Somali Taliban

Editorial, The wall Street Journal

July 3, 2006 — Events are going from bad to worse in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. The Islamists now running the country have also seized control in much of southern Somalia, made public their intention to declare Shariah law, and named as their leader a cleric on the U.S. watchlist for suspected links to al Qaeda.

So it goes in the failed state in northern Africa that is beginning to look like Afghanistan under the Taliban. The world can’t afford another radical Islamic state that shelters terrorists. And while it would be nice to think that Somalia’s neighbors or the United Nations or NATO might do something about all this, the reality is the task will be left to the U.S.

Somalia has been without a functioning government since dictator Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. Warlords have since fought for political power — most notably, to Americans, in 1993, the year of “Black Hawk Down.” Eighteen American special forces were killed in a failed attempt to capture the warlord Mohammad Farrah Aidid and restore order after failed efforts by U.N. peacekeepers. Since 2004, the U.S. and U.N. have backed a transitional government whose members have bickered and accomplished nothing.

Enter the Somali Supreme Islamic Courts Council, the alliance of 12 Muslim militias that seized Mogadishu on June 5. They range from moderate to extremist, and until recently neither wing had the upper hand. So long as that was the case, U.S. officials say, it was difficult for al Qaeda to operate from Somalia without being caught in the internecine crossfire.

The U.S. says a dozen or so terrorists are hiding in Somalia, including one or two the U.S. believes were responsible for the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Half of the terrorists in Somalia have been linked directly to al Qaeda. The ink had scarcely dried on last month’s cease-fire agreement between the Islamists and the transitional government when the Council demoted its relatively moderate leader, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, in favor of a former associate of Osama bin Laden, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys.

One danger is that Islamist militias may next move on the northern half of Somalia. This relatively calm area is divided into semi-autonomous regions called Somaliland and Puntland and home to strategic ports. Ensuring that Somaliland and Puntland remain safe zones — like Kurdistan in prewar Iraq — would be a useful goal of U.S. policy, enforced if necessary with U.S. special forces. The U.S. has a joint task force in nearby Djibouti that trains African troops and helps African countries to track down terrorists.

Neighboring Ethiopia is also watching the Islamists’ rise, warning against any movement into the border town of Beledweyne or into Baidoa, where the transitional government is based. Ethiopian officials say they’ve moved troops near the border to guard against an incursion. They also want to discourage cooperation between the Somali Islamists and Ethiopia’s own hostile domestic groups.

There’s no appetite in the U.S. for a large military intervention in Somalia, but that doesn’t mean the new regime should think it is immune from outside attention. So here’s a suggestion: Send an emissary to the new Islamist government and propose a deal: Hand over the 1998 embassy bombers, refuse safe harbor to al Qaeda operatives, do not invade Somaliland and Puntland. Agree to that, and we will be able to get along. Don’t agree, and the U.S. will do what it must to disrupt any terrorist camps or terrorist activity within its borders.

Al Qaeda interpreted the U.S. retreat from Somalia in 1993 as a sign of weakness that only encouraged further attacks. The Somali Islamists need to understand that if they attempt to turn their country into another refuge for terrorists, it will end as badly for them as it did for the Taliban.