Human security in Darfur : A remorseless deterioration

Human Security in Darfur and Eastern Chad: A Remorseless Deterioration
Civilians and humanitarians remain caught amidst uncontrolled violence,
with no prospect of meaningful international protection

By Eric Reeves

March 9, 2007 — Despite desperate pleas from both civilians and aid organizations, in
Darfur as well as in eastern Chad, security continues to deteriorate
badly in the greater humanitarian theater—threatening lives,
livelihoods, and all humanitarian operations. Nor is there any prospect
of an adequate or timely international protection response to these
deepening, inter-related security crises. Ethnically-targeted violence
on both sides of the Chad/Darfur border, growing directly out of the
Khartoum regime’s genocidal counterinsurgency war, has created a
conflict-affected population of over 4.5 million human beings. Hundreds
of thousands of these people will die in the coming months and years. A
cataclysm of human destruction has begun that simply cannot be halted,
though of course it might still be substantially mitigated. But the
approximately 500,000 people who have already died from violence,
disease, and malnutrition over the past four years of conflict provide a
ghastly metric for future human destruction (see my two-part mortality
assessment of April/May 2006 at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article102.html and
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article104.html .

Humanitarian access to these desperate populations is contracting at an
alarming rate. One has only to see the terrifying contrast between a UN
map of humanitarian accessibility for May 2006 and a similar map for
January 2007. These maps are juxtaposed on page 2 of the UN’s “Sudan
Humanitarian Overview” (Volume 3, Issue 1, January 31, 2007), available
as a PDF at
www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan%20Humanitarian%20Overview%20Vol3%20Iss1%20January%2007.pdf
.

All this is put starkly in the headline of the first issue (March 2007)
of a new UN publication:

“The humanitarian crisis in the Darfur-Chad-Central African Republic
triangle has deteriorated to unprecedented levels in recent months, with
increasing spillover from the conflict in Darfur to Chad and CAR.” (UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Regional Office for
Central and East Africa, “Humanitarian Newsmaker,” Volume 1, Issue 1,
March 2007)

This deterioration is a direct result of what is now uncontrolled
violence on the part of all combatants, but most conspicuously
Khartoum’s regular military forces and its brutal Janjaweed militia
allies. The desperate nature of the security issues facing humanitarians
received some fleeting notice in January 2007 when 14 operational UN
humanitarian organizations, as well as six prominent international
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), made two compelling collective
statements about how close they are to withdrawing from Darfur. The UN
organizations declared bluntly:

“In the face of growing insecurity and danger to communities and aid
workers, the UN and its humanitarian partners have effectively been
holding the line for the survival and protection of millions.”

“That line cannot be held much longer. Access to people in need in
December 2006 was the worst since April 2004. The repeated military
attacks, shifting frontlines, and fragmentation of armed groups
compromise safe humanitarian access and further victimize civilians who
have borne the brunt of this protracted conflict. In the last six months
alone, more than 250,000 people have been displaced by fighting, many of
them fleeing for the second or third time. Villages have been burnt,
looted and arbitrarily bombed and crops and livestock destroyed. Sexual
violence against women is occurring at alarming rates. This situation is
unacceptable.”

The concluding statement by these UN organizations was equally
emphatic:

“The humanitarian community cannot indefinitely assure the survival of
the population in Darfur if insecurity continues. [ ] Solid guarantees
for the safety of civilians and humanitarian workers is urgently needed.
At the same time, those who have committed attacks, harassment,
abduction, intimidation, robbery and injury to civilians, including
Internally Displaced Persons, humanitarian workers and other
non-combatants, must be held accountable. If not, the UN humanitarian
agencies and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations will not be able
to hold the fragile line that to date has provided relief and a measure
of protection to some four million people in Darfur affected by this
tragic conflict.”

“This statement has been endorsed by the following members of the UN
Country Team in Sudan:

– International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
– Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
– United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
– United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO)
– United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
– United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
– United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
– United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
– United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)
– United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
– United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
– United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
– World Food Programme (WFP)
– World Health Organisation (WHO)

(Joint Statement on Darfur, January 18, 2007; source: UN High
Commission for Refugees)

And yet almost two months later security continues to deteriorate, even
as the enfeebled and demoralized African Union force in Darfur remains
the only source of protection for civilians and humanitarians. And the
AU force itself faces daily greater threats from combatants on all
sides, further attenuating its highly limited capacity (see below).

