AU’s Salim reveals Abuja handicaps, last-minute compromise
May 21, 2006 (ADDIS ABABA) — African Union Special envoy and Chief Mediator at Abuja talks, Salim Ahmed Salim presented a general assessment of the last-minutes secret negotiations to achieve Darfur Peace Agreement signed on 5 May between the Sudanese government and the main faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Movement les by Minni Minawi.
In his six pages speech Salim before the AU Peace and Security Council, on 15 May presented a general review of obstacles that caused the slowness of the talks, the last-minute proposals formulated by the US, UK envoys; and contacts with SLM Abdelwahid al-Nur to join the deal.
HANDICAP AND PROBLEMS
According to Salim three points — mistrust between the parties, divisions among rebel groups and restrictions imposed by Naivash peace deal signed between Sudanese government and the former rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) – constituted constraints that the mediation team has to deal with and to surpass.
LAST MINUTE PROPOSALS
These proposals covered essentially the security area and more specifically guidelines on the neutralization and disarmament of the Janjaweed, as well as the integration of the Movements’ forces. They also helped to fill the blanks concerning the number of rebel forces to be integrated and the manner of their integration.
There were also minor modifications on power sharing. These included the increase of the numbers of Movements Representatives in the State Legislatures from 18 to 21 as well as strengthening of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). There was also a further elaboration on the issue of compensation.
SLM’S NUR INDECISIVENESS
On the Abdelwahid al-Nur refusal of the peace accord, the Chief mediator said “I and my colleagues in the Mediation are particularly saddened by the indecisiveness of Mr. Abdulwahid. Throughout this Round he has been most enthusiastic about arriving at an agreement. He and/or his collaborators have been in a series of discussions with the Government of Sudan. And so the general expectation was that he would be among the first to sign”. He further gave the details of the last contacts with him.
Below the full text of Salim speech before the AU Peace and Security Council:
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ADDIS ABABA, MONDAY 15 MAY 2006
Mr. Chairman
Your Excellency Professor Alpha Oumar Konare
Distinguished Ministers and Other Representatives of the Council
Ladies and Gentlemen
I am honoured to address this important session of the AU Peace and Security Council. Unlike the last time I did so here on April 6, when the prospects for a Peace Agreement in Darfur were still on the balance, I am delighted that this time around, I am addressing the Council when the main task given to me and my colleagues in the Mediation has to a very great extent been accomplished. A PEACE AGREEMENT HAS NOW BEEN SIGNED. Now we face types of challenges which in many respects are no less daunting. Foremost among these challenges is how to translate the Peace Agreement into a durable Peace in Darfur itself.
I shall refrain from giving a lengthy expose on the evolution of the Abuja Peace Talks its progress, its moments of frustration and the various shortcomings that we encountered. Nor, is it necessary for me to speak in details about the content of the Agreement itself since the report of the Chairperson of the Commission contained in document PSC/MIN2 (L1) clearly highlights the salient points of the Agreement. Furthermore, the Text of the Darfur Peace Agreement as originally presented by me to the Parties on April 25, 2006, has already been made available to this Council which led it to take a decision on 28th April affirming that the Draft DPA represented “a fair, comprehensive and workable solution to the conflict in Darfur”. It is important to point out that the fundamentals in the Final Agreement has basically remained the same.
It is not also necessary to give this Council a blow by blow description of developments which culminated in the signing of the Agreement at the State House in Abuja on May 5. Yet a brief resume highlighting what has been achieved, how it was achieved and the way forward would, in my opinion, be in order.
The Darfur Peace Negotiations have been going on for two years starting in April 2004. And here it is appropriate that I pay tribute to my predecessor Mr. Hamid Al Gabid for his efforts and contribution. I was privileged to take over the Peace Talks in Abuja in June 2005. This was the Fifth Round, which lasted a month. The Sixth Round took place from September to October that year and we begun this Seventh Round on 28 November 2005.
This Seventh Round as the Chairperson’s Report points out went on for over 5 months on a continuous basis. And even though during the opening session the leaders of the Government and Movements delegations as well as all of us who were associated with the Talks emphasized that this was to be the final and decisive Round, nothing was certain up to the very last moment.
The Pace was agonizingly slow. We were operating under a number of handicaps and problems. These included:
– The considerable degree of mistrust and suspicion which the Movements had towards the Government of Sudan which made it difficult and indeed for a greater part of the time, impossible, for direct negotiations between the Parties;
– The unfortunate deep division that prevailed within and among the Movements complicated the negotiation process and more often than not made the decision-making process on the part of the Movements a lengthy and tedious exercise. This situation also resulted in positions being reversed just when one felt that an agreement on a particular point has been reached regrettably a process of fragmentation of some of the Movements continued unabated.
– The limitations which the Mediation had in terms of making some recommendations on certain issues conscious as we were, and were continuously reminded, that we should not do anything which would unravel or undermine the provisions of the Naivasha Comprehensive Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Throughout the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Darfur conflict in Abuja, we, the Mediation while being conscious of this had also to take into account the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Movements. It was not an easy balancing act.
