Where is the African Union in Darfur?
By Julie Flint, the Daily Star
July 12, 2006 — An attack on the North Darfur village of Bir Maza last weekend bore all the hallmarks of the war the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed militias have waged for the past three years against the Darfur rebel movements and the civilians accused of supporting them: a ground offensive by regular and militia forces, aerial support from helicopter gunships, murder, and rape. But the government’s partner in crime in Bir Maza was not the Janjaweed. It was Khartoum’s new partner in peace – the faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Minni Minawi.
With the conclusion of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5, the conflict in Darfur has entered a phase even more cynical than that which preceded it: The two signatories of the DPA, whom few Darfurians trust, are attempting to force their “peace” on reluctant civilians and in so doing to eliminate all opposition, armed and otherwise, to their dominion.
Senior United Nations officials in Sudan are privately expressing “great concern” about the government-Minawi alliance, which threatens to be the end of the infant DPA and the beginning of a new war in Darfur. But the African Union (AU), which sponsored the peace process and whose troops are (in theory) keeping the peace in Darfur, has said nothing – even though there is evidence that Khartoum disguised one of its own helicopters as an AU chopper and used it to ferry supplies into Bir Maza and to airlift its wounded out.
The AU’s silence is eloquent testimony to the paralysis that has afflicted it, under the wholly inadequate leadership of Baba Kingibe, ever since the DPA was signed in Abuja. This silence will return to haunt it. In Darfur today, an increasing number of people believe the AU is taking sides – and, in their opinion, the wrong side. AU leadership of the peace process, already seriously compromised by the inadequacy of the process and the lack of support for the eventual agreement, risks becoming untenable – indefensible, even. In the short term, there is a danger of violence against AU police and staff in the displaced camps where opposition to the DPA has been manifested in demonstrations, riots and attacks on AU personnel. The people of Darfur were not consulted over the agreement and were not told what it offers them. Rightly or wrongly, they have no confidence it will enable them to return in safety to their homes.
For the DPA to have had any chance of success, the AU had to move ahead swiftly and decisively to implement it – both to control the deteriorating security situation and to show those who were shut out of Abuja that the agreement was more than a wish list. But nothing has been done and no deadlines have been met.
Two examples stand out as potentially fatal to the hoped-for peace: the failure late last month to organize a meeting at which the government would have presented its plan for disarming the Janjaweed; and the delay in appointing the head of the preparatory committee for an all-Darfur conference without which peace is a pipedream.
Senior AU officials are threatening to resign, saying nothing can be achieved while the current casual attitude persists. The mood among those who care about Darfur – and there are many in the AU – is one of total, genuine, unmitigated despair.
As a result of the AU’s inaction – and the failure of the international backers of the Abuja process to jolt the AU out of its lethargy and incompetence – the carrot held out by the peace agreement has been replaced by a vacuum. Into this vacuum have stepped the Sudanese government and Minawi – both of whom believe in domination by force; both of whom hope their signatures on the DPA may afford them some protection from the International Criminal Court, which is mandated by the UN Security Council to investigate war crimes in Darfur.
The first punch of the new government-Minawi alliance came in the first days of July and was directed not against armed opponents of the DPA – but against civilians on the northeastern side of Jebel Marra, the heartland of Minawi’s SLA rival, Abdul Wahid Mohammad al-Nur. Twenty-four civilians were killed in a single village, Sibi. The AU said nothing.
The second punch, also against civilians, came a few days later on the northern edge of Jebel Marra. Fifty civilians were killed in attacks on a string of villages. The AU said nothing.
An attack on Fanga village in eastern Jebel Marra left another 25 civilians dead. Again the AU said nothing.
On July 8, the government-Minawi alliance attacked two villages that are strongholds of commanders critical of Minawi and the peace agreement, Bir Maza and Um Sidir. Eyewitnesses say the offensive was carried out by ground forces supported by four helicopter gunships and an Antonov bomber. A white helicopter marked “African Union Mission to Sudan” provided logistical support. The AU assured the UN that none of its helicopters participated in the attack on Bir Maza. The UN urged the AU to issue a statement to this effect to prevent further hemorrhage of support. The AU said nothing.
The people of Darfur have been regaled with long months of debate over whether their tragedy amounts to genocide or merely (merely!) war crimes. Dignitaries and celebrities have come and gone, consuming vital AU man-hours. Now, because of AU inaction, the DPA is being reduced to a defense pact between two abusive forces. Yet it was – and is – the only glimmer of light on the horizon, no matter how faint.
After so many mistakes, and so much inaction for so long, there is no easy solution. More force – whether in the shape of a NATO force or another foreign army – will only add fuel to the fire in Darfur. A UN force to replace the present AU mission is rejected, with increasing conviction, by the Sudanese government. Without a change of heart in Khartoum, UN peacekeepers would have to fight their way into Darfur. The lesson of Abuja is inescapable now: There is no quick fix, and no lasting peace that is not both consensual and comprehensive.
With the conclusion of the Abuja talks, there is no political process, no table around which Darfurians can sit to thrash out their outstanding differences and seek to resolve them. Priority must be given to creating a new forum – perhaps through the Darfur Joint Commission, in which all parties to the conflict, including the dissident rebel factions, are represented. The UN and the AU’s Abuja partners – the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, France, Italy and the Netherlands – must take the lead in planning for the all-Darfur conference now. Building a consensus on the way forward among all sectors of Darfurian society is too important to be left in the lethargic hands of the African Union.
* Julie Flint has written extensively on Sudan. She is the author, with Alex de Waal, of “Darfur: A Short History of a Long War.” She wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.