting base in the ranks of the SPLA or “liberated” areas, as their comrades in the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessna, which would qualify them to assume leadership positions, notwithstanding the claim that the Movement has transformed itself from a military entity to a political party. While understanding the underlying logic of such a rationale, however, applying the same formula for northern membership in the Political Bureau, in the spirit of equitable representation of all components in all the institutions of the SPLM, would have given a strong message of inclusion, cohesion, and a reflection of unity of the Movement.

11. However, it clearly transpires from close scrutiny of the matter that there is an intention in the minds of the current SPLM leadership to weaken the institutional representation of northerners, and simultaneously minimize their contribution to the dialogue on crucial issues and critical challenges facing the Movement, particularly in relation to the question of self-determination and the equation of unity and separation. Thus, there was a proposal to further divide the Northern Sector into four sub-sectors (north, centre, east, and west) during the discussions of the Movement’s Interim National Council of the Draft Constitution before its submission to the National Convention. The proposal was rejected twice in a row by the majority of the Council’s membership for it contradicts, albeit indirectly, and runs contrary to the spirit of the SPLM Constitution, as Article I.2.2 unambiguously defines the SPLM as a political party in terms of two sectors only; the Northern Sector and the Southern Sector. The Constitution does not make the slightest reference to regions within the sector, and offers no definition, or even mere guidelines, for determining such regions. Therefore, basing representation on unclearly defined regions, and with overlapping constituencies, is yet another way of sowing divisions within the Northern sector (and this is what eventually transpired), the latter being the underlying reason for refusing to endorse the proposal. Even if we assume the relevance of the principle of representing regions within the north, for reasons of fairness, we should agree first on a) the objective criteria for this representation and for the determination of regions eligible for representation, and b) the requisite leadership qualities and contribution to the SPLM, before embarking on putting names forward. We cannot put the cart before the horse. Room should have been given for wider consultation to reach a consensus on these critical issues. Thus, what is the value-added of such representation if the representatives themselves lack the capacity and the required skills?

12. It is true that realities, as in the case of Southern Sudan, dictate representation and balancing along tribal and ethnic or regional lines. This representation, however, should by no means compromise the objectives, competence, performance, and outcome of the SPLM, especially at the level of the top leadership. Thus, the SPLM leaders have always demonstrated varying degrees of leadership qualities, while representing their respective ethnic communities (though the fairness of this representation is in question by many). What is important to underline here is that all those leaders acquired their leadership positions, not because of their tribal affiliations, but in recognition of their leadership capabilities and sacrifice during the armed struggle phase in the evolution of the Movement. Above all, it is the demonstrated qualities of the member and commitment to the ideals of the Movement for a sufficiently long time span that qualifies a person for promotion to leadership positions. The principal criterion for ascendance to leadership positions, therefore, is not the ethnic group or geographical area one comes from, but in essence it is the longstanding commitment and outstanding contribution to the SPLM that count in the final analysis. Otherwise, why not divide the Southern Sector into regions or ethnic groups and then ask the respective defined constituencies to name their nominees to, or representatives in the Political Bureau, as typically followed in the case of the Northern Sector? Therefore, why is the prejudice against northerners and the North Sector carried out by resorting to double standards?

13. By the same token one would expect the same logic and criterion of selection to apply for the leaders coming from the North. The SPLM is not short of veterans who contributed to the development of the SPLM, especially politically, both during the armed struggle and in the post CPA phase, and who are acceptable to a large sector of the society in the North. There is no reason for preventing the appointment of Northerners to the Political Bureau except for seniority and rank in the army, which reflects the dominance of a “military mentality”, this despite the transformation of the movement into a political organization! Therefore, why the haste in appointing newly groomed leaders from the North, whose signatures on the SPLM membership’s application form is still wet! Is this meant to be a window-dressing exercise, with symbolic and ineffectual representation of the North? One really wonders if this is a benign gesture or indicative of sinister design! The grassroots of the Movement in the North are united in their commitment to the SPLM and the Vision of the New Sudan. This is what essentially prompted them to join the SPLM. Why do we divide them along unclearly defined regional bases and for an equally ambiguously articulated objective, while the Sector is still under structuring and without regard for their abilities and leadership qualities? Thus, my conversations and discussions with comrades during the Convention conveyed a strong feeling that an onslaught has been mounted on the Northern sector. Most of the delegates from the North believe that the attempt at weakening the Northern sector had actually started with the process of excluding the SPLM cadres in the Sector who have been with the SPLM since the phase of armed struggle, by adopting the state as the Electoral College.

