CEPO’s oversight observation report on the Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan

November 30, 2018 PEACE OBSERVATORY FINDINGS Abstract: This report intended to demonstrate progress made and challenges faced during the second month of implementing the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan. The second month for the implementation of R-ARCSS was encouraging and motivating if the parties’ signatories to the agreement will maintain trust and confidence for working together for inclusive and diverse government for transforming the society from violence to peace. Peace and stability in South Sudan were proven to be requiring total change in political attitudes and approaches for participatory and pluralistic politics for state building 1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION The conflicting parties in South Sudan on the 12th September 2018 in Ethiopia-Addis Ababa singed Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The parties are in their third month of implementing the R-ARCSS. CEPO program of “Peace Observatory” committed to conduct regular monthly oversight observation reporting on the implementation of the R-ARCSS. The purpose of the rendering regular monthly oversight observation report on the implementation of R-ARCSS is to hold the parties’ signatories to it accountable. This is the report of the third month oversight observation report for the implementation of R-ARCSS produced by CEPO This report is developed mainly to building narrative from available secondary data for informing facilitation of citizens’ perception survey to be conducted during the fourth month of R-ARCSS implementation. Limited primary data is used in building this report because the generated data of this report will be treated as baseline information for informing collection of primary data on citizen perception after fourth month of R-ARCSS implementation. On the fourth month of R-ARCSS implementation, CEPO will be conducting citizens’ perception on the half period of pre-transitional. 2. METHODOLOGY The information collected for this report was directly generated from the progress and challenges observed by CEPO Peace Observatory observers on the ground. CEPO deployed a team of developed observers to use standard developed questionnaire, checklist for interviews, secondary reports and observations on the ground in the preparation of this Report. Media, Journalists and civil society organizations on the ground were reached for verification and qualification of the public perceptions generated by the observers and key informant interviews technique used to collection information within the communities where the progress and challenges associated with R-ARCSS implementation were conducted. Information cross-checked with some members of the parties’ signatories to R-ARCSS including community, religious and women’s leaders and traders. This report was generated through sample size of over 1,600 respondents interviewed during 25 conducted workshops on R-ARCSS dissemination with civilians and security forces across the country. The reliable sources for generating and qualifying this report’s information are composed of the following; Civil Society; Religious Leaders; Women’s Leaders; Youth Leaders; Traditional Authorities; Traders; Media articles published; Local Journalists; Press Conferences made by any of the Party signatory to R-ARCSS and State Authorities. This report focus much on compiling secondary data with limited primary data generated by CEPO observers on the status of R-ARCSS implementation 3. THE PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT This report is aiming at building facts from mainly the available secondary data for setting baseline for border citizens’ perceptions survey on R-ARCSS implementation across the country 4. SUMMARY Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO) has observed reasonable progress made by the parties to the agreement in the second month of the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan. The second month of implementation is impressive and promising as parties continue to show their commitment in availing political will for accelerating R-ARCSS implementation. Political will is needed from the principal parties’ signatories to the agreement for genuine implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. The impressive accomplishments of the second month of the implementation of R-ARCSS are centered on the following; a) The meeting conducted between President and leaders of the opposition parties after the celebration of the peace agreement dated 1stNovember, 2018 in Juba. b) The joint military ground forces leaders meeting of Government, SPLA-IO and others was motivating c) The recent move by CTSAMVM in some parts of the country aiming at promoting trust and confidence building among the ground forces of the parties’ signatories to the R-ARCSS is inspiring. d) The consistent political elites posing warming for citizens to avoid hate speech and hostile propaganda. While the challenges observed during the second month of the R-ARCSS are as follow; a) Downplaying application of 35% for women by the parties’ signatories to R-ARCSS. b) Alerts on potential risk posed by Ebola, limited or inadequate support for media performance on accurate reporting and use of threatening language towards others who can be named as non-signatories of R-ARCSS or low appetite for R-ARCSS. c) Some of isolated hindrance towards humanitarian access. The developments observed during the second month of R-ARCSS implementation were impressive but some efforts are needed for accelerating genuine implementation of R-ARCSS and all actors should be got on the road to peace and stability in South Sudan. Among the key efforts needed are; a) Engaging the warring parties who did not sign the R-ARCSS to sign it or lobby to opt to resolve their political difference in non-violent manner than posing threats to them. b) Bodies tasked with the implementation of the R-ARCSS including IGAD need to conduct regular citizens perspective on R-ARCSSS. The second month for the implementation of Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan registered progress. This has created moment for the citizen to pick interest in having deliberations on the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan. The parties’ signatories to the R-ARCSS should have a spirit of engaging those parties that are not signatories to the R-ARCSS for dialogue with an intention of getting them to join the peace process. Finally, the role of the regional and international community should be revitalized with intentions of turning the regional and international communities to be pro-active in accelerating the implementation of R-ARCSS. UNMISS new mandate should concrete on management and exited strategy for the protection of civilians sites (POCs), Mobile protection for returnees, prevention of conflict-related sexual violence and observation of human rights. Deployment of peacekeeping mission in South Sudan requires being under United Nations single mandate and command. The joint coordination of efforts between IGAD-AU and UN is essential. Since in 2017 there is already commitment made for coordination of efforts per the Joint Statement issued during the AU, IGAD and the UN Consultative meeting on the Republic of South Sudan in Addis Ababa, 27 January 2018. 5. R-ARCSS CELEBRATION DATED 31ST OCTOBER 2018 IN JUBA AND MEETINGS CONDUCTED BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES The R-ARCSS peace celebration in Juba was a clear break through episode for building trust and confidence among the conflicting parties especially the major fighting forces of the government and SPLA-IO. The occasion surprised majority of the audiences, the turnout of the citizens was comparable with the citizens’ turnout to witness the declaration of the independence of South Sudan from the rest of Sudan. Majority of the people are having doubts over the arrival of the top leaders of the opposition parties or expecting them to arrive with heavy military protection team. But the opposite of the public assumptions took place. The demonstrated body language during the speeches in the celebration made majority of the public to gain confidence that this time things will be different. Among the key surprises was the arrival Dr. Riek Machar, the leader of the SPLM-IO, from Khartoum including top leaders of South Sudan Opposition Alliance without any military protection team to Juba. This particular accomplishment has raised the moral and reasonable interest of the public on advocating for R-ARCSS implementation. CEPO public opinion poll survey in Juba City generated evidence that the public has started open debates/discussions on R-ARCSS implementation due to the influence created by the peace celebration conducted in Juba on 31st October 2018. The various opposition groups such as SSOA had face-to-face political meetings with President Salva Kiir over the process of implementing R-ARCSS. The meetings came out with remarkable resolutions which need to be executed without any delay. These meetings have convinced sizeable citizens that our political elites are ready to do things in positive manner this time in comparison with 2015 experiences. The meeting of the president with outspoken political figures like Professor Peter Adwok Nyaba who was in opposition is a practical way of demonstrating. Such efforts should be carried out regularly among the political elites. The question about availability of political will for genuine implementation of R-ARCSS seems to be developing in reasonable speed. The performance of the National Pre-Transitional Committee (NPTC) if it is made public regularly will contribute effectively in keeping the citizens well-informed about the political development on the implementation of R-ARCSS. The best approach is for NPTC to conduct regular media briefings on their performance. Finding 1: Regular Interactions among the principals need to be made public for strengthening citizens’ trust and confidence building on R-ARCSS 6. JOINT MILITARY MEETINGS BETWEEN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE’S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF) AND SPLA-IO The recently conducted joint military leaders meetings between South Sudan People’s Defense Forces and the SPLA-IO were encouraging and demonstrated sense of commitment for making peace prevail in South Sudan. The face-to-face meeting of the security leadership of the parties’ signatories to R-ARCSS is essential for setting motto for the ownership of the signed peace accord(R-ARCSS). The element of trust and confidence for aiding availability of political will for the implementation R-ARCSS is much dependent on level of communication among the members of the parties’ signatories to R-ARCSS. The communication is all about meeting each other regularly for accelerating the implementation of R-ARCSS permanent ceasefire and security arrangements. The recent positive development on the establishment Joint Defense Board (JDB) is a remarkable step for strengthening trust and confidence building among the armed groups. The JDB formation has delayed too much and this has contributed in slow implementation of the R-ARCSS chapter 2. The positive developments observed between SSPDF and SPLA-IO for reaching some ground military commanders agreements on free movement of citizens, free humanitarian access and honoring the ceasefire is impressive and it is highly appreciated by the citizens. These are some of the actions that will encourage citizens to own the R-ARCSS and have trust and confidence on R-ARCSS as a roadmap or pathway for transforming the society from violence to peace. Observed locations across the country where SSPDF and SPLA-IO have conducted joint meetings for honoring the CoHA they signed are demonstrated in the map at the left landside. The symbol in circle on the map shows the locations where the meetings were held. Finding 2: The parties’ military and security leaderships are interested to faster the implementation of R-ARCSS chapter 2 but they are faced with funds limitation 7. THE COMING OF SPLA/M-IO LEADERSHIP MEMBERS TO JUBA WITHOUT EXTERNAL PROTECTION The return of the SPLA/M-IO deputy chairperson to Juba to attend the meetings of the national Pre-Transitional Committee is great and an opportunity of fostering the process for trust and confidence building. For the parties to succeed in implementing the R-ARCSS genuinely, they need to work together without fear of each other. The failure of ARCSS in 2015 was due to the fact that, the parties were not working together, and they had parallel leadership structures that never embrace