The Complexities of Darfur
By Richard Lobban
August 03, 2004 — By now all are agreed that a human catastrophe of significant proportions is unfolding in Darfur the westernmost province of the Sudan. Indeed, the cry of alarm has gone out that this may be a case of genocide and ethnic cleansing. There is little question that many thousands have already died and probably tens of thousands are at grave risk, while hundreds of thousands are facing bare survival in squalid refugee camps in neighboring Chad or are internally displaced within Sudan. This conflict has gone on for almost two years and has recently gained a measure of popular attention in the mass media.
The easily demonized Sudanese regime is projected as the chief culprit and the outcry and angst in the west is now broad among humanists and other activists who have now managed to shine more light on this topic that is usually reduced to the dictatorial Arabs versus the “Black Africans”. Certainly some measures of this equation are to be found, but truly this conflict is much more complicated in its origin, evolution, and resolution. As painfully discovered in Iraq, if there is no clear understanding of the Sudanese crisis there can be no plan that will lead us out of it. As a modest start to move from shouts to reflection there are at least a dozen factors that could be considered.
First there is the military situation which pits the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Abd al-Wahid Mohamed Nur, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Khalil Ibrahim who are fighting against formal elements of the Sudan military led by General Omar Beshir and this irregular militia called locally the janjaweed camel and horse riding raiders led by Musa Hilal among several others. Divisions and rivalries within the SLA and JEM, not to mention the janjaweed, result in unresponsive and unpredictable activities on the part of most of these groups. Essentially the SLA and JEM see themselves as part of the armed resistance against the military government of Sudan in Khartoum. The janjaweed, especially Baggara nomads, are threatened by both Darfuri groups and have been informally permitted and probably encouraged to function as militias to take matters in their own hands for Khartoum.
Secondly, it is clear that this conflict has emerged at the present in the context of persistent ecological crisis of increase desertification and lack of production and limited grazing lands among the pastoral and agricultural peoples.
Thirdly, there is a grave and chronic political crisis Sudan whereby usual options for dissent, debate, elections and democracy are foreclosed. The pariah nature of the Sudanese regime has made normal diplomatic measures and negotiations difficult to apply in a broad atmosphere of distrust. As an aspect of this, the secretly published “Black Book” on the political economy of Sudan has shown a deep pattern of marginalization of the peripheral regions and dominance by central Nile peoples whether under democratic or military regimes. The currently pronounced role of extreme Islamist governance has only made this worse. Another complexity of the military equation is that a disproportionate number of the Sudanese soldiers are from Darfur, while the officer ranks are much more likely to be recruited from the central Nile “Jellaba.”
Fourthly there are the broad economic factors whereby material burdens of Sudan fall heavily against the people of Darfur and the redistribution of wealth from manufacture, agricultural and expanding petroleum production only very slowly reaches this province. Clearly there are many long standing economic grievances that precipitated the SLA and JEM to initiate this round of fighting and the disruption caused by the janjaweed may even have helped the two Darfuri armed groups to recruit more members if the relative lack of men in the refugee camps can be interpreted in this way.
The fifth factor is that of regional strategic concerns. These include those internal Sudanese forces that seek to destabilize the regime that can range from liberal, left and democratic opposition, to rightist forces such as the National Islamic Front. Equally to the east, Eritrea has its reasons to destabilize Khartoum simply because Khartoum threatens to do the same in Asmara. The case of Chad is not less complicated since several of the ethic groups of Darfur range into Chad either as war refugees or habitual nomads. Amidst all of this, the only slightly patched together Naivaisha agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLA is at risk of collapse if the conflict in Darfur can not be better managed. In fact, few of the neighboring regimes have positive, working ties with Khartoum.
