TEXT- Rebel SLA principal perpetrator of security situation in Darfur

Feb 2, 2006 (KHARTOUM) — The rebel SLA Minawi faction has been designed by the envoy of the African Union in Sudan as principal perpetrator of the security situation in Sudan’s troubled Darfur region.

During a press conference held today in Khartoum the Special Representative of the Chairman of the AU Commission in Sudan Amb. Baga Gana Kingibe accused the Darfur rebel SLA – Minawi faction of perpetrating violence not only against the Sudanese army but also against innocent civilian villagers.

The further said that “developments in Chad introduced a new dimension to the already tension laden situation in West Darfur”.

Kingible said there was no direct confrontation between the belligerent parties in Darfur due to the self restraint exercised by government troops. But, he explained this relative calm by the internal power straggle and armed confrontation within the SLM ranks. SLA-Minawi faction has been also pointed as “assuming an increasingly confrontational posture” in this issue.

Nevertheless, the AU special envoy urged the Sudanese government to disarm the Arab militias. He said these dangerous elements “still continue to burn, kill and rape on an ever escalating scale”.

The following is the full text of the briefing of the Special Representative of the Chairman of the AU Commission in Sudan Amb. Baga Gana Kingibe distributed by the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

Good morning and welcome to the HQ of the African Union Mission in The Sudan.

You will recall that I held a similar press briefing on 1st October, 2005, in view of the serious deterioration of the security situation in Darfur between July and September 2005. As you may recall, on that occasion, I lamented the violations of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement by all the warring parties. I particularly decried the attacks on civilians, including the IDPs in their camps, not only by the parties, but also by the armed Arab Janjaweed militias, as well as splinter groups of the rebel movements, especially in Sector 5 of our AOR in North-Western Darfur.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Four months on, I am again addressing you against the background of continuing degradation of the security situation in Darfur. In many ways, insecurity in Darfur is more widespread, more intense, and more frequent on all fronts.

You will recall that it was in early October that the previously sporadic harassment of AMIS troops and members of the humanitarian and NGO communities took a tragic turn on the 8th of October, 2005, with the killing of four (4) Nigerian soldiers and two (2) civilian drivers working for an AMIS contractor. This was followed by the abduction of members of the Senegalese contingent, on 9th October 2005 in Tine, Sector 5, by a break away faction of the JEM, working with the NMRD. On this occasion, though no fatalities were suffered, a number of our vehicles and equipment were confiscated and stolen by the attackers. Even as recently as the 26th of last month, the Senegalese Contingent again came under fire between Kulbus and Tine, always in Sector 5. In this attack, we tragically lost one soldier while 10 others were wounded, five of them critically. Again AMIS vehicles and equipment were taken by the assailants.

Indeed, the last days of the month of January 2006 witnessed an upsurge of violence particularly in West Darfur, and largely perpetrated by the SLA, not only against GOS Army and Police, but also against innocent civilian villagers. On the other hand, an unidentified aircraft circled over Khor Abeche four times on 22 January 2006, creating unnecessary panic in the area.

Meanwhile, developments in Chad introduced a new dimension to the already tension laden situation in West Darfur. In Mournei for instance, our scheduled patrol to Dereisa Village was once obstructed by heavily armed Chadian deserters. On 20th January 2006, Chadian regular Forces crossed into Sudanese territory in pursuit of Chadian rebels who had earlier reportedly abducted their District Commissioner and a soldier.

We also have reports indicating that on 28th January 2006, there was an attack on GOS Army Camps at Armankol village near Tandalti in Sector 3, El Geneina, by several heavily armed men believed to be Chadians. In this attack, three GOS soldiers were wounded and two of the attackers killed.

While attacks and harassment of AMIS personnel and humanitarian workers escalated, I must say that actual confrontation between the three parties to the N’Djamena Agreement, ie GOS, SLM and JEM had considerably diminished for most of this period. This, I should acknowledge, is largely due to the restraint exercised by GOS Forces even in situations where they were clearly provoked and there were temptations to retaliate. A clear example of such incidences was when the SLA attacked and took over control of Shearia. We, therefore, commend the GOS Forces for heeding our appeal for restraint.

The absence of direct confrontation between the principal parties was also partly due to the preoccupation, especially by the SLM, with the wranglings within its own ranks. These internal difficulties which were aggravated by the Mini Minawi faction’s unilateral convening of the Haskanista Congress in October, 2005, led to the emergence of an alternative, but so far unrecognised, leadership for the SLA. Expectedly, the period following the Haskanista Congress witnessed a number of clashes between the two rival factions of the SLA, with the Minawi Group assuming an increasingly confrontational posture not only vis a vis the GOS Forces, but also all other parties on the ground, including AMIS troops and international humanitarian workers.

This division within the SLA indeed hindered any movement forward in the 6th Round of the Abuja peace talks, which had to be adjourned without any significant progress on the positive foundations laid by the adoption of the Declaration of Principles in the 5th Round. Several efforts by ourselves, the UNMIS and some of our partners, particularly the U.S. through Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick and Assistant Secretary of State Fraizer, to bring some cohesion within the ranks of the SLA did not bear any immediate fruit. However, as you might recall, following the intervention by Chad, Libya, Eritrea and ourselves in N’djamena, the two factions did finally agree on the 24th November, 2005, to set aside their differences and, together with JEM, to work as one team in the 7th Round of the Peace talks now going on in Abuja. So far they have remained faithful to this agreement.

