The Salvation Military/Shura Accountability for the Executions of Ramadan, 1990
By Mahgoub El-Tigani
Nov 25, 2003 — The Ramadan Martyr outcry (Sudan Tribune: November 24, 2003) for Sudanese people and the International Community to insure legal accountability of the Sudan Government concerning the 1990 murders of army regulars by the Salvation leaders deserves a detailed account of the movement that was aimed to change the political leadership of the June coup 1989 without engaging in a blood-shed in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, only to ensue in horrible killings of more than 200 army personnel by the NIF commanding groups, the Salvation Revolution Council (SRC) and the Shura Council.
It all happened in April 24, 1990 (the 28th of Ramadan) almost one day before the occurrence of the Eid, the Muslim religious festival which usually celebrates the ending day of the Ramadan sacred month, when the NIF leadership of the June coup 1989 murdered 28 army officers and 200 regulars (or more) without proper adherence to the military law that guaranteed specific rights, procedure and appeal, in the case of a court martial or other prosecutable trials to maintain the rights of the accused.
By that time, the Islamic fundamentalists’ terrorist coup had already poisoned the political climate against the nationally approved Sudanese Peace Agreement 1988 being democratically initiated and developed by many democratic groups (professional associations, trade unions, USAP, SPLM/SPLA, DUP, Umma, and the communist party with a strong support by the Sudanese Armed Forces led by the late General Fathi Ahmed ‘Ali) until it was finally approved by the democratically elected Constituent Assembly.
The coup started serious escalation of a religious Jihad war, detained thousands of democratic politicians and union leaders in torturing conditions, and murdered in cold blood innocent civilians: Archan Gelo, a political activist from the Nuba Mountains who was arbitrarily arrested, detained, and tortured to death in a secretive torture center (Ghost House), Majdi Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub – a businessman, son of a famous national industrialist – and Girgis, a civil pilot, son of a reverend Coptic priest. Majdi and Girgis were unlawfully robbed from their owned foreign currency and then hanged to death.
Colonel Salah Karrar, Head of the SRC economic committee at that time, spoke at the Omdurman National Radio the very day these innocent citizens were heinously murdered by Karrar’s ruling colleagues to “justify” these egregious crimes in accordance with the Brotherhood brutalizing ideology. The SRC “economist expert” confidently “ascertained” in his speech to the public “Islamic revolutionary principles of the Salvation Revolution, which is determined to eradicate the crime of smuggling foreign currencies by eradicating al those who become involved in it, as well as using many other harsh measures by “legitimate” State powers” (!).
The truth of the matter was exactly the opposite: foreign currency exchange was normally legalized by the democratic government for industries and businesses, in addition to the conduct of many social, cultural, and religious activities by lawful bank arrangements. All these normal transactions were strangely prohibited by the Brotherhood rulers most evidently to monopolize the national economy, as they actually enjoyed, throughout the subsequent years to the detriment of the national economy.
Unlike Girgis and Magdi, who were enjoying legitimate ownership of their own monies for which the SRC extra-judicially executed them, Colonel Salah Karrar (who lately became ambassador in Bahrain but was finally purged in a humiliating way by his “former” SRC remaining dictators) was popularly suspected for underground activities in foreign currencies before and after the Salvation coup! “This must be a heavenly punishment,” said League members in private comments at the London 13th Anniversary of the Ramadan Martyrs. “Still, the deserved punishment of Sudan killers is extremely important by law before the independent judiciary,” they further emphasized.
The murders of the innocent citizens Archan, Magdi, and Girgis were further extended with another savage crime by the SRC: the brutal killing of Dr. ‘Ali Fadl, a humanitarian physician, community figure, and famous leader of the Doctors’ Union. Dr. ‘Ali participated actively in the leadership of the April Uprising 1985 that toppled the 17-year defunct dictatorship of the deposed Marshal Nimeiri. In 1990, physician Fadl was arbitrarily arrested, detained in a clandestine Ghost House, and severely tortured to death by security elements directly commanded by the SRC members Major Dr. al-Tayeb Ibrahim (Sikha) and Lieutenant-General Dr. ‘Ali Nafi’ (a former university professor of agriculture at the University of Khartoum).
