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Sudan Tribune

Plural news and views on Sudan

Fragile unity of the marginilized people of Sudan

By Steve Paterno *

Jan 10, 2006 — The state of Sudan as a country with its current trend provides a grim prospect for its survival. For many years, many scholars and political practitioners of the Sudan embark on diagnosing the problems attributing to the failures of Sudan as a stable modern state, and not surprisingly, though each scholar or politician allotted different factors as the causes of the failures, they all arrive to the same conclusion that with the contemporary politics of the Sudan, there will be no Sudan.

Since Sudan obtaining independence from the Great Britain in 1956, many competing interest groups have been battling for power in the central government of Khartoum through, coups, counter-coups, extortions, and manipulations. Meanwhile, on the other parts of the country, the South in particular, arm rebellions constantly rage against the successive powers in Khartoum. Just in a span of five decades, the power in Khartoum changed hands at least seventeen times, and moreover violently, leaving no doubt that the state of a country is in a complete shamble. Also within that five decades, many agreements have been signed among the constant raging rebellions, mostly in the South and the successive powers in Khartoum. Yet none of those signed agreements resulted into the stability and peace of the country, prompting a prominent practitioner of Sudan politics and scholar concluding in his book that “too many agreements are dishonored.” Those agreements just become like those U.N. drafted resolutions-the resolutions that seem to have no effects on what they are intended for.

Given Sudan’s religious, ethnic, and regional complexities, it proves difficult to forge a nationalistic stand so as to establish a viable and stable state. Just recently, a fragile coalition under a vague banner of the “marginalized people of the Sudan” joined hands with one common goal of waging a war against the present regime in Khartoum. There are various arms and political groups from all parts of the country that all claimed to be marginalized by the central power in Khartoum who ended up forming this coalition of the marginalized people of the Sudan. However, it is interesting to note that among this coalition are people and groups who at some points held enormous powers and exert significant influence at the central government in Khartoum. This will leave one to ask whether marginalization is an empty rhetoric just use for political slogan.

Even more ironically, is that one of the leading partners in this coalition of the marginalized, the SPLA/M is currently sitting at the center of power in Khartoum. The history of SPLA/M and how it got to the center of power in Khartoum can make a good case study for the politically marginalized people of the Sudan. In 1983, the SPLA/M took arms to wage a revolutionary war against the regime in Khartoum. The SPLA/M rebellion survive four successive brutal regimes in Khartoum. The SPLA/M long survival and its vision to create a new, just and democratic Sudan help other arms and political groups bought into the vision of SPLA/M. On SPLA/M twentieth revolutionary anniversary, there were already several arms and political groups from all parts of Sudan acting in concert with SPLA/M to topple the regime in Khartoum.

However, last year, SPLA/M secured a peace deal with the regime in Khartoum that guarantees the SPLA/M to share the power, share the wealth, participate in national army, and run South Sudan until the South held a referendum on whether it wants to remain part of a united Sudan or opt for independence.

Now every arm and political group that has been opposing the regime in Khartoum is trying to strike a deal with Khartoum that relatively replicate the peace deal that the SPLA/M struck a year ago. The best case in point is the various arms and political groups in the Darfur region. The peace talk between the Darfur rebel groups and Khartoum has just broken off before both sides could resolve among other things, the power sharing formular. The power sharing proposal that the Darfur rebel presented clearly threaten the power of SPLA/M at the national level and undermines the peace that it signed. Unlike the South with huge depository of oil to share, one will wonder what kind of wealth the Darfur has to share, and what formula it will use for sharing such wealth. So, it is the SPLA/M that will lose if the Darfur rebels succeed in replicating the same peace deal with Khartoum.

It seems the lack of progress in peace talk between the Darfur rebel groups and the Khartoum is creating more anarchy in the region of Darfur. Ambushes, clashes, raids, rapes, and tortures are increasingly becoming the order in the region. So, does any marginilized willing to replicate such situation as well? Equally disturbing is the situation in the Eastern part of Sudan where rebels opposing the Khartoum regime are threatening to fill in the vacuum of SPLA soldiers who are preparing to leave the region because the peace agreement makes them to leave. Such situations in Sudan political atmosphere provides no option but for one to jealously control its powers and region as any agreement will be a zero-sum game, where one gains and the other loses.

Perhaps it is not even worthy to fight to control the power in Khartoum given the current political atmosphere. The first step is for the South and the SPLA/M to go separate and independent before it loses any of its power and wealth to any fake partner in peace. Those other regions and groups may follow suit if really they are willing to replicate things. But they must do so on their own not on the expense of others such as the SPLA/M. Power and wealth are what people dies for and it cannot be relinguished that easily through a negotiation in some foreign capitals as the arms and political groups of Sudan are expecting.

* Steve Paterno is a Sudanese residence of the U.S.A., and he can be reached at [email protected]

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