New Sudan: Towards building the Sudanese Nation-State
By Elwathig Kameir
This paper originally presented at the General Congress of the Sudanese Writers’ Union on 19 September 2006 in Khartoum.
October 30, 2006 — The New Sudan is a concept viewed by many as enigmatic, ambiguous and may mean different things to different people. The idea has been criticized by some from the outset as racist, and whose ultimate aim is to Africanize the country or is Anti-Islam in its orientation, while it is perceived by others as a disguised call for separation and the creation of an independent state in the South. There are also those, particularly in Northern Sudan, who outrightly condemned the vision merely because it came from a source unfamiliar to their minds and hearts.
I am inclined to think that Kamal Eljizouli asked me to address this topic, in particular, because of my affiliation with the SPLM, whose late leader was the architect, ardent proponent and prime mover of the New Sudan vision. I have no objection to the rationale for his choice, but it would have added more value had another writer, with no SPLM links, been invited to provide an account of his/her perspective and understanding of the concept. You may wonder why I am invoking this? One main thesis of this paper is that most of the mystification and misinterpretation of the Vision is partially caused by confusing the New Sudan, as a conceptual framework, with the SPLM, the promoter and politically organized actor and vehicle that entrusted itself with the leading role of turning the vision into reality at a particular historical moment. Thus, non-identification with the SPLM in the organizational sense by no means implies a contradiction with actually embracing the vision. Indeed, I would venture to say that all believers in the New Sudan are SPLM(ers) but not all members of the SPLM champion the vision!!
The purpose of this brief contribution is to trigger debate on the concept of the New Sudan by trying to clarify the ambiguity and misconception about the concept, by shedding light on its genesis and tenets, to which I strongly feel that many in this gathering would subscribe. Contrary to what the critics and skeptics think, the concept of the New Sudan has no racial, ethnic or separatist connotations. It is rather a framework, a national project, for building a true and sustainable Citizenship-State capable of accommodating the multiple diversities of Sudanese society. It denotes a conceptual framework that is global in nature and can be extended beyond Sudan to address similar situations of conflict inside and outside the African continent, while taking the particularities of each case into consideration. Above all, the concept is an intellectual and scholarly contribution to the unfolding political discourse on rebuilding of the Sudanese State.
THE GENESIS OF THE NEW SUDAN CONCEPT
The late Dr. Garang’s preoccupation with the Sudanese governance crisis, the civil war in the South and his genuine search for achieving a lasting and just peace, were behind the concept of the New Sudan. The failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement, to which the late Dr. John was a staunch opponent, in delivering promised peace and prosperity to Southern Sudan, prompted him to revisit the approach and the way the Sudanese conflict has been perceived. Why would Sudanese people keep fighting and killing each other if the contested issues were not so grave? It dawned on him that marginalization in all its forms, discrimination, injustice and subordination, constitute the root causes of the conflict that cannot be addressed in a piecemeal fashion through dishing out handouts and concessions to the disgruntled and rebellious groups whenever a conflict erupted in a particular region. Sudanese have problems everywhere in the west, in the east, in the center, in the far north. It is an attempt at marginalization to define the problem as the “southern problem”. Garang’s thinking, thus, goaded him to redefine the problem to be the “problem of the Sudan” and not the “problem of the South”, as conventionally advocated by the successive ruling regimes in Khartoum. The fish rots from the head and not from the tail! It is the Sudanese state, epitomized by the power structure in the Center, that needs to be radically restructured in order to accommodate the Sudan’s manifold diversity and attend to all forms of exclusion and marginalization of its people.