The three murders were shockingly received by the families of the victims, as well as the Sudanese professional and political communities and the public at large. Of the most deeply affected people by these serial killings, that had been committed within a very short period of the tyrannous coup, a great many army regulars were determined to put an end to the NIF brutality before it would reach a greater level of criminality against the innocent citizens. In fact, serious violations of peoples’ rights had already been committed by the SRC since it seized the political power in June 30, 1989.
The SRC early human rights violations included a brutal police confrontation that suppressed a peaceful protesting memorandum submitted by the Sudanese Workers’ Federation, the Doctors’ Union, Sudan Bar Association, and leaders of the textiles, banks, and the water and electricity trades unions. The memorandum bravely placed the SRC under strong pressure “to insure without delay full civil freedoms and human rights for the country, as the coup statement by its leader Omer al-Bashir publicly claimed (!).” The Unions’ historic memo was documented by the late Mahgoub Seed Ahmed, one of the distinguished leaders of the Sudan Workers’ Federation who was arrested and tortured in a Ghost House for long months immediately after the confrontation, in his 50 Years Memories on the Sudan Workers’ Union Movement (SHRO-Cairo publication, 1997).
The unions’ strike was crushed by force: the lives of Dr. Mamoun Ahmed Hussain and his colleague Dr. ‘Abd-Allah were miraculously saved under national and international protest against the SRC evil decision to execute them “for their role in the doctors’ strike.” The participating unionists were unlawfully purged from public service. Many were severely injured, and a great many were subjected to the ordeal of Dr. Nafi’ Iranian-trained NIF privileged Ghost House torturers for long years throughout the 1990s.
Here, it suffices to mention the documentary complaints by Professor Farouq Ibrahim, who was brutally tortured for “teaching secular biology lessons at the University of Khartoum (!)” as the SRC Member Bakri Salih told him at the Kober central prison after his arrest in 1989, and Brigadier Mohamed Ahmed al-Rayah who was savagely tortured by Professor Nafi’ favorite torturers for almost a complete year at the torture center of the State Security Headquarters.
Ironically, Professor Nafi’e colleague and sincere friend, Professor ‘Ali Shumu, the Chairperson of the National Press Council, is equally famous for the notorious torturing of Sudanese intelligentsia. Hence, while Professor Nafie’ converted his intellectuality to command sadist tortures and extra-judicial killings of innocent citizens, Shumu torturing activity is mainly focused on harming the intellectual well-being of the citizens concerned with the freedom of expression, especially in the Press arena, to the extent of outlawing the Khartoum Monitor while confiscating regularly al-Sahafa and most recently al-Ayyam independent papers.
The NIF terrorist climates were very frustrating to the Ramadan army democrats that had been gravely disenchanted by the NIF party interference in army affairs, the abrogation of the Sudanese Peace Agreement that had been nationally approved by the Constituent Assembly (the democratically elected parliament of 1986), and the succeeding Brotherhood Shura Council with its ignorant meddling in military affairs versus the citizen in the South, DarFur, and the Nuba Mountains. The reckless planning of Saif al-‘Uboor offensive by the Shura Sheikhs, irrespective of military consultation, was particularly rejected by the Ramadan leaders because it would massively kill the southerner civilians as well as a great number of the northerner recruits, as actually occurred.
Even at that early stage of the June coup, the Ramadan officers were aware of the drastic changes in education, the serious signs of health deterioration, the immeasurable financial corruption and abuse of authority, the speedy stagflation of the market, and above all the unprecedented brutality of the coup leaders who for the first time directly collaborated with the NIF quasi-military party and the PDFs militias versus the rest of the nation. Particularly important, the massive audience that accompanied Dr. Fadl funeral to the Farouq Cemetery in 1990 greatly affected Brigadier Karrar, Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Abd al-Mon’im Karrar, Major Nugd-Allah, and Captain Khugali among the other Ramadan group members, because they were deeply touched by the community’s anger, distress, and sorrow for the savage assassination of the beloved doctor.
