Abyei: Predicting the future

By Tim Flatman

30 April 2011, updated 9 May 2011

Analysts have been reluctant to predict exactly what will unfold in Abyei over the coming months. On a purely human, individual level, this is entirely understandable. The region is notoriously unpredictable. No-one wants to embarrass themselves or jeopardise their reputation by making forecasts which are quickly proved inaccurate. More charitably, stakeholders naturally want to project optimism that a solution can be reached and massive bloodshed averted, rather than create a self-fulfilling prophecy of impending armageddon. Even those advocacy groups who are highlighting the dangers of genocide and/or conflict in Abyei are fairly vague as to the sequence of events which may unfold, and maintain confidence that intervention can still result in prevention of widespread violence. Strategically too, it makes sense to concentrate on CPA fulfilment, an objective speculation on potential actions outside of the CPA can distract from.

Yet it is pointlessly counter-factual to argue that CPA implementation can proceed according to the letter of the agreement. The deadline for the Abyei referendum has, after all, passed. It seems highly unlikely that a referendum will take place at all. “CPA implementation” has become a proxy for a consensual agreement on the status of Abyei, rather than for a mechanism for determining and delivering on the aspirations of the permanent residents of Abyei. If the latter was the object, we might conclude that a unilateral process was likely to adhere more closely to the letter of the CPA.

So too even the most ardent optimist must now admit there is a chance no agreement will be reached before the CPA end-date of July 9th. A more realistic assessment might conclude that this is likely. In this context it would be negligent to rule out public deliberation on what may happen over the next few months, how key stakeholders are likely to react and how a range of different external responses could shape events as they unfold.

This paper aims to make some predictions, based for the most part not on direct inside information, but on a detailed reading of the behaviour of key actors over the last few months. The “international community” is a nebulous phrase, but is used here primarily to refer to those who have led mediation efforts: the US, UN, AU, to a lesser extent the UK and other members of the Troika, and those who have a direct interest in Sudan or who are likely to have a prominent role in the recognition of South Sudan – China, Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, etc. Where “international community” is too nebulous a descriptor to be at all useful, effort will be made to clarify which parts of it are being referred to. With other actors (NCP, SPLM, Dinka Ngok, Misseriya, etc) it should be clearer who the referent is.

Diplomats and policy makers seem to have been operating under the assumption that both NCP and SPLM fundamentally want peace and will compromise on Abyei in a last-minute deal following brinksmanship from both sides. They cite the Southern referendum, whose implementation seemed so unlikely for so long, as evidence of that. If international mediators facilitate engagement between the two parties, they will come to an agreement if they want it enough – and if they don’t want it enough, it isn’t workable, this cavalier approach suggests. The role of mediators is to bring the parties together, then get out of the way. The absolute worst thing they could do is to appear to favour one of the parties. Studious impartiality, supposedly, means treating and referring to both parties in equal terms – whatever the material facts of the situation.

Diplomats must quickly wake up to the reality that Abyei is unique, and a compromise is not inevitable or even likely. There is plenty of evidence in favour of this assertion. The Republic of South Sudan’s draft transitional constitution famously includes the definition:

“The territory of the Republic of South Sudan comprises all lands and air space that constituted the three former Southern Provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in their boundaries as they stood on January 1, 1956, and the Abyei Area, the territory of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred from Bahr el Ghazal Province to Kordofan Province in 1905 as defined by the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal Award of July 2009.”

It might have been hoped that this inclusion would dispel any vestiges of optimism within the corridors of power in the UN, AU and US government that the South can accept any further territorial compromise. Holding out for such an agreement has made the resolution of Abyei’s status less, rather than more likely. It also relies on the questionable assumption that the NCP would settle for whatever territorial compromise was reached, rather than accepting it at first then pushing for more land, as they have done consistently since 2005. Sadly the inclusion only resulted in international pressure through the AU to strike the language from the constitution. Any Southern acquiescence to this demand will be met by strong resistance from within South Sudan. If, as the AU suggest, the South do meet this demand, it should not be seen as a sign they are willing to compromise on territory, but simply as a desire to halt the escalation of violence so that conflict over Abyei is delayed, for reasons that shall be explored later.