14. The correct approach is to give the opportunity to these new SPLM leaders/members from the North to prove themselves and demonstrate the abilities that would qualify them to eventually assume leadership responsibilities in the leading executive organ of the SPLM. The NLC, for this matter, avails both the opportunity and the forum for acquiring the necessary leadership qualities and skills. The NLC is the grooming and testing ground for promotion to leadership positions in the SPLM top policy making body entrusted with articulating the concerns of the Movement’s various constituencies all over the Sudan into national programs and policies. Otherwise, the inevitable result is that the Political Bureau, contrary to its main mandate, will turn into a platform for power struggle and for endorsing the agenda of the prevailing group(s) in the south, at the expense of the Movement’s higher goals enshrined in the Manifesto and the Constitution. Indeed, this is what really happened on the pretext of the “token” (or mock) representation of the Northern Sector and its leaders, whose role has been restricted to bless the decisions in a top-down fashion as instructions to the grassroots, without any deep dialogues or serious discussions.

15. On the one hand, we have to admit that there have been glitches and shortcomings in the organization of the Northern sector, as well as in the Southern sector, but the North sector shouldn’t be singularly punished by allowing its division along regional lines on the pretext of better management and organization. Equally, the tremendous efforts that have been expended on restructuring and organizing the Northern sector should equally be recognized and applauded. On the other hand, however, this should not absolve the Sector’s leadership of the failure to reach and engage important segments of the society in the north, especially among the professionals, employees, workers, farmers, the intellectuals groups, these groups constituting the longstanding supporters and followers, and enthusiasts and fans of the New Sudan Vision. Thus, the leadership of the Sector has failed to expand the membership base and building popular and syndicated organizations, supportive of the political body of the Movement in northern Sudan. Besides, the Sector did not take the general elections seriously, the only mechanism for change as provided for by the CPA, or put it in the forefront of its priorities in terms of the required keenness and preparedness since the onset of the interim period in 2005. The leadership of the Sector, however, opted to boycott the elections in the north a few days prior to their commencement on the pretext of arguments that are short of credibility. Meanwhile, the late Chairman of the Movement, Dr. John Garang, had counted very much on these elections, thus in his own words “the SPLM clearly has the potential to become the majority party in the coming national elections at all levels – local, state and national”. In addition, the decision to boycott the elections was taken outside the established institutional frameworks of the Movement, including the institutions of the Northern Sector itself, which caused bewilderment and confusion in the midst of the Sector’s membership. This ultimately led to the isolation of the Sector’s leaders from their grassroots, and created an anomalous situation, reflected in the representation of the Southern Sector in the legislative and executive institutions of the State, while the Northern Sector has found itself outside these institutions. Therefore, what is the ultimate role of the Sector in this critical historical phase prior to the referendum on self-determination, and what are its objectives and goals? Will the Sector turn into a self-standing and full-fledged opposition party? Again, what is the position of the Sector regarding the statements, uttered in a strident and strong-worded language, of some of the SPLM leaders at various levels, within and outside the Sudan, in favor of separation and the independence of the south? Or are we this time on the verge of a split into two movements, one “southern” and the other “northern”?

16. I mentioned in an earlier paper, published two years before the elections that “the outcome of those elections would be disastrous for the SPLM, as well as for the cause of the “southern nationalists”, in case it decided to politically decamp from the north, or if it failed to secure a comfortable representation in the national parliament” (Enduring the Hazards of “Attractive Unity”: The John Garang Calling, Khartoum Monitor, August 2007). In reality, boycotting the elections fuelled the secessionist tendencies by providing strong arguments to the separatists, as they would say “did we not warn you that the SPLM lacks a credible base in the north, and that the claim of the Northern Sector of registering over two million members is by no means reflective of reality, for how would an organization that wields such sizeable support dare to boycott the elections, whether fair or fraudulent? Therefore, why should we stay in the north when we lack the necessary public support and popular mandate? Even if the decision to boycott is interpreted as emanating from the reluctance of the SPLM leadership in providing the necessary support and requirements, this in itself reflects that the Movement’s leadership is no longer enthusiastic about the cause of the Northern Sector, and may be perceived as the culmination of the attempts that aimed at weakening it, revealed by the deliberations and the events of the Second National Convention. This means that the Sector, and for that matter the north itself, is no longer on the list of priorities of the Movement’s leadership, and even completely outside the sphere of its interest! Perhaps, what underlines this attitude was the shocking leadership’s decision to withdraw the SPLM candidate from the electoral race for the presidency, which resulted in frustration and disappointment among the supporters of the Movement, especially since the stated reasons for the decision were not convincing or satisfactory, giving credence to the widely circulated story of a secret “deal” between the two ruling partners. The withdrawal occurred despite the impetus provided by the dynamic and vigorous electoral campaign of the candidate, which was well responded to by wide sectors in the north, including even those who already lost hope in the SPLM to lead the process of change that the Movement has preached, especially following the sudden and tragic departure of its historical leader. Also, perhaps the reluctance to call for the convening of the NLC is intended to reinforce the fading voice of the northerners in the SPLM, and the unionists at large, by depriving them of the opportunity to express their opinion and clarify their position on the equation of unity and separation, as well as on the Movement’s stand on the referendum on self-determination, and to make their contributions to the future of the SPLM, in the context of an open and transparent dialogue.

