How the U.S. can break the deadlock on Darfur

AFRICA ACTION

Contact: Ann-Louise Colgan (202-546 7961)

July 25, 2006 — More than three years into the genocide in
Darfur, there is a belated international consensus on the need for a
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force to provide protection to
civilians and humanitarian operations in western Sudan. As Africa Action
has previously noted, the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission in
Darfur has now received the support of the U.S., the UN
Secretary-General, most members of the UN Security Council, the African
Union (AU), the leadership of the Arab League, and dozens of
organizations and millions of public citizens.

Yet the government of Sudan, the author of the ongoing genocide in
Darfur, adamantly refuses to allow a UN mission into Darfur and
continues to hold hostage the international response to this crisis. For
weeks and months, the international community has been paralyzed in the
face of Khartoum’s opposition. Countless Darfuri lives have been lost as
mounting violence has overwhelmed the small AU operation in Darfur, and
the partial peace deal signed in Abuja on May 5th remains fragile at
best. Despite the desperate need of the people of Darfur for protection,
the international community has failed to overcome Khartoum’s opposition
and take the necessary action to achieve a UN peacekeeping force.

The U.S. can and must be the one to break the deadlock on Darfur. The
U.S. has unique power and leverage with the government of Sudan that can
end the stalemate and advance the goal of a UN peacekeeping mission for
Darfur. The U.S. also remains the only government to have publicly
acknowledged that what is happening in Darfur constitutes genocide,
though it has failed to articulate or pursue a strategy to improve the
security situation on the ground. If the U.S. is committed to ending
this genocide, it must use its power to protect the people of Darfur and
secure the necessary UN peacekeeping force now.

Precedents

In the past, U.S. pressure on Sudan has yielded results. In the 1990s,
the Clinton Administration focused on the isolation and containment of
Khartoum, particularly in reaction to Khartoum’s hosting of Al-Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996. In the early 1990s, U.S. sanctions
ended bilateral aid to Sudan, and in 1993, Sudan was added to the list
of state sponsors of terrorism. The U.S. also supported a 1996 UN
Security Council resolution censuring Khartoum for failing to extradite
suspects in an assassination attempt on the Egyptian president. Finally,
also in 1996, the U.S. removed any American diplomatic presence from
Sudan. These ostracizing tactics had an impact on Khartoum, and in 1996,
the Sudanese government responded by expelling Osama bin Laden and
subsequently distancing itself from such terrorist networks.

Under the Bush Administration, strong U.S. diplomatic engagement in
efforts to end the decades long civil war in Sudan ultimately helped to
secure the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.
The U.S. made clear that any future “normalization” of relations,
including the lifting of economic sanctions, was contingent on a
successful conclusion to the North-South peace process, and this was a
key factor in pushing the Sudanese government to the negotiating table.
Though the subsequent implementation of the CPA has had serious
challenges, and though the U.S. commitment in this area has been
insufficient, it is generally agreed that U.S. diplomatic investment in
the peace process influenced the Sudanese government’s position,
including its consent to a UN peacekeeping mission for southern Sudan.

Current Pressure Points

Africa Action has previously pointed out that the current relationship
between the U.S. and Sudan features “strategic priorities”, such as
intelligence-sharing, that have undermined a stronger U.S. response on
Darfur. As the world seeks Khartoum’s acquiescence to a UN mission, and
as the U.S. claims a commitment to ending this crisis, this relationship
gives the U.S. special leverage to pressure Khartoum to accept a robust
Chapter VII UN peacekeeping force for Darfur. The Sudanese government
wishes to strengthen its ties with Washington, and ultimately
“normalize” relations, and the Bush Administration must use all
available pressure points to force the necessary action from Khartoum
and to pave the way for a UN mission to protect civilians and
humanitarian operations, and to support the goal of peace in Darfur:

· The U.S. should make clear to Khartoum that the future of U.S.
relations with Sudan depends on Khartoum’s cooperation with the
international community in allowing a UN peacekeeping mission into
Darfur. The Sudanese government had previously stated that it would
welcome a UN mission after the signing of a peace deal in Abuja, and it
must now adhere to this commitment. President Bush has repeatedly stated
that a UN mission is needed in Darfur and he should call President
Bashir directly to convey this position and the expectation of Sudanese
cooperation in this regard.

· The U.S. should push for new sanctions against senior Sudanese
government officials responsible for the continuing violence in Darfur,
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1591. Thus far, only four
individuals have faced sanctions, and no sitting Sudanese official has
been targeted. The U.S. should seek further targeted sanctions through
the Security Council, including asset freezes and travel bans.

· The U.S. should offer its cooperation to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in its proceedings against those charged with war crimes and
crimes against humanity in Darfur. The relationship between the U.S. and
Sudan, particularly with regard to counter-terrorism efforts, has
provided the U.S. with unique insights and information that should be
made available to the ICC.

· The U.S. should encourage other countries to enact comprehensive
bilateral sanctions against Sudan, as the U.S. has had in place since
1997, precluding investment in Sudan’s growing industry and other such
economic relations. Such sanctions would register international outrage
at the ongoing crisis in Darfur, for which the Khartoum government must
be held responsible.

· The U.S. should use its relationships with governments around the
world to “internationalize” pressure on Khartoum and create a united
front for new and urgent action on Darfur. Just as the U.S. has leverage
with the Sudanese government, it also has bilateral leverage with
Sudan’s allies on the Security Council (particularly Russia and China),
and it must use this leverage now to enlist their support to pressure
Khartoum to admit a UN peacekeeping operation into Darfur.

· While Khartoum’s advance consent for a UN peacekeeping mission in
Darfur is desirable, the urgency of the crisis requires the Security
Council to take new action regardless. Even as it takes steps to
increase pressure on Khartoum, the U.S. must simultaneously seek the UN
Security Council’s authorization of a robust UN peacekeeping operation
with a Chapter VII mandate and an expedited timeline.

Africa Action emphasizes that the U.S. is uniquely positioned to bring
effective pressure to bear on Khartoum to accept the international
community’s demand for a UN mission in Darfur. By taking the steps
described above, the U.S. will show that it is committed to protecting
the people of Darfur, and that this is the priority in U.S. policy
toward Sudan. New U.S. action is needed now to break the international
deadlock and achieve a rapid and robust UN peacekeeping force for Darfur.

This resource is available in PDF format on Africa Action’s website at:
http://www.africaaction.org/newsroom/docs/LeverageonDarfur.pdf

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