each other in terms of decision making. This time round, there is need to embrace each other and work together as partners for peace than as opponents trying to make peace to happen. Finding 3: The principals of the parties signatories to R-ARCSS should keep the approach of having regular meeting as a tool of fostering trust and national ownership of the R-ARCSS. PERFORMANCE OF CTSAMVM In the second month of R-ARCSS implementation, CTSAMVM was observed performing incredible role in nurturing trust and confidence building among the armed groups who are signatories to the peace accord. Especially between the Government and the SPLA-IO ground forces in various locations such as Yei, Wau and Raja and others not named. These interactions between the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and SPLA-IO forces are effectively contributing in building citizens’ trust and confidence on the R-ARCSS. Further, the recently CSTAMVM engagement with the armed groups signatories to R-ARCSS forces on trust and confidence building has created appetite among the citizens to have time of learning about R-ARCSS. It was observed that this time the parties’ cooperation with CSTAMVM was much better and effective in comparison to the time of 2015.CSTAMVM reports observed to be positive and encouraging. The CSTAMVM reports contents demonstrated remarkable evidences of progress made by the armed parties that are signatories to R-ARCSS. The other positive development around performance of CSTAMVM is the media briefings conducted by CSTAMVM, this practice confirms commitment for transparency and other R-ARCSS mechanisms should adopt CSTAMVM approach for exercising transparency in relation to R-ARCSS Implementation. Interacting with some CSTAMVM civil official in the field about dissemination of CSTAMVM mandate was very impressive and it will be remarkable if the civil officials of CSTAMVM can engage on updating the citizens about the implementation of R-ARCSS. Finding 4: CTSAMVM should get to the point of offering chance for border media coverage of their events that focus on trust and confidence building among the forces 8. PUBLIC FIGURES STRONG STAND ON DE-CAMPAIGNING HATE SPEECH AND HOSTILE PROPAGANDA The recent move by the public political figures in warning citizens about the use of hate speech and hostile propaganda was remarkable and timely. The trend of some individuals who have strong negative instincts utilizing hate speech and hostile propaganda divide the communities of South Sudan. The open de-campaign of hate speech and hostile propaganda by the top political figures across the country has positive impact on the social media users but little on the online media outlet commenters. We observed sharp drop down of hate speech and hostile propaganda among political activists especially those who have direct links with their political leaders and political parties’ hardliners. The challenging situation is the online media outlet commenters and some social media users that turned to take ethnic dividing lines of argument as their points of views. The views expressed take into account individual duties and responsibilities for safeguarding freedom of expressions. An expression that triggered or champion ethnic dividing line is negative and it is total stereotype that may trigger violence along ethnic setting. The most threatening trend now is the issue of the online media commenters who are totally championing hostile propaganda and hate speech in hiding by using nicknames. The disturbing aspects among the online media commenters are that majority of them are well-informed persons and close to the political elites. The positive development that is encouraging was the regular stance of the political elites across the country in offering warnings to the public to avoid hate speech and hostile propaganda from the date of signing of the R-ARCSS. Finding 5: Immediate stoppage of Hate speech and hostile propaganda is needed for building trust in the R-ARCSS. 9. BUILDING TRUSTS AND CONFIDENCE AMONG THE POPULACE Considerable citizens through our R-ARCSS dissemination workshops demonstrated low trust and confidence on the leaders of the parties signatories to R-ARCSS at their various capacities be political or military for accomplishing this R-ARCSS without return to war. This trend is strongly demonstrated by the rural communities including good number of political elites in the urban communities of South Sudan. Out of 23 dissemination workshop conducted, 19 depicted the aspect of citizens having low trust and lack of confidence for the leaders to accomplish R-ARCSS implementation without return to war. The recent move of Military leaders from SPLM/A-IO and South Sudan People’s Defense Forces on publically apologizing to the citizens is great act and it needs to be translated into action. Military and Political leaders accepting mistakes that they committed since 2013 which let citizens to suffering is important. But apology by the military or political leaders from the parties signatories to R-ARCSS needs to be honored by the ground forces in the communities. The armed parties signatories to R-ARCSS should ensure that their soldiers within the communities behalf well with fill commitment of respect and honoring principles of human rights and rule of law including abstain themselves from armed criminal acts. Genuine execution of the provision on the release of the political detainees was identified by CEPO observation as one of the pillars for building trust and confidence on R-ARCSS. Majority of citizens were open in telling CEPO observers that they will have trust and confidence for ownership of R-ARCSS, if the following actions were accomplished a) Political elites approach of interaction with citizens is free from expression of hate speech and hostile propaganda b) Political detainees are all free from detention without any executes c) Attitude of bully, grapping and abusing the law stopped. Finding 6: The behaviors of the security and political leaders from the parties signatories to R-ARCSS are critical in making the citizens to have trust and confidence for them on accomplish the R-ARCSS without return to war. 10. SHORTCOMINGS OBSERVED A. STILL SOME HINDRANCE FOR HUMANITARIAN ACCESS Restricting of humanitarian access is still going-on across some parties of the country though it looks like