Security, money problems hamper progress in Darfur – GAO
Dec 11, 2006 (WASHINGTON) — U.S. humanitarian aid to Darfur continues to be hampered by a lack of security in the region, restrictions by the Sudanese government and delays in international aid, according to a congressional report Monday.
The Government Accountability Office, the research arm of Congress, said in its report that the nearly $1 billion in U.S. aid and efforts by the international community have helped improve a dire situation. In 2004 and 2005, malnutrition and mortality rates dropped.
But nongovernmental organizations and the U.N. still face serious problems in aiding the nearly 4 million people who require assistance, including frequent attacks on aid convoys, the report states.
Since 2003, Darfur, the western region of Sudan, has been embroiled in war between armed militias and the government. The conflict is deemed one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters. The Sudanese government has refused to allow a U.N. peacekeeping force in the region, and it has restricted access by private groups.
According to GAO, the Sudanese government’s restrictions and delays in international funds have hurt humanitarian efforts. More than half of the U.S. money for food this year wasn’t provided until recently, prompting the U.N. to cut food rations dramatically.
To improve the security situation, GAO recommended the State Department press the African Union to allow for a NATO-led review of its security operations in Darfur. According to the report, NATO’s offer to conduct such an assessment was accepted last summer but no actions have been taken.
“The fact that the violence in Darfur has not abated, and has even worsened in some instances, indicates the region’s need for continued assistance,” the report states.
A separate report released by GAO urged the State Department to release more data on its death count in Darfur.
The State Department reported that some 98,000 to 181,000 people died from the conflict in less than two years, between March 2003 and January 2005. Independent researchers have estimated the death count as much higher – as much as 400,000 deaths between February 2003 and August 2005.
According to both reports, the State Department agreed in general with the studies and their recommendations.
(AP)
Below a Summary executive for the two reports:
Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrates Severity of Crisis, but
Their Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced (GAO-07-24), November
9, 2006: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0724.pdf
In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan, broke out between rebel
groups and government troops and government-supported Arab militias.
While few would dispute that many thousands of Darfur civilians have
died, less consensus exists about the total number of deaths
attributable to the crisis. Estimates by the Department of State (State)
and other parties report death tolls up to about 400,000 for varying
populations and periods of time between February 2003 and August 2005.
Based on the views of experts convened by GAO and the National Academy
of Sciences, interviews with estimate authors, and a review of relevant
literature, this report (1) evaluates six Darfur death estimates, (2)
identifies general challenges to estimating deaths in such crises, and
(3) discusses measures to improve death estimates.
The experts GAO consulted did not consistently rate any Darfur death
estimate as having a high level of accuracy; moreover, they noted that
all the studies had methodological strengths and shortcomings. Most of
the experts had the highest overall confidence in estimates by the
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and had a
slightly lower level of confidence in State’s estimate. Many experts
believed State’s lower-end estimate was too low. Additionally, the
published documents describing State’s estimate lacked sufficient
information about its data and methods to allow it to be replicated and
verified by external parties. Estimating deaths in a humanitarian crisis
such as that in Darfur involves numerous challenges. For example, in
Darfur, difficulties in collecting mortality data, such as lack of
access to particular geographical regions, impacted the data’s quality
and led to data gaps. Because of such data gaps, some Darfur death
estimates relied on potentially risky assumptions and limited contextual
information. Further, limitations in estimates of Darfur’s population
before and during the crisis may have led to over- or underestimates of
the death toll. Finally, varying use of baseline mortality rates–the
rate of deaths that would have occurred without the crisis–may have led
to overly high or low death estimates. The experts proposed and rated a
wide range of measures that U.S. agencies could take to improve the
quality and reliability of death estimates for Darfur and future
humanitarian crises. Among these measures, the most highly rated was
ensuring that public documentation of the data and methods used contain
sufficient information to enable external replication and verification
of the estimates. Other very highly rated measures include collecting
and maintaining data for specific periods of time and geographic areas
and housing the responsibility for making estimates in a reputable
independent body.
===
Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by
Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges (GAO-07-9) November 9, 2006:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d079.pdf
In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel
groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab militias, known
as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million Darfurians
and has so affected over 1.9 million others that they require
assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S. government has provided
humanitarian assistance in Darfur and supported African Union Mission in
Sudan’s (AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace support mandate. This report
reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur and the
challenges that have been encountered and (2) African Union efforts to
fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these efforts.
The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to
Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through September
2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance consisted of food
aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs, such as water and
sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003, humanitarian
organizations have made significant progress in increasing the number of
people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality
rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other officials attribute
in part to humanitarian assistance efforts. However, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the entities providing U.S.
humanitarian assistance have encountered several challenges that have
hampered delivery of, or accountability for, humanitarian services in
Darfur. These challenges include continued insecurity in Darfur;
Sudanese government restrictions on access to communities in need; the
timing of funding; and an incapacity to ensure monitoring of, and
reporting on, U.S.-funded programs. AMIS has taken several positive
actions in Darfur to pursue its mandate, although some actions have been
incomplete or inconsistent. For example, to monitor compliance with a
2004 cease-fire agreement–one mandate component–AMIS investigated
alleged cease-fire violations and identified numerous violations;
however, the resulting reports were not consistently reviewed at higher
levels or made fully publicly available to identify those violating the
agreement. The U.S. government, via private contractors, provided about
$280 million from June 2004 through September 2006 tobuild and maintain32 camps for AMIS forces in Darfur, according to the Department of
State. Numerous challenges have been identified by African Union or U.S.
officials, among others, as negatively affecting AMIS’s efforts in
Darfur. These challenges include inadequacies in AMIS’s organization,
management, and capacity, such as inconsistent interpretation of the
AMIS mandate; its relatively small forces; limited or poorly allocated
resources; and a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from,
the parties to the conflict. A transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping
operation is being considered, although the Sudanese government has
rejected such a transition. A possible NATO-assisted review of AMIS
operations has not been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence
continue in Darfur.