Shortly after this unprecedented UN organizational statement on
security in Darfur, six international nongovernmental humanitarian aid
organizations, operating or formerly operating in Darfur, issued their
own extraordinarily dire warning (January 30, 2007), declaring that the
“enormous humanitarian response in Darfur will soon be paralysed unless
African and global leaders at the AU Summit [January 29-30, 2007] take
urgent action to end rising violence against civilians and aid workers.”
Of course no such action was taken at the AU Summit—instead, UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was reduced to urging “patience.” Such
counsel came in the immediate wake of a failed effort by Ban to persuade
National Islamic Front President Omar al-Bashir to accept a greater UN
role in providing security for Darfur.

The six distinguished nongovernmental humanitarian organizations—Save
the Children, Action Against Hunger, CARE International, Oxfam
International, Norwegian Refugee Council, and World Vision—declared
that,

“African Heads of State and the new UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon
will fail the people of Darfur if they do not take concrete steps to
herald the start of a new chapter in the region and ensure an immediate
ceasefire is both agreed and adhered to.”

But no “concrete steps” of any sort were taken in Addis Ababa, and in
the second week of March 2007, Secretary-General Ban still awaits a
response from Khartoum about the nature of its commitment to the second
phase of a UN assistance package to the AU. Indeed, in his February 26,
2007 Report to the Security Council, Ban was obliged to note that the
entire UN contribution to date comprises “a total of 81 military and
police officers deployed to Darfur,” this as part of the first or
“light” phase of UN assistance to the AU. In other words, fewer than
half of the mere 186 personnel called for under this initial part of the
so-called “UN/AU hybrid operation” have actually been deployed. This
comes more than half a year after the UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 1706, authorizing deployment of 22,500 troops, civilian
police, and Formed Police Units. This force was to have deployed under
Chapter VII auspices of the UN Charter, which would have conferred
enforcement authority. This authority would have guided the force in
taking up the primary mandate specified in the Resolution, civilian and
humanitarian protection, as well as sealing Darfur’s borders with Chad
and Central African Republic.

Instead, half a year later, these courageous independent humanitarian
groups were left to echo the grim assessment of UN organizations:

“The six agencies—Action Against Hunger, CARE International, Oxfam
International, Norwegian Refugee Council, World Vision and Save the
Children—said aid workers are facing violence on a scale not seen
before in Darfur, leaving access to people in need at the conflict’s
lowest point at a time when the humanitarian need is greater than ever.
Attacks on civilians are again rising and forcing even more people to
flee their homes, and a breakdown of the aid response will leave
millions in even greater danger. The worsening four-year-old crisis must
not be allowed to deteriorate any further.” [ ]

“More than a month after an attack on aid workers in Gereida—the most
violent of the conflict so far, which saw staff raped, beaten and
subjected to mock executions—it is still far too dangerous for
agencies to return to the camp, the world’s largest for displaced
people, where 130,000 have sought refuge from attacks on their
villages.”

“Temporary evacuations of staff from other locations across Darfur have
continued, with nearly 500 aid workers withdrawn since the start of
December. In early January, the UN warned that malnutrition rates are
again rising close to emergency levels. Progress made in stabilizing
conditions over the past four years is in serious danger of being
reversed.” (allAfrica.com, January 30, 2007, at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200701300918.html)

There could be no greater cry of distress, unless it comes from the
desperate civilian population that depends upon these aid organizations
for their very lives.

In a further international disgrace, Khartoum continues to escape
significant consequences for its obstruction of humanitarian operations.
Examples of the regime’s barbaric war of attrition against the
desperate international efforts to save Sudanese lives go back to the
very beginning of National Islamic Front rule, following the military
coup of June 1989. In his February 26, 2007 Report to the Security
Council, Secretary-General Ban reports that “[Khartoum] government
authorities continued to restrict freedom of movement of UN personnel”
(paragraph 14); that “UN staff also continued to be hindered in their
work by restrictions imposed by government authorities, in violation of
the Status-of-Forces Agreement” (paragraph 18). The examples are
countless, and Ban notes only a few in this Report:

