President Mbeki: Innocent as the wolf of Joseph’s blood! (3-3)

Let Us Support His Proposals

By Elwathig Kameir

In addition to the three obstacles, I reviewed in the preceding article, “Obstacles in the Way of Sudan National Dialogue (SND)”, a major obstacle stands in the way of ending the war and achieving peace (Sudantribune, 19 November 2015). Indeed, a strategic disagreement remains unsettled, especially between the government and the armed movements, mainly the SPLM-North. This discord is worth contemplating, for, in my opinion, it is destined to sabotage both the tracks of negotiations, and national dialogue. This strategic challenge prompted the Chairman of the AUHIP to present to the negotiating parties a package of workable proposals, which I seek to review in this paper. Hence, I call upon all public opinion leaders to support President Mbeki’s proposals, and promote them in the national interest.

Strategic Obstacles to Negotiations with Armed Movements

1. As noted in the above mentioned article, (para I.2), the President’s refusal to hold any meeting abroad may be attributed to a strategic consideration in the perception of the ruling regime, and in its approach to both negotiations, with the armed movements, and the national dialogue process. What are these strategic considerations? After reviewing the results of preceding rounds of negotiations, between the government and the SPLM-North, the Chairman of the AUHIP believes that “the one central matter blocking progress in these negotiations is the issue of – the conditions and modalities relating to the cessation of hostilities (COH) leading to comprehensive security arrangements (CSA)”. The two parties have agreed that a) the Final Agreement will include a section on cessation of hostilities, and b) two weeks after it is constituted, the Joint Security Committee will submit a proposal to the Principles to achieve the COH. However, each party holds a contradicting proposal to the other, notably on the issue of sequencing of actions.

2. The government proposes that after six months, the Joint Security Committee should submit a proposal to the Principles to achieve the CSA, including the timeframes for the implementation of its various elements. Meanwhile, the SPLM-N proposes that the pace of all the matters relating to the CSA should be determined by the pace of the agreement at the Sudan National Dialogue (SND). Alternatively, the SPLM-N proposes that as they and the GoS reach an agreement on the CSA, they should also reach a Comprehensive Political Agreement, which would include a provision for the Autonomy of the Two Areas, which would then be endorsed by the SND.

3. Therefore, the view of the AUHIP is that the respective views of the two parties, concerning the CSA, are based on two diametrically opposed and currently irreconcilable strategic perspectives.

4. The strategic perspective of the GoS is premised on; a) renouncing the use of force and resolving all challenges facing Sudan, including war and peace, through and within the framework of the SND; b) the government is ready to enter into an agreement with the SPLM-N to stop the fighting in the Two Areas, understanding the position of the SPLM-N as a legitimate armed belligerent in the Two Areas; c) followed by extending humanitarian assistance immediately to all civilians impacted; d) agreement should be reached on all matters related to the CSA, which will be implemented through agreed processes and structures; d) consequently, any political arrangements relating to the Two Areas that would be arrived at through the GoS/SPLM-N Joint Political Committee would be of a temporary and transitional nature, pending the final determination of the constitutional structure of the Republic of Sudan through and within the SND; and f) it would, therefore, be fundamentally incorrect and unacceptable for the GoS to enter into any final agreement with the SPLM-N about any and all matters that should rather be included in the agenda of the SND, including the final status of the Two Areas.

5. Meanwhile, the strategy of the SPLM-N is to reach an agreement that provides for; a) ending the conflict with GoS, on all relevant matters, through peaceful dialogue, provided that the SPLM-N reserves its right and capacity to resort to war if its’ political objectives are not met, especially since it had taken up arms to achieve a particular political objective; b) the fighting in the Two Areas should stop immediately; c) humanitarian assistance should be extended immediately to all civilians affected; d) being an authentic representative of the people of the Two Areas, it is ready to enter into a bilateral Political Agreement with the GoS about the Final Status of the Two Areas, among others, providing for their autonomy, consistent with their unique nature within Sudan; e) guarantees that this GoS/SPLM-N bilateral agreement would be endorsed by the SND and included in the constitution of Sudan, and f) in return for the above, it would enter into an agreement with the GoS about the CSA relating to the Two Areas.

6. As an alternative to 5.a-f above, the SPLM-N a) is ready to accept that all political matters related to the Two Areas be resolved through and within the SND, b) in this case, it is ready to enter into a COH agreement with the GoS, and stop the fighting in the Two Areas until the implementation of agreed CSA c) not compromise the possibility for the SPLM/A-N to resume its military operations, d) the SPLM-N would then implement any CSA once the SND produced political outcomes it considered acceptable, and e) the SPLM-N would honour the above, relating not only specifically to the Two Areas, but also to peace in Sudan as a whole, particularly in Darfur. All of the above outcomes are conditional on practical implementation, including security sector reform.