Garang was not only a politician and a freedom fighter, but he was also a scholar and a global thinker, aspiring to see a new world order established. As such, he was not immune to being influenced by all of the world’s grand theories, trends of thought and revolutions. The concept of the New Sudan is, thus, informed by Marxism, various schools of socialism, as well greatly indebted to humanist idealism. It also substantially draws from all relevant other countries’ experiences with nation-formation and state-building in both of North and Latin America. This is why it should not be surprising that the earlier version of Garang’s vision of the New Sudan was tinted with socialism. The country’s ills were thought to be only resolved “within the context of a united Sudan under a socialist system that affords democratic and human rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religions, beliefs and outlooks”. The reference to socialism, however, did not dilute neither did it temper the founding percepts of the New Sudan concept. Again, the late Dr. Garang admitted that the content of this socialism cannot be determined mechanically, but rather the “conceptualization and particularization of socialism in the Sudan shall unfold as the armed struggle proceeds and socio-economic development programs are implemented during and after the war and according to Sudanese local objective conditions”. Besides, the last mention of socialism with regards to the New Sudan was made in the speech of late SPLM’s leader on 3 March 1984. Thus, socialism was rather an inspiration that was politically motivated by the environment in which late Garang, in the cloak of the SPLM’s leader, worked and interacted. It does by no means cast any ideological shadows on the vision of the New Sudan.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: A SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING
The failure to methodologically distinguish between the vision of the New Sudan, on the one hand, and the SPLM (in the organizational sense and in terms of strategies and tactics) and the political process of building the New Sudan in the course of struggle (political, military, negotiations), on the other hand, is one main source of the confusion about the concept. Some critics and skeptics have always been, since the SPLM late leader introduced the vision of the New Sudan, preoccupied with questions on the origin and genesis of the SPLM/A, its ethnic composition, and political and military performance. Little attention, if at all was given, to objective examination and analysis of what the SPLM stands for or to seriously scrutinize the vision it proposes.
Unity, for instance, is intrinsic to, and an integral part of the New Sudan vision, which is a grand objective cherished by wide sectors of the Sudanese society in all parts of the country. Coming from a “southerner” and a leader of a “southern movement”, however, this genuine call was not taken seriously and was disdainfully ridiculed, may be until late Garang’s appearance in Khartoum and his sudden and tragic departure. Though the right of self-determination became an SPLM demand only in 1991, in response to objective political conditions both in Khartoum and the South, it was often singled out as damning evidence of the SPLM’s and its leader’s separatist inclinations. Self-determination is a tool or a mechanism for achieving voluntary unity in an adverse environment and is not a founding principle of the New Sudan. This is simply why it was invoked 9 years following the Movement’s inception, at a particular historical moment in the political process of struggle for building the New Sudan .
Separation of religion from the state is cardinal to the building of a nation-state and, thus, is part and parcel of the New Sudan. This has also been confused with the SPLM’s political strategies i.e. mixing the vision with the political outcome of negotiations. It was, thus, felt that the SPLM had reneged on its position on the relation between the state and religion by agreeing to the maintenance of Sharia’a in the North. Under the circumstances of the negotiations, only two routes were open for the SPLM to follow. One option was to insist on the separation of religion from the state all over the Sudan, thus leading to a stalemate and the eventual breakdown of the talks. This would not have looked good either for the SPLM constituency in the South or for the mediators. Even worse it would have gotten the country back to a devastating war. The second option was to seek workable solutions that would end the war, without compromising the citizenship rights of the non-Muslims not only in the South, but also in the whole country. Therefore, what has been achieved through negotiation is only a step forward in the long political process of building the New Sudan.
Adoption of a one-country-2-systems model in the negotiations, following the government’s adamant refusal of separating religion from the state, was seen by many as a diversion from the New Sudan and a recipe for separation. Voluntary unity in the New Sudan is conditioned on creating a political and socio-economic commonality that brings all the Sudanese together as equal citizens in rights and obligations. This would not be possible if the religion of any particular constituent of this commonality were to become, and not the constitution, the source of legislation. The “one country-two systems model” advocated by the CPA was, thus, a direct response to the government’s intransigent position on the relation between religion and the state. The proposition was, therefore, intended to ensure unity without relegating non-Muslim Sudanese to second-class citizenship in their own country. The formula was by no means dictated by the Americans or other foreign powers as was believed by some people, but was premised on the confederal arrangements (“Solution Modalities for the Sudan Conflict”) presented by the Movement’s leader as early as 1993 during the Abuja talks. Therefore, the late leader was under no illusion that Model 2 i.e. “one country-two systems model”, precipitated by the CPA, represents New Sudan as proposed in the vision. This is why he refers to it as “Minimum New Sudan”. It is premised on the assumption that confederal arrangements provide space for promoting and fostering Sudanese commonality during an interim period that would eventually lead either to “A Transformed Democratic Sudan” (Model 1) or split of the country into two independent states (Model 5). Model 3 assumes an Islamic-Arab Sudan dominating the South (the pre-CPA situation), which will definitely lead to the separation of the South. Model 4 is purely theoretical where an indigenous African secular state dominates and would lead to the formation of an independent state in the North. The best way to maintain unity is to move directly from Model 3(Old Sudan) to Model 1 (A Transformed Democratic Sudan), and this means decisive defeat of the incumbent regime of the Old Sudan. However, if this was not feasible and you opted for negotiation, then the second best would be to go to the New Sudan through Model 2(Confederal Minimum New Sudan or a “Two System-One Country” Model). Understandably, this option bears the risk of the outcome of Model 5 (Separation) and that is the price of the failure to achieve decisive victory by the forces that want a secular-democratic New Sudan. Undoubtedly, this is not a separatist position. But going all the way to establish the New Sudan is not the sole responsibility of the SPLM. Other forces of change, particularly in the North, have a role to play in order to move the situation from Model 2 to Model 1, instead of allowing it to move to Model 5. This is a political process and should not be muddled up with the vision of the New Sudan.