“On 16 November [2006], upon landing in Kornoi (North Darfur), a group
of UN staff were searched and questioned by [Khartoum’s] Sudan Armed
Forces soldiers. On 13 December [2006], a UN Agency team was prevented
from traveling to the Zam Zam IDP camp without a Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination travel permit, and on 20 December [2006], National Security
officials prevented a UN vehicle, with UN Mission in Sudan personnel,
from proceeding from El Fasher to Mallit on the same grounds. Again on
20 December [2006], a UN helicopter flight that was scheduled to
transport people from El Fasher to Fanga (North Darfur) was refused
permission because the aircraft was based in Kadugli, not in El Fasher.”
(paragraph 18)

Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely. The UN Mission in
Sudan Bulletin for February 28, 2007 (two days after the nominal date of
Ban’s Report to the Security Council) reports:

“On 27 February [2007], a high level delegation comprising a UN Agency,
a foreign governmental organization and an INGO were refused entry into
Kutum township and the Kassab IDP camp by the Kutum military
authorities, despite the fact that the delegation had [Khartoum’s]
Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) clearance. The military
authorities argued that they were not notified on the visit and insisted
on refusing access to the delegation even after HAC in Al Fasher
confirmed to them by phone that the delegation had travel clearance. The
delegation had to return to Al Fasher without conducting its mission.”

The next week, the UN Mission in Sudan Bulletin for March 5, 2007
reported:

“On 4 March [2007], the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) in North
Darfur denied travel clearance to a joint UN-INGO assessment team headed
to the Hashaba area (45km North-East of Kutum). No reason was given for
HAC decision.”

In assessing the cumulative effective of countless such acts, US
Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, who has previously had trouble speaking
fully honestly about Darfur, offers us the unvarnished truth in a
statement from Khartoum:

“Sudan’s government is paralyzing the humanitarian operation in Darfur
with a complex web of bureaucratic obstructions which could cause
massive loss of life, US envoy Andrew Natsios said on Wednesday [March
7, 2007].” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], March 7, 2007)

After failing to secure any agreement from Khartoum’s génocidaires on
increasing the international security presence in Darfur, Natsios was
also obliged to acknowledge that,

“the most immediate worry was the restrictions and threats facing aid
workers in Darfur, where the world’s largest humanitarian effort is
under way. ‘The greatest immediate threat to the people on the ground is
the deteriorating humanitarian space in Darfur,’ he told reporters at
the end of his trip [to Sudan]. The government has constructed a very
onerous set of bureaucratic requirements which are essentially
paralyzing the relief effort,’ [Natsios] said. The government is slow
and difficult on visa and travel permits, imposes high customs and
delays shipments of equipment at Port Sudan, he added.” (Reuters
[dateline: Khartoum], March 7, 2007)

The most egregious instances of humanitarian obstruction come in the
form of physical intimidation, threats, and even assaults. The
international community has still been unable to secure from Khartoum
any acceptable explanation for the vicious assault by “police” thugs in
Nyala (South Darfur) on January 27, 2007:

“Aid workers have described how they watched helplessly as Sudanese
police officers dragged a female United Nations worker from an aid
agency compound in Darfur and subjected her to a vicious sexual attack.
Staff say they feared for their lives when armed police raided their
compound in Nyala, dragging one European woman out into the street by
her hair and savagely beating several other international staff before
arresting a total of 20 UN, aid agency, and African Union staff. [ ]
Workers at the party said the attacks were part of a campaign of
harassment. ‘It seemed as if they had been waiting for an excuse to get
stuck into some foreign aid workers, and this was their chance,’ said
one.”
(The Telegraph [UK] [dateline: Darfur], January 28, 2007)

Humanitarian obstructionism in the context of the desperate human
conditions prevailing in Darfur is simply genocide by other means. For
over three years, Khartoum has deployed this savage weapon of mass
destruction, and is still unconstrained. In December 2003, UN Special
Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Vraalsen wrote to Mukesh Kapila, UN
emergency relief coordinator for Sudan, declaring:

“Delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need is hampered
mostly by *systematically denied access* [latter phrase emphasized in
text]. While [Khartoum’s] authorities claim unimpeded access, they
greatly restrict access to the areas under their control, while imposing
blanket denial to all rebel-held areas.” (Tom Vraalsen, Note to the
Emergency Relief Coordinator, “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur,”
December 8, 2003)

It was of course UN coordinator Kapila who would declare the bluntest
truths about Darfur several months later, in March 2004 (a full three
years ago):

“‘The only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers
involved. [The conflict in Darfur] is more than just a conflict, it is
an organised attempt to do away with a group of people. [ ] I was
present in Rwanda at the time of the genocide, and I’ve seen many other
situations around the world and I am totally shocked at what is going on
in Darfur.”