Yet despite the aforementioned constraints, the months of continuous negotiations at Chida International Hotel, Abuja, were making steady even if slow progress. This was made possible by the persistent efforts of the Mediation team working closely with the facilitators, and for a large part of time with the Chad Co-Mediation as well as with the International Partners.
I should at this stage like to mention that three factors immensely assisted to quicken the pace of the negotiations create the propitious conditions for the Mediation to present the Draft of the Darfur Peace Agreement on April 25. These were the decision of the Peace and Security Council taken at its meeting on 10 March 2006 to give a deadline of 30 April 2006 for the conclusion of the Talks; the arrival in Abuja of the second vice President of Sudan, Ali-Osman Taha with a powerful delegation including senior members of the SPLM and their collective involvement in the Peace Process as well as the arrival of the current Chairman of the AU President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo who together with our host President Obasanjo, joined by the Chief Mediator and his team had extensive discussion lasting a whole night of Saturday 8 April and later Sunday 9 April 2006, separately with the Government delegation and with the leaders of the Movements. The presence of the Vice President Ali Osman Taha in Abuja for almost a month resulted in separate direct discussion between him and the leaders of both wings of this SLM/A, Messrs Minni Minawi and Abdulwahid, as well as, with delegation of the Justice and Equality Movement. Among other things his presence broke the taboos concerning direct negotiations between the parties.
The Draft Darfur Peace Agreement that I presented on April 25 was a culmination of prolonged discussions, sustained efforts and negotiations. It addressed all the fundamental issues raised to the parties. It was a compromise text but one which took active consideration the legitimate areas of concern of the Movements and the legitimate aspirations of the people of Darfur and especially the plight of millions who were in IDP camps and those in refugee camps.
The text dealt with power sharing, wealth sharing, security arrangements and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue/Consultation. Before this draft was presented to the parties, the facilitators, observers and international partners were consulted. They were all fully supportive.
As it has been repeatedly explained, the draft Agreement did not meet the full expectations of any side but there was something for each of the parties. It was essentially a compromise document. And like any compromise text in such circumstances, it was not perfect. Most of the elements of the Agreement are aptly stipulated in the Commission Chairperson’s report especially paragraph 14.
While the Government of Sudan despite its reservations on a number of provisions of the text declared its acceptance, the Movements were not prepared to sign the text.
When midnight April 30 arrived and the Movements were still unprepared to sign the Agreement I stopped the clock for 48 hours, at the request of International Partners and the guidance of the Chairperson of the Commission. I had subsequently to extend the time for another 48 hours at the request of President Obasanjo.
This extended period provided an opportunity for the reinvigoration of efforts aimed at persuading the Movements to come on board. As the Chairperson’s report stipulated at paragraph 7, we were joined by Deputy Security of State, Robert Zoellick, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer and UK’s Secretary of State for International Development. They were later joined by the representatives of Canada and the European Union and all worked closely with us as they made some proposals aimed at getting the Movements support for the Peace Agreement. These proposals covered essentially the security area and more specifically guidelines on the neutralization and disarmament of the Janjaweed, as well as the integration of the Movements’ forces. They also helped to fill the blanks concerning the number of rebel forces to be integrated and the manner of their integration. There were also minor modifications on power sharing. These included the increase of the numbers of Movements Representatives in the State Legislatures from 18 to 21 as well as strengthening of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). There was also a further elaboration on the issue of compensation. All these proposals helped to make the DPA more attractive to the Movements. Here I wish to put on record my appreciation for this timely contribution of our international Partners.
All these efforts combined with the prolonged efforts of President Obasanjo (with whom I have worked very closely throughout the 7th Session) together with the valuable input of President Sassou-Nguesso and the support of the facilitators including Libya whose delegation was led by Minister Ali Treki, resulted in the Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Aguda House, State House, on May 5 by the Government of Sudan led by Dr. Magzoub Al Khalifa and the Chairman of the SLM/A Mr. Minni Minawi. The latter demonstrated a great quality of leadership and courage showing preparedness to workout the challenges of peace despite some of the reservations that he and his Movement had.
Unfortunately, this has so far not been the case with other groups. I and my colleagues in the Mediation are particularly saddened by the indecisiveness of Mr. Abdulwahid. Throughout this Round he has been most enthusiastic about arriving at an agreement. He and/or his collaborators have been in a series of discussions with the Government of Sudan. And so the general expectation was that he would be among the first to sign.
It is with this background that we of the Mediation together with some International Partners have continued to make efforts aimed at getting to board the peace train.
A few days ago, I received a letter from him asking for a more clarification on the contents of the Agreement as well as the AU to register his position and understanding on various issues.
Furthermore, in his letter Mr. Abdulwahid wants the African Union to facilitate a meeting with the Government of Sudan so that they can discuss further with the Government in order to reach “a supplement to the Agreement on certain outstanding issues including the representation and the function and status of the Transitional Darfur regional Authority”.
Mr. Abdulwahid ended his letter by stating “once you have indicated that you will register our clarifications undertaken to ensure that the Agreement is implemented fully and faithfully and undertaken to facilitate further discussion with the Government of Sudan on the issues mentioned above, I shall be ready to attach my signature to the Darfur Peace Agreement”.