Another methodological consideration to be noted is that the New Sudan is not the antithesis of the Old Sudan nor does the vision imply the complete destruction of the Old Sudan and build the New Sudan on its ashes. The construction of the New Sudan is, rather, a “transformative” process for fundamental socio-economic change and political restructuring that would build on all of the positive elements of the Old Sudan, informed by all our historical and contemporary experiences and cognizant of, and equipped for, the enormous challenges of the 21st century. It is the responsibility of the SPLM and other forces of change, particularly in the North, both originated and grew in the very Old Sudan, to take the most refined and positive components of their respective experiences in leading the transformation process into the New Sudan.
On the other hand, however, there are other forces who benefited, and continue to benefit from the Old Sudan who are well aware that the New Sudan is a threat to their interests, be they in power or the opposition. These forces are, thus, bent on misleading and frightening their respective constituencies that the New Sudan is a mere euphemism for an African, Christian, anti-Arab and Islam, which in collaboration with Zionism is intent on substituting the Arab-Islamic identity of the Sudanese (the North, in particular). Such unfounded suspicions, fueled by racism and religious bigotry, have been adequately responded to elsewhere and have not been able to stand the test of time. Even in his modeling exercise “Solution Modalities for the Sudan Conflict”, the late SPLM leader underlined Model 4 (where an indigenous African secular state dominates) as purely hypothetical. Indeed, if Model 1, the pre-CPA Old Sudan(Islamic-Arab Sudan) is and unsustainable, how would the SPLM leader even think of an unequally deplorable Sudan?
A stark example of confusing the vision of the New Sudan with the SPLM is a recent article in Sudan Tribune mistakenly taking the use of the term New Sudan to denote all the areas under control of the SPLA in the south, Southern Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains, as the Movement’s definition of the vision . Of course, this cannot be true for a movement that has been fighting for 22 years spearheading the struggle for change.
THE NEW SUDAN: A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR REBUILDING
THE SUDANESE STATE
What is wrong with Old Sudan?
Consistent with the conceptualization of the Sudanese debacle as the “problem of the Sudan” rather than the problem of the South, the solution is envisioned to be in the transformation of the whole Sudan after diligent and deep analysis of the Old Sudan. The entry-point was the unfolding crisis of national identity precipitated by the post-independence governance frameworks throughout much of the African continent. This crisis of identity is the outcome of a historical evolution. Historically, the African (Sudanese) state was carved out of racial, ethnic and cultural diversities that gave the state a pluralistic configuration. The African state was and is still largely a composite of distinct ethnic units – many of which would likely have described themselves at the time of colonization as nations in their own right. As the colonial powers applied a preferential treatment to the various groups and regions in the development of political and economic policies, this pluralism became characterized by considerable disparities in the shaping and sharing of power, national wealth, social services, and development opportunities. The effect of combining sharp diversities with extreme disparities was to sow the seeds of potential conflict among the component elements. Instead of seeking remedies in addressing these disparities through an equitable system of distribution of power and representation, many post-independence African governments invariably chose to merely adopt wholesale the constitutional models left behind by their colonizers. In doing so, they emphasized monolithic concepts of unity by suppression of the various forms of diversity, thus, leaving many Africans feeling disempowered, disfranchised and not only seeking recognition for their distinctive identities against majority domination, but also a reflection of themselves in the constitutional and governing frameworks of the state within which they live. In a number of African countries, this culminated in armed conflict and a demand for various forms and degrees of self-determination .