And despite mendacious claims by Khartoum in early February 2004 to
have brought the situation in Darfur under “total military control,”
Kapila insisted that:

“The pattern of organised attacks on civilians and villages,
abductions, killings and organised rapes by militias is getting worse by
the day and could deteriorate even further. One can see how the
situation might develop without prompt [action]…all the warning signs
are there.”

Three years later, Kapila’s ominous premonition about what “might
develop” has come fully to pass—and on a scale that increasingly does
bear comparison to Rwanda. Moreover, in arguing for the importance of a
Darfur war-crimes tribunal, Kapila declared: “There are no secrets. The
individuals who are doing this are known. We have their names. The
individuals who are involved occupy senior positions [in the Government
of Sudan].” To date, the International Criminal Court has made no
“application” for warrants for these same ruthless men who “occupy
senior positions” in the NIF junta. Two years after receiving a
referral from the UN Security Council, the ICC Prosecutor has made
“application” for warrants for only one mid-level official, Ahmed Haroun
(previously the junior minister of the interior
and—shockingly–currently Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs),
and the Janjaweed leader known as Ali Kushayb. Khartoum has utterly
dismissed the ICC actions, and has made clear it will not extradite any
Sudanese witness or accused person.

KHARTOUM’S CONTEMPT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ONLY GROWS:
Consequences for southern Sudan

There are various ways in which to understand the intertwining of the
crisis in Darfur and the far-from-settled peace in southern Sudan. As
an increasing number of international observers are remarking, Khartoum
is flagrantly reneging on the terms of the January 9, 2005 Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended 22 years of north/south civil war. Not
only has the regime refused to allow for real power-sharing in the
merely notional “Government of National Unity,” but it has failed to
disarm the highly destabilizing militia forces operating in the oil
regions of Upper Nile Province. These militias—armed and supported by
Khartoum, with a number of militia commanders enjoying senior ranks in
the Sudan Armed Forces—were to have been absorbed into either the
southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army or Khartoum’s own Sudan Armed
Forces by January 1, 2006. Well over a year later, many of these
dangerous militias forces remain fully constituted and the most likely
catalyst for renewed fighting in the south.

At the same time, Khartoum refuses to abide by the findings of the
distinguished international panel that made up the Abyei Boundary
Commission, as the regime was bound to by the terms of the CPA. The
findings of the July 2005 report from the Commission continue to be
openly flouted, as the National Islamic Front media organ (“Sudan
Vision”) has very recently reported, here with singular authority:
“President al-Bashir affirmed the government rejection to the report of
experts on Abyei area, adding that the next year will witness
demarcation of the borders” (“Sudan Vision,” March 5, 2007). Of course
“government rejection” means only National Islamic Front “rejection”:
the people of southern Sudan, including First Vice-President Salva Kiir,
completely support the findings of the Abyei Boundary Commission.

We catch another glimpse of how Khartoum means to undermine the terms
of the CPA in its refusal to fund the urgently required census in
southern Sudan, a prerequisite to any meaningful elections. Reuters
reports ([dateline: Juba, South Sudan], March 5, 2007):

“A census in south Sudan that is vital to the success of elections [ ]
may be delayed 6 months to January 2008, a census official said on
Monday [March 5, 2007]. Delays in receiving funds from the Sudanese
government are jeopardising the timely implementation of the national
census in the semi-autonomous south, the official said.” [ ]

“Preparations have been slow for a census, key to successful
parliamentary and presidential elections foreseen by the end of 2009 and
the [2011 self-determination] referendum. The census official said a
planned June 30, [2007] start date for the census was now unworkable.
‘In my personal opinion a realistic start would be January 2008,’ said
Isaiah Chol Aruai, head of the Southern Sudan Commission for Census,
Statistics and Evaluation. ‘We have not received any money for 2007
yet,’ he said.”

It is certainly not the case that Khartoum, flush from massive oil
revenues, cannot find the money for this essential census; rather, the
denial of funds is a deliberate effort by the regime, one of many, to
sabotage any truly democratic process in Sudan. This important Reuters
dispatch continued:

“Aruai said the southern census office was still waiting for about
$600,000 from the 2006 budget. Sudan has budgeted $73.7 million for the
national census, of which $30 million should come in 2007. A north-south
boundary commission was supposed to have demarcated the frontier between
north and south, but delays in forming and funding this commission have
further complicated the southern census bureau’s work, Aruai said.”