The Ramadan rebels included distinguished high ranking officers as well as junior officers and a number of non-commissioned army personnel. The names of more than 200 regulars who actively participated with the Ramadan officers in the field are not yet disclosed, although both of the Army General Command and the Democratic Opposition’s Legitimate Command of the Sudanese Armed Forces maintained full lists of the Ramadan Movement’s army personnel.
General Khalid al-Zain, a key figure of the Sudanese Army, former military attaché, and highly-trained pilot was most likely identified by the SRC as the group leader. The group included the well-reputed army leaders, Lieutenant-General ‘Uthman al-Sayed Baloal, Lieutenant General Hussain ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Kadaro, Brigadier Mohamed ‘Uthman Karrar, Colonel Mohamed Ahmed Qasim, Colonel Bashir Mustafa, Colonel Ismat Merghani Taha, and Colonel Salah al-Deen al-Sayed.
The murdered officers also included Lieutenant-Colonel Sayed Hassan ‘Abd al-Raheem, Lieutenant-Colonel Bashir al-Tayeb, Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Lieutenant-Colonel Bashir ‘Amir, Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Abd al-Mon’im Hassan ‘Ali Karrar, Major Nihad Ismail Humaida, Major Seed Ahmed al-Nu’man, Major Taj al-Deen Fath al-Rahman, Major Usama al-Zain, Major al-Shaikh al-Baqir al-Shaikh, Major Akram al-Fatih Yousif, Major Mua’wiya Yassin ‘Ali, major Salah al-Deen al-Dirdeeri, Major al-Fatih Ahmed al-Yass, Major Isam Abu al-Qasim, Major Babikir ‘Abd al-Rahman Nugd-Allah, Captian Mustafa ‘Awad Khugali, and Captain ‘Abd al-Mon’im Kemair.
By army standards, the Ramadan officers were well-reputed for their discipline, bravery, and professional performance. Many of them were publicly celebrated for resistance of the Nimeiri tyranny. Lieutenant-General ‘Uthman Baloal and Colonel Qasim were famous for the active role they played within the armed forces to support the April Uprising 1985. Brigadier Karrar was a popular governor among the Beja of the Eastern Region in the 1986 democratic government. Leader of a highly selected army expedition, Colonel ‘Ismat Merghani was appointed with the United Nations Peace Mission to the Republic of Namibia to help insure the Namibians’ democratic transition. Major (Pilot) Akram Yousif and Captain (Pilot) Mustafa Khugali were decorated with bravery medals for salvation operations of army personnel, and the others were recognized for similar records.
The full text of the Ramadan leaders’ statement has not yet been released to the public whether by the Sudan Government or the Democratic Opposition Legitimate Command of the Armed Forces. In the press conference following the extra-judicial executions of the Ramadan leaders, the June coup leader Omer al-Bashir, however, said that “his enemies, the April coup (!) leaders wanted to: 1) abrogate the September Laws 2) reinstate the 1974 laws; 3) form a secular council in the name of the Salvation Council to allow [free] party activity; and 4) enable John Garang or his Movement to share in state governance” (‘Abd al-Sattar al-Tawel, Egyptian Wafd, April 1990).
These same agenda were largely adopted by the democratic public of the country, including many members of the elected Constituent Assembly, before the Bashir’s military coup in June 1989. The pressure for the regular democracy and the just and permanent peace was increasingly recognized by the Sudanese masses all over the country. The Ramadan agenda as related by al-Bashir to “his Ramadan enemies” clearly supported the Sudanese Peace Agreement 1988 and the anticipated democratic transition thereof.
It should be recalled at this point that the democratic government scheduled a conference to finalize the nationally approved Peace Agreement with the SPLM in July 1990. The June 1989 coup was evidently staged to abrogate the Peace Agreement in the first place while the April 1990 attempted coup was meant to re-instate the same agreement.