President Bashir’s response to the language in the constitution similarly offered little room for compromise: “I say it and repeat it for the million times, Abyei is northern and will remain northern”. He went on to threaten war, stating that the movement must submit to the will of ballot boxes “or else boxes of bullets will decide the matter.”5 This is decidedly odd rhetoric coming from the person who, in an arguable design flaw in the Abyei Protocol, had the sole responsibility for setting up a referendum commission for Abyei, but failed to do so – followed by the mass displacement of tens of thousands of Abyei residents from their homes by Northern militias, making a referendum harder to implement. The events of 1st May in Tajalei and Todach also suggest Bashir is not serious about resolving the status of Abyei through democratic means. While a counter-spin operation by the GoS has so far been successful in persuading the international community and media not to treat the incident as an act of Northern aggression, this author has seen evidence to the contrary. The events deserve a fuller treatment elsewhere, and information is still coming to light. Suffice to say here it is far more plausible that this was part of an attempt to get SAF forces and military hardware to Abyei town under the flimsy cover of being part of an (unauthorized) JIU operation. The attempt was thwarted by Southern intelligence and quick reactions. The intent was either to occupy Abyei town in a surprise attack, or to put well-equipped units in place for expected conflict in July. These actions are not compatible with a belief that the status of Abyei can and should be resolved through democratic means.

Validation of the questionable premise that Bashir’s objections to the Abyei referendum are based on a pro-democracy outlook requires acceptance of Misseriya voting rights, or at least acceptance of the idea that the question of Misseriya voting rights is a legitimate area of debate within the CPA framework. Bashir relies on the perception of disengaged outsiders that to argue to the contrary is to treat the Misseriya as somehow inferior. Yet we should recognize that the claims Misseriya and the Dinka Ngok are simply not equal and should not be treated as such. This historical accuracy of this statement was recognised by both the Abyei Boundaries Commission and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but it is also becomes apparent when we look at how claims have been articulated by the respective communities.

A seemingly obvious, yet often overlooked point is that the claim that Misseriya should have voting rights is a very recent phenomenon. No-one suggested seasonal migrants passing through Abyei should be granted voting rights at the time the Abyei protocol was agreed. The Abyei Referendum Act, passed by Sudan’s National Assembly, does not mention the Misseriya.6 The NCP did not attempt to establish a precedent in the Southern referendum act that seasonal migrants would be able to vote in the referendum, suggesting they did not expect voting rights to be the wedge issue in setting up a commission for the Abyei Referendum Act. The Misseriya demand for voting rights has been manufactured relatively recently to provide an excuse for non-implementation of the Abyei Protocol.

Of course, not all Misseriya are seasonal migrants. Some do indeed live in Abyei. But President Bashir’s assertion is that all Misseriya should be able to vote in the Abyei referendum, and it is uncontestable that most are seasonal migrants. Furthermore, there is no way of discriminating between those who do travel through Abyei during the dry season, and those who travel through other areas but might try to vote in a referendum. Bashir knows that Southerners know this: his condition is an impossiblist demand he knows Southerners cannot possibly accept as it would allow him to effectively rig the referendum, with Misseriya who would normally have nothing to do with Abyei overwhelming the Dinka Ngok vote. (Even when considering the Misseriya families who are permanent residents of Abyei, the only way of distinguishing them from other MIsseriya in terms of voting rights is to have the 9 Dinka Ngok traditional chiefs identify them during a registration process: something the Dinka Ngok community is happy to do. While this process hardly seems ideal, no-one has suggested a viable alternative.)

Some writers will complain that I am conflating the Misseriya with the NCP in this account. To that accusation I would retort that by effectively isolating ordinary Misseriya people and preventing any work to identify their opinions and aspirations, the NCP and Misseriya leadership have left no other choice. The Dinka Ngok are again different, their claims as to their community’s demands are verifiable: it is easy to get access to go and speak to ordinary Dinka Ngok people and ask them what they want. To the Misseriya there is no equivalent access, so we cannot simply take the Misseriya leadership’s claim to speak for the community at face value. Privately, those who work directly with the Misseriya suggest current Misseriya leadership reflect an NCP whose patronage they rely on, more than the community they supposedly represent. Historians recall that the traditional party of the Misseriya is the Umma, rather than the NIF. Furthermore, the gap between the youth and leadership is widening, with many youth desiring a more settled lifestyle where fixed health, education and social provision can have a greater impact on their lives. Some suggest that Misseriya leadership, cautious of this growing gulf, have deliberately isolated their community so that much of it remains unaware of the SPLM offer of continued migratory, grazing, social and political rights post-separation, and do not form social networks with Dinka Ngok youth.