What followed this positive development, however, was that the major features of insecurity in Darfur became largely inter-tribal confrontations accentuated by the unrelenting activities of the Arab militias and opportunistic bandits, especially in North and South Darfur. In West Darfur, acts of banditry and attacks against humanitarian workers and NGOs increased as a result of the spill over effects of developments within Chad which resulted in the crossing into Sudan of Chadian Army deserters and other Chadian rebel elements.

This new source of instability from Chad was injected into an already over-charged area of Darfur ie the North-West, which is infested with not only the three traditional groups, but also all other elements in the Darfur mix, including the NMRD, the Mohammed Saleh Harba faction as well as the out-law group of Col. Jibril.

Following the exchange of accusations and counter accusations between the Governments of Chad and Sudan about responsibility for supporting their respective dissidents, and especially following the attack by some Chadian dissidents on the Chadian border town of Adre on 18th December 2005, the security situation in West Darfur was further compounded, leading to the withdrawal of many UN humanitarian Staff and NGO workers. There also followed large-scale movement of the Sudanese Forces to reinforce their border security. Nevertheless, I commend the restraint by both Governments in not allowing their border situation to get out of hand, and for paving the way for the AU Peace and Security Council to intervene at the appropriate time.

Generally, the situation, especially in the past couple of weeks, is a continuing deterioration of security, mostly provoked by SLA elements. For instance, the continued illegal occupation of Graida by the SLA is a constant source of provocation. The SLA must abide by the decision of the Joint Commission for Graida to be demilitarised and neutralised, and thus pave the way for AMIS to establish presence as was done in other similarly contested towns like Labado, Marla, and Ishma.

Equally condemnable is the attack by the SLA on Shearia on 16 January 2006, and Golo on 23 January 2006. Both attacks resulted in high causalities and further displacement of people. These SLA actions prompted reprisal attacks by the Janjaweed militia. These reprisal attacks in fact took further toll of human life, most of whom were innocent unarmed villagers.

With or without SLA provocations, the Janjaweed/Arab militia continued to cause havoc on farmlands and crops ready to be harvested by farmers who were mostly what has been termed ?’agricultural commuters” from nearby IDP camps. The militia still continue to burn, kill and rape on an ever escalating scale.

This is the more reason why once again, we reiterate calls by the international community on the Government of The Sudan to take immediate, vigorous and credible steps to disarm these dangerous elements. Their continuing ability to strike who, when and where they like reinforces their strong sense of impunity and if they continue unchecked, they will remain a serious factor impeding our collective efforts to stabilise the security situation in Darfur.

These violations and breaches whether by the SLA or the Arab militia or indeed by GOS Forces should not be tolerated anymore as they not only further undermine what is in any case a tenuous ceasefire, but also derail the ongoing peace talks in Abuja, into which so much energy and resources have been put by the AU and the international community. Indeed, the recent escalation of violence in Darfur, particularly the SLA attacks on Golo and Shearia has reverberated in Abuja and has prompted the A.U. Chief Mediator to express deep concern and outrage.

I too wish to renew my earlier appeal to all the warring parties to immediately cease any further hostilities amongst themselves or those directed against AMIS personnel, members of the international humanitarian community including the NGOs, as well as innocent civilians, including the IDPs. For the time being, at any rate, I understand that there has been progress in the Abuja talks in the past one week. I urge that this progress be sustained despite the ugly incident of the 28 January 2006 when for the first time, some JEM participants at the talks assaulted each other with serious injuries being sustained by two of them.

However, as we have seen right at the start of these talks, , it is almost impossible to combine talking peace and continuing violence whether it is in Abuja or in Darfur. The fine words of commitment to peaceful negotiations spoken by the parties in Abuja are not reflected by their belligerent deeds on the ground in Darfur. The rebels, the SLA in particular, must stop all further attacks and intransigence in Darfur. The Government for its part must rein in the militia – they continue to be the menace which should no longer be tolerated by any one committed to peace in Darfur.

A final point on this.

I cannot commend enough the AMIS troops, CivPol and civilian personnel as well as the UN’s OCHA and all other humanitarian groups on the important role they are playing in this most ambitious ever AU peace support intervention. I am aware of the tremendous pressures under which all those who work in Darfur come. Still, I call on the humanitarian agencies and NGOs which have suspended operations not to give up and stand ready to resume their vital work of providing the much needed life saving assistance as soon as the situation permits. Copy of a brief summary of the incidences which constitute clear breaches of the cease-fire and violations of the Humanitarian Agreement will be circulated to you after I finish this statement.

Now to other issues.