isolate incidences but they are repeatedly happening in some locations. Majority of these incidences are mostly commercial interest motivated cases by some individuals who hold state public office. The recently made public case was the incident where armed group in Boma State attacked humanitarian convey on its way to former Unity State, SPLA-IO spoke publically made a statement about the attack in various media outlets. But more incidences of same kind were observed by CEPO across the country although majority of them are at same scale but still it mounted to restriction of humanitarian access. More efforts are needed from the ground forces of the parties signatories to R-ARCSS to order their soldiers to stop interfering with the humanitarian access. In October, 2018 many disturbing incidents of interference with humanitarian access were observed. These incidents were also officially confirmed by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The map at the left hand side demonstrated OCHA report on the incidents registered on interference with humanitarian access in October, 2018 The positive development of the military conducting meetings for honoring of CoHA in November 2018 should be translated into commitment on the ground across the country towards non-interference with humanitarian access. The registered incidents of interference with humanitarian access have contributed in scaling up suffering of innocent civilians. It is essential for the leaders of the parties’ signatories to R-ARCSS to inform their ground forces that interfering with humanitarian access means imposing suffering on the innocent civilians and violation of international law. Finding 7: Humanitarian Access is still facing challenges even during the pre-transnational period of the implementation of R-ARCSS. B. INADEQUATE COMMITMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OF 35% FOR WOMEN The kickoff of the implementation of R-ARCSS is immediately marked by violation of the application of affirmative action of 35% for women. The established committees and mechanisms have not fully met the threshold of affirmative action of 35% for women. The women representation and participation in the majority established mechanisms for the R-ARCSS implementation is below affirmative action of 35% for women. The kick-off for applying affirmative action of 35% for women faced challenge of being implemented below the stipulated quota per the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan in article 1.4.4 a) National Pre-transitional Committee (NPTC) met 10% out of the stipulated affirmative action of 35% for women b) National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) met 13% out of the stipulated affirmative action of 35% for women c) Strategic Defense and Security Review Board (SDSRB) met only 17% out of the stipulated 35% for women d) Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) met 0% out of the stipulated affirmative action of 35% for women. e) Joint Defense Board (JDB) met 0% out of stipulated affirmative action of 35% for women f) Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) met 43% beyond the stipulated affirmative action of 35% for women presentation The parties should be encouraged to honor full application of 35% for women during the formation of the various institutions for the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan. Commitment for genuine implementation of affirmative action of 35% for women is one of the factors in the peace agreement that tests political will for making peace happens. The example of having 43% for women in CTSAMVM is encouraging and motivating because it demonstrates enforcement of inclusivity and diversity. Finding 8: Efforts need to be doubled by the parties’ signatories to R-ARCSS to observe application of affirmative action of 35% for women without any form of excuse 11. POSITIVE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ACCORDANCE TO R-ARCSS IMPLEMENTATION It was observed that parties signatories to the R-ARCSS have demonstrated reasonable political will for genuine implementation of R-ARCSS. Political compliance was witnessed from the parties through the following deliverables: a) Engagement on incorporation of the R-ARCSS into the transitional constitution of South Sudan, 2011. The National Constitution Amendment Committee (NCAC) is conducting its work on incorporating the provisions of R-ARCSS into the National Transitional Constitution, 2011 b) The National Pre-Transitional Period Committee (NPTC) besides financial constraints managed to established four units as its working committees for the implementation of the R-ARCSS pre-transitional period provisions NPTC officially has established four units to implement the provisions of the pre-transitional period. Each unit will be composed of five individuals including the head of the unit. The four units established are: 1. Administration and Finance will be headed by somebody nominated by the SPLM-IO 2. Security Sector implementation will be headed by the incumbent TGoNU 3. Governance and Legal Affairs will be headed by Former Detainees 4. Dissemination and Advocacy will be headed by a representative from SSOA The four established units will have secretariat headed by someone from the Other Political parties. These were observed happening because the parties have some feeling that the political situation in Juba has improved for the implementation to the R-ARCSS. The feeling that the political environment in Juba has improved was confirmed by other stakeholders publically in media. Finding 9: The parties are demonstrating reasonable political will for drive the political process for genuine implementation of R-ARCSS. 12. LIMITED FOCUS ON EMPOWERING MEDIA FOR EFFECTIVE REPORTING ON R-ARCSS IMPLEMENTATION There is no proper and consistent support for empowering the media for accurate reporting on R-ARCSS implementation. The media support for effective performances for accurate reporting on R-ARCSS implementation is to be taken seriously by the various stakeholders. One of the lessons learned from the 2015 attempt for the implementation of the signed peace agreement in August. 