Resolving Nivasha shortcomings is too much on Sudanese politics!
By Mahgoub El-Tigani
July 5, 2005 — The National Democratic Alliance concluded leadership meetings (Asmara: June 29th – July 2nd) in a number of resolutions that considered the Peace Agreement between Sudan Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) “a significant step to change the structure of the existing regime for the sake of a pluralist democratic rule. The agreement provides a climate conducive to the peaceful political struggle that aims to increase the popular movement in the country in order to stabilize the peace process, achieve the democratic transition, and bring about a permanent just solution to Darfur and Eastern Sudan.”
Despite this positive evaluation, the NDA Leadership expressed dissatisfaction with “many shortcomings and negativities of the Cairo Agreement (June 2005) in respect of A) Generalizing certain provisions, for example the revisions required in the present-day Judiciary, besides the non-accountability for corruption and robbery of the State Treasury, due to the government’s reluctance to include the detailed position of the NDA on these specific issues in the agreement; B) Establishing a committee on the armed and disciplinary forces by the next Interim Government, instead of the NDA wish to entrust a national expert-group with this non-partisan task; G) Discarding the need to reinstate the civil service and armed forces’ dismissals by a political decision; D) and E) Ignoring regional and international guarantees to implement the agreement; and revising the country’s foreign policy relations.”
The NDA Leadership Council hoped “these shortcomings would be resolved in the next round of negotiations on the modalities of implementation.” Accordingly, “the final result of the negotiations on the proportion and participation of the NDA in the executive and the legislative bodies of both regional and central governments will determine whether the NDA would participate in a broad government of national unity, or that it would stay in opposition. In both cases, the NDA will be committed to its own visions and programs.”
The NDA “is aware that the agreed upon modalities have not completely achieved the required settlement of these problems. Hence, the political conflict will continue about them. This political dispute will take place in a new situation which, after the 9th of July (the day designated for the announcement of the new transitional government), will have at least one NDA party, i.e., the SPLM, as a partner in the new authority.”
Never was the dilemma of the NDA/SPLM partnership with Sudan Government much clearer! Correctly, Farouq Abu Eissa, a prominent NDA leader, blamed the government in an interview with Jazeera (July 2nd) for the ongoing failures of the negotiations: “It was the government that split the negotiating groups into bilateral talks, which is now generating unresolved disputes with the government from the North, Eastern Sudan, and Darfur.”
For many Sudanese, the Cairo Agreement was not action-oriented: it was rather a memo of understanding that rested only on some consensual principles. This bitter criticism from NDA supporters, in particular, was further asserted with the fact that the Cairo Agreement after long years of expectation had not specified executive provisions on the major issues of power sharing or the political and legislative measures related to them. The NIF rulers would continue to frustrate the NDA expectations to have a proportionate share of the Interim Parliament, as they did with the Umma and all other opposition groups, simply because the Nivasha Agreement has already overruled such possibilities by prescribed provisions placed above the Interim Constitution itself.
The NDA resort to some anticipatory evaluation of the Cairo Agreement was seen as “save face politics” by the NIF opposition faction. This opinion, however, was less aggressive than NDA supporters of whom Kamal al-Jizouli among many others saw the NDA participation with its partner the SPLM in a coalition government with the NIF rulers as “de facto sharing in the guilt of the Salvation rule” that the NDA has been endlessly rejecting by all possible means for 16 consecutive years! The mode expressed by a great many NDA supporters favored a straightforward stay in the opposition with full-time homework to prepare the NDA for the next elections – a situation that the Umma and its restored ally, the Turabi faction, already adopted.
The NDA Leadership’s anticipation of some improving position with “a new situation” in the next Interim Period (which would last for 6 years) was specifically related to the ascendancy of the SPLM leader, Dr. John Garang, to the office of the First-Vice President of the State. Many observers asked, however: would this Office possibly act for the NDA opposition group, which was all together excluded from the peace negotiations, when the SPLM is now politically and legally bound to work as a political, legislative, and executive partner with the NDA foe to execute the Nivasha Peace Agreements?