Sudan is not an exception. The country suffered a seventeen year secessionist war that began only four months before independence. Temporarily halted by a precarious peace accord, the war resumed a decade later with the unilateral abrogation of that accord by the Government. Thus, late Garang’s question was: Why? What is the problem? Why should a community subject itself to generations of war and suffering in so many parts of the country? The attempts by various Khartoum-based regimes since 1956 to build a monolithic state, premised on two components only with the exclusion of other parameters of the Sudanese diversity constitutes the fundamental problem of the Sudan and defines the Sudanese conflict. The Sudanese state hitherto has excluded the vast majority of the Sudanese people from governance and therefore their marginalization in the political, economic and social fields. This provoked resistance by the excluded. There have been wars and there continue to be wars in the Sudan, later vindicated by outbreak of war and armed conflicts in Darfur and Eastern Sudan. This is simply because the majority of the Sudanese are not stakeholders in their own governance. The solution to this fundamental problem is to build an all-inclusive Sudanese state, a Citizenship state. A new political Sudanese dispensation in which all Sudanese are equal stakeholders irrespective of their religion, irrespective of their race, ethnic origin, tribe or gender.
PILLARS OF THE NEW SUDAN
The founding notions of the New Sudan articulated in March 1985, unlike the negotiation positions and SPLM political strategies, have not changed, but were further articulated and elaborated upon.
• Evolving a Sudanese Identity: The Sudan is a truly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. One major problem of the Old Sudan is that it has been looking and is still looking for its soul and spirit, for its true identity. We are an Arab country and we are an African country. But, are we hybrid? Are we Afro-Arab? What are we? Failing to find this identity, because we do not look inside the Sudan, we look outside, “some take refuge in Arabism, and failing in this, they find refuge in Islam as a uniting factor. Others get frustrated as they fail to discover how they can become Arabs when their creator thought otherwise. And they take refuge in separatism”. The New Sudan belongs equally to all the peoples that now inhabit the country. Its history, its diversity and richness is the common heritage of all Sudanese. The Sudanese identity cannot be defined by two parameters only to the exclusion of all other parameters intrinsic in the Sudanese historical and contemporary diversity. The process of national formation presupposes looking deep inside our country and the experience of others to form a unique Sudanese nation that does not have to take refuge anywhere. There are many countries, nations and peoples who have done it. “The English went to America and formed thirteen colonies. But they were the same Englishmen, they spoke English, they were Christians. But they had to fight England-Britain in order to get their independence. They are now the United States of America. They do not claim to be English, although they speak English” . The Spaniards and Portuguese in Latin America, are also good examples. English is the language of Americans, but that country is America, not England. Spanish is the language of Argentina, Bolivia and Cuba, but they remain those countries, not Spain. Similarly, in Sudan Arabic cannot be said to be the language of the Arabs, but rather the language of the Sudan.
• Unity on New Basis: The unity on which the old Sudan is based is neither viable nor sustainable. This unity is rooted in the economic, political and cultural hegemony of particular groupings, where other groups basic to the formation of the Sudanese society are excluded and isolated from effective participation in political power, from expressing their “national” and cultural identities, and from an equitable share in national wealth, all this in the context of an uneven development paradigm. Sudan has an old and rich history since the civilization of Kush, thousands of years before Christ. This is what late Garang calls historical diversity. Today’s Sudan constitutes an incomplete outcome of a long and complex historical process of interactions and transformations, as a result of which it has matured into an ethnically, culturally,, religiously and linguistically, as well as socially, economically and geographically, diverse blend. This variety epitomizes Sudan’s contemporary diversity. The Old Sudan restricted unity of the country to selective parameters and elements (Arabism and Islam) from the totality of the components that make up Sudan’s historical and contemporary diversity, whereas it neglected and overlooked other key ingredients. First, Unity, premised on these partial components and with all the attendant political, economic and social implications, will always be fragile and unsustainable. The constitutional and institutional arrangements, programs and policies of the New Sudan should be reflective of both these historical and contemporary realities. This is a necessary prerequisite for creating a great nation that is voluntarily united in diversity rather than divided by diversity. Second, insistence and persistence on identifying one religion with the state, and thereby establishing a theocratic state will only lead to serious rifts in the fabric of the Sudanese society and the eventual disintegration of the country. For not only are all Sudanese not Muslims, but even among Muslims themselves there is no consensus on the Sharia’s laws. The separation of religion from the state should not be misinterpreted, wittingly or unknowingly, to mean banishing religion from society. This is not possible because religion is part of humanity. All Sudanese have beliefs, whether Muslims, Christians or believers in indigenous African religions. All that the vision of the New Sudan proposes is that religion regulates the relationship between humans and their creator, a relation governed by religious legislation in the personal realm. Whereas the state is a socio-political institution contrived by humans and to which all belong regardless of their respective religious affiliations. Therefore, late Garang wondered as to why we confuse issues and divide people as a result? In the New Sudan, it is the constitution and not religion, which must constitute the sole source of legislation.