2018 was the lack of adequate support for media to be pro-active for accurate reporting on the peace agreement implementation. The public demands from various officials being State or mechanisms such as Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) to engage media to play effective and responsible role for fostering dissemination and reporting the implementation of R-ARCSS. JMEC with partnership with CEPO and other institutions such as UNSECO and United Nation Peace Building conducted number of trainings for empowering media and journalists for accurate and responsible reporting on the implementation of the peace agreement. Finding 10: Media support is required for strengthening proper, pro-active, responsible, conflict sensitive and accurate reporting on the R-ARCSS implementation. 13. ALERTS FOR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION A. EBOLA THREAT Ebola prevention in Yei requires stoppage of the on-going violence between the fighting forces on the grounds of the SPLA-IO and national Salvation Front under leadership of Thomas Cirillo. Armed opposition forces in Yei should take the potential threat posed by Ebola against their own ground forces. Ebola is active in Democratic Republic of Congo, it is essential for the fighting opposition forces in Yei to stop the violence due to the risk of Ebola. Since already World Health Organization, as of 6 November 2018, a total of 308 cases, including 189 deaths have been reported in eight health zones in North Kivu Province and three health zones in Ituri Province in DRC. WHO also mentioned that the risk of the outbreak spreading to other provinces in Congo and neighboring countries including South Sudan and Uganda remains high. Finding 11: Ebola is real threat to the citizens of South Sudan at border of Democratic Republic of Congo if violence continues among the conflicting parties in Yei area. B. ON-GOING LOST OF HUMAN LIVES DUE TO CATTLE RAIDING, REVENGE ATTACKS AND MAIN ROAD ARMED GROUPS’ AMBUSHES ON CIVILIAN VEHICLES The violent cattle raiding and revenge attacks incidences that are claiming the lives of innocent citizens in big number among various communities are potential triggers for continuation of violence among those communities. The trend of the communities killing themselves due to cattle raiding or revenge attacks should be taken serious by the government especially after the formation of the Revitalized Government of National Unity. The armed ambushes of the civilian vehicles on the main roads especially Juba-Bor and Juba-Nimule roads are real factors that will undermine the support for the peace accord implementation. The illegal armed groups’ activities along the main roads require intervention from the government. Finding 12: The rate of human lives lost to raiding, revenge attacks and road ambushes is alarmingly high. C. THREATENING MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY The parties’ signatories to the R-ARCSS members at their various capacities should abolish posing threat to the media and civil society in any form. It is better for the parties to offer consultative and productive advice to the media and civil society inline of R-ARCSS implementation. The citizens’ turned to assess the successful for R-ARCSS implementation through the state relationship with media and civil society. Of recent through our public opinion survey, it was realized that good number of the citizens are more engaged on public debates about R-ARCSS implementation in online media more than offline media Finding 13: Free media and civil society can play great role in strengthening public trust and confidence on R-ARCSS implementation. POLITICAL SPLITS/FRAGILITY The parties signatories to R-ARCSS are observed to be facing splits that turn into be fragile in partnering with the government for fostering peace, stability and democratic transformation. The on-going published political friction among the parties signatories to R-ARCSS is a great concern that needs to be addressed urgently before it gets to worse stage of declaration of new political groupings. Any political split among the parties’ signatories to R-ARCSS offers challenge that in return some parties signatories to R-ARCSS become the dominant player for determination of the fate of R-ARCSS implementation. This means that political fragility will continue and the state and citizens will continue to suffer in the hands of political elites that are specifically interested in political power control more than working for the stability of sate, human development and growth the society of South Sudan. Finding 14: Political splits among the political grouping signatories to R-ARCSS will foster political fragility during the implementation of R-ARCSS. D. PEACE KEEPING Tracking the efforts for making the implementation of R-ARCSS hold, it was realized that one aspect that may create some tensions between the region and UN is he deployment of the Regional Protection Forces (RPF). Already majority of the citizens during our R-ARCSS Dissemination are asking is RPF replacement of UNMISS? Or are we going to have two peace keeping missions with separate mandates and commend? The IGAD Chiefs of Staff decided during their meeting in Addis Ababa, 19-22 Nov. 2018,to deploy additional (1695) troops to complete the tasks by assigning (Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia),as reported by the official Sudan news agency (SUNA). The contributions of the forces will be as follows: four hundred ninety-nine (499) each from Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan, and ninety-nine (99) each from Somalia and Djibouti. The great confusion that will happen about peace keeping in South Sudan is when the deployment of the additional declared RPF forces is not under UN mandate of a continuing priority of protection of civilians. There is a need to preserve a single peacekeeping force with one unified command and control structure; and, that any addition to the force would have to be carried out consistent with the principles of peacekeeping and the standards to which we hold all troop and police-contributing countries. Sense of possible tensions over peace keeping in South Sudan is merging if the RPF deployment is under separate mandate from UNMISS mandate tasked and under separate command not single command under UNMISS mandate Finding 15: Peace keeping in South Sudan requires single peace keeping mandate and command. 