UN Security Council report on its recent visit to Sudan

June 16, 2006 (NEW YORK) — Below the text of the report submitted to the UN Security Council by the Britain Ambassador on the visit of the recent visit to Sudan by the Security Council delegation.

In his report the UK Ambassador Jones Parry, who was leading the mission, indicated the principal mission of the delegation was to persuade Sudan to accept UN force deployment in western Sudan region of Darfur. He says the Sudanese rejection of the UN deployment is fuelled by the “adoption of Security Council Resolution 1679 under Chapter VII”.

The delegation explained to the Sudanese official that “Chapter VII was a technical, not a political, issue. A Chapter VII mandate was likely to be required for any UN force in Darfur to enable the force to give the necessary protection to civilians, and to itself”.

“President Bashir made it clear that he did not think external troops should be mandated to attack Sudanese”, the report said.

On the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the report says that the CPA remains a fragile deal.

Sudanese First Vice-President Salva Kiir told clearly the UN SC delegation that “implementation of the Agreement was essential. Without it, there would be no Agreement, and with no Agreement, war would be probable”.

— 

1. Madam President, May I begin by thanking all members of the Council who participated on this
Mission. Their commitment and solidarity made this a particularly useful and
timely visit. I am also grateful to the Secretariat for their assistance and
participation.

2. It is now almost three years since the Council first began to debate
whether Sudan was an appropriate subject for its agenda. Grave problems
had emerged in Darfur, and relations between Khartoum and the periphery
were increasingly difficult. Much has happened since then. By today the
Council has adopted seven Resolutions on Sudan, and two Presidential
Statements. Those of us who visited the region can be in no doubt about the
appropriateness of the Council’s attention to Sudan and the wider region. For
me, the argument is not whether we should be involved in Sudan and Darfur,
but have we been able to do as much as we ought. That view was reinforced
by the visit to Chad.

3. Sudan, the biggest country in Africa, is very complex. Darfur has rightly
seized the attention of the world, but the situation there is very complicated.
During its visit, the Mission found the conflict in Darfur not fully understood by
the international community. It found, for example, that the terms
‘government’, ‘rebel’, ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ were often over-simplifications of a
more complex situation on the ground,where alliances between tribes and
groups often shift. The porous – or non-existent- border with Chad
exacerbates this. A number of the Council’s interlocutors described the
situation ‘in Darfur as a traditional conflict between herdsmen and farmers
over limited national resources. They outlined the challenging nature of
governing a region with its peculiar tribal complexities and lack of public
services. A lasting solution to the problem in Darfur can only be found
through the traditions and customs of the peoples of the region. Indeed, GoS’ support for an AU, rather than a UN, force in Darfur is partly motivated by its
belief that African states possess a similar heritage to the people of Darfur.
We will need to continue to ensure – and stress to GoS – that any UN force
will have a strong African participation and character.
4. In the North/South context, the comprehensive Peace Agreement marked
the cessation of hostilities, but the Government of National Unity is still a
young body.

5. It was important that the Mission begin its work in Khartoum and
emphasise its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan.
We stressed that the Security Council wishes to work in partnership with the
Government and the other main actors in Sudan to help tackle the range of
problems which the country faces. That assistance today is expressed in the
United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the South, UNMIS, by the work of
the Special Representative Jan Pronk to which I pay credit, and by the huge
involvement of the UN Agencies delivering support to the people of Sudan.
But if it is the Security Council’s role to promote international peace and
security, correspondingly it is the obligation of the Government of Sudan to
protect its citizens, and to respond positively to the offers of help from us and
others.

6. The situation in Darfur has deteriorated this year. Humanitarian access
has not been consistent and has diminished. Attacks on individuals,
particularly women, have increased. The Wali of North Darfur told the mission
that there are 129,000 lDPs in the camps in North Darfur,with another
279,000 lDPs outside them. There were a further 622,000 people who had
been affected by war, bringing the overall total impacted by the conflict to be
1.31 million. Positively, the African Union Mission, AMIS, has been on the
ground for 12 months, and its peace troops have been delivering improved
security to the people of Darfur in exceptionally difficult circumstances.
Thanks in particular to the AU, and with the support of others, the Darfur
Peace Agreement was signed in Abuja on 5 May. Support for this Agreement
is not homogeneous among the different groupings in Darfur, nor is opposition
consistent among those parties who have declined to sign the Agreement.

