SPLA requires strict discipline and morale booster
By Steve Paterno
Dec 15, 2006 — Ever wonder it will only take one military officer to order hundreds of soldiers to stand on the sun, disarm them, and instruct them to march inside the jail if they ought to be detained or even order them to go kill or get kill on the process? Well, people in the military are bounded by strict discipline that civilians are not bounded by and their adrenaline is propelled by high morale. Whereas it takes just one military officer to detain hundreds of armed soldiers without encountering any problems instead it will take eight police officers after putting up a stiff fight to subdue one unarmed civilian. That shows that the military personnel are highly disciplined only the angels of God surpass them in the field of discipline.
In the context of SPLA, both the discipline and morale are in a short supply. These can be traced in the rebellion history of SPLA that it has to yet emerge out of as it is gearing to become the national army. In SPLA’s years of rebellion, the command and control was virtually obliterated. Command and control ended up being structured through tribal lineage and sectionalism. For example, people like Koul Manyang earned the trust of John Garang the commander in chief of SPLA simply because both happen to come from the same tribal section. Even though Koul Manyang was down below in the hierarchy of SPLA, he wielded significant powers at the time and bypassed all the chain of command that was supposed to be in place. It is said that Koul Manyang is directly responsible for the rebellion of William Nyoun who was deputy commander in chief of SPLA. Koul Manyang was acting with impunity and summarily executing the Nuers who were in the SPLA which prompted William Nyoun to seek a resolution in disciplining Koul Manyang. But as William Nyoun could not get the resolution, he had to therefore rebel. And that rebellion set SPLA ten years back in its course of the liberation struggle.
However, it is pathetic today to see a more credulous Koul Manyang in Khartoum occupying the ministry of transportation. He is somewhere there in the surroundings of the Arabs cowed down even though he is carrying a title of a minister. If there is an example of a Junuba getting intimidated in a face of the Arabs, that example is Koul Manyang. One will hope Koul Manyang should utilize his zeal that he had in roaming around in the liberated areas to roam around at the presidential palace in Khartoum . We will be waiting for his move from Khartoum or else he will be declared a tribal zealot who capitalized on John Garang’s position of power to advance his tribal agenda within SPLA and in the process dismantle the SPLA.
Suspicion among the high ranking SPLA officers let into lack of trust within SPLA themselves. And that is clearly evident by the number of bodyguards that SPLA officers maintain. If one is in the liberated areas and is maintaining a battalion of soldiers as bodyguards then one will know the reason for that is not to guard against the enemy who are hundred of miles away but it is to guard against each other. To make it worse, SPLA are still maintaining such practice today which is actually increasing the suspicions among themselves. For example, we know Salva Kiir is not popularly elected as the president of South Sudan but there is also no doubt that the people mandated him by the virtue of how things are as the president of South Sudan. Therefore, it is unnecessary for Salva Kiir and his convey of motorcades to speed around Juba town killing people throughout the roads and cannot stop to console the people that they are killing or injuring as a result of reckless driving. After all, the people that Salva Kiir’s motorcades are killing or injuring in the hit-and-run accidents are already dead or vulnerable for Kiir and the company to fear stopping and console them. Not only that, those are souls too which deserve some human dignity. So, lack of trust among the SPLA themselves and with the population is actually creating more problems. There has to be away to mend that.
It was in the late 1980s that SPLA was in the pinnacle of its morale; however, that peak dwindles gradually ever since. SPLA ended up splitting into factions, desertion hit all time high, and worse of all, the SPLA lost its source of recruitments and conscriptions. The last SPLA meaningful recruitment and conscription ended in late 1980s and early 1990s. Significant number of population of those along the borders plus those SPLA from Ethiopia ended up in neighboring countries as refugees—a significant reduction of SPLA recruitment pool.
However, with peace in place, one will hope SPLA will reinvent the wheels and restructure the system to create disciplined soldiers with high morale. The restructuring should have started from down and up. Currently, SPLA is inflated with officers of higher ranks such as generals which is not quite well measure to the soldiers that those generals are supposed to command. For example, a brigadier is supposed to be in charge of a brigade and a brigadier general or a major general should be in charge of a division. Until SPLA mobilize all of its forces and assign those officers with inflated ranks some sort of command, their inflated ranks mean nothing.
Once all the SPLA foot soldiers are mobilized and assigned into their units, they ought to be deployed in designated locations throughout the South with a heavy concentration in the North and South borders. That is so as to create a buffer zone between the North and South as well as to eliminate any confrontation between the military and civilian populations. While in their deployment, those soldiers need to be engaged in drills and trainings to maintain their combat readiness. They must also be paid, fed, cloth, and equipped with the best military equipment that the government can afford as a morale booster.
Hopefully, with constant insecurity around Nimule-Torit- Juba road, the clashes in Malakal, and soldiers rioting for lack of better treatment, the government of South Sudan will eventually restructure the SPLA to make it a credible military force. Or else, the South will just accustom to constant instability.
* Steve Paterno is a Sudanese residing in the U.S.A., and he can be reached at [email protected]