Realism and Darfur
By James Forsyth , The New Republic Online
Mar 1, 2006 — John Bolton is nothing if not direct. So it was unsurprising that when Time magazine asked him recently whether genocide is “the right term for what’s happening” in Darfur, he gave a blunt response: “Sounds right to me.”
Bolton is a fervent defender of the American national interest, with little appetite for liberal idealism. So his comment reveals something important about the Darfur debate: Even those who are generally skeptical of humanitarian intervention are prepared to admit that genocide is taking place in Darfur. But while almost everyone agrees that a genocide is happening, there is little agreement as to how the United States should respond, if at all. This is where advocates of intervention have failed. They have portrayed intervention in Darfur as a moral imperative–which it is–but have focused little on winning over foreign-policy realists to their cause.
In fact, there is a strong national-interest case to be made for intervention in Darfur. The failure to act is weakening the U.S. position on a continent of increasing importance to American energy needs and the fight against terrorism. How? By demonstrating that being under the Chinese umbrella guarantees you impunity. Given the Bush administration’s passionate, noble rhetoric on human rights and its decision to label Darfur a genocide, the world is wondering why a supposedly intervention-happy U.S. government is treading so softly. To many African governments the answer probably appears obvious: Khartoum has a powerful patron in China, whose seat on the Security Council stymies American efforts to deal with the situation.
A recent survey published in Foreign Policy magazine (where I work) revealed that sub-Saharan Africa was the principal area of research for only 6 percent of American international relations scholars. Only one percent of academics thought the region was of greatest importance to the United States now and only two percent thought it would be in 20 years time. In contrast, the Chinese diplomatic establishment has long paid close attention to the continent. Its interest dates to the Bandung conference in 1955 and China’s quest for recognition at the United Nations. Recently, though, Beijing has stepped up its outreach to Africa as it seeks to build a global supply chain and secure access to energy and mineral resources.
Chinese trade with Africa increased from $10 billion in 2003 to $20 billion in 2004; the Council on Foreign Relations estimates that in 2005 it increased by another $10 billion. China is not only building trade links with Africa, though. It has set up a ministerial level China-Africa cooperation forum, and since the turn of the millennium 40 agreements have been inked between Beijing and African nations. China is also moving aggressively to plug any gaps left by the United States. Yesterday, a headline in the Financial Times read: “Nigeria shifts to China arms.” The Nigerian vice president told the newspaper that U.S. cooperation was not “moving as fast as the situation is unfolding.” So, rather than waiting, Nigeria is obtaining patrol boats to protect oil installations in the Niger delta from China. The deal is a microcosmic example of the Chinese advantage: The United States, the paper reported, was moving slowly because of concerns over corruption and human rights abuses by Nigerian forces; the Chinese had no such qualms.
The Chinese deputy foreign minister boasted to The New York Times in 2004 that for China in Africa, “Business is business. We try to separate politics from business.” But this isn’t quite true. China might not make the aid it offers conditional on human rights and good governance. But it does offer, according to a recent Council on Foreign Relations report, a “total package: cash, technology, and political protection from international pressures.” The most enthusiastic client of this “total package” is Sudan. Sudan supplies China with 7 percent of its oil; in exchange, China is the largest foreign investor in Sudan and gums up moves in the Security Council to punish the Khartoum government for perpetrating the Darfur genocide. (It also supplies military equipment used by government-backed militias in their genocidal raids.)
If the Khartoum government succeeds in completing the Darfur genocide without international intervention, other African pariahs will marvel at the benefits of coming under the Chinese umbrella. Indeed, it seems that Robert Mugabe has already learned this lesson. Last year, he traveled to China to sign a trade deal as part of his “Look East” policy. While he was there, the Chinese helped to head off a U.N. debate over his brutal slum clearance policy.
Some realists dismiss Mugabe’s embrace of China as the action of a desperate despot that shouldn’t overly bother the United States. “Mugabe doesn’t have a lot of friends. So, he takes them where he can get them,” retorted Christopher Preble, a founding member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, when I raised this point with him. But as the Council on Foreign Relations report notes, “China offers an alternative source of support, even for some of the United States’ closest allies when they chafe under Western pressure for economic or political reform.” Ethiopia, Kenya, and Angola have all availed themselves of this assistance recently.
The problem, then, with Chinese influence is that it presents African governments with an alternative to greater political and economic liberalization. As Ian Taylor, an Africa specialist at the University of St. Andrews, pointed out to me, growing Chinese influence will have a “huge impact on [the West’s] leverage over dictatorships and autocrats on the continent.”
Realists might respond that greater political and economic liberalization–i.e., good governance–in Africa would be nice but is not a compelling U.S. interest. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the twentieth century–the American century–was bad governance in Africa. But this attitude ignores the fact that poorly governed states offer a haven for terrorist groups–wittingly or unwittingly. Realists scoffed at the idea that the United States should intervene in Liberia in 2003. But Charles Taylor’s regime both provided sanctuary to Al Qaeda members and helped them launder money through the illegal diamond trade. Another cause for concern is the potential for Christian-Muslim conflict in many African countries–most notably Nigeria, which is also the continent’s largest oil exporter. (Indeed, unrest in the Niger delta–where the equipment that the Chinese just sold the Nigerians will be used–could be the trigger for such conflict.) The continuing failure of the West to act in Darfur will make it far more likely that groups, and governments, will believe they can slaughter with impunity, especially if they have protection from the Chinese. Even the most cold-hearted realist must acknowledge that the last thing the United States needs now is a wave of Christian-Muslim violence for Osama Bin Laden to exploit.
The United States must push harder at Turtle Bay for a meaningful military response to Darfur: not just to save the lives of innocents, to atone for sitting on its hands during the Rwandan genocide, and to live up to its ideals, but also to thwart the rise of its strategic competitor in Africa–an ascendance that could undermine U.S. interests on the continent. There is evidence that China will buckle if pushed. In the face of concerted international pressure, China did not block last spring’s Security Council resolution referring the Darfur genocide to the International Criminal Court. As Ian Taylor argues, real action to stop the genocide “would send a signal that China’s ability to protect autocrats has its limitations.” Sound right to you, Ambassador Bolton?
* James Forsyth is assistant editor at Foreign Policy.