7. Two truths were clear to the Mission: first the Agreement needs to be sold
urgently to those living in the region and those displaced elsewhere;
secondly, its implementation is key to peace in Darfur, in the Sudan, and in
the wider region. We heard many interlocutors describe what was wrong with
the accord. It is not perfect. But it is the only agreement that we have, and in
the view of the Mission, it needs to be implemented robustly. We encouraged
those who had not joined the Agreement to do so as soon as possible.
8. In support of this Agreement, the UN family, particularly the World Food
Programme, has now the largest food support operation in the world.
Hundreds of tonnes of food are delivered daily by convoys coming all the way
from Port Sudan and from the South, much of the time on unmade roads, the
line of white trucks visibly delivering life-saving relief.

9. In Addis Ababa, the Mission found them selves in full agreement with the
African Union that at the earliest opportunity, the United Nations should take
over the peacekeeping role in Darfur. President Konare and Peace and
Security Commissioner Djinnit emphasised that this was the wish of the
African Union. The AU has done a very good job starting from scratch in
difficult circumstances. We emphasised this in our meeting with the
Commander of AMIS in Darfur. But sustaining such a force, rotating its
troops, providing the necessary capacities including command control and
communications, delivering financing, implementing the more robust post-
Abuja mandate, are all difficult challenges. Hence the agreement that it was
time for the wider international community to share the burden and provide a
UN force for Darfur.

10. A primary purpose of our visit and of our discussions was to persuade the
Sudanese Government that this was the best option for Darfur and for the
country. In Khartoum we found many hostile perceptions of a UN
deployment, fuelled in part by concern by the adoption of SCR 1679 under
Chapter VII. This Chapter is a major irritant for the Government, the
President and Parliamentarians in Khartoum. We explained that Chapter VII
was a technical, not a political, issue. A Chapter VII mandate was likely to be
required for any UN force in Darfur to enable the force to give the necessary
protection to civilians, and to itself. So Chapter VII would help the UN to
implement the DPA, which was what the Government wanted. Chapter VII
would only mean the UN mission in Darfur had the same mandate as nearly
all the UN’s peacekeeping operations in Africa, including, at the moment in
DRC-which the Council visited after Sudan – Cote d’ivoire and Liberia.

11. It was always unlikely that the Government of Sudan would agree to a UN
mission during the Council’s visit. But the Mission had an important role in
explaining why we thought this was in the interests of Sudan and encouraging
them to take on this view. The process to get agreement from the
Government of Sudan may be tortuous. By the end of our visit, the Mission
felt we had edged further towards the probability of the Government of Sudan
accepting such a deployment. Under Secretary-General Guehenno and his
colleagues from the AU are now in Khartoum and the region as a Technical
Assessment Mission. The Mission considers that they should have two
objectives. First, to secure the agreement of GoS to strengthening AMIS so
that it is better able to implement the DPA and protect civilians until a UN
force is deployed. Second, to then identify with GoS the transition
arrangements if AMIS is to be gradually replaced by a UN force. That is the
intention, and in my view, it is crucial that this is agreed very quickly, and the
necessary planning completed urgently.

12. Security in Darfur must be quickly improved in order to cope with the
present array of attacks. Civilians must be afforded protection, their rights
assured and impurity for abusers ended. That is why we need to implement
the DPA and quickly strengthen AMIS’ role. To secure the agreement of the
Government to the transfer, I assume that the AMIS mandate must first be
strengthened to reflect the need to implement the DPA, and the UN should
then take over that same mandate. If this is agreed, then it will be for this
Council to draft and agree the necessary Resolution to provide the mandate
for the UN Force. President Bashir made it clear that he did not think external troops should be mandated to attack Sudanese. He therefore accepted that control of the Janjaweed, long sought by this Council and a pre-condition for the security of persons in Darfur, was the responsibility of his government. We looked to them to fulfil that responsibility now.

