Rebel divisions hamper Darfur peace
Sept 11, 2006 (AL FASHER) — The signing of a peace agreement between the Sudanese government and one of the main rebel groups in Darfur has exacerbated inter-rebel violence and diminished chances for stability in the warn-torn region, observers say.
“To the average Darfuri, the Darfur peace agreement [DPA] has brought nothing but misery,” a humanitarian official in Darfur added.
Relations between rebel factions have gradually deteriorated since September 2005, but fighting escalated after the signing of the DPA on 5 May between the government and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). The group, under the command of Zaghawa leader Minni Minnawi, was the largest of the three main rebel factions in Darfur.
Abdelwahid Mohamed al-Nur, the leader of another faction of the SLM/A with a predominantly Fur following, and Khalil Ibrahim, leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), refused to sign the peace deal, brokered by the African Union (AU). They claimed it did not fulfil their key demands for more compensation, political representation and stronger security arrangements.
“For the Fur – settled farmers who bore the brunt of the violence and lost land on which they depended – compensation was a much bigger issue than for the Zaghawa herders, the majority of whom had not been displaced and lived in so-called liberated areas,” is how one senior UN official explained Al-Nur’s reluctance to sign.
Discontent is widespread among the Darfur population. Many demonstrations against the DPA have taken place inside camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Arab nomadic groups complain they have been excluded from the negotiations and that the peace deal does not address their concerns.
“It doesn’t mean that they reject the DPA altogether; they reject its shortcomings. The net result is that the DPA, as it stands now, is unacceptable for many,” a political analyst, who requested anonymity, said.
The under-funded and under-equipped AU mission in Darfur, which has been unable to prevent widespread abuses against civilians, has borne the brunt of people’s wrath. Affiliated to the flawed peace deal and increasingly perceived as siding with the government, attacks against its peacekeepers have risen by 900 percent compared with the same time last year, according to UN figures.
“Without the capacity to forcefully implement the peace agreement, security deteriorated, its implementation fell behind schedule and its perceived failure became a self-fulfilling prophecy,” the analyst added.
The government’s reluctance to implement the peace agreement, its refusal to renegotiate any part of the text to accommodate other rebel groups and its antagonism towards a strong international protection force to oversee the implementation of the DPA has further contributed to the deadlock.
On 31 August, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a gradual transition of the AU mission in Darfur to a stronger UN protection force. But the deployment of 17,500 UN troops and 3,300 civilian police is contingent on the government’s consent; Khartoum has rejected calls for such a force.
“The AU is unable to start the implementation of the peace agreement; the government is not serious about implementing it, and the international community doesn’t do anything about it – this gives legality to the claims of groups who resist the DPA,” Col. Ali Muktar, representative of Minnawi’s SLM/A faction on the AU ceasefire commission in North Darfur, said.
The mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is due to expire on 30 September and the Sudanese government has refused to allow an extension as a transition to a UN peacekeeping force for Darfur.
“If the AU is forced to leave Darfur without a UN force to replace it, this will mean the collapse of the DPA,” Khalil Tukras, a member of the North Darfur executive committee of Ummah, the political party with the largest popular support among the Sudanese, told IRIN.
“If the war ignites again, Darfur will descend into warlordism and turn into another Somalia,” he added. “The movements are already organised along tribal lines and they will defend their own communities – the G-19 [a dissident SLM/A faction] is calling on Minnawi’s commanders to avoid this.”
“We have established a committee of mediators with the G-19, consisting of tribal elders and native administrators,” Muktar confirmed. “They are sitting together right now and we hope to reach an agreement on all aspects very soon.”
FIGHTING ESCALATING IN NORTH DARFUR
Since the signing of the DPA, the security situation has become particularly volatile in North Darfur State and the adjacent Jebel Marra mountains. Most of this territory is controlled by the competing SLM/A rebel factions of Minnawi and Al-Nur or the National Redemption Front (NRF). The NRF is an umbrella group for rebel factions that are unhappy with the DPA. It was founded in Asmara, Eritrea, on 30 June.
The NRF’s founding declaration was signed by JEM leader Ibrahim, Khamis Abdallah Abakar – former vice-president of the SLM/A and now the leader of the G-19 – and senior Darfur politicians Sharif Harir and Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige of the Federal Democratic Alliance (FDA).
Two G-19 commanders, Jar Al Nabi and Suliman Marjan, were in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, to sign the DPA on behalf of their group. Although they believed that the G-19 was the fulcrum of the original rebel SLM/A – before it split into a Minnawi and Al-Nur faction – their presence was not acknowledged and they could not formally sign the peace deal.
“It seems that the political leadership of the G-19 incited their military commanders to acquire more territory so that they would have a stronger hand at the negotiating table,” a political analyst said.
According to NRF sources, G-19 forces managed to gain control of large swathes of formerly Minnawi-controlled areas in North Darfur, starting with the capture of Minnawi’s headquarters at Birmaza in the northwest of North Darfur State on 22 May.
Fighting did not escalate on a large scale and displacement was limited, however, as many local Minnawi commanders switched sides to the approaching G-19. According to an NRF source, several commanders were disgruntled by the lack of consultation before the signing of the DPA; others simply refused to fight people they considered their brothers while some welcomed the G-19 as a way to fend off Arab militia attacks in the area.
Many of Minnawi’s commanders were weary of fighting and would have accepted the DPA if the process had been better and Minnawi had consulted them, a local observer said. “Hell hath no fury like a field commander scorned,” he added.