Khartoum’s obdurate refusal to create a working north-south boundary
commission is another long-running violation of the terms of the CPA,
and allows the regime to commandeer revenues from oil production
deriving from southern oil reserves. The struggling Government of South
Sudan is entitled to approximately 50% of revenues from southern oil
production, and has to date been denied hundreds of millions of dollars
in critically needed revenue because of Khartoum’s manipulation of the
north/south border.

Current evidence strongly suggests that Khartoum has no intention of
allowing for either the 2009 elections or the 2011 referendum on
southern self-determination, with secession as an option. Delaying the
2009 elections is the first step; but whenever the moment seems right,
Khartoum will move even more decisively. The regime would prefer to do
so while international attention is not focused, however ineffectually,
on Darfur. We should recall that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was
in many ways a product of Khartoum’s conclusion that it could not fight
both in southern Sudan and in Darfur, as well as deal with the
international consequences of its intransigence in both arenas. But the
grim implication of this calculation by the regime is that when the
Darfur conflict is extinguished, one way or another, it will set its
sights on the oil regions of the south.

The large UN peace support operation currently deployed in southern
Sudan has proved thoroughly ineffectual in responding to the crisis
posed by militia groups in Upper Nile, and has no mandate or ability to
halt a large-scale resumption of hostilities. At the same time, the
military equities are continually shifting in favor of Khartoum, which
is acquiring large quantities of sophisticated weapons and weapons
systems. Khartoum also benefits from the continuing development of
elevated, all-weather oil roads in Upper Nile Province—roads that
accelerate oil development, but which would also allow for the rapid and
unprecedented projection of mechanized military power southward by
Khartoum.

For its part, the southern military—the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA)—is still struggling to convert to a peace-time force
capable of shouldering the essential task of guaranteeing the security
provisions of the CPA. Without meaningful international guarantors of
these critical security protocols, the SPLA must become the military
deterrent in the face of Khartoum’s rapidly growing threat to seize the
oil reserves as far toward the Equatorian Provinces as possible, and as
far west into Bahr el-Ghazal Province as possible. The US and other
countries that invested so much in the north/south peace agreement are
squandering a very significant diplomatic achievement by failing to
invest adequately in the peace process. This requires much greater and
more focused support for the fledgling Government of South Sudan, as
well as for an SPLA that is almost certainly weaker today than it was a
year ago.

KHARTOUM CONTINUES TO STONEWALL ON INTERNATIONAL FORCES TO DARFUR

Even as the humanitarian situation in Darfur continues to deteriorate
rapidly because of insecurity, Khartoum refuses to accept any
significant augmentation of the desperately inadequate African Union
force. US Special Envoy Natsios was compelled by circumstances to offer
a blunt assessment following his much-heralded trip to Sudan and
Khartoum:

“After meeting President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, Natsios said there was
still no agreement on allowing non-African peacekeeping troops to assist
a cash-strapped and inexperienced African Union mission in Darfur.”
(Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], March 8, 2007)

As of Secretary-General Ban’s February 26, 2007 Report to the Security
Council, the US and its allies within the world community had succeeded
in deploying a mere 81 technical experts to a badly under-manned,
under-equipped, and deeply demoralized AU force…a force now on the
verge of collapse.

The desperate weakness of the AU force is captured all too well in a
vignette from the outskirts of Kutum (North Darfur):

“On February 1, [2007] an unarmed African Union civilian police officer
was shot dead and his vehicle stolen while on a routine patrol at Kassab
IDP camp–home to 30,000 people. The AU immediately ceased patrols to
the camp, fearing for the lives of other unarmed officers. Three weeks
later, with the AU still unwilling to patrol, two Darfuri girls, ages
eight and 10, were collecting firewood when they were abducted by three
armed men who took them to an abandoned hut, made them remove their
clothes and raped them.” (Voice of America [dateline: Kutum, North
Darfur], March 7, 2007)

Attacks on the AU have recently increased sharply and there is clear
risk of dramatic attenuation rather than augmentation of this force:

“Two African Union peacekeepers were killed and one was seriously
wounded in Sudan’s violent west when former Darfur rebel troops opened
fire on them, an AU statement said on Tuesday [March 6, 2007]. The death
tally brought to 11 the number of AU personnel killed since it started
its mission in Darfur in 2004. ‘Two AU Protection Force soldiers were
abducted and subsequently killed. A third soldier was critically
injured,’ the statement said. ‘This deplorable and condemnable act was
perpetrated by gunmen believed to be elements belonging to SLM (Minni),
which is in full control of Gereida [South Darfur].'” (Reuters
[dateline: Khartoum], March 6, 2007)