That is not to say that the Misseriya, and even the Misseriya leadership, do not have their own interests which may diverge from the NCP from time to time. Their reaction to the Abyei Referendum Act’s passing in the National Assembly remains the most theatrical presentation of their autonomy. The Abyei Referendum Act was a carefully worded document which clearly accepts the verdict of the PCA as to who could vote in an Abyei referendum, without reinforcing it.[[ Part 2, 24, on voter eligibility refers directly to the Dinka Ngok and other Sudanese who meet residency critera; Part 1, 14, (1) states that a commission shall determine residency criteria in accordance with the Abyei Protocol, which itself refers to “permanent residents”. Abyei Referendum Act 2009]] Misseriya representatives walked out of the National Assembly before the bill was passed in protest. But to suggest those actions prove voting rights are a demand coming from the grassroots of the Misseriya community makes two unverifiable assumptions: first, that Misseriya leadership represents well the feelings of its community – as we have seen, an assumption that is at best unprovable and at worst entirely spurious, and second, that voting rights are the only means to achieve Misseriya aspirations.

The Misseriya had a right to feel betrayed by the NCP-led government they fought for during the war. Western Kordofan, the state in which they could be regarded as the majority tribe, was abolished and its territory merged into the considerably larger and more diverse South Kordofan state. Misseriya areas remained undeveloped. They were encouraged to look to Abyei as “their” area, which would be developed upon taking the land for themselves. Within this context, the sanctioning of a process which would remove the possibility of Abyei becoming “their” area too, must have seemed like betrayal indeed. But the recreation and development of Western Kordofan state, combined with strong guarantees that the migratory, grazing, social and political rights promised by the South will be respected, might satisfy their aspirations (and especially those of the youth who want to move away from a nomadic lifestyle) without the need to control Abyei politically. There recreation of Western Kordofan looks more realistic a proposition than it has for some time: leaders of Misseriya and Nuba tribes set up a committee in late March to reclaim Western Kordofan state, and the NCP in South Kordofan recently stated they had no objection to re-establishing Western Kordofan. Recreation should be approached with caution: Nuba are split over the issue, SPLM leadership in South Kordofan against, and much depends on where boundaries between the two states are drawn. It is also an easy giveaway from the GoS who will be looking for soft options to demonstrate they have not entirely ignored the voice of the people expressed in the upcoming popular consultation in South Kordofan. But it does suggest that there may be ways of meeting Misseriya aspirations within a North that does not include Abyei, and that voting rights, to the extent that they are an autonomous demand from Misseriya communities, are a demand conditioned by the situation the NCP have manipulated them into, rather than a demand intrinsic to their identity.
If we conclude that Bashir’s attachment to Misseriya voting rights is a ploy to prevent the implementation of a referendum in Abyei, and indeed an agreement on the status of the region, by setting a condition that cannot possibly be met, we will take a different view as to the possibility of reaching an agreement on the status of Abyei before July.

Yet as many have noted, resumption of full-scale war with the South is hardly in the NCP’s interests. Though a proxy war might be welcomed by those who see a need to save face with external backers after being outmanoeuvred into letting the South go, proxy war could easily develop into full-scale war, and full-scale war could reach Khartoum and threaten the NCP’s hold on power, when new conflicts in Darfur, rising discontent in South Kordofan and Blue Nile region, and a more professionalised and better-equipped SPLA/SSAF than previously existed are taken into account. This is a risk the NCP seem to be preparing for by their actions in Darfur: pursuing a strategy of “peace from within”, exploiting the situation in Libya to decapitate JEM, increasing attacks on Jebel Marra to weaken a divided SLA, and offering a referendum on a single region in Darfur to undermine the ideological basis of support for rebel movements – all textbook strategies developed during the war with the South. The aim being to put themselves in a position where they can focus on the southern frontier come July. But why take the risk at all?

