Abuja 2 Lurking in Doha: Politics versus Policy

By Hamid Eltgani Ali

January 12, 2011 — The war in Darfur has cost around US $31 billion, by my estimate, in direct and indirect costs to Sudan’s treasure and destruction of the infrastructure in Darfur. Let us not forget that of every dollar earned from oil revenue, $0.21 was spent on war efforts. More importantly, the estimated loss of life is around 312,000 persons, with more than 3 million displaced. All those sacrifices hardly seem worthy of the flawed peace process in Doha that has been dominated by the National Congress Party’s (NCP) supporters from the early stages. Day by day we are gradually losing the force and the credibility of the Doha process. Darfuri civil society has spoken clearly that they will not buy a retail peace and all parties to the conflict should sign on to this judgment.

Sad to say, the Sudan Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) has misread the political map. They will make a big blunder if they sign any deal with this aging and despotic regime without a soul. Lately, the LJM has become a liability and the weakest link and appeared, it is working in tandem with GoS (Government of Sudan) in project that is not delegated by anyone except the dweller of MÖVENPICK Hotels in Doha. Disingenuously, they are using tricks to sell a defunct accord to the Darfuri people. I have coined the term “Abuja 2” for the expected peace document accepted by LJM and the Al-Bashir regime that is tacitly in agreement with document. The key components of the accord will be similar to, if not worse than, the Abuja 1 accord in 2005. The new “peace document” (Abuja 2) is available in the public domain. However, no matter how strong its international backing is, it is failed the public scrutiny, as the key provisions are silent on the issues of international justice and the status of Darfur as region. Furthermore, the proposed compensation is so meager that, if divided among the victims individually, everyone would receive less than US $100. For example, as insult to the victims, for IDPs to start their lives, each is entitled US $350. This amount is not enough to buy a donkey or cow to start a new life.

Both parties recognized the tuff time head to sell this document. Consequently, the government walked away from the negotiating table, while LJM remained silent for unfolding episodes. This was a maneuver and a trick collectively orchestrated by the government of Sudan, and the LJM to manipulate public opinion to hail what comes next as a breakthrough. The tragedy of this orchestrated game, it gives the LJM some room to garner some international support, and offers credibility to it’s claim that they are not all an extension of the NCP and that they are in a dogfight with GoS to represent the Darfuri interests. Some members are genuine on that claim, but not all. In addition, it is appearing to the public that the GoS negotiators have exhausted their mandate and are heading home! The timing of the documents, if it goes according to the plan of the two parties, it would have given Khartoum a victory at the moment they need it most while doing nothing for the people of Darfur, and provides cover for the regime’s “New Strategy for Darfur” as well said by Eric Reed.

Moreover, if this orchestrated move were not a theatrical show, why and how did the government delegation stunningly depart from Doha, in less than 24 hours, while the mediators declared publicly that pending issues had been resolved? Then in a matter of hours, the presidential advisor and official of the Darfur dossier, Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin, held a press conference to declare that the results of negotiation between the government and the LJM have reached the inevitable conclusion and should be accepted. I smell a rat! Dr. Ghazi added that the government is accepting 95% of the document. Then why does he leave Doha then. Ironically, the 5% that remains to be negotiated are the issues that most interest the Darfuri, including, but not limited to, the issues of Darfur as a region, the retain shares of Darfur natural resources oil and minerals, the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the process for prosecuting war criminals including Al-Bashir, and individual compensation.

As we have learned, concerning the key components of the documents, the ICC issues on war crimes were dropped, for the sake of domestication of justice. Moreover, the semi-final text of Abuja 2 includes a provision that there will be a Transitional Regional Authority for five years, followed by a popular referendum to determine the status of the region. This déjà-vu provision is the same regional authority stipulated in the failed Abuja 1. This Regional Authority lacks any legal power. In addition, there has been no discussion of power structures, how to control the fraudulently and farcically elected governors who are profiteering from war, or the structure of the relationship with the federal state. Of course, there is one position, dear to some hearts, namely the position of vice-president to a president who is a fugitive from the international law. The position is called “Vice-president” instead of “Senior Assistant to the President” to make it more appealing, but in reality the guru and deal maker Ali Osman Taha will retain all the power as the first Vice President, while the other Darfuri position will be ceremonial—a completely worthless position in the current power structure. Can any Darfuri stand taller and ask for the presidency? Cannot Al-Bashir, who has had it for more than two decades, now let it go?

A profoundly creative mind on the part of the mediator is revealed by the provisions to create “commissions.” These “commissions” have been renamed “ministers,” so Darfur will have a minister of compensation, a minister of Land, DDR and so forth. This should eliminate the lust for positions, as it seems there are enough ministerial positions for everyone in Darfur. The dark side of it is that the ministerial positions come with compensations and perks; a disproportionate amount of the Darfuri resources will go for bureaucracy at the expense of development and reconstruction. Does no one know how to curb the absolute power and corruption of these commissions that are masquerading as “ministers”?

Abuja 2, with its current provisions, will prolong the suffering and give breathing room, or rather life support, to this despotic regime. Darfuris cannot overlook justice and Darfur as entity to trade them for a few government positions. Our thumbs down to Abuja 2: we call for Darfuris everywhere to reject it. We should end this tragic chapter in the history of our country collectively on a strong note, not based on opportunism and politics which will only open up new wounds in the torn body of Darfur and the country as well. Of course the first and best policy option, I whisper in any ear willing to hear from Darfur: let us opt for regime change, accept the northern opposition parties in a broader coalition to claim our motherland once again. Otherwise, no one should live in a country without a soul, with the leaders that are pariah and disgraced by all the civilized nations.

Hamid Eltgani Ali, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, School of Global Affairs, American University in Cairo, can be reached at: [email protected]