Sixthly, many historical factors are rarely discussed. At a variety of periods Darfur has been a sovereign state or Sultanate under the Keira dynasty. During the Mahdist period (1885-1898) it was tenuously conquered and the Sultan of Darfur recovered complete independence from 1898 to 1916, when it was again conquered by the central Nile power that was at that time, British colonialism. If the British intervened now, when already bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, they would not be seen in a favorable light by Darfuris. Likewise the use of militias or mercenaries by the Khartoum government has an unfavorable parallel with the thirty thousand or so informal mercenary forces employed by the Americans in Middle Eastern wars. Dangers of perceiving a short-term gain of such intervention should be considered very carefully in terms of engaging and supply such forces, not to mention a clear exit strategy, to draw upon the forgotten Powell doctrine for military engagements. Perhaps this explains something of the American reluctance to call this genocide or ethnic cleansing, since that would compel them to act in some way in support with the Geneva accords of 1948, not that the United States has taken much care with such international agreements in the period since 11 September 2001. Yet, in this world of political schizophrenia and an election year the Bush administration needs to show some engagement with the Darfur problem if only for the merits of distracting attention from the miseries in Iraq and salvaging the positive achievement of the North-South accord assisted by Senator Danforth.
Seventh, are linguistic factors, where by central Sudanese are broadly Arabic speakers and in Darfur Arabic is more likely a second language rather than the primary language at home. The skilled use of Arabic is emblematic of higher social position; the awkward use of the language can be twisted to imply people of a lesser degree of social status.
Eighth must be the related anthropology of Darfur that contrasts markedly with that of the central Nile. While, the identity crisis for northern Sudanese is itself a problematic and much denied national issue, certainly that vast majority of Darfuris belong to such groups as the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Berti, Bongo, Banda, Tama, Daju, Birked, Kimr, Sila, Ndogo, Tungur, Kreish, Fertit, and Kanuric speakers. With substantially different cultures in remote locations it is very easy to have deep misunderstandings.
Ninth, and related to language and anthropology, is the painful question of racio-ethnic prejudice. Despite the fact, that all Sudanese could be perceived as “Black” by the simplistic racial system of America, it is clear that important differences of perceiving “race” in Sudan are powerful and sensitive in terms of alliances, enemies, and the very structure of society. The journalistic gloss of “Arabs” versus “Black Africans” hardly illuminates this central and important topic that is foundational in the present conflict.
The tenth factor is oil. True there is no production yet from southern Darfur but the oil is there. Oil buys weapons for Khartoum. Oil attracts foreigners ranging from Germany to China. Oil is worth fighting for at some point, but so far most of the conflict in the central regions of Darfur.
The eleventh feature of international paralysis of action from the delayed, stick waving trips by Colin Powell and Kofi Annan to the resource strapped and diverted African Union folks to that of ECOMAG that are preoccupied with policing in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. Not to mention cash strapped nations that are fighting AIDS and trying to educate their populations. This is not an attractive short-term conflict with lots of glamour or heroism. Who wants it?
A twelfth factor in the equation is gender. So far, most victims are refugee women and girls who are intimidated and systematically terrorized by rape reported by many independent accounts. As long as sexism and gender prejudice are deeply rooted, the ease to overlook gender abuse assist in worsening the conflicts on the planet.
Well, let’s also add religion. Despite that the majority of combatants on all sides of this conflict are Sunni Muslims; this commonality has not curbed the bloodshed. Yet religion is still a factor as the Khartoum government exalts in it rigorous and politicized orthodoxy of Islam, while in rural Darfur, Islam can be more accommodating in folk and syncretic forms.
What to do? First note that this is an act that has crossed the threshold of genocide or at least, we should not debate that this is an urgent matters for self-evident humanitarian concerns. Especially this should be true for the pressing horrors of the non-combatant refugees. Secondly, all measures and manners need rapid and negotiations for a ceasefire and political stabilization. The resumption of productive peace negotiations needs all endorsement. Thirdly the intervention by a non-European, Africa separation force and international monitoring force should be marshaled without further delay. Fourth, keep in mind the dozen factors already mentioned.
What not to do? Sanctions and the threat of sanctions will not work very well in the short and urgent term. The record is poor in Sudan and they sell us little and are largely self sufficient in many respect. The world does not have enough leverage or places to apply it. Foreign military invention should be eschewed, especially American or British, but an African force should be assisted in creative logistics. Will the crisis in Darfur become a further catastrophe or opportunity for humanity?
Dr. Lobban is Professor of Anthropology and African Studies, Rhode Island College. Among his many works, he is co-author of the Historical Dictionary of the Sudan, Scarecrow Press, 2002 and a founding member of the Sudan Studies Association.