President Bashir’s recent threat at an election rally in South Kordofan that “If they put Abyei in the constitution of the new state of south Sudan, we will not recognise the new state” is indicative of Khartoum’s high-risk strategy on Abyei. The NCP will encourage its allies to follow suit and hold back recognition, playing on the West’s desire to achieve consensus and avoid a situation where recognition and non-recognition of the South splits the world down the middle. If the NCP can successfully out-manoeuvre the US & UK into holding back on recognition of the South in July, pressure on the South to accept further compromise on the lands constituted by Abyei, and on resource-sharing, will be intensified. This is a continuation of existing Northern strategy, rather than a bold new gambit. Existing strategy relies on refusing to enforce existing agreements (constantly inventing new obstacles to implementation so this position seems less unreasonable), while utilizing and threatening further military capability to strengthen its position, and relying on the international community to put pressure on the South not to intervene.

This strategy has proved successful so far. Local reports of militia attacks on villages seemed to be confirmed by satellite imagery, yet were reported by international media as “clashes”,[[ A good example can be found at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12596613 Accounts given by the GoS and Abyei Area Administration on the events of 1st May were also given equal weight in a report by Reuters available at: http://af.reuters.com/article/sudanNews/idAFLAE36532720110503?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0 despite a large discrepancy in plausibility between the two accounts. The GoS account fails to give a reason for the simultaneous attack on Tajalei, or explain why the SAF contingent had no documentation/authorization from Abyei town itself, yet is treated in the same way as the more plausible Abyei Area Administration account. This approach assists the GoS, allowing them to shroud events in confusion, and avoid responsibility for their aggression. It also reduces international sympathy for the South if the North can, by fair means or foul, equalize blame between both sides for any violent incidents.]] and international condemnation has often equalized blame on both sides. South Sudan has not intervened when Southerners have come under attack in Abyei, and has consistently been the first to respond to international demands to demilitarize the surrounding areas. The US, UN and AU have persistently put options on the table which try to manoeuvre the South into accepting further territorial compromise,[[See Douglas Johnson’s account in The Road Back From Abyei, available at: http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/4702/The-Road-Back-From-Abyei.aspx However, in some more recent statements, international institutions have explicitly recognized the PCA verdict on the borders of Abyei, for example UN Security Council Presidential Statement SC/10231, available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10231.doc.htm This is to be welcomed.]] even as Southerners complain this sets a precedent for rewarding ethnic cleansing with claims to land.[[SPLM Press Release on Abyei, January 2011]] The NCP’s calculation that the threat of non-recognition will force the South to back down on implementation of the Abyei Protocol seems realistic, if risky, viewed in the context of recent events.

Yet it is not clear, for a number of reasons, that this decision by Southern leadership to bow to such pressure is anything more than a temporary tactic. It is in the interests of the RoSS to allow preparations for formal separation (including the publication and acceptance of a new transitional constitution) to get as far underway as possible before asserting itself in Abyei. Even if President Salva Kiir and Minister for Peace & CPA Implementation Pagan Amum no longer believe a negotiated solution is possible on Abyei, like Bashir it is in their interests to wait and present military engagement in Abyei as reluctant and a last resort. These are reasons for holding back now which will expire in July.

There are also positive reasons to suggest Northern calculations that pressure created by the threat of non-recognition will force the South to back down are wrong. The fragility of the SPLA has been persistently highlighted by international media even as forced displacement in Abyei has gone unreported, not least by a Guardian interview with Bashir in which he predicted the South would become a failed state. Regional loyalties can trump operational commands, especially in emotive cases like Abyei. Dinka Ngok recruits were some of the first to join the SPLA, shoring up John Garang’s leadership, and many in the top ranks of the SPLA feel a debt of gratitude. There is fear in the higher echelons of the SPLM/A that senior officers, many of whom are Dinka Ngok or have ties to Abyei region, could mutiny and take their soldiers to fight in Abyei even if the President of RoSS gave a direct order not to, should the North occupy Abyei when the South secedes. Individuals from other Dinka sub-tribes threaten to follow them. We should not assume that, because Salva Kiir is Dinka & the SPLM/A has often been accused of being dominated by Dinka, the splintering of the SPLA over Abyei is less likely than in Upper Nile or Jonglei. As John Luk Jok pointed out, “We [Nuer] have seven ministers and also the post of the Vice President” and ”The SPLA Chief of General Staff, James Hoth Mai, is also son of the Nuer community”. Yet it has not stopped Major General Peter Gatdet appealing to a narrative of betrayal and marginalization.