14. RECOMMENDATIONS I. For the parties signatories to R-ARCSS a) There is need to continue interacting among themselves. The regular interactions among the principals and field military commanders of the parties signatories to R-ARCSS is healthy in nurturing and fostering trust and confidence building b) The National Pre-Transitional Committee should get in partnership or collaboration with the media and civil society for effective dissemination of the R-ARCSS c) The National Pre-Transitional Committee should adopt system of regular media briefing on the R-ARCSS implementation status d) There is need to keep positive language towards those political actors that are non-signatories to R-ARCSS to be encouraged to opt to pick non-violent approach for resolving their political difference e) The principals of the signatory parties should ensure that all political detainees are released without any excuse f) There need to honor the full implementation of the affirmative action of 35% for women during establishment of Revitalized Government of National Unity at all levels g) The National Pre-Transitional Committee should establish regular forum for dialogue with donor and diplomatic communities h) The parties signatories to R-ARCSS should ensure that no any form of restriction on humanitarian access to the vulnerable population II. For Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commissions a) There is need for JMEC to take seriously the engagement of media and civil society to strengthen accurate and responsible reporting on R-ARCSS implementation. b) JMEC should establish outreach program for interactions with the population directly c) JMEC should keep their website timely updated for the citizens that are searching for latest information on the status of R-ARCSS implementation d) JMEC should speed up summarizing the R-ARCSS into simplified version and if possible translate the simplified version into national languages e) JMEC should advocate for deployment of the RPF to be under UN mandate with single command under UN mandate III. For Ceasefire Security Transitional Arrangement Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CSAMVM) a) Keep the public of South Sudan informed about the parties’ commitment for honoring the permanent ceasefire through regular public/media briefings b) There is need for CSTAMVM to strengthen the communication among the parties signatories to R-ARCSS by training the communication wings of each party IV. For National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC) a) There is need to keep the public of South Sudan informed about the process of the constitutional amendment as symbol of embracing transparency in relation to R-ARCSS implementation V. IGAD and Guarantors (Sudan and Uganda) a) There is need to be pro-active in engaging the parties signatories to R-ARCSS for genuine implementation b) IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan should conduct some communities’ briefings/rallies on the R-ARCSS as a strategy of building community trust and confidence on R-ARCSS c) IGAD leadership should develop strategy for formal engagement of the non-signatories to R-ARCSS since military solution is not a viable option. d) IGAD should stand on the ground that any deployment of forces for peace keeping from the regional must be under UN mandate and single command e) IGAD should ensure the implementation of R-ARCSS is not in selective manner VI. African Union Ad hoc committee of five members states (South Africa, Rwanda, Algeria, Nigeria and Chad) known as (AU C-5) a) There is need to revitalize the mechanism of AU High Representative to South Sudan with specific focus on accelerating the triple approach of IGAD-AU-UN as per the joint communiqué dated January 27, 2018, in Addis Ababa, on the margins of the African Union 30th Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government b) AU C-5 should take primary responsibility and duties to accomplish the aspirations enshrined in R-ARCSS for AU to deliver c) AU C-5 should be pro-active in building trust and confidence among the principals of the parties signatories to R-ARCSS d) AU C-5 should make parties signatories to the R-ARCSS adhere to continental benchmarks for deliverance of peace and stability in South Sudan. Among the key benchmarks are; i. Non-interference with humanitarian access/support ii. Non-restriction of civic space and freedoms associated with press, speech, association, movement and assembly iii. Sincere demonstration of transparency and accountability by R-TGoNU iv. Spoilers and violators of R-ARCSS should face regional punitive measures v. Commitment for effective implementation of the affirmative action of 35% for women as stipulated in R-ARCSS vi. Non-military approach for resolving political grievance and all political grievance must be resolved in formal negotiation/dialogue process vii. Non-signatories of R-ARCSS should be engaged in formal process than military approach e) AU should revive the mechanism of AU High Representative on South Sudan with specific mandate focusing on AU delegated roles stipulated in R-ARCSS f) AU C-5 should put pressure to those AU members that required by R-ARCSS to nominate representative to the relevant implementation mechanisms g) Au C-5 should strengthen CSTAMVM by deploying experienced military-political oriented experts for strengthening the dialogue between CSTAMVM and South Sudanese VII. Civil Society and Media a) There is need to get faster in disseminating the R-ARCSS among the communities and elites b) There is need to develop simplified version of R-ARCSS for easier population sensitization c) There is need to facilitate workshop on R-ARCSS ownership, trust and confidence building VIII. UNMISS New Mandate a) The new mandate of UNMISS should have clear and straight forward provisions on management of protection of civilians sites (POCs) and exited strategy for PoCs b) UNMISS mandate should embrace mobile protection for returnees during voluntary return of Refugees and Internal Displaced Persons c) UNMISS mandate should strengthen the implementation of the signed joint communiqué on the prevention of conflict-related violence between the president of the Republic of South Sudan and United Nation Secretary General Special Representative on Prevention of Conflict-related Sexual Violence d) UNMISS mandate should openly stand for deployment of Regional Protection Forces under single UN mandate and command 15. CONCLUSIONS The second of