Accompanied with supporting army regulars, the Ramadan Rectification leaders decided to arrest the June coup executives for the voluminous crimes committed (in less than a year) against the Homeland and the People of Sudan. On April 20, 1990, the retired Lieutenant-General ‘Abd al-Qadir Hussain al-Kadaro, a former commander of the Shigara Armored Brigade, was reinstated active commander by members of the brigade following a stormy meeting at the Shigra Headquarters.
The Shigara forces bitterly criticized the NIF party and Shura Council. They strongly condemned the SRC for “instating unconstitutional rule, collaborating with non-democratic civilians to monopolize the political power by force, abrogating the Sudanese Peace Agreement that was about to stop civil war, escalating civil war with strange jihad slogans, and destroying with all these deeds the honor, discipline, and well-being of the armed forces and the political future of the country,” as relayed by retired officers of the Brigade (al-Ittihadi al-Dawliya: December 1994).
A small force led by Brigadier Karrar and Captain Mustafa was able to control the Khartoum Airport the dawn of the next day in which Kadaro assumed leadership of the Shigara decisive forces. However, the other group that was heading towards the National T.V. and the Omdurman Radio did not successfully occupy the media institutions while the movement of the Paratroopers Force at Shambat, Khartoum North, and the mobile paratroopers/infantry forces of the General Command of the Armed Forces were carefully monitored and frustrated by SRC elements.
Apparently, the Ramadan Movement had been detected and monitored through the betrayal of two of its members, an officer and a non-commissioned officer, who reported the matter to the SRC a few hours before the Shigra meeting. Moreover, Mohamed Khugali Saliheen, then minister of culture and information, announced that the “coup attempt was an extended stage of an earlier attempt in March 1990 that was earlier put down” (al-Khaleej: Wednesday April 25, 1990). The March armed attempt was probably led by Lieutenant-General Mohamed ‘Ali Hamid al-Toam. The movement included 20 officers who were condemned and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment (1990: different sources, including the SRC official paper al-Quwat al-Musalaha and al-Inqaz al-Watani).
The SRC, however, was not able to arrest Kadaro in the stronghold of the Shigara camp. In actual fact, the SRC was in disarray at the beginning of the events: while the Shigara meeting was discussing the SRC fate, Omer al-Bashir and the other SRC leaders escaped to a nearby comfortable hiding at a remote farm in the outskirts of Soba. The defense minister Colonel Bakri Hassan Salih and most of the SRC members were also enjoying secured hiding in Khartoum while Major Ibrahim Shams al-Deen took his way with NIF civilian supporters (in military dress) and waited at the main gate of the General Command for the Ramadan rebels. That was when many officers and non-commissioned officers were arrested and subsequently condemned to death or dismissed and sent to jail long terms of imprisonment merely for showing up at the GC without prior permits.
In the meantime, the NIF Shura Council moved speedily to engage Kadaro in deceptive negotiations to loosen his grip on the Shigara powerful armored troops. The Shura Council provided a security valve for the SRC since it managed to insure several military and civilian safeguards against the Ramadan Movement before General al-Kadaro or his assistants would have moved to control the GC. Led by Dr. Hassan Turabi and Professor ‘Ali Nafi’, the Shura Sheikhs guided the SRC to negotiate with the Rectification General who was determined to arrest all SRCs as well as the collaborative NIFs, put them to a fair trial, and reinstate civilian rule via a transitional government that would abolish above all the SRC notorious decrees. General Kadarro and his colleagues wanted to process the Assembly-approved Sudanese Peace Agreement, exactly as the pre-arrested Ramadan Rectification Statement was prepared to announce to the Nation from the Omdurman National Radio.
