Gen Lazaro, the voice of reason in Sudan peace talks

Sept 3, 2006 (NAIROBI) — The man who helped resolve one of Africa’s longest running conflicts tells Nicholas Asego how the delicate process was nursed As an army officer, Lieutenant General Lazaro Kipkurui Sumbeiywo was used to getting orders from his superiors.

When one morning, in 2000, the hotline connecting his office to the President rang, it was nothing unusual for him — after all he was the Army Commander. But that morning President Daniel arap Moi’s voice was urgent. “Lazaro, I want to give you a job and I don’t want you to refuse,” said the President in a calm voice.

Sumbeiywo was a bit taken back by the prospect of starting a new mission while he was still working on restructuring the army. Unprofessional behaviour and indiscipline had taken root and the force was in dire need of a clean up.

Born on July 14, 1947, the sixth in a family of seven, the young Sumbeiywo was destined to take after his father and become a soldier. Having served in the Kings African Rifles 5th Battalion, the older Sumbeiywo wished his sons would follow in his footsteps. His dream came true when they started developing a liking for the forces.
“Everybody in my family believed that I was carved out to be a soldier,” he says. After his Kenya African Primary Education examinations at Yokot Primary School, Sumbeiywo went to Tambach for his secondary education. After his form four examinations in 1967 he joined the army at the insistence of his elder brother, Elijah Kipkosgei, who was then a district intelligence security officer.

Later on in 1968, Sumbeiywo was among the six recruits chosen from a total of 43 to join the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in the UK. On coming back he rose through the ranks to become a major in charge of personnel and administration. He was later posted to the Department of Defence as military assistant to the then Chief of General Staff, General Jackson Kimeu Mulinge. His meteoric rise in the armed forces culminated in his appointment as the Commandant of the Defence Staff College on September 19, 1999 and Army Commander on December 1, 2000.
When the President told him to negotiate peace in Southern Sudan, Lt Gen Sumbeiywo was surprised. “I wanted to refuse, but the President had told me not to refuse,” he says, in reference to that early morning call. “In the army a request by your superior is usually a camouflaged command, and in this case it was from the Commander-in-Chief,” he adds amid laughter.

It wasn’t the first time he was being asked to act as a special envoy to the peace process. In 1997 he was appointed a special envoy, a position he relinquished in December 1998 when he left the country for a course in International Relations in the UK. He nevertheless tried to solve the differences between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) following the signing of Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1994. This was a frustrating effort. “The position taken by one side would be the complete opposite of the one taken by the other,” he recalls.

When he was appointed a special envoy in 2001 Sumbeiywo, a committed Christian, sought divine guidance. “I shared with my wife Lorna and together we decided to fast and pray for three days,” he says. “All my children knew what was going on and they joined us in the prayers,” he adds.

Like the biblical Jeremiah, he felt called upon to perform a task that he was ill prepared for. His church, the African Inland Church, incorporated his prayer into the church bulletin for the entire period of the peace process. “I was prepared spiritually for the task ahead,” he says. And off to Khartoum he left. “I had to seek the consent of the two warring parties, and they all accepted me to be their mediator despite their initial misgivings. I also had to work out rules of procedure and modalities of the negotiations.”

Sumbeiywo worked closely with the then minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Kalonzo Musyoka.

He quickly realised that the negotiations needed a delicate combination of military and background information to make any headway. His experience as a soldier came in handy. “Both Omar Hassan al-Bashir and Dr John Garang were military men hence they needed a man well versed in the art of war,” he says. “As a soldier I knew the effects of war and these people had been fighting for over 20 years. My mission was therefore to put a stop to the war,” he adds. Though the peace negotiations had been slow and at times appeared to grind to a halt, many donors began showing interest. The US assigned a special envoy, Mr John Danforth, while many countries sent observers to the talks. Sumbeiywo’s first meeting with all the parties took place in Karen in May 2002. The meeting ended acrimoniously, with the government side accusing Sumbeiywo of being biased. “Since they didn’t know me well enough they were suspicious of me,” he says. “The SPLM/A had also trusted many people before and had been let down, hence suspicion was expected,” he adds. Despite the hiccups, at no time did it ever occur to Sumbeiywo that the negotiations would fail. “I never believed in deadlocked negotiations, but would instead raise possibilities for both sides to consider,” he says.

The second meeting, held at Machakos, was characterised by similar suspicions. The situation was further complicated by Sumbeiywo’s relationship with the observers, whose interests kept shifting. When asked whether the first draft that led to the Machakos protocol had been ratified by Washington, Sumbeiywo was curt and to the point. “My friend,” he told the observer, “I am not answerable to Washington.” This endeared him to the Sudanese and earned him support from the many others, including the British, Italians and the Norwegians. “The Sudanese thought that they were being pushed around, so when they found someone to defend them they loved it,” says Sumbeiywo. “Many didn’t understand that we were looking for a Sudanese agreement and not just a crafted agreement,” he adds.

This confrontation made the Americans distrust Sumbeiywo and even spread word that he was useless to the process. The general was unshaken. “When you have schooled with the whites you find that they are not always better than you. Moreover there were many in the West who believed in me. When you trust in God you realise that human beings are just mere mortals.” The parties went ahead and adopted the negotiating text, leading to the Machakos protocol, which was a great breakthrough in the peace process.