7. President Mbeki’s determination to overcome this strategic dispute between the parties to the conflict, has never waned. Indeed, he addressed the Principles of the Negotiating Parties, in a 15-page memorandum. The memo concluded with a comprehensive proposal to transcend this strategic difference, as posed by the following interrelated issues: i) COH leading to CSA, ii) the SND, and iii) stop armed conflicts and achieve peace in the whole of Sudan, in particular Darfur. The Chairman of the AUHIP strongly stated to the parties that “we will find it difficult to convene the next session of the GoS/SPLM-N negotiations about the Two Areas unless we have some certainty, based on your responses, that you, the belligerent parties, have found it possible to agree about the fact and the consequences of the strategic difference we have mentioned, and the ways and means to amicably resolve this fundamental contradiction.” He further affirmed that “if your responses, and after our interactions with you in this context, communicate the negative message that there is no possibility to conclude Agreement on the Two Areas, obviously the AUHIP will not convene any further (10th?) Session of the GoS/SPLM-N Two Areas negotiations!” Following is a presentation of Mbeki’s proposals.

i. Cessation of Hostilities Leading to Comprehensive Security Arrangements

a. During the period of CoH, prior to the implementation of the CSA, all armed formations in the Two Areas should fall under one Joint Command, constituted by both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA-N;
b. All matters relating to the CSA should be negotiated and agreed upon through a Joint Security Committee;
c. The AU would deploy a military unit(s) to support and assist the Parties with regard to both the CoH and the CSA, and help ensure the necessary respect of all agreements; and;
d. The AU unit(s) would report regularly to the AUPS Department, which would exercise an oversight function concerning both the CoH and the CSA.

ii. Sudan National Dialogue (SND)

a. The SPLM-N should join the SND as soon as agreement has been reached on the CoH;
b. As already agreed, the SPLM-N, with others, should engage the 7+7 Committee to discuss and agree on all procedural matters concerning the SND;
c. All efforts should be made to ensure the realization of the call made by H.E. President Al- Bashir in January 2014 that the SND should be fully inclusive: in this regard the necessary CoH Agreement with the armed movements, active in Darfur, should be concluded as early as possible;
d. The GoS should take all necessary measures to implement all the steps as reflected in the SND Roadmap, and endorsed by the AUPSC, to ensure the creation within Sudan of a climate conducive to open and successful conduct of the SND;
e. As an important confidence-building measure, all stakeholders/participants in the SND, including the GoS, and the armed movements, should publicly declare their commitment to respect and implement the outcomes of the fully inclusive SND; and;
f. Accordingly, the SND Roadmap as endorsed by the General Assembly could be amended explicitly to state and confirm the commitment of all participants, as well as the GoS, to accept the creation of structures, authorized by the SND, with the necessary constitutionally-approved executive powers, to ensure the implementation of all the SND outcomes.

III. Achievement of Peace in All of Sudan

1. It is important to note that agreement has been reached, as mandated by the AUPSC, and is being implemented, to have the AUHIP facilitate both the GoS/SPLM-N and the GoS/Darfur negotiations, in a coordinated and synchronized manner, to ensure that peace is achieved all over the Sudan;

2. Following the same approach, the AUHIP will continue to facilitate CHO and CSA negotiations between the GoS/SPLM-N, and JEM and SLM/N (Minnawi), with the understanding that these negotiations are two different streams, under one coordinating center, each requiring its unique solutions;

3. The AUHIP strongly believes that it would not be correct to accept any proposition that the immense benefits of peace for one area should not be accepted and brought about, unless these benefits also accrue to all other areas concerned – the application of the ‘principle’ – everything for all, otherwise nothing for all;

4. Accordingly, the necessary agreed upon CoH and CSA agreements, and the implementation of the consequent agreements for humanitarian access, relating to any particular area of Sudan, should be agreed upon and implemented as soon as possible, without regard to whatever might be happening to negotiations relating to any other area of Sudan.

Conclusions

1. In a nutshell, ending the war, achieving peace, and the transition to democracy, remain together the sole responsibility of the Sudanese government and the contending political forces, and not that of President Mbeki. It is the latter, who, in fact, has put forward to the GoS and the SPLM-N a comprehensive proposal for realizing these objectives. In fact, each party has as their respective duty to carry out, if the efforts of the AUHIP are to bear fruit, the freeing of the political movement, and forces of change, from the constraints imposed by the armed insurgency. Only thus can the arena of civil and peaceful struggle be liberated from being held hostage to military action, rendering the movement for change vulnerable to risks of violent confrontation.