17. Adding insult to injury, the representation of northerners in the Government of National Unity was weak and marginal (a State Minster and a Presidential Adviser “without a portfolio”), on the pretext that the Power Sharing protocol of the CPA assigned to them only 7% out of the 28%, which is the share of the SPLM. However, had the heart of the Movement’s leadership been on unity, this text would have not acted as an impediment to an equitable representation of northerners in the government. This is especially when the assigned percentage did not restrict their representation in the Committees of the Interim National Assembly where the north was represented by 40% of the SPLM total share in the parliament. Even if we disregarded that, what would be the argument for excluding them entirely from the government that was formed following the general elections? Is it because the Northern Sector boycotted the elections? Or is it a sort of collective “blanket” punishment and an excuse to absolve the leadership of the burden of unity and unionists, in lieu of the Sector’s leadership defiance of the decision of the Political Bureau? (the resolution was to: a) withdraw the SPLM presidential candidate, and b) participation in elections in the north at all levels, except in Darfur). Did the SPLM leadership not give the green light, albeit un-institutionally, to the Sector’s decision to boycott the elections, which was publicly declared by the Movement’s Secretary General? So, if the non-participation in the elections is the culprit, are there not appointed ministers in both the federal and regional governments, who failed in the same elections or even did not participate to start with? It is obvious that allocation of ministerial portfolios firmly rests on regional, ethnic and tribal considerations, which equally calls for the representation of the Northern Sector in proportion to its due weight in the National Convention and the NLC. Otherwise, wouldn’t the token representation of northerners be reminiscent of the southerners’ representation in all the successive northerners-dominated central governments, an approach and attitude that Southerners themselves strongly detested and used repeatedly as glaring evidence of marginalization and oppression. Indeed, it is an irony for the NCP, depicted by the SPLM, and southerners at large, as a party that breaches charters and dishonors agreements, to be more keen on the participation of its southern members and allies in the government, while the SPLM (supposedly national in character and membership) dump and dispose of those who stood firmly with Movement and behind its leadership during all the phases of armed political struggle.

CONCLUSION

18. Sudanese from all parts of Northern Sudan were agitated and captivated by the Vision of the New Sudan, or the united Sudan on new bases, witnessed by the unprecedented turnout for the reception of the late SPLM leader in Khartoum on July 8, 2005, and in the rush of large numbers to join the Movement following the conclusion of the CPA. However, their lack of a base in the ranks of the SPLA, like their counterparts in Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile, deprived them of having an important influence on the decision-making process within the SPLM, especially with the growing separatist inclinations amongst the Movement’s leadership after the sudden and tragic death of its leader. After the completion of the organizational structure of the Northern Sector, in the first phase, it was hoped that the Second National Convention would allow genuine representation for the Sector and northerners in the leading institutions of the SPLM organizations, and effective participation in the formulation of strategies, programs, and policies of the Movement, particularly with respect of reconciling the objectives of unity and self-determination. However, the Convention turned into a political “demonstration” as its deliberations did not go beyond endorsing only the two documents, the Constitution and the Manifesto, which were presented to the delegates, while northerners were faintly represented in the leading organ of the party, in light of an observed onslaught against the Northern Sector. On its part, the leadership of the Sector did not disappoint its adversaries by squandering the opportunity of harvesting votes in the general elections, in particular since the northerners do not have a constituency within the ranks of the SPLA! Thus, they were left lurking outside the legislative and executive institutions of the state, a predicament that has weakened the position of the Sector in the structure of the SPLM, and completely undermined its influence.

19. The leaders of the Northern Sector are accountable to their membership, and supporters of the movement in general, to conduct a comprehensive review of the Sector’s political and organizational work experience, and identify the gaps, shortcomings, and constraints, and build on the successes and achievements. It is also imperative to further take two important steps: 1) a call for a general Sector-wide meeting for dialogue and discussion about the equation of unity and separation, and the position of the Movement on the two options of the referendum on self-determination. This, is in addition to a wide ranging brainstorming and deliberation over the future and the fate of the Sector in case of separation of the south, which is strongly imminent, and 2) perseverance in the demand for convening of the NLC with the objective of holding a serious and frank dialogue about the Movement’s position on the referendum on self-determination, and unity of the country. If brainstorming has taken place on the future of Southern Sudan in the post 2011 period, through convening many seminars and symposia for this purpose both within and outside Sudan, it is equally pertinent to commence a deep dialogue and frank discussion on the present status of the SPLM and future scenarios. The SPLM, as we have come to know it, was founded and launched in southern Sudan as one body that has gradually embraced various nationalities and political trends, firmly committed to the Vision of the New Sudan. Thus, if it is abandoned by its founding entity, or any of its other components, the Movement will fall apart as the country is split into two parts or spirals towards disintegration and fragmentation. Realizing the New Sudan vision on the ground is contingent on keeping the country united on new bases, and only a dreamer would think that it is feasible for the SPLM to continue being viable in “multiple Sudans”!

Dr. Elwathig Kameir can be reached at [email protected]