The SPLM would be overly busy with the challenging realities of the post-war South that desperately needs to run a regular democratic life based on the respect of human rights and public freedoms with sufficient modern services and stable development, as top political agenda. The obstacles inhibiting sound implementation of these vital concerns are already slowly creeping over the South from the part of the NIF rulers whose strategies vis-à-vis the Northerner democratic opposition aimed persistently to relegate the SPLM to NIF dominancy by intelligence plans, government-supported militias, and perhaps some other hidden alliances to keep the SPLM away, as far as possible, from the NDA democratic pressures or expectations. There is much to see occurring within these competing strategies. Understandably, Abu Eissa blame of the NIF splitting politics could be further extended to the Naivasha engineers who deliberately ignored the Sudanese cultural and political realities that only rest with a national consensus.
Principle, Non-Authority Agreement
“The agreement,” said the NDA, “includes agreed-upon issues concerning: 1) The incorporation of principles of the NDA Charter in the Interim Constitutional Draft chief of which is democratic pluralism, citizenship as the basis of rights and duties, and a clear reference of constitutional rights to international human rights norms; 2) Prerequisites of the transition to democracy, including the abrogation of emergency law, revisions of all enforceable laws to ensure their compatibility with the freedom of assembly and the press, as well as the other international fundamental freedoms; legislation of new laws to ascertain the due process of justice, democratic elections, and political activities, trade unionism, and provision for an independent Bar Association, etc.; 3) Conversion of the State bodies to national apparatuses free of partisan rule (an independent judiciary and a non-authoritative, only informative and consultative security department by law); 4) Fair settlements of the injustices and the abuses of authority that occurred throughout the Salvation rule, including dismissals for political reason from the civil service, the judiciary, or the armed and disciplinary forces; the return or compensation of all sequestrated properties; and the accountancy for financial and/or administrative corruption; 5) Evaluation of the decentralized system of government by an expert committee to help establish democratic federal governance; 6) Mobilization program to increase the optional unity; and 7) Participation of all political forces in the legislative and executive bodies and commissions and the committee on interim constitution.”
The NDA leadership meeting reiterated agreement with the ruling regime with respect to “necessary principles to achieve social justice and alleviation of poverty; the representation of women in all positions of decision making; participation of all political forces to face out problems of the homeland; expansion of regional powers at expense of the Center; affirmative action for the most backward regions and the war-affected areas; and the settlement of the displaced and refugee populations and NDA organizations.” Nothing was guaranteed, however, by the Cairo Agreement to implement any specific obligation to alleviate the escalated pauperization of the vast majority of the population. The NDA itself has not yet worked out such program in any of its published materials!
Large Frustrations, New Alliances
What was being accomplished of the agreed-upon principles in the Cairo Agreement, as the NDA mentioned, included the formation of three bilateral or national political and legal committees representing all political forces “to execute a would-be agreement that would be supervised by a bilateral NDA-Government committee. The NDA already participated with 15 percent representatives in the Committee on Interim Constitution that enabled the NDA to include the Cairo Agreement as one reference of the constitutional draft.” Still, the NDA had no say in approving the constitutional draft, according to the provisions of the Nivasha agreement.
The NDA Leadership meeting blamed the NIF for its negative stand: “Throughout the negotiations, the NDA has been consistently working to ensure the participation of all Sudanese political groups in the transitional period. The NDA endeavors have not been received, as they deserved [by the government]. Despite this fact, the NDA will pursue its good efforts to bring together all political forces in a national conference to accomplish national consensus and the participation in national affairs by all people? If the agreement is successfully implemented, through the mobilization of the largest popular support to protect it and to guarantee its procession, it will play a major role in the completion of the Nairobi Agreement for peace all over the Nation. The agreement, nonetheless, will continue uncovered and is susceptible to breakdowns unless it would respond favorably to the just demands of our people in Eastern Sudan and Darfur on the basis of the peaceful democratic solution of the problems in question.”
This same prediction has been lately raised by the Sadiq al-Mahdi-Turabi strategic re-alliance: would the NDA align with the Umma-NIF opposition faction versus the SPLM/NIF ruling faction in the Interim Period? Or would the Taha-Mirghani-Garang follow-up committee of the Cairo Agreement incorporate the NDA with better shares to roll back the Muslim Brotherhood’s determination to re-establish an Islamic Republic with the Nivasha prescribed elections?! What if a larger strategic alliance joins together al-Mahdi, Turabi, and Taha in the upcoming national elections? Has Nivasha, as many said years ago, weakened the secular democratic forces of the country? Has Nivasha neutralized, in any sense, the armed, police, and security forces, the authoritative bodies of the ruling junta that continue to guarantee an upper hand to the Muslim Brotherhood coup leaders over public politics?