2. Convening the Addis Ababa preparatory meeting, before reaching an agreement on a ceasefire, or at least cessation of hostilities, is akin to ploughing in the sea, since the agenda items of the meeting are purely procedural. Indeed, if the positions of the conflicting parties around the table are so far part, on many dialogue and constitutional issues, how would they be able to agree on procedures and process matters? Similarly, the chances of successfully concluding the national dialogue and building national political consensus on the meeting’s outcomes, in the absence of a comprehensive cease-fire and an agreement on security arrangements, seem very slim, if not -inexistent. The strategic disagreement between the government and the SPLM-North, and the rest of the armed movements, on what should come first: the national dialogue or agreeing on the security arrangements must be urgently settled by the parties to the negotiations, and the mediation. Yassin Bashir, succinctly argued that; “the national dialogue is, by its very nature, a peaceful exercise that embodies making political compromises, within the conceptual framework of a historical compromise in the interest of the Sudanese nation. Thus, it is not possible to envisage the integration of an armed movement in such a peaceful endeavour, while it is carrying arms against the government, and the government is taking up arms against it. It is imperative for the warring parties to agree to lay down their arms, agree on peace arrangements, and then join the National Dialogue. Only, then, will there be a common political language among all those around the table of national dialogue” (Altayar, 7 September 2015).

3. All the Sudanese political parties, and other engaged societal forces, must agree on the “scope of change” required in the institutional and political structure(s) of the Sudanese state. Each of the political and armed opposition, and the government, must come forward with their respective but realistic visions and conceptions, of change and restructuring of state institutions, to the table of the inclusive national dialogue.

4. Also, it is necessary that the parties to the conflict transcend the dispute over the scope of the negotiations agenda, whether it should be confined to the Two Areas and Darfur, or go beyond to address national constitutional issues. However, the AUHIP has made it clear that these negotiations will be conducted without prejudice to the inclusive national dialogue and political processes at the national level. Mbeki’s propositions are consistent with our call on the leadership of the SPLM-N to demonstrate their willingness to begin talks based on the regional aspect of the conflict, i.e. the Two Areas, provided that it would lead, in the end, to effective participation in the inclusive national dialogue. This was on 16 April 2013, almost one year before the SND was initiated by President al-Bashir on 27 January 2014. However, this “regional” dimension includes more than the NCP’s demand to discuss only the outstanding CPA issues.

5. Due to the nature of the conflict, the Two Parties must discuss the Two Areas-centric issues that go beyond popular consultations, i.e. more specific proposals about power- and resource-sharing (on the basis of the “positive discrimination” or “affirmative action” principle), and concrete security arrangements for the Two Areas. However, this step should be reciprocated by the NCP, which should consent to going beyond popular consultations and partnership to discuss real and genuine governance transformation in the two states. There is no doubt, that the last round of negotiations, in November 2014, has made considerable progress, prompting the AUPSC Communiqué 539 (paragraph 12) to make reference to the Draft Framework Agreement between the GoS and the SPLM-N, the “coloured document”, in December 2014, and to underline that “negotiations have already yielded substantial consensus capable of forming the basis for the resolution of that conflict”.

6. Hence, I call upon writers and columnists, peace activists, public opinion leaders, and all those genuinely concerned with national issues, at this critical juncture of our contemporary history, to reach consensus and articulate a common position on the realization of peace in our country in order to avoid the evils of disintegration and fragmentation. Indeed, the more time elapses, the more the country’s complex crises are destined for escalation and aggravation, thus widening the rift between the contending parties. Upon close scrutiny and thorough reflection, we are collectively obliged to stand by President Mbeki, Chairman of the AUHIP, and support his comprehensive proposal, for the sake of the country and the Sudanese people at large, as well as the future of the coming generations. Thabo Mbeki, by virtue of his expertise and experience, drawn from his deep longstanding interactions with the various Sudanese political forces, has correctly comprehended the complexity of the Sudanese national question and armed conflicts issue and the Sudanese conflict at large, in all its complexity. President Mbeki is genuinely concerned and is determined to succeed in carrying out his mandate and mission. Unfortunately, he is being treated as a scapegoat by both the government and the Sudanese contending political forces. In reality he should be absolved of allegations that hold him responsible for stalling and prolonging the negotiations. Indeed, the problem remains essentially Sudanese, and its solution equally lies in the hands of the Sudanese. Indeed, the AUHIP’s Chairman is innocent as the wolf of Joseph’s blood! Let us stand by his side.