R-ARCSS implementation witnessed some reasonable progress made in its implementation. The military leadership of South Sudan People’s Defence Forces and SPLM/A-IO made some reasonable progress in trust and confidence building through conducting ground forces meeting on issues of observation of cessation of hostilities, free movement of civilians, and non-interference with humanitarian access and abstaining from hate speech and hostile propaganda. But still the challenge is cases of interference with humanitarian access and hostile propaganda is going on in several parts of the country. The conducted meetings have contributed in softening relationship between the forces of SSPDF and SPLA-IO. The appeal is now if the SSPDF and SPLA-IO reached out to the other forces that are signatories to R-ARCSS in same manner across the country. The formation of sub-committees of the National Pre-Transitional Committee was another reasonable step for moving forwarding in strengthening the implementation of R-ARCSS pre-transitional period provisions. We are calling for the sub-committees to reach out to other stakeholders for collaboration on the fostering their work. Especially the sub-committee for Dissemination and Advocacy should build partnership with civil society and media for effective sensitization of the citizens on the provisions of R-ARCSS. Annexes 1. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON R-ARCSS (SWOT ANALYSIS) REVITALIZED AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 1. Created chance for inclusive and diverse formation of Transitional Government of National Unity at all levels 2. Majority of the conflicting parties signed/committed to implement R-ARCSS 3. Offer framework for transforming the society from violence to stability 4. Set methods for nurturing democratic transformation 5. Increased women participation and representation to 35% at all levels of the government 6. Provide direct participation of the stakeholders namely civil society, Youth, women, Faith-based, Business community, Eminent personalities and Academia) in the peace accord implementation 7. Fixed the political and armed conflicting parties for commitment on resolving their political conflict in South Sudan in non-violent manner 1. There are shortfalls in the application of responsibility sharing formula with regards to Formers Detainees (FDs) at state level ( R-ARCSS provided FDs to select three state ministers of their own chance –how easy will this be?) then will the other part -distribution of states and state responsibility sharing among the parties signatories to R-ARCSS- have no clear formula–Responsibility sharing gaps 2. Unclear resolution on the presented reservations namely a) Number of states b) System of governance c) Constitution making process d) Criteria for ministerial distribution –at national, state and local government –R-ARCSS further constraints 3. Inadequate criteria for establishment of cantonment areas –security gaps 4. Deficit in providing punitive measures for peace spoilers or violators-security undermining attitudes-control of command gap 5. The parties have a fear for some provisions of the peace accord such as Chapter Five and specially matters of justice and accountability (Application of Hybrid Court )-Justice and Accountability gaps 6. Continue splits among the political parties that signatories to the R-ARCSS e.g. (SSOA group members all split into two wings or more)-Political transformation gap OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS 1. Provide chance for testing the political mind set of the South Sudanese political elites on transforming the society from violence to peace – political attitudes change 2. Set framework for donors support on transitioning the society from violence to stability –like Japan government support for peace implementation through IGAD 3. Being welcomed by UN and AU-it offers some legitimacy for the R-ARCSS 4. Empowering stakeholders (CSOs, Media, Women’ faith-based and Youth) for holding conflicting parties accountable on provision of peace and security 5. Nurture dialogue among regional and international actors on the agenda of peace and stability in South Sudan 1. No united position among the donors on funding the implementation of the R-ARCSS –Donors lack of appetite for funding –this it generates public inquiries on the fate of the R-ARCSS (Trust, confidence and ownership)gaps 2. Fear on involvement of Sudan and Uganda in the peace keeping specially if is outside UN mandate without single command-interference gap 3. Reluctance in the partnership of IGAD-AU-UN for laying joint strategy for aiding the R-ARCSS implementation- unity of purpose for peace among regional and international actors gap. INDICTORS FOR MEASURING PROGRESS OR FAILURE ESSENTIAL INDICATORS FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION ESSENTIAL INDICATORS FOR UNSUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION The principal of the each party signatory to R-ARCSS availed political will for the smooth and timely implementation of each chapter of the agreement. Each party signatory to the agreement turn to established parallel process on the implementation of the agreement Political will driven by non-inference for obstructing the implementation of the agreement provisions. Dishonoring the political protocol set up by the agreement for implementation The principal of each party signatory to the agreement move away from personalizing the implementation of the agreement. Applying the delaying tactic on the implementation of the some provisions of the agreement. Principal of each party signatory to the agreement refrain from undermining the political protocol for creating conducive environment for the implementation of the agreement. Creating new interpretation on some provisions of the agreement agreed upon. Allocation of national generated revenue is done in a transparent manner for the implementation of the agreement provisions Deficit in transparency during utilization of the generated national revenue for implementation of the agreement Effective control of national revenue from any form of corruption or multi-practices Each principal of the party signatory to the agreement is acting under influence of Political and Ethnic centered interest Observation of permanent ceasefire and execution of security arrangements without any