It was said at this point that the Shura Sheikhs advised the SRC to seek the mediation of a close relative to al-Kadaro who was equally close to the Brotherhood rulers. It was also rumored that General Swar al-Dahab, the former Chairman of the Military Transitional Council 1985, was engaged in the SRC-Kadaro negotiations “to avoid any blood shedding in the holy month of Ramadan.” Close observers further claimed that the Armored Forces and the Karrar Airport group strongly rejected the SRC offer to surrender with due respect to “the sacredness of the Holy Month of Ramadan” since they never trusted the Shura/SRC promise to guarantee “fair negotiations with the rebels in order to maintain the unity of the armed forces, or that there would not be any military trial for the Ramadan Movement.”
For reasons not clearly specified by army sources until today, General al-Kadaro finally accepted the SRC offer. In the meantime, the SRC took advantage of the negotiations to reinstate full control of the situation by arresting General Karrar and Captain Khugali at the Airport, as well as Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Abd al-Mon’im Karrar, a popular leader of the parachute force, and almost all of the other Ramadan leaders who approached the General Command the early hours of April 21, 1990. Continuous arrests were then enforced on hundreds of army regulars all over the country.
The subsequent surrender of Karrar to the SRC, however, did not “save the Muslim blood in the Holy Month of Ramdan” that basically motivated the pious General to give up optimum military chances to the deceptive conspiracy of the mediating Brothers. Three retired officers were already arrested and killed without trial: General Khalid al-Zain (Sunday April 22), Lieutenant-General Baloal, and Colonel Mohamed Ahmed Qasim (Monday April 23). With flagrant violation of the Sudanese Armed Forces Law and military regulations, the SRC extra-judicially killed al-Kadaro, Karrar, and the other Ramadan army personnel by death sentences passed and executed in only-five-minutes by summary military trials.
The trials were conducted by the Bashir close assistants, Colonel al-Khanjar and Colonel Kunna, immediately after the June 1989 SRC rushed to approve the killing sentences with the Brotherhood blessing of the Hassan Turabi/’Ali ‘Uthman Shura Council. The first day of the Eid, Turabi issued jubilant congratulations to the SRC and the Armed Forces for “a job well done” (al-Khaleej: April 25, 1990), that is to say for killing, in cold blood, without trial, the army regulars, regardless of the “Islamic mediation of the NIF Brotherhood to save Muslim blood in the holy month of Ramadan.”
The Ramadan martyrs’ killing was executed with the full consent of the coup leader General Omer al-Bashir (al-Khaleej: April 25, 1990; al-Inqaz al-Wattani, April 25, 1990) and the other SRCs including his deputy Lieutenant-General al-Zubair Mohamed Salih, Brigadier ‘Uthman Ahmed Hassan, Brigadier Faisal Salih, Brigadier Ibrahim Iddam, Colonel Faisal Madani, Colonel Salah Karrar, Colonal Martin, Colonel Bakri Hassan Salih, Colonel Mohamed al-Amin Khalida (who personally stabbed Karrar after his arrest from the Airport), Major Ibrahim Shams al-Deen (who executed the killings), Major Dr. al-Tayeb Ibrahim (Sikha, the main accused person in the murder of Dr. ‘Ali Fadl) supported by the Intelligence Commander Brigadier Kamal Mukhtar and Colonel Dahawi of the Intelligence Bureau, as well as State Security Director ‘Ali Nafi and his office assistants, in addition to other NIF military personnel.
These NIF rulers are held responsible for the murdering of General Khalid al-Zain, Lieutenant-General Baloal, and Colonel Qasim without trial since Baloal and Qasim were actually incarcerated in prison when the Ramadan rebels moved to overthrow the SRC. Another competent authority specifically held responsible by the Martyrs’ League for the executions was identified as the NIF Shura Council, which was directly led by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the National Council Speaker, ‘Ali Uthman Taha, a senior government executive and a leading member of the Shura Council, besides the other key figures of the Council such as Ahmed ‘Abd al-Rahman, Ibrahim al-Sanoasi, al-Hakeem, Dr. ‘Abd al-Rahman Khalifa (the General Prosecutor in 1990) and many other members of the Muslim Brotherhood group that planned and executed the June coup with the above-mentioned SRC officers.