Those who believe it will be possible to stop the SPLA responding to a Northern intervention in Abyei in July should therefore consider whether Salva Kiir is likely to risk the disintegration of the SPLA, heralded by some of the communities most loyal to it, over an attempt to maintain international goodwill. But there are further reasons to believe the Southern leadership has already made its mind up on how to approach Abyei in the face of continued Northern intransigence.

The 9 Dinka Ngok Chiefdoms in Abyei are more independent of the SPLM than is often assumed. Part of the thinking behind the setting up of Abyei Civil Society following the 2008 attacks on Abyei town was that the people of Abyei needed organs through which they could express themselves and exert pressure on the UN, GoSS and GoS in situations where the national leadership of the SPLM. It is no secret that the Ngok Dinka Consultative Conference in Juba, held November 15-16, resolved that “Should the two CPA Parties fail to take positive action on the Abyei Referendum by November 30th , 2010, wethe Ngok people reserve our right to exercise self-determination as affirmed under the principles of International law”[[Resolution 10, Resolutions of the Abyei Ngok Dinka Consultative Conference, Juba, Southern Sudan, November 15-16, 2010]] and that discussions subsequently took place amongst the Dinka Ngok people themselves as to how that process could be managed. Misinterpretations of how self-determination would be outworked may have laid behind some of the Misseriya attacks on Dinka Ngok communities around the date of the referendum, especially since there was a strong desire from the grassroots in Abyei that self-determination be achieved just before or as the Southern referendum took place.

The anger and lawlessness which found expression in the events following the shooting in Abyei market of February 14 was an expression of the lack of trust civil society groups had in political leadership and youth had in elders. This author received accounts which bemoaned the SPLM’s willingness to succumb to international pressure to redeploy JIUs without solving Abyei’s problems, and which said “the Kadugli agreements destroyed our hopes”. This thinking is dissonant to that of some international mediators who seem to regard the Kadugli agreement as a basis for a wider political agreement rather than as a short-term means of de-escalating conflict.

The Dinka Ngok have had numerous opportunities to make an attempt to realize their own self-determination and the organization of the Consultative Conference and the series of petitions organized by Abyei Civil Society from 2009-10 suggest they have the organizational capacity to pull off some kind of self-determination process, even if it didn’t adhere to the strict process of a referendum. There have been no public reports of how close local communities have come to making a decision independent of the national SPLM leadership, but keen observers know the strength of feeling of local communities. Dinka Ngok have had Pagan Amum visit and Salva Kiir contact them directly to reason with them on more than one occasion since the beginning of 2011, and on each occasion have subsequently stepped back from the brink. Given the independence and strong feelings of the Dinka Ngok community, who desire self-determination as soon as possible, it seems unlikely that some form of reassurances as to future support were not given in return for a commitment not to act unilaterally before July. This does not mean that the SPLA will act pre-emptively in Abyei before July 9, but that if they did not respond favourably to any assertion made by the Dinka Ngok, and react robustly to Northern aggression post-July 9, this might be regarded by Dinka Ngok as a betrayal of any assurances given.

It seems then, we have an international community that fundamentally misunderstands both sides’ positions and has at least until now been naively optimistic about the chances of a last-minute deal, an NCP that thinks it can get away with more than it can by pursuing a high-risk strategy (based on the success of that strategy thus far), and a South that cannot meet the demands of the international community or fail to respond to Northern aggression, but will leave it ‘till the last possible moment to act decisively; a Dinka Ngok community that will not compromise further and is more independent of the SPLM than commonly assumed, and a Misseriya community whose leadership has so effectively isolated its grassroots that no-one can tell to what extent they are misrepresenting community feeling. This is a heady mix.

Having analysed the behaviour and interests of key actors, we are now in a position to make some predictions:

1. Shortly before separation of the South, the Dinka Ngok community will make it clear that they consider themselves part of the South, conducting a formal exercise to confirm this.

2. The North will try to disrupt any such process, and give Misseriya and government-backed militias tacit permission to violently occupy further stretches of Abyei, driving out the Dinka Ngok.