13. But whilst the international community’s attention is righly focussed on the
problems of Darfur, the Mission left with a clear sense that we shouldn’t lose
sight of the wider problems in Sudan, in particular in the South. The
comprehensive Peace Agreement, which marked the cessation of hostilities,
is being taken forward. But the Mission found that implementation is slow.
International donations to the South are also dying up. In one of the more
sobering comments made, a member of the Southern Sudan parliament
reminded the Mission that were Southern Sudan a country, it would be the
poorest in the world. Yet Darfur’s future is inexorably linked to that of the
South; and the South’s to that of Darfur. A holistic solution is required, that
addresses all the countries problems and through a coordinated response of
the range of bodies in the UN family. Security is of paramount importance.
But, it cannot be viewed in isolation from the humanitarian or social initiatives.

14. The Council in November 2004 travelled to Nairobi, and in its work there,
contributed to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded in January
2005. Our Mission was united in pressing for the implementation of the CPA.
We visited UNMIS and were impressed by the work it carries out on the
ground. We met and discussed implementation of the CPA with President Kiir
of Southern Sudan, also Vice President of Sudan, and his Ministerial
colleagues. It was clear that the Agreement remains fragile, and that there is
a continuing risk to civilians outside the main towns. President Kiir also stated
clearly that implementation of the Agreement was essential. Without it, there
would be no Agreement, and with no Agreement, war would be probable.
This was a stark warning of the crucial importance of moving forward on full
implementation of the CPA. As we left Juba, we paid our respects at the tomb
of Dr John Garang, who negotiated the CPA, and whose death has been such
a loss to the peace process and to Southern Sudan.

15. In the South, we also discussed the problems caused in the region by the
attacks launched by the Lords Resistance Army, the LRA. This scourge is
present in Southern Sudan, and also in the Garamba Park in the DRC, as well
as affecting Northern Uganda. Its activities over 19 years have led to more
than 1.7 million internally-displaced persons, and to many deaths. The need
to overcome this small group of people who are causing such havoc
throughout the region is only too obvious. The Government in the South is
making overtures to the LRA, hoping that it can persuade them to negotiate
peace with the Government of Uganda. Clearly, there is a need for a political
process to entice the bulk of the LRA members away from the leadership, and
to try to reintegrate them into their societies. But there must be real doubt
about the extent to which Kony and the other indictees are in any way
prepared to work for peace and to put aside their appalling record. In my view
they need to face justice in The Hague. I have separately asked the
Secretary-General, in following up the mandate in Resolutions 1653 and
1663, to provide this Council with a written report on the regional dimension of
the LRA. We need to put in place a comprehensive response by the
international community, given the obvious threat to regional peace and
security which the LRA still poses.

16. In Addis, we had a full exchange, not just on Darfur, AMIS and a UN
peacekeeping operation, but on wider issues. President Konare set out his
deep concern about the situation in Somalia, and described the AU approach
to the DRC and Cote d’ivoire, in both cases in terms very similar to that of the
Security Council. But we also noted the importance of the wider relations
between the United Nations and the African Union. With foresight, the
Chapter VIII of the Charter addresses the role of regional organisations. Our
co-operation with the African Union is a positive and timely development,
which has many possibilities. Peacekeeping and demobilisation,
destabilitarisation and reintegration, security sector reform are obvious
candidates for co-operation. The UN has a particular responsibility to seek to
help develop the capacities of the AU and of its regional manifestations. But
that responsibility goes wider. I hope that other regional groupings can
increase the support they are already giving, and that bilateral donors will also
help develop essential capacity0 .It is crucial in its own right, but particularly
important that we help African initiatives to tackle African problems. But more
widely, the entire UN family should develop closer relationships with the
African Union and its different components.

17. We were able to have four meetings with representatives of NGOS
working in Sudan and Chad. I would like to pay tribute to their immense
contributions. They, the UN Agencies and the peacekeepers are carrying the
burden for us today in Africa. They are tackling humanitarian concerns,
providing water and sanitation, delivering medical assistance and educational
support, and proving an essential basis for longer-term development.

18. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the work being done with
women. We could only admire the courage of women confronting the
immense burdens of life in Darfur and in the camps of Chad. With quiet
dignity, they have to carry water, search for firewood, face attack and
violation, not just from the Janjaweed, and at the same time bring up families,
often without male support. SCR 1325 was much quoted. So it should be. It
was a landmark Resolution which addressed the role of women as the
particular victims of conflict, suffering disproportionately from attacks, from
HIV/AIDS, often wrongly disowned by their families, and with little access to
medical assistance, counselling, and so on. At the same time, they lack the
empowerment to play the role in political life which is not only their right, but
would introduce a degree of sanity into much of the activity in the region. So
the need for full implementation of 1325 is obvious. That requires a
comprehensive strategy to secure the rights of women, to provide them with
relief and assistance, and to empower them to play their just role in society.