Taking Mr. Abdulwahid at his word and after consultations with my colleagues of the Mediation, as well as with the Commissioner on Peace and Security and his team, replied to Mr. Abdulwahid and assured him that his reservations will be registered, and a meeting will be arranged. I also addressed the other issues raised in his letter. Both Mr. Abdulwahid’s letter and my response will be made available to members of the Council.
Not only did I send this letter but we asked the Head of the AU Mediation Team and some of our colleagues, as well as one of the resource persons to delay their departure from Abuja from Friday to yesterday Sunday and engage Mr. Abdulwahid. Furthermore, I am aware that some of the Partners have approached him and made further appeals to him to sign the Agreement. But despite all these efforts, Mr. Abdulwahid is at best still sitting on the fence.
Mr. Chairman,
All these efforts aimed at getting more support for this Agreement should not and cannot in any way detract from the historic importance of the Agreement which has been dully signed by two principal Parties whom we applaud. The Darfur Peace Agreement constitutes a major breakthrough in our Continent’s and our Organization’s efforts at resolving conflicts. As President Olusegun Obasanjo rightly observed during the signing ceremony, the Darfur Peace Agreement is an eloquent testimony that Africa is determined to play a vanguard role in conflict resolution in our Continent with the support of the international community.
Moreover the DPA when implemented will be a great relief for the people of Darfur. It is a deal, which seriously addresses the grievances including their sense of marginalization. It is a fair deal for the Movements and an important contribution to peace, security and stability not only for Darfur but also Sudan as a whole. It represents a fine example of genuine cooperation between Africa and the International Community.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Council,
At the very beginning of my statement I remarked that while the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks have been successfully concluded – and may I add that we have every reason to rejoice at this accomplishment of the Mission – new and no less daunting tasks still lie ahead.
First and foremost, we must ensure a vigorous, efficient and timely implementation of the Peace Agreement. In this there are responsibilities for the parties themselves as well as for the African Union and the wider international community.
At the security level, AMIS must be strengthened in terms of troops, logistics, finance and operational mobility in order for it to cope with the many responsibilities entrusted to it under the Darfur Peace Agreement. These include in addition to the current responsibilities of the Force, having a capacity to deal with such issues as verification, monitoring of the Comprehensive Ceasefire, disengagement and redeployment of Forces, monitoring of demilitarized zones along the humanitarian supply routes and around the camps for internally displaced persons as well as in buffer zones that separate the forces of the Parties.
Other issues requiring follow up include:
– Ensuring that the various provisions of the Agreement are strictly adhered to;
– Preparing for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue/Consultation in consultation and cooperation with the Parties;
– Working in concert with the Parties and the International Community to inform and sensitize the people of Darfur as to the actual contents of the DPA;
– Working in concert with the Parties and the International Community for a safe return of the IDPs and refugees;
– Mobilizing international support for the much needed funding for Reconstruction and development of Darfur.
This list is not exhaustive. It does however demonstrate the enormity of the work that lies ahead.
In the meantime, while efforts should and must be made to bring all on the Peace Agreement, it is important at the same time to send a firm warning to all the spoilers and would be spoilers that their actions and in particular those in clear violation of the Ceasefire provisions shall not be tolerated. And that any undermining of the Peace Agreement will have consequences for the Groups and/or individuals concerned.
Mr. Chairman,
The Darfur Peace Agreement is a product of collective efforts. It is therefore only proper that I end my statement by recognizing and paying well-deserved tribute to all whose contribution has made this possible. First, I wish to salute the Parties – the Government of National Unity and the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mr. Minni Minawi for showing the courage of making peace.
President Obasanjo and Sassou-Nguesso as well as AU Commission Chairperson Professor Alpha Oumar Konare have spared no effort in supporting the mediation efforts. Tribute must also go to all the facilitators and observers – Libya, Nigeria, Eritrea, Egypt as well as Chad which for a long time played an active and helpful co-mediation role. Our friends of the international community have worked with us as a team and supported our efforts throughout the process. My special thanks go to those who have been regular participants in the process. They include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Norway, the Netherlands, the League of Arab States, the European Union and the United Nations.
I wish also to put on record our appreciation to the Commissioner for Peace and Security Ambassador Said Djinnit and his team at headquarters. But it would be remiss on my part if I did not pay tribute to the men and women of the Mediation team including the resource persons for their exemplary dedication and commitment. Time does not allow for me to mention them all. I will however single out a few. The Head of the AU Mediation team Ambassador Sam Ibok was a pillar of strength. He was ably assisted by Ambassador Boutbou Niang. The Coordinators of Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing and Security Arrangements, Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, Minister Ablasse Ouedraogo and General Garuba respectively played invaluable roles. My Thanks also go to the Special Representative for Sudan of the AU Commission Chairperson, Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe and his team from AMIS especially the current Force Commander Maj. General Ihekere and the Former Force Commander Major General Okonkwo.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like once again to thank the Chairperson of the AU Commission Professor Konare for the confidence he reposed in me and the honour given to me to once again serve our continent and especially the people of Darfur and Sudan as Special Envoy and Chief Mediator.
Thank you for your attention.
(ST)