• Restructuring of Power: i) Radical restructuring of power of the central government in a manner that takes into account the interests of all marginalized regions and peoples, those who took to arms and those who patiently opposed in silence. This is the only way to end the monopoly of power by a few in Khartoum, whatever their background, whether they come in the uniform of political parties, family dynasties, religious sects or army officers. Representation of southerners and other marginalized groups in the central governments has always been symbolic and without effective consultation or participation in the formation process. They were invited to join “national” governments as hangers-on and not equal stakeholders. This exclusion pushed the elites and power aspirants of these regions to fall back on their ethnic and regional constituencies, leading o the formation of regionally-based political organizations and movements. This was what the late Dr. John described as “the not-so-coincidental coincidences” of always having power wielded by a certain group or groups from the North. ii) Decentralization of power by redefining the relation between Khartoum and the regions and devolving more powers to the regions in the form of “autonomy”, where and when necessary, and federalism i.e. a form of regionalism that would enable the masses, not the regional elites, to exercise real power for economic and social development and the promotion and development of their respective cultures.
• Democratic Governance and Human Rights: A democratic New Sudan in which equality, freedom, economic and social justice and respect for human rights are not mere slogans but concrete realities that should be promoted, cherished and protected. Democracy in the New Sudan is not the sham procedural democracy of the past, which was a camouflage for the perpetuation of vested interests. In that sham democracy civil rights were subject to the whims of rulers. The majority of Sudanese regions remained peripheral to the central power and was treated as an expendable appendage only to be manipulated through political trickery and double-dealing. The transformation envisaged in the New Sudan vision represents a political and socioeconomic paradigm shift which entails the recognition of political diversity by guaranteeing full freedom for political pluralism. The entrenchment of human rights and peoples’ rights in the constitution, the upholding of the independence of the judiciary, including the creation of an inviolable constitutional court and commitment to the rule of law by the government and the governed, and the establishment of a truly independent and competent civil service at all levels of government. It also conceptualizes and seeks to realize a recreation of the legislature in a manner that shall ensure rigorous checks and balances and guarantees powers to the regions, which can neither be withdrawn nor impaired by other centres of power. Democracy should no longer and solely be a struggle for power but rather as a competition on providing good governance, development and delivering social services for our people and restoring the dignity and worth of every man and woman.
– Even and Sustainable Development: Evolving an economic paradigm that would make rational use of the country’s vast natural and human resources to arrest unequal development, put an end to all forms of mariginalization and deprivation and equitably distribute the fruits of growth. An integral part of even development is the appropriate and fair sharing of wealth among the various peoples of the Sudan.
Conclusions
The national crisis that has been afflicting the Sudan since independence is a crisis of identity emanating from the inability of the Sudanese to reconcile themselves with the cultural and ethnic realities that make of them a nation. The vision of the New Sudan, thus, is essentially a national framework, a socio-economic and political commonality, anchored in and accommodative of the country’s multiple diversity. It is a framework for reshaping all Sudan, molding democracy, equality, freedom and progress, all essential ingredients for stability and genuine democracy. This is precisely what sets it apart from Old Sudan being exclusively based on only two parameters of the Sudanese historical and contemporary diversity. The essence of the vision is equitable management of diversity and respect for the identities and cultures of all “national” groups. Though the Sudan is the base and focus of the vision, contexts could apply globally to countries and regions torn apart by racial, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and disparity. As such, the vision is not an SPLM doctrine or ideology and should not be confused with the Movement’s organizational structure, strategies and tactics or with the accompanying political processes towards its realization, albeit all these are legitimate issues for debate, dialogue and critical appraisal.
