No independence to celebrate in Sudan

By Charles Anteros

Jan 3, 2006 — Late Dr. John Garang called the politicians of North Sudan as the “Elite.” While such a terminology is acceptable, it is equally important to add yet another terminology that may relatively be appropriate. I call The Sudanese Elite as Special Interest Groups because of the Composition of its political parties that established themselves and made contacts with the British and the Egyptians who were rulers, to make favorable policies that interest only their group members. And because of the special relationship between them and the rulers, they have even made the military as an institutional Interest Group who are there to safeguard their social, political and economic interest while suppressing profound values and acceptable policy making for an average Sudanese. Just looking at the Constituencies these political parties represented was sufficient ground to deem these parties as an Elitist and Interest Groups.

With the consent of the British and Egyptian Governments of course, Sudan achieved independence on January 1, 1956, under a provisional constitution. The United States was among the first foreign powers to recognize the new state. However, in the run-up to compromising Sudan’s independence, the civil service and administration were placed increasingly in Northern Sudanese hands – largely excising the Southern Sudanese from the government. Northern Sudanese like-wise were given military ranks to control all junior cadres of Sudan’s armed forces. The British’s failure to ensure equity for both the north and the south would create heavy lasting effects to Sudan’s longevity.

Feeling disenfranchised and cheated the Southern Sudanese began an initially low-intensity civil war aimed at establishing an independent South Sudan with an interregnum for ten years before a major and politically organized war led by the SPLA/M in 1983. It was obvious the British policy of providing education and improved infrastructure only in Northern Sudanese cities of Khartoum and Wad Medeni while leaving most of the Sudan along primitive traditional lines of living would ravage the country and probably bring it to dismemberment. By Feburary 1953 negotiations between the Colonialists and some Northern Sudanese political parties agree to provide that a three-year period of self-government under international supervision to begin immediately, to foster the decision of the Sudanese people on the future of their country. Elections of the self-government parliament took place in November and December 1953 while their counter parts from South Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur were not represented.
The Northern Interest Groups quickly hastened with the decision to announce for independence without seeking to promote a predictable secure environment for the inhabitants of Sudan. Thus, the pattern of relationship between the rulers and the ruled quickly became the disintegrating fact, because between themselves the Interest Groups restricted change by using the military as its organ to control the pace of change, from the British Rule, to Military and Civilian power transfers. Rates to shifts in support for and demands on the system quickly illustrated the unacceptable policies and decisions imposed on all citizens who sought equal representation in government besides economic and resource sharing.

For its part, Northern Interest Groups blamed the British for having imposed the South/Northern policy which in their opinion distanced South Sudan away from the Islamic Northern Sudan. For factual reasons, one could arguably describe the British Southern Policy as an unfortunate policy that worked favorably for the Sudanese Interest Groups, while conversely affected the majority Black citizens. The British Policy believed by the Egyptians and Northern Sudanese to have two-fold advantages for both Egypt and Sudan: one, the control over the water reservoir of the Niles, and two, the administration of land that is directly placed over the Arabs in Sudan to ensure there is a perverse control relationship over the Blacks in Sudan.

Sudan’s Independence was not an independence because it was a handover of the country’s majority political future to those who special relationship with Egypt and Britain. It was a handover of Sudan to another Colonial Power.

* The author is based in Vancouver, Canada. He can be reached at [email protected]