Aside from the Ramadan troops’ lack of communication in the field and the other fatal administrative and military mistakes of the Ramadan Movement, the Movement failed to achieve its goals because some of the rebel leaders apparently placed their trust on the Brothers deceiving mediators, thus providing the SRC with determining time to plan on their demise. The Ramadan Rectification Movement might be compared to the July Rectification Movement of Major Hashim al-‘Atta who in July 19, 1971, made an earlier attempt to correct the corrupted policies of the May military coup by military action.
Although the perfectionist July 1971 coup, which successfully seized the political power in less than 25 minutes in daylight and thus did not actually suffer any lack of military or administrative communication as the Ramadan movement did, the July rebels were not able to control many other loopholes of which confidence in the deposed Katibat Ja’far regulars (that returned with Egyptian and Libyan assistance to eliminate the July leaders) was similarly a fatal mistake.
The Ramadan Movement was certainly defaulting in military communications as well as other key preparations. Both movements, however, met with sudden incalculable intervention that mercilessly dealt a killing blow to each one of them: the July 1971 was unexpectedly attacked by the (Libya, Egypt, and Great Britain) international ad hoc intelligence alliance, which arrested the July leaders Lieutenant-Colonel Babiker al-Nour and Major Farouq ‘Uthman Hamad Allah before they arrived at the destination airport Khartoum, besides the provision of strategic and logistical support that confused the July Movement and expedited its collapse. The Ramadan Movement was deceptively foiled in the name of Islam and Ramadan, the very month that witnessed the group’s brutalization by the false Caliphate.
Unfortunately, the democratic personnel of the armed forces that respectively made the July and the Ramadan attempts to salvage the country from corrupted military rulers acted in their own right on behalf of the civilian democrats, thus forcing the latter without sufficient coordination or preparation to face out the traumatic consequences of their armed movements. Thus far ruled by the armed forces for most of the post-independence times, the Sudan is certainly rife with coup possibilities.
Due to the negative impact of weak democratic governments, oppressive military governance, and continuous civil wars, the possibility of repeating the July or the Ramadan (April) attempts is quite plausible in the Sudanese arena in light of the successful survival of the November 1957-1964, May 1969-1985, and the June 1989-present time army governance. North or South, the army is undoubtedly considered by most army personnel a most valued avenue to gain political power!
Apart from the latest repeated rejection of military coup by Sadiq al-Mahdi, the democratically elected Prime Minister whom the Brotherhood coup unlawfully deposed, in Eid Sermon at the Ansar Mosque of Omdurman, the national capitol of Sudan, the Sudanese are required to come to terms with the armed forces that continues to plan on and to execute political movements by military action to seize the political power. Here, the major question is straight away: how to insure constitutional army participation in the next democratic transition, rather than how to exclude the army from sharing political power.
Many Sudanese people solemnly prayed in the Ramadan Eid: “may the next Rectification Movement come about only via full coordination with the Sudanese unions, professional groups, democratic political parties, and international support to facilitate the establishment of a sustainable civil democracy, not to jump over that to repeat the June 1989 savage rule for another decade or to engage in military actions that only result in endless killings of army personnel, as well as the victimized civilians!”
Unfortunately, military action by definition is an act of violence, no matter how it plans to secure peaceful implementation. Both civil and military politicians are therefore required to act wisely, venerating and promoting the public will to which the military must be trained to assume the role of legal protection to keep the public order, according to the law, in collaboration with regular police forces only when asked to do so by legitimate civilian rule under full command of the independent judiciary, not for any so-called security guardianship or political patronage.
Until democratic transition is peacefully processed, nonetheless, the graves and the wills of the Ramadan Martyrs must be officially recognized, the NIF murderer personnel must be fairly put to trial before the independent judiciary, and the Sudanese Armed Forces must stop acting on behalf of people for good.
*Member of Sudanese Writers’ Union (in exile) and the president of Sudan Human Rights Organization Cairo-Branch