EXPANDING THE FRONTIERS OF THE DEBATE
If I succeeded in clarifying the vision of the New Sudan, the constituency of the Sudanese Writers’ Union, and all delegates to this General Conference, would agree with me on the following:
– This vision of the New Sudan is a national project for building a viable and united Sudan that would avert the country the risk of disintegration. The competing vision of Old Sudan in both of its versions, from independence to 1989 and from 1989 to 2005, has failed in sustaining the unity of the country. The vision is rooted in the concept of citizenship, to which I suspect most of the attendees of this conference would subscribe to.
– The SPLM propounded the vision. However, as the Old Sudan undergoes fundamental change in its transition to the New Sudan, the SPLM/A itself is bound to evolve and undergo fundamental change. So, while its basic content has remained the same, the SPLM/A has undergone a process of metamorphosis over the years, and in its various stages of transformation it appeared different to various people (or interest groups) at different times. The CPA, signaling the most radical constitutional restructuring since independence, has ushered the SPLM into a new phase/Republic with multiple transitions that need to be effectively managed. In the transition from war to peace, the Movement is facing a critical 3-fold transformation trajectory: from a military/politico organization to one that is politically-based; from regionally/ethnically-bound to a movement that is national ; and from opposition to partnership in government. The sudden and tragic loss of the Movement’s leader has compounded the burden of dealing with these multiple transitions.
– The New Sudan vision is hardly a program of the SPLM, or any other single political entity, for that matter. It is a national framework within, and on the basis of which political parties and organizations carve out their respective programs and policies.
– The late SPLM leader recognized from the outset that the SPLM on its own would not be in a position to achieve the transformation of the Old Sudan into a New Sudan . Indeed, the Movement’s leader was keen from the beginning to extend his hands to political and social forces in the North and was instrumental in binging them together in Koka Dam, Ethiopia, as early as March 1985. The SPLM has, thus, established alliances with all the “traditional” and “modern” political forces for moving forward the process of national formation. Though the post-CPA situation has created new political realities, the SPLM is bound to interact with other political forces and enter into alliances that would serve the objectives of the New Sudan.
The organizers of this conference should be commended for bringing the vision of the New Sudan for debate and discussion in this veritable forum. This endeavor should, however, by taking an extra step move further the frontiers of debate through serious studies and research dialogue, and engaging all forces of change in the dialogue, particularly in Northern Sudan. First, it is imperative to identify the burning and critical issues raised by the vision and that requires articulation and filling in of gaps. A shortlist may include the questions: Old/New Sudan vs. Modern/Traditional; concept of marginalization: ethnicity or class; pluralism, participatory democracy and culture; women and equality of rights; democracy and human rights; concept of constitutionalism; culture and media; market economy and private sector development. Second, the time is opportune for the forces of change in the North and the SPLM to engage in a candid and serious dialogue on the transition to the New Sudan in the context of the CPA. How to make best of the new situation created by CPA for moving forward the project of the New Sudan, is in itself a rich area for research, interaction, and dialogue. If the SPLM is seen to have retreated from the vision of the NEW Sudan and has shrunk into a regional/southern movement, what would be the position of the other forces of change in the North? The often erroneously framed question about the (ill) fate of Northerners in the SPLM following the death of John Garang should be rephrased as to what would be the fate of all Northerners, not only those in the SPLM, if the Movement retrogressed into a southern political entity? Do these forces have any alternative vision to the New Sudan? Isn’t it in the very interest of the forces of change in the North to lend support to the SPLM through effective participation in its transformation as the only guarantee for thwarting the agenda of separatism and narrow base of identification? How would this be approached? If the SPLM failed in transforming itself into a strong national movement, would the strategy of these forces be to realize the objectives of the New Sudan? The million dollar question is: What are the long-term strategies of the forces of change in the North if the southerners voted for separation? What is the nature of the state they will be aspiring to build in the North? Isn’t this a probability looming on the horizon?
Former professor of Sociology and consultant with for numerous regional and intl organizations, Dr. Elwathig Kameir has maintained close affiliation with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and had close working relations with the Movement’s late Chairman, Dr. John Garang de Mabior. He coordinated the Ambo workshop in February 1989 that brought together leaders of the SPLM with intellectuals and trade union activists from North Sudan. He edited and introduced a book on the Vision of the New Sudan, published both in Arabic and English. He has also published a number of articles on current political developments and the SPLM between 1986-2006. He can be reached at [email protected]