3. The North will use the ensuing confusion and chaos to persuade its allies to delay official recognition of the RoSS, and utilize informal networks to suggest there is still a chance of resolving the situation through political compromise if key actors like the US hold back on recognition, rather than divide the world over the issue.

4. The international community will put pressure on the SPLA not to intervene but to resolve the situation by signing a last-ditch compromise on Abyei’s borders.

5. Surprising the international community and to a lesser extent the NCP, the SPLA will reluctantly respond to Dinka Ngok calls to defend them with full force, without the consent of the international community, at the first instance up to the borders of the RoSS defined in the transitional constitution of South Sudan.

6. The international community will condemn both sides.

7. Such condemnation will be privately welcomed by the NCP, who will use it to reinforce their argument that the RoSS cannot be officially recognized until Abyei’s status is resolved.

8. Abyei will remain in a state of limbo.

9. ?

Beyond point 8, there are too many possibilities to make realistic predictions. Full-scale war is one possibility; some kind of deal on resources & the speeding up of Sudan’s reintegration into the international community is another; embarrassed withdrawal by Northern or Southern Sudanese Armed Forces following a recognition that they have risked too much and are fighting on too many fronts is another. Much depends on the outcome of initial military engagement in Abyei. It should, however, be clear that the situation described is sub-optimal. For anyone who recognizes the analysis above, and the likelihood of the events described, the questions arises: which of these outcomes are most changeable, which of the actors is most likely to change their behaviour, and how can those changes be achieved?

Earlier I claimed that the strategy the international community is following rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of each side’s positions and a belief that everything that has taken place in Abyei (including the burning of villages and displacement of tens of thousands of people in early March) thus far is brinksmanship, intended to strengthen the bargaining position of each side before an inevitable compromise in shortly before the South formally secedes. Is there, then, some possibility that when it becomes clear that that conceptual framework is wrong, the international community will shift its position? Could the international community press ahead with recognition of the South over and above the objections of Khartoum, take pressure off the South not to intervene, and refuse to condemn the South when it does so? Could such actions strip the North of the efficacy of its strategy and force it to come to a hasty deal allowing the transfer of Abyei (as defined by the PCA) to the South? Would they cause the NCP to re-evaluate the risks and rewards of their strategy? Such a course of action would require a sudden conceptual shift, and places a lot of trust in the so-called “international community” with competing, conflicting interests. Neither is it in their interests to admit past mistakes.

Another approach would be to ask what direct solidarity work interested groups and individuals could do on the ground. To counter the public relations work that presents ethnic cleansing as clashes, and equalizes blame where actions are not equal would take continuous footage and reporting from the ground. The satellite images provided by the likes of the Sudan Sentinel Project are welcome, but not sufficient to achieve this kind of aim. But if it was achieved, it might be possible to make military occupation of Abyei a public relations disaster for the GoS, to the extent which it conflicted with its goal of reintegration into the international community and hastened withdrawal.

Another approach (none of these approaches necessarily conflict, although they might appeal to different kinds of people) might be to be bolder in getting a message through to Misseriya communities that conflict is not in their interests. How would they react if they believed that their being involved in a Northern violent occupation of Abyei would precipitate SPLA action to secure the area, that the South have the muscle to do so, and that it is likely to affect their future migratory and grazing rights – currently guaranteed? What if that threat was accompanied by the promise of development in a new state of Western Kordofan, guaranteed by access rights on which the reintegration of Sudan into the international community were dependent? Would the Misseriya prioritise relations with a regime whose internal divisions are showing more by the day and which surely cannot last forever, or a community who they will always live next to, if they are provided with the means of self-reliance, politically, socially, culturally and economically?

The scope of this paper is already arguably over-ambitious, and there will be those who argue it contains too much speculation and supposition. It would be foolish to try and answer all of these questions. But if it achieves nothing else, it is to be hoped it illustrates the necessity of a public discourse over the questions of what the outcomes will be if there is no agreement before July 9, which outcomes are changeable and how.

The author is an independent campaigner based in the UK. He has previously worked for the British Labour Party and on a wide range of campaigns, especially trade union, migrant rights and solidarity campaigns. Tim’s interest in Sudan stretches back over 15 years and he has travelled extensively through South Sudan and areas bordering Northern & Southern Sudan.