19. Sudanese women have already identified a series of actions to help
achieve these goals. These include urgent political, economic and social
legislative reform; access to and ownership of property and land; their full
involvement in DDR processes; the protection of women and girls from
gender-based violence and the prosecution of the perpetrators; and the
establishment of women’s resource centres for refugee and l DP women.

20. Responding to these priorities is essential if we are to achieve
sustainable peace in Sudan. I hope that the UN family, but not just in Darfur
and Chad, can better play its part in working with host governments to
develop strategies which deliver these goals. Then as effectively as possible
and without duplication, the individual Agencies should work to secure
implementation of that strategy.

21. It was right that we should end our visit in Chad. After Darfur we flew to
N’djamena and on Saturday, 1� June flew back Eastwards, nearly to the
Sudanese border, and visited the camps at Goz Bieda. Their scale is huge.
President Deby said that 700,000 Chadians had been displaced due to the
raids being undertaken daily from Darfur, although the UN estimate is much
lower. There were a further 300,000 external refugees in Chad, including
200,000 from Darfur and 40,000 from the Central African Republic (CAR).
We had to Ieave the camps by 12:30, because any later, and our planes would
not have been able to take off in such a hostile climate.

22. The Mission was immensely moved by the dedication of UN workers, and
NGOs as they tackled the massive task of bringing relief and assistance to so
many people. Worryingly, despite being in camps, individuals particularly
women, are at risk of attack. Within the camps we were alarmed to learn that
recruitment and intimidation of persons is regularly carried out by rebel
groups. Nor had we appreciated in advance the threats which the camps
pose to local resources, particularly declining water supplies and firewood.

23. Yet the local community has embraced the lDPs and refugees as guests.
It was also a stark reminder of the poverty of the region to discover that local
people visit the camps in order to receive medical attention, particularly to
give birth, and to be guaranteed food. The provision of food by the WFP and
others is close to 100 % of requirements, but to sustain that level, is an
immense challenge. So is the need to provide adequate security for and
within the camps. But it will not be acceptable to deliver a UN force giving
better security in Darfur if this merely transfers the attacks and the insecurity
into Eastern Chad through a porous or non-existent boundary.

24. Back in N’djamena, our final meeting was with President Deby. He set
out clearly his preoccupations, his concern that the consequences of the
Darfur situation was undermining Chad, and that the State was under threat.

25. The Council has primary responsibility for international peace and
security. Our visit demonstrated the importance of Council action on the
ground in Sudan, and in the region. But it also reminded us of the wider UN
interests in Africa. 2005 was a good year for development assistance.
Substantial additional resources were pledged. Sudan and Chad underline
why these are so desperately needed, why the MDGs are crucial, and how
their implementation is so far behind schedule. The need to move from the
humanitarian to longer-term assistance is all too apparent. But Chad is the
seventh poorest country in the world. Delivering the Goals, ensuring a
partnership with the international community, and accountable relationship
between donor and recipient, is basic to the development contract. With it
goes governance, the Rule of Law, and essential rights for the people of the
region – rights which include the protection of women and the right to
development.

26. This was a successful visit by a united Council. We delivered messages
of support and partnership, but did not shirk from the tougher arguments
where those were necessary. Sudan demands an integrated approach to
secure the implementation of the two Agreements, and then to move on to
tackle other issues like Eastern Sudan. But Sudan cannot be considered
alone. It needs to be seen in a regional context. Its relations with Chad and
the situation there should be of particular concern to this Council. Of course,
the governments concerned have the overall responsibility for the security and
protection of their people. But it is all too apparent that the UN will have to
strengthen its assistance, not just for security, and be prepared to do this for
some time if fragile Agreements are to be implemented. Peace in Darfur is
closely related to peace in Sudan, and in turn is vital for regional peace and
security. The United Nations must be prepared to provide essential support
until sustainable peace and development are achieved.

(ST)