AU mission to Darfur deserves the West’s support

By LIA COPELAND, The Globe and Mail

May 16, 2005 — Canada can’t stop agonizing over what to do about the humanitarian crisis in Darfur in the eastern Sudan. Independent MP David Kilgour has linked his support for the minority Liberal government to its taking action. Should Canada send 100 military advisers (as the Department of Foreign Affairs continues to suggest) – even though the Sudanese government has just rejected the presence of any but African troops? Or should Canada send only what Khartoum will allow: logistical and financial support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which is already operating in Darfur?

Part of Canada’s problem in deciding what should be done is that some North American observers have been highly skeptical of AMIS and its capacity to deal with Darfur’s continuing violence. Critics say that the mission’s 2,400 personnel are not up to the task, that they lack experience and expertise, and that they’re not effective peacekeepers.

I am currently a UN humanitarian-affairs officer and I’ve been in Sudan since the beginning of October, 2003. In my view, the AU mission deserves the West’s support, not its censure.

The conflict in Darfur began in early 2003, when the Sudan Liberation Army – and later, the Justice and Equality Movement – launched attacks against the Sudanese government. The Khartoum regime responded by arming and supporting Arab militias, commonly referred to as janjaweed, to counter the rebels. The continuing conflict has displaced almost two million people. Horrifying accounts of rape, torture, abduction, murder and the burning of villages prompted Washington to apply the term “genocide” to the situation.

In this extremely dangerous, complex and challenging context, the presence of AMIS has made a significant difference to people on the ground. AMIS has used its helicopters to evacuate 35 humanitarian personnel after they were attacked in the town of Tawilla in November, 2004. The African Union mission has evacuated wounded civilians and transported them to medical care; it has also transported aid workers back to the scene of attacks to help with assessments and humanitarian assistance.

As for the charge that AMIS personnel aren’t properly trained, the African Union has requested that its mission undergo training in basic international human rights and humanitarian law, gender-based violence and child protection.

When the AU personnel arrived in Darfur last summer, they originally came in as military observers, accompanied by a small protection force, with a mandate to oversee the implementation of, and adherence to, a ceasefire among three warring parties, the Sudan government, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement.

The new AU arrivals quickly formed ceasefire observation teams, which included themselves, each of the parties to the conflict, a Chadian mediator, and a representative of the European Union or the United States. These teams went out to investigate alleged ceasefire violations. In October, 2004, the number of AMIS personnel grew to 2,400, including military personnel, military observers, 250 civilian police, and civilian personnel. There are plans to expand their ranks again, to a total of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police by the end of September.

The AMIS mission has been most successful where it is able to proactively engage to defuse tensions, as it has done in Kebkabiya, Zalingei, and Muhajiriya. Hearing rumours that attacks were about to occur in these areas, the AU stepped in to negotiate and thereby prevented more death and displacement.

The mission’s impact on Kebkabiya, in North Darfur, is a particularly good case study. In November, 2004, the AU received 168 reports of rape in the town; in January, that number had dropped to two. Of course, this could simply indicate that fewer rapes were being reported, but our impression here in Darfur is that security in the town has significantly improved since the AU established a permanent presence.

In mid-December, the Sudanese government attacked the Southern Darfur town of Labado, which had been controlled by the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (the assault was one in a succession of many, aimed at “clearing the roads” – a convenient euphemism for burning villages within 20 kilometres of the main road). The violence displaced Labado’s entire population of 18,000, including many refugees sheltering in the town. However, by January, AMIS set up a permanent presence in Labado, comprised of observers and a small protection force. Within days, civilians started streaming back; to date, more than 12,000 have returned. When questioned, almost without fail they credit AMIS’s presence with allowing them to feel safe enough to return. The African Union’s deployment to Labado was at the request of the humanitarian community; its success has helped build an excellent relationship.

Here’s another example of AMIS’s effectiveness. In much of Darfur, women and girls risk rape and attacks when they leave the relative safety of their camps in search of firewood and shelter materials. Médecins sans frontières estimates that it treated more than 500 survivors of rape between October, 2004, and the first half of February, 2005 (almost a third of them raped by more than one attacker). Acting on the advice of international NGOs, AMIS personnel are now patrolling the routes these refugee women and girls use to collect firewood, and the patrols have drastically reduced the violence.

A particularly encouraging development is the deployment of African Union civilian police. It is anticipated that the AU will maintain a regular, in some cases permanent, presence in the larger and more volatile camps for internally displaced peoples, and having on-site police is expected to do much to improve camp security. The fact that they will be civilian police, as opposed to military personnel, is important to maintaining the civilian nature of these camps. Better yet, about 10 per cent of the civilian police are female – which helps protect vulnerable women and children.

Here’s what Canada can do. Rather than criticizing or merely applauding AMIS, we should ensure that the mission receives sufficient support to do the full job. The mission requires material and financial support, cars and communications equipment. The AMIS civilian police need assistance with accommodations. Above all, these people require our full political and moral support to fulfill their daunting mandate. With even greater numbers, they could have an even greater impact on a stricken region.

It would be unfair, however, to ask AMIS to solve all that’s wrong in Darfur. Their presence does not absolve the international community of its obligations. That obligation will only be met when refugees are able to return to their areas of origin in safety and dignity, and to resume their lives and livelihoods. Anything else is a stopgap measure.

Any initiative to support the AU and the relief effort must be accompanied by a parallel political process to address the root causes of the Darfur conflict, and to bring pressure to bear on those who are benefiting from the current state of affairs.

The recent history of Sudan has shown that the only way to achieve this is through concerted and sustained international pressure on the Khartoum regime to disarm and neutralize the militias it supports – and, to a lesser degree, to encourage the rebel groups to come to the table ready to discuss a political resolution. Without this, it won’t matter how many troops we send – we’ll continue to fail the people of Darfur.

Lia Copeland is a humanitarian-affairs officer with the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, focusing exclusively on Darfur.