Somalia’s war, a second chance for Ethiopia’s Zenawi
Time to regain the hitherto lost political chances
By Agere Aleme
Dec 27, 2006 — When an Islamic militia first established a foothold in Somalia by capturing the capital of Mogadishu in June 2006, the United States initially withheld judgment until the intentions of the group could be determined with some certainty. While the militia rejected the label of “terrorist organization,” its actions over the next few months made it clear that Islamic extremists had taken their quest for a radical Muslim state, based entirely on Sharia, to the African nation. Now America may be faced with a new battleground in its global war on terrorism.
The United States has refused to engage in dialogue with the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC) until it renounces some of its more radical positions and practices. Over the past six months there have been multiple reports out of Somalia of beheadings, stoning, and the implementation of severe restrictions on everything from music and movies to the freedoms granted women.
When the SICC continued to make advances throughout the country, the Somali interim government retreated to the town of Baidoa, with protection from the armed forces of Ethiopia. Somalia’s neighbor has repeatedly warned the SICC that it would intervene in the conflict, and that intervention has now become the reality on the ground.
This past week Ethiopian forces launched multiple air strikes against the Islamists as part of their effort to defend the interim government. Fighting continues today with Ethiopia and the Interim Government of Somalia holding the upper hand on the battle field. The threat of a larger regional conflict is looming as the Islamists have made an open call for foreign fighters, both from Ethiopian adversary Eritrea and from other Jihads around the world. Voluntary fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Britain and even the USA have already joined the SICC in Mogadishu.
If an African conflict erupts, and if Islamic extremists flock to the continent to participate in the battle for a Taliban-style Somalia, will U.S. and other western forces get involved? Any war on terror would require a response to a new haven for Islamic extremists. The United States is heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq and just does not have the forces available to engage in another fight in Somalia.
So what happens next? Obviously, the United States will increase aid and support to Ethiopian armed forces, and that is probably a safe bet. Getting someone else to do the fighting is always preferable, as long as the interests of the United States can be secured that way.
Another possible course of action is the attempted revival of Somali warlords. This would be dangerous ground indeed, and the likelihood of success is not very high. Warlords, by their very nature, are loyal to those who enhance their power, wealth, and prestige the most.
It is likely that Ethiopia and Eritrea will bloody fight each other in what will hopefully not become a larger regional conflict. Ethiopia is concerned with its borders and is not likely to support the Somali interim government to the degree necessary to eliminate the SICC as a ruling force, despite what appear to be initial battlefield successes. For the United States, other regional realities will delay the expansion of the war on terrorism to Somalia until another day.
More than any other time ever in the past, the US government is now convinced that Ethiopia is its natural ally in East Africa that can fight and stop international and home grown terrorists alike. Consequently, it has nothing to say against Ethiopia whatever the Ethiopian regime does concerning its national sovereignty just like Israel. As a result of the regional political game to balance power, Ethiopia has a huge political capital in the eyes of the Western world. Home grown terrorists like AFD, OLF, ONLF and EPPF have become history.
Viewed from Ethiopian political leverage, one can also see that this is the best time for Meles Zenawi to regain our port Assab, by every means possible. For example, Ethiopia can tell the Western world that it needs to control the port, for security concerns. No one forced Israel to go out from Golan Heights of Syria until now. No one can force Ethiopia for taking Asseb back.
The fact that the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not yet clearly demarcated is also a blessing factor. Ethiopia can argue that Assab port was part of Wollo until 1990, and the 1993 Eritrean referendum was conducted on an emergency basis in haste without any formal border demarcation being carried out at the time. Ethiopia can also continue to with-hold the boarder issues in suspense further as the Ethiopian people have not been asked to vote for such referendum.
The current war with the Somali-Islamists has given Meles Zenawi a second chance to regain our access to the sea. The first one was lost with the premature conclusion of the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea. Will PM Meles use Ethiopia’s favorable position in the eyes of the Western world to her advantage and bring back Assab now? Many doubt it, given Meles Zenawi’s past record on Eritrean Issues. But it is not an impossible task altogether. This is perhaps another chance for Meles Zenawi to straighten up the wrongs he committed from other political aspects in haste. Ethiopia will for sure get back her port one day with or with out Meles, because the people want it (including the people of Tigre) and it is a just demand for having access to the see for our 80 million Ethiopian peoples. But PM Meles can take the credit for himself if he does this left over homework now. He himself and his children will live in peace for a long time to come, if he manages to return Assab that was given away unfairly to Eritrea as Assab is the only legitimate out let of Ethiopia to the sea. If this mission is accomplished, then overwhelming majority of the Ethiopian population is actually ready to forgive him for his past mistakes. Indeed and very truly indeed, for any government that calls itself ‘Ethiopian’ there is no other time better than the present one to regain the Assab port.
* The author is based in the USA. He can be reached at [email protected]