You will recall that the 6th Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the AU was concluded in Khartoum last week. I should not, therefore, end this Statement without acknowledging the impressive performance of the Government of The Sudan in providing all the necessary facilities which ensured a successful and hitch free Summit. The African leaders who had decided way back during the Abuja Summit a year ago to meet in Khartoum in January 2006, to honour the people of Sudan on their 50TH Independence anniversary and the first anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, left Khartoum fully satisfied with all the arrangements made for them.

This success entailed in its wake also a challenge and an opportunity for Sudan. President Al-Bashir in his address at both the opening and closing ceremonies did candidly acknowledge that there was a problem in Darfur and gave a solemn pledge to his peers that he is committed to bringing peace soon to that Region. In turn, African leaders gave the Government of the Sudan the opportunity to deliver on these undertakings. My conversations with Sudanese officials give me the confidence that the Government will rise to the challenge and grasp the opportunity of the message of the Summit and give the lead in the continuing efforts to bring about peace to Darfur.

I should also mention that we now have a new leadership of the AMIS Forces in Darfur, following the departure of the pioneer Force Commander, General Festus OKWONKO from Nigeria, and his Deputy, Brigadier Jean Bosko KAZURA from Rwanda.

General OKONKWO and his pioneer team of the AMIS Forces leadership did a tremendous job of setting up our operations in Darfur from scratch. They were responsible for establishing our presence with the initial Sixty (60) military observers and not more than three hundred (300) protection forces and nurturing it to its current strength of 5300 military and some 700 civilian police personnel.

They came to Darfur following the great humanitarian tragedy of 2003/2004 with the bearest minimum of logistics and equipment when, let us not forget, no one else, including the UN, were willing to do so. In spite of the limitations of their mandate, and other constaints, General OKONKWO and his Colleagues did succeed in getting the AU Forces to stabilise the rampant insecurity of those horrendous days in Darfur as well as any Force in similar situation could, especially in an environment absent of any real ceasefire. I am proud of what General OKWONKO and his team have achieved despite numerous deficiencies and the harsh operational environment. I have the confidence that the new Force Commander, General IHEKIRE, and his Deputy, Brigadier KAMANZE would build on the solid foundations they met.

You are also aware that we undertook the second Assessment Mission of the AMIS operations in Darfur in December 2005, to see the extent of implementation of the recommendations of the March 2005 Assessment Mission and make further recommendations on the way forward. The Peace and Security Council of the AU on 12th January 2006, deliberated on the Report and our recommendations which included that in the long term, a single peace support operation covering the whole of the Sudan should be considered. Since then, the question of the future of the AU Mission in the Sudan has become the focus of much discussion, especially on the possible transition to the U.N.

The Assessment Report in essence made two types of recommendations -in the short to medium terms and in the long run. The first set of recommendations dealt with the technical aspects of AMIS operations, and how to improve upon them. They covered such matters as management, command and control, operations, logistics, mandate, rules of engagement, training, relations with the parties, etc.

The second set of recommendations on the long term was based on the following observations:

– the initial stabilisation phase in Darfur has been largely achieved;
– AMIS efforts have contributed to reducing the number of large-scale ceasefire violations,
– AMIS has created conducive conditions for the political process in Abuja;
– Even if there is a peace agreement in early 2006, only about 30 % of IDPs can return;
– Even under the best case scenario, a peace support operation will be required in Darfur for 2-3 more years to enable complete IDP and refugees returns;
– The operation of AMIS has grown large and become increasingly complex, requiring greater technical, operational and command and control skills and experience;
– AMIS has no assured funding beyond March ending 2006;
– While the international partners are not prepared to continue funding AMIS on voluntary basis after March 2006 without a clear exit strategy, they would nevertheless find the necessary resources to enable AMIS carry on operating for a further 9 months or so, if there is a definitive decision on a transition to the UN.

It was for these and other mostly internal considerations, that the Peace and Security Council requested the African Union Commission to engage the UN on the modalities for a transition pending a final decision on the matter by the Council meeting at ministerial level. For the moment, this is where matters stand. And I know that vigorous opposition has already been voiced by the GOS and there have been demonstrations in some Darfuran cities against the transition option. However, I hope that it is now clearer where the AU is coming from on this matter. Historically, AU peace support operations whether in Burundi or elsewhere had always been predicated on the clear knowledge that eventually, there will be a transition to the UN. When we embarked on the Darfur Mission, this was also a clear understanding from the outset. Apart from, and also because of, the considerations which I have already referred to, it is clear in our minds that a transition is inevitable in the long run for the simple reason that it will create a more efficient single peace support operation for the whole of the Sudan, bringing coherence and synergy, and integration of political, humanitarian, military and post conflict issues.

It is also very clear that this transition will not happen overnight. AMIS will continue to operate in Darfur for at least 6-9 months after a firm decision is taken, and therein lies yet another window of opportunity for the Sudanese parties, especially those who have reservations on the transition to the UN. Clearly, 6-9 months is more than enough time to conclude the Abuja Peace process which will still remain under the auspices of the African Union. The sooner there is a peace agreement on Darfur and the more solidly it takes root, the less will be the need for any robust peace support operation by any Organisation. This is where I would like to put the emphasis and on this note, take any questions your might have.

Thank you for your patient attention.

(ST)