Who to blame if the Juba peace process collapses?
By: Peter J. Quaranto and Michael Poffenberger
Feb 11, 2007 — Six months ago we wrote that peace talks in Juba were the best opportunity in over a decade to end the war. However, while this potential remains true, events of the last month have sparked skepticism. All parties – the Government, LRA and the international community – have, by their obstinacy, obstructed the progress of negotiations. At the current stalemate, the parties remain blind to their interests in a politics of peace: a blindness whose legacy will only be more blood and bad faith.
The Juba process has been hailed as historic for good reason. Government efforts to end the war militarily have never provided security, and have not allowed for the social and political roots of the conflict to be addressed. In Juba, the confluence of a strategic third-party mediator, international pressures on both parties, and Kampala’s newfound flexibility gave the talks serious potential to succeed. The breakthrough Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) Agreement, negotiated in August and renewed in November has brought relative calm to northern Uganda, allowing more than 300,000 displaced persons to return home. Hundreds of thousands more have left the “death camps” for decongestion camps: an important step on the road to return. This progress underlines the high stakes of ensuring the peace talks succeed.
President Museveni and the Government have received much praise for their openness to these negotiations, especially given pressures from the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its supporters. This is deserved, however this acclaim may be averting scrutiny of recent decisions made by Kampala. Security officials in southern Sudan have reported that the UPDF is violating the CoH Agreement and pursuing LRA rebels, some of whom may even be blocked from reaching the designated assembly points. This comes after the CoH Monitoring Team reported that, on November 30, a UPDF helicopter dropped bombs near Opari, which is very close to Owiny-ki-bul. These violations not only perpetuate mistrust between the parties; they also call into question the commitment of the Government to fully seeking a peaceful resolution.
Moreover, while most commentators agree that Juba is the right venue for these talks, flexibility is needed to build LRA confidence. Concerns of partiality by the mediator may be a result of increasing cross-border trade and business between the governments of Uganda and South Sudan. Therefore, the Ugandan government should not completely dismiss LRA concerns as irrational. Instead, the Government could provide space to reassess and renegotiate the technical details for talks. Too much rigidity from Kampala gives northerners the sense that the Government’s commitment to their peace is partial itself.
Finally, claims by the UPDF that northern Uganda will be secure regardless of what takes place in Juba have fallen on deaf ears. A recent LRA abduction in Gulu town once again brought panic to Acholiland. While the LRA may not be able to return to Uganda en force, northerners still lack faith in the ability and will of the UPDF to provide security for their return home. Government’s “responsibility to protect” means a responsibility to fully and flexibly engage the peace talks, if for nothing more than to win the trust of northerners so they can then return home. The displacement nightmare increasingly undermines Uganda’s international reputation, and will be an impediment to a successful CHOGM meeting in November.
LRA intransigence and political maneuvering have also presented significant obstacles to the process. First, it has become increasingly clear that the LRA is far from a united body. Divisions between the High Command, negotiating team, and external wing are undermining the LRA’s ability to present a coherent, and even consistent, political agenda. In addition, security officials have confirmed that LRA rebels committed several of the recent attacks on civilians near Juba, violating the CoH Agreement. Given increasing international scrutiny and mounting pressure on the ICC to deliver arrests, the LRA is foolish to abandon this opportunity, which may likely be their last, to secure a peace end to the war.
The waning confidence and growing hostility of the parties has put the mediator in a nearly impossible situation. However, current intractability of the situation can also be blamed on the international community, which has retained a largely passive position. The current impasse highlights the critical need for external confidence-building, inducements, sanctions and technical assistance to rejuvenate the peace process. Among other actions, the international community could strengthen the CoH Monitoring Team, inject accountability into the process, assist the mediator, sanction “spoilers” in the LRA external wing, and bolster security for the displaced. Generic statements from the diplomatic community do not go far enough; only serious action will bring regional stability in not only Uganda, but also Sudan and DR Congo.
Six months after the outbreak of optimism around these talks, a return to open conflict may loom near. A failed Juba process will leave all parties to face a legacy of disappointment and devastation. Yet, our hope still resides in the parties realizing that their self-interests lie in peace. Unfortunately, the people of northern Uganda, caught between these fires, have been waiting for that realization for now twenty-one years.
* The authors are the co-founders and leaders of the Uganda Conflict Action Network, the Washington D.C.-based advocacy campaign for peace in northern Uganda. Visit www.UgandaCAN.org to learn more and get involved. Contact Peter at [email protected] and Michael at [email protected].