Not the NATO forces, but a Sudanese national conference
By Mahgoub El-Tigani*
March 18, 2006 — “Calls have been made by a number of AU partners and other actors for the hand-over of the Mission to the United Nations… to ensure its financial sustainability … and provide the much needed protection to the civilian population in face of continued violence and insecurity,” emphasized Chairperson Konare (AU: Addis Ababa, June 2006).
Unlike many non-Sudanese voices that have been unrelentingly asking for “military intervention” in Darfur to force “the warring parties” (that are mistakably restricted to the government armies/militias versus rebel forces) to end the disastrous conflict that continues to devastate Darfur, Sudanese opposition groups, including the Umma, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Communist Party, the People’s Congress Party and a long list of trade unions, human rights and democracy groups, and many professional associations have been appropriately calling on the Government of Sudan to convene a national conference under the auspices of the United Nations to bring about a real, far-sighted, and permanent solution to Darfur within a comprehensive just and peaceful solution of the Sudan’s Crisis as a whole.
Two problems, however, have been unfolding along the escalated crisis: 1) the uncooperativeness of the government with the International Community, namely, the United Nations and the relief agencies; and 2) the negligence of the International Community itself to potentialities of the Sudanese People to resolve the crisis by a national constitutional conference for both opposition and government on equal terms.
For one, many observers witnessed the poor performance of the Sudan’s National Unity Government, which, in essence, came about as a direct product of internationally-planned, designed, and enforced peace agreements whose procession basically failed from the very beginning to realize the political diversity of the country and the need, henceforth, to realize its national traditions, and modes of participation without discrimination or prejudice to any political constituency or professional association.
Many Sudanese writers have insistently issued continuous alerts about the NIF determination to run the nation, as it has unilaterally done since it seized power in June 1989 by a military coup. Nonetheless, internationally-approved plans on the country’s peace continued unchallenged, one-sided, focusing on victims needs to humanitarian relief while keeping a blind eye to the victims’ foremost hope to accomplish a permanent political solution for the region and the nation. The International Community must, therefore, rethink the anti-nationalist approach adopted by its think-tanks and sponsoring teams with the little or no success thus far attained to end the crisis at expense of feasible national solutions.
In his latest address to the African Peace and Security Council, the African Union’s Commission chairperson Alpha Konare acknowledged that “considerable progress has been achieved in the resolution of conflicts in some parts of the continent,” including South Sudan: “the progress achieved has remained fragile with the likelihood of fresh crisis erupting at any time. Darfur (western Sudan) is an eloquent illustration of this state of affairs… Undoubtedly, some progress has been made as demonstrated by the improved security situation in areas where AMIS is deployed, the overall improvement of the humanitarian situation, as well as the launching of the inter-Sudanese Peace Talks in Abuja and the progress, albeit slow, made in the negotiations there. However, much remains to be done to fully achieve the AU’s objectives.”
Correctly, the Chairperson stressed “The persistent violence against civilians, in complete disregard of basic humanitarian and human rights norms, the fact that no significant return of IDPs and refugees has taken place, the continued attacks against humanitarian workers, the precarious situation at the Chad/ Sudan border, and the inability of the Sudanese parties to conclude a peace agreement more than a year and half after the start of the negotiations bear testimony to the challenges ahead.” Unfortunately, however, the Chairperson, like many other critics and western think-tanks, ignored the Sudanese opposition and its role in the conflict’s resolution.
Mr. Konare complained about the limited capacity of the AU to manage the increasing costs of peace in the region. The lion’s share of his complaint, however, touched heavily upon the failures of international community and, above all, the Sudanese parties to the conflict, specifically, the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups.
In the Chairperson’s words: “the achievements of the AU, through AMIS, cannot be ignored, especially given that the Mission has, from the very beginning, operated under difficult circumstances. On the one hand, the Sudanese parties have not been fully cooperated with AMIS, having failed to comply with the very commitments into which they solemnly entered under the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and the Abuja Protocols. On the other hand, the increasing factionalization of the rebel movements and the continuing tribal tensions and conflicts, which have contributed to the perpetuation of the prevailing situation of violence and insecurity, have further compounded the problems confronting the Mission on the ground.”
In its forthcoming deliberations, the Chairperson advised, the 45th meeting of the PSC “may wish to consider the following elements: a need for a sustained and effective peace support operation in Darfur to facilitate compliance with existing agreements, enhance the protection of the civilian population, … create conditions conducive to the early conclusion of a peace agreement… [and] address the complex tasks of post-conflict reconstruction, including DDR and security sector reform. This would demand an increased integration of the different aspects of the peace process and the establishment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, requiring expertise and experience, as well as the mobilization of considerable and predictable financial and logistical resources, together with a management capacity, which AU does not yet possess.”
Playing down the Sudanese potentialities to solve the crisis, the Konare’s statement might well support many non-Sudanese calls to superimpose NATO forces over the AU “failed party” – still, with no attention paid to the Sudanese vital constituencies that include parties well-known for influential historical, ideological, and political bondages with the region, especially the Umma and the DUP opposition groups.
The fact of the matter is that all of the national perquisites desperately needed to “create conditions conducive to the early conclusion of a peace agreement… [and] address the complex tasks of post-conflict reconstruction, including DDR and security sector reform” hinge on a broad, nationally-acceptable deal that, understandably, would only succeed on the basis of an All-Sudanese National Constitutional Conference.
The United Nations, the African Union, Arab League, and the concerned governments of the United States, European Union, and the International Community at large are strongly urged to invite the Government of Sudan to convene the conference in question with the Sudanese Opposition under the auspices of the UN and the other regional and international entities for that meaningful conference alone would avoid escalation of the crisis with extra military operations in a region already rampant with armed struggles, armed hostilities, and armed conflicts.
A successful national constitutional conference would do the difficult tasks: political solution, permanent peace, and avoidance of a larger pool of primordial feuds in perhaps unprecedented regional and international levels.
* Member of Sudanese Writers’ Union (in exile) and the president of Sudan Human Rights Organization Cairo-Branch.