Next in Darfur

It’s time to think around the impasse over peacekeeping.

Editorial, The Washington Post

November 11, 2006 — LAST WEEK President Bush put a brave face on the killing in Darfur, declaring that the United States was working on a plan to save the victims. The truth is that his administration has offered versions of this claim since 2004, when it first described Darfur’s crisis as genocide. Sudan’s murderous government, which has provided air cover to the Janjaweed death squads and has magnified civilian suffering by keeping U.N. peacekeepers away, has proved impervious to U.S. pressure. Feeling itself to be an isolated Arab elite in a resentful African country, presiding over a capital city that has absorbed 4 million or more Africans who have fled Sudan’s internal wars, the ruling clique in some ways resembles the minority white regime of South Africa circa 1985. Its back is against the wall, and it is prepared to be ruthless — particularly so long as China, Russia and the Arab states provide diplomatic cover.

Andrew S. Natsios, the president’s special envoy to Sudan, visited the country recently and was treated to a characteristic prevarication. He was told that Sudan refused to accept the U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a peacekeeping force in Darfur, even though the professed ground for this refusal — that U.N. peacekeepers would compromise Sudan’s sovereignty — is belied by the fact that U.N. peacekeepers are already in Sudan to monitor a north-south peace treaty. But Mr. Natsios was encouraged not to lose patience. On the contrary, he was warmly entreated to have hope: Sudan might be open to certain other peacekeeping configurations. The existing African Union force could be supplemented with Arabs, or maybe with Pakistanis, or possibly even with Norwegians. The message to the United States was: Go away and do your diplomatic thing, and if you’re lucky we’ll talk after that.

The Bush administration should certainly assemble commitments of peacekeeping troops and call Sudan’s bluff. But it should also attempt to revive the failed Darfur peace plan negotiated this year, for without peace even a large peacekeeping mission may be doomed. Reviving the peace process means pressuring both the government and the rebels: The last agreement failed because many of rebels refused to sign on and instead resumed fighting, while the government took that as an excuse to bar U.N. peacekeepers, harass western humanitarian workers and launch a military offensive. To pressure the rebels, the United States needs to work through their backers in Eritrea and Chad. To push the government back to the talks, the United States needs to work with Sudan’s diplomatic enablers in Beijing, Moscow and the Arab capitals.

The world’s leaders may hope that the problem of Darfur will go away if they close their eyes long enough. But the reverse is likelier. Darfur’s violence is spilling into Chad and could precipitate the collapse of that country’s government. It is also contributing to the risk of renewed north-south fighting. If there is no solution in Darfur, the world will witness Darfur-like atrocities elsewhere on a scale appalling to imagine.