Minnawi rebels subsequently tried to consolidate and extend their control of the region west of El Fasher, colliding with Al-Nur’s forces in Jebel Marra. Fighting was much more fierce and civilians were often caught in the crossfire or directly targeted, leading to mass displacement. The UN says more than 50,000 people have been displaced since July.
According to a local source, the fact that Minnawi’s forces attacked civilian communities and collaborated with the Sudanese military has further soured relations between signatories and non-signatories to the peace deal. In certain areas, Minnawi’s former rebel group has now been dubbed ‘Janjawid 2′ in reference to government-allied Arab militia who are notorious for razing villages to the ground.
“The main factor causing the insecurity is that the parties who signed the peace agreement use it as a shield to continue to wage war on the non-signatories, creating factionalism, fighting over territory, and increased attacks against civilians,” a senior humanitarian source said.
But, said Muktar, in defence of his colleagues: “We had no intention to fight but some commanders were obliged to protect their communities and the humanitarian community from abduction, harassment, and hijackings in their area of control. When fighting starts, for one reason or another, of course there will be damage to the civilian population; but it was not the intention.”
In defiance of the UN Security Council plans to deploy a UN force in Darfur as well as the security provisions of the DPA, the Sudanese government has started to implement its own protection plan, which involves deploying another 10,500 troops to “consolidate the security situation” in Darfur.
Local observers confirmed that government forces started an offensive to push back the NRF on 28 August, attacking the villages of Abu Sakin, Kulkul, Sayah and Turra, 35 km northwest of the capital El Fasher, from the air with Antonov planes. Subsequently, Sudanese armed forces took over the area and pushed northwards, recapturing Um Sidir in early September.
REBELS DIVIDED
Despite reconciliation efforts between Minnawi and G-19 rebels, disunity and shifting alliances remain a major hurdle to achieving peace and stability in Darfur.
Al-Nur’s SLM/A group is the most notable rebel faction that refused to join the NRF, rejecting any alliance with the Islamist Khalil Ibrahim, the former North Darfur State Minister of Health.
The G-19 and the FDA are also exclusively Darfur-oriented and secular, and observers say a long-term political alliance with the JEM, for which the Darfur rebellion is part of a larger goal to overthrow the government in Khartoum, is unlikely.
“Apart from discontent about the DPA, there is little that keeps this rebel alliance together,” a regional observer said. “The NRF has no political leader and very little political coordination – it is primarily an alliance of military necessity. The NRF is starting to disintegrate at the leadership level. It is a very fluid situation right now.”
According to unconfirmed reports, small clashes took place between JEM and FDA forces in North Darfur in early September and JEM troops are reportedly moving west towards Chad, away from the main NRF rebel force. On the other hand, a senior commander of Al-Nur’s SLM/A faction in the eastern Jebel Marra mountains, Tarada, has reportedly joined forces with the NRF.
“The NRF is like a city-bus-ride: at every stop, some people get on and some people get off,” a local source observed.
Al-Nur experienced serious post-DPA internal opposition too and his SLM/A faction lost many supporters from ethnic groups other than the Fur, negating his faction’s claim to represent all Darfuri people.
Internal dissent reached such levels that Al-Nur’s commanders replaced him in August and appointed Ahmed Abdul Shafi Bassey as the new political leader of Al-Nur’s faction. They requested him to convene a new SLM/A-wide leadership conference.
POTENTIAL FOR PEACE
“The SLM/A leadership conference could be the way forward,” a political analyst said. Although the JEM is unlikely to sign a Darfur peace deal – given its national ambitions – the G-19, the FDA and Al-Nur’s SLM/A faction can be persuaded to sign an agreement, if given the right incentives, he added.
“Peace in Darfur is unattainable unless everybody signs on to a peace deal, and large amounts of money are spent on reconstruction and rehabilitation,” the analyst stressed.
According to a local source, the Sudanese government would be receptive to Al-Nur’s demands. His constituency is the largest ethnic group in Darfur and the government realises any sustainable peace deal will have to include their leaders. On the other hand, the government is unlikely to give in to the JEM, because of its national agenda, its relatively small armed force in Darfur and its links with Chad and Libya.
“The international community must exert much more pressure on the Sudanese government to allow SLM/A, Abdelwahid [al-Nur] and the NRF to sign the DPA as well,” Muktar stressed. Sufficient financial support to guarantee six months’ pay for ex-combatants until their forces were reorganised and absorbed into the army was another crucial element to prevent a relapse into war, he added.
However, even if the remaining rebel groups signed the DPA, the concerns of Arab nomads remain largely unaddressed. Mohammed El Sayed Hassan, director of El Massar, an NGO that supports nomadic groups, said their main concern was land – acquiring a homeland where they could settle and opening up migration routes for their animals.
“If the issue of the return [of IDPs] comes up, there are bound to be many problems – many nomadic groups are occupying pastures that belong to displaced communities. Unless these issues are tackled comprehensively there won’t be stability in Darfur,” he said.
“Ultimately, the DPA itself is not at the heart of the matter,” an analyst observed. “It’s about the way it was negotiated and the lack of consultation of rebel leaders – who were rarely in Darfur to meet their supporters on the ground – with their field commanders.”
Through a process that involves all genuine stakeholders and has solid international support, peace is attainable in Darfur, a local observer stressed. “Organising that is difficult enough in itself, however, and unfortunately there are always spoilers,” she added.
(IRIN)