political and ethic dominance or interest of the principals of the parties signatory to R-ARCSS attached Violating the permanent ceasefire and delaying execution of security arrangement provisions Taking honesty position for resolving the actual realities on the ground without any self-interest attached Imposing new interpretation for the agreed upon agreement provision Non-suppression of freedom of expressions, , media, civic space freedom of movement, Humanitarian and CSTAMVM access Principals allowing themselves to be subjected to fulfill interest of some individuals within their party Remarkably stand up for nurturing trust and confidence with opponent for the sake of securing societal stability and non-violent mitigation of political difference Creation of competition over control of specific state institution(s) within party or among parties by specific individuals or group of individuals within the party INTERNAL ACTORS EXPECTED TO INTERNAL ACTORS EXPECTED TO -Avail political will -Ineffectiveness in nurturing trust and confidence among the military and political elites -Build trust and confidence for joint work on implementation of R-ARCSS -Being selective in implementing provisions of R-ARCSS -Abstain from political splits -Fostering hostile propaganda and hate speech -Obey, respect and fulfill human rights values (Freedom of movement, freedom of speech, expression, press and media) -Not standing firm in holding spoilers and violators of Ceasefire accountable -Demonstrated clear and stronger commitment for transparency, freedom of expression and protection of civic space, non-interference with Humanitarian and CSTAMVM access -Inefficiency and ineffectiveness in executing self-monitoring of R-ARCSS provisions implementation EXTERNAL ACTORS EXPECTED TO EXTERNAL ACTORS EXPECTED TO -Avoid double standards games in influencing the implementation of the peace agreement (R-ARCSS) -Besides funding the R-ARCSS implementation, no measures (benchmarks) such as non-interference with humanitarian access , transparency, non-interference with CTSAMVM, freedom of movement, observation of freedom of expression and civic space were taken into consideration -Take responsibility of being accountable on the principle of global responsibility to protection humanity -Playing double standard games with financing and supporting R-ARCSS implementation -Avoid generate doubts that directly influence the citizens ownership of the peace agreement and strengthen the capacity of the spoilers -Amplifying doubts on the fate of R-ARCSS without offering a realistic and practical alternatives -Engage on the peace agreement implementation through adopted benchmarks for implementation -Impose punitive measures on the peace spoilers and violators 78% (out of sample size of 1600 persons) OF THE RESPONDENTS IDENTIFIED THE CRITICAL CONCERNS THAT MAY MAKE R-ARCSS FRAGILE (LEGITIMACY, EFFECTIVENESS AND OWNERSHIP) AS FOLLOW; 1. Splits among the parties signatories to R-ARCSS 2. The continuous violation of ceasefire and interference with humanitarian and CSTAMVM access 3. Deficit in trust and confidence among the parties’ signatories to R-ARCSS 4. Absence of appetite among the traditional donors of South Sudan for funding the R-ARCSS implementation 5. Fear for some provision of the agreement-especially chapter five (Justice and Accountability) will be ignored by the parties signatories to R-ARCSS 6. Signatories attitudes of being selective on the implementation of the R-ARCSS 7. Unclear approach for the resolution of the number of states issue 2. SUMMARY OF THE A-RCSS IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: 3rd Month (D-Day + 90 Days): 12th November to 12th December, 2018 R-ARCSS Provisions. Expected date of Implementation Implementing Authorities The actual status of implementation Comments, and Recommendations Drafting of the Constitutional Amendment Bill to incorporate R-ARCSS into TCRSS D-Day + 21 days NCAC Slow Compliance a. NCAC should speed up with the Ministry of Justice the process of R-ARCSS incorporation into the constitution b. NPTC and JMEC should facilitate NCAC work timely Review and complete draft amendment to relevant national security legislations that relate to the R-ARCSS D-Day + 90 days NCAC Slow Compliance Reconstruction of DDR Commission D-Day + 7 days H.E. President Non-compliance H.E. President should act on the matter of reconstruction of DDR and the reconstruction of DDR should be gender sensitive Demilitarization of civilians centers D-Day + 45 Days JDB,JMCC & CTSAMVM Non-Compliance Delaying in forming the JDB and JMCC contributed for the non-compliance Collection of long and medium range heavy weapons D-Day + 45 Days JDB,JMCC & CTSAMVM Slow Compliance JDB and JMCC should speed up the process of the long and medium range heavy weapons collection Cantonment of all forces D-Day + 45 Days JDB,JMCC & CTSAMVM Slow Compliance JDB and JMCC should inform the public about the cantonment of forces Commencement of the joint training of the necessary unified forces of the military, police and other security services D-Day + 60 Days JDB, JTSC,JMCC, CTSAMVM JDB, JTSC and JMCC should speed up the planning for the forces training Nomination and appointment of members of an Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) to consider the number and boundaries of states, composition and restructuring of the council of states D-Day + 14 Days Parties, AUC-5, IGAD Executive Secretariat, The president of Republic of South Sudan Non-Compliance 1. AU members are very slow in nominating their representative to IBC and this resulted to non-compliance 2. AUC5 should help in pressuring the identified AU members states to speed up their representatives nomination for IBC IBC to complete and present its recommendations to IGAD Executive Secretariat D-Day + 90 Days IBC Non-Compliance Non-formation of IBC till now is offering potential delay in resolving the issue of the number and boundaries of states Automatic transformation of IBC into Referendum Commission on the Number and Boundaries of the state (RCNBS) D-Day + 90 Days IBCNPTC IGAD Appointment of a Technical Boundary Commission (TBC) D-Day + 7 days IGAD Non-Compliance IGAD should speed up the process of naming members of TBC Completion of the task of the TBC D-Day + 60 Day TBC Non-Compliance

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