Despite his demanding schedule at the Igad secretariat, the general created time for his duties as the Army Commander. “For at least one year I worked 14 hours a day, leaving my military office at 11 pm. I had fine officers who waited patiently for me,” he recalls. “We have some of the finest and most dedicated officers and I salute them,” he adds.
After the 2002 General Election the army organised a smooth handover of power. As the head of the army, Sumbeiywo clearly understood that the military had to be impartial. Things changed when in February 2003, upon arrival from Sudan on a peace mission, he was summoned by the Chief of General Staff. “The Government has made some changes in the army and you have been retired,” the CGS told him.

Though his four-year term had been cut by two years, he took it all in his stride and calmly encouraged other service commanders to fully cooperate with his successor, Lieutenant General Jeremiah Kianga. During a colourful send off staged by the army, he remarked, “I served in this profession with honour and dignity, and this should be the aspiration of every officer in uniform.”

On the peace front, Sumbeiywo’s position was threatened, as all officers perceived to have been close to the former President were being eased out. The situation was saved when Kalonzo, who had retained his Foreign Affairs docket in the new Government, persuaded President Mwai Kibaki not to remove Sumbeiywo. Since Kalonzo was not a stranger to Sumbeiywo, things went on well in the initial months of the Kibaki presidency.

Things however changed when Kalonzo was replaced by Mr Chirau Ali Mwakwere and after the creation of the Ministry of East Africa and Regional Cooperation, headed by Mr John Koech. “No one seemed to be in charge of the peace process,” says Sumbeiywo. “I met Mwakwere and did not get any feedback from him. I was told to go to Koech and he did not have any clue either concerning the peace process,” he says. “It’s like the Government was not interested,” he adds.

The next peace talks took place at Nakuru and here Sumbeiywo agreed to involve the top leaders of the negotiating parties. “I knew that the people at the table would not be able to finish the negotiations because it involved sharing of power, wealth and security,” he says. This involved inviting Sudanese First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha and Garang, who were running the show behind the scenes. After keeping Taha waiting for four days, Garang finally arrived and the two were left alone in a room with only one bottle of water and two glasses. “What was unknown to many was that the fate of the peace talks hung on the water bottle,” says Sumbeiywo, laughing.

Taha, being a superstitious man, believed that if he opened the bottle first the talks would bear no fruit while Garang bid his time. “This was just a coincidence because we only had one litre bottles. We decided to let them share one,” Sumbeiywo explains. “We had no idea of the ensuing battle of trust and nerves between the two men,” he adds.
Garang finally opened the bottle and even served Taha first, much to his relief.

The next three months were fruitful. The two parties signed an agreement on security arrangements and on September 25, 2003, they agreed to an internationally monitored ceasefire. Sumbeiywo is full of praise for both Taha and the late Garang. “Ali is a clever man and one who knows how to read the times. He even chose to surrender his position as a first vice-president,” he says.

“Can any Kenyan today step down voluntarily from any position?” he challenges.
“Garang’s soft nature and forgiving heart made things easy for both parties,” he adds, admiration unmistakable in his voice. With victory in sight the Americans wanted the final document to be signed in America, thereby claiming victory, but once again Sumbeiywo stood firm.
“There were silent hostilities from the Americans,” Sumbeiywo remembers. “But I made it clear that I was not happy with the constant references to Washington.”

A document detailing what they had agreed on — which came to be known as the Nairobi Declaration — was signed on June 5, 2004. On December 31, 2004, presidents Al Bashir and Thabo Mbeki arrived in Nairobi to witness the signing of the agreement. “They were marking the official end of the 21-year-old civil war,” he recalls. Despite the obvious lack of coordination that marked the official signing ceremony held at Nyayo Stadium, for Sumbeiywo it was the culmination of many years of hard work.

It was akin to what an athlete goes through. “They train so hard for many years only to run a race in less than a minute, but the joy is in winning the gold medal,” he says. “I felt very humbled and it was a prayer answered,” he adds.

He recalls an incident during an earlier visit to Sudan when a haggard looking woman confronted him.

“Are you the man of peace? Why did you not bring peace?” she asked. “We are still negotiating,” he answered.

Looking straight into Sumbeiywo’s eyes she said, “You see these tattered clothes I am wearing? I will not change them until you bring peace.” “Seeing the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Deal, I realised that her prayers had been answered,” he says with a distant look in his eyes. Though he has not had the chance to visit Sudan again, he managed to send clothes to the lady. Sumbeiywo has captured his experiences as a special envoy during the Southern Sudan Peace process in his biography entitled The Mediator: Gen Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process. It is authored by journalist Waithaka Waihenya.

His reason for doing this is purely cultural. “In our culture a man must do three things; he must sire a son, he must plant a tree and finally he must write a book,” he explains with a smile.

Through the successful negotiation of the Southern Sudan peace deal, Sumbeiywo has learnt that Africans don’t need to look to the West to solve their problems for them. “We are known to one another and can settle our own problems,” he says, his voice ringing with confidence and an air of satisfaction.

(The Standard)