Half a deal for Darfur

Editorial, Financial Times

May 9, 2006 — The deal between Sudan’s government and the main rebel faction in Darfur is at best a first step towards settling the region’s devastating crisis. Reached in Nigeria after serial delays and under US-led international pressure, it provides a shaky foundation for peace, in a festering conflict no longer confined to Darfur but now closely linked to tensions in neighbouring Chad.

There must, first of all, be doubts about the genuineness of Khartoum’s commitment to the pact, given its record up to now. The deal, providing posts in government, financial support, insertion of rebel soldiers in the army and police, and a referendum in 2010 on a new regional status, is a diluted version of the comprehensive peace agreement signed in January last year for southern Sudan. That first agreement raised hopes of a solution for Darfur along the same lines. But Khartoum’s sluggishness in implementing the provisions of its deal in the south makes the example look less encouraging.

Secondly, the deal failed to win support from other rebel factions in the Sudan Liberation Movement and the separate Justice and Equality Movement, which has a wider agenda. Their absence weakens the chances of the deal working. Plans for disarmament of government-backed janjaweed militias before that of rebel forces may be unrealistic in these circumstances.

But it is at least a deal and should be enough to provide the basis for a full-scale United Nations peace force. After three years of brutality, the displacement of about 2m people and tens of thousands of deaths, it is about time.

The hope is that by providing a security framework it can bring other armed factions into compliance. A humanitarian ceasefire, in place since 2004, has been completely ineffectual. The African Union’s force of peacekeepers, now numbering 7,000, has been overwhelmed. Khartoum said it would not countenance a UN mission without a peace agreement. It now has it.

What is vital is that the UN should deploy with sufficient force. The mission must have a robust mandate and be well-equipped, including armed helicopters. Contingency plans should be made for a no-fly zone. But troop numbers will also be needed to deal with a complex pattern of violence in a territory the size of Iraq. Guaranteeing protection of civilians will get harder when they start filtering out of the camps and return to their villages. Condoleezza Rice, US secretary of state, has said it should remain “largely an African mission”. But Africa does not have enough trained peacekeepers to sustain the current mission, let alone the larger force of 20,000 or so that is likely to be needed. If Nato is unwilling to send ground troops, countries in Asia or Latin America should be asked to fill the gap. Pushing the AU into a failure in Darfur would be a disaster not only for the region and the humanitarian effort there, but also for Africa’s emerging security arrangements.