We learn all too much from these actions by forces associated with
Minni Minawi about the price of diplomatic expediency in forcing through
the ill-conceived Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, May 2006). No
agreement signed only by Khartoum and the ruthless Minawi could possibly
bring peace to Darfur. And as Reuters reports all too accurately:

“Minni Arcua Minnawi, leader of the only faction of the Sudan
Liberation Movement to sign a peace deal in May last year, has since
lost much ground in Darfur and been sidelined in Khartoum.”

Minawi’s commanders have turned into bandits or warlords, sided with
Khartoum militarily, or in some cases joined with non-signatory rebel
groups. But the disaster of the Abuja signing cannot be undone, and
unsurprisingly Khartoum continues to insist in every document, in every
forum, that the Darfur Peace Agreement is the only point of diplomatic
departure. This adamant insistence creates a stalemate in trying to
create a negotiating process attractive to the non-signatory rebel
groups.

The lack of diplomatic progress, despite disingenuous words to the
contrary from UN officials, and the ongoing collapse of the African
Union as a minimal security presence in Darfur, portend even greater
catastrophe. The UN News Center reports (March 8, 2007) on what could
easily become the scenario for future massacres in camps for displaced
persons:

“Hundreds of Arab militia in Sudan’s strife-torn Darfur region recently
surrounded a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) after
abducting two civilians from inside the camp, forcing the temporary
suspension of humanitarian work there, the United Nations mission to the
impoverished country said today.”

“On Wednesday [March 7, 2007], Arab militiamen swept through Ardamata
IDP camp in West Darfur, capturing two civilians in connection with the
killing of one of their relatives, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) said
in a press release, adding the two suspects had then been taken to the
Government police station but the militia refused to allow the officers
to investigate.”

This explosive confrontation gives us a terrifying glimpse of horrors
that now seem inevitable, and which could propel rapid humanitarian
withdrawal. Associated Press reports ([dateline: Khartoum], March 7,
2007) another recent and extremely ominous development:

“On Monday [March 5, 2007], about 30 gunmen of groups that have signed
the May [2006] accord [i.e., those of Minni Minawi] surrounded an office
for the implementation of the peace agreement in El Fasher, the capital
of North Darfur, and ‘threatened the [AU] officer-in-charge,’ the [AU]
statement said.”

Minni Minawi’s forces have always been the most brutal in their
treatment of civilians, and it is hardly surprising that this
threatening action against the AU should come from the men who are part
of his former cohort.

If Minawi has lost political and military control, his cruel and
ungoverned ways live on in the men guilty of this dangerously
consequential provocation. These “signatory” rebel forces are guilty of
many attacks on civilians and humanitarians in various parts of South
Darfur and North Darfur south and west of el-Fasher. Most notably,
Minawi’s men were responsible for the savage attack on humanitarian
workers in Gereida (December 2006) that precipitated the withdrawal of
the aid organizations Oxfam and Action Contre la Faim (Action Against
Hunger). Neither organization has returned to Gereida, leaving the world
largest concentration of Internally Displaced Persons (130,000) with the
resources of only the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Why does the African Union remain, with full knowledge by the entire
world community, the only source of security on the ground in Darfur?
Why has no international force deployed to eastern Chad? There are
finally as many answers as there are international actors of
consequence, but all take final form in the unrelenting defiance on the
part of Khartoum’s génocidaires. And why should these moral barbarians
relent? They have felt no consequences for their actions, and there are
no consequences in prospect. Indeed, the regime’s defiance, despite its
conspicuous nature, is not honestly acknowledged: an international
charade persists in which Khartoum is simply not credited for meaning
what it says, even when those words are fully borne out by actions.

Most conspicuously, various international actors pretend that Khartoum
has agreed to a UN/AU “hybrid force.” But at every turn since the “High
Level Consultation on Darfur” (November 16, 2006) convened by the UN and
AU in Addis Ababa, Khartoum has insisted that it agreed only to a UN/AU
“hybrid operation.” And the essential difference between a “force” and
an “operation” has been just as insistently asserted: the latter, all
that has been agreed to, does not include international or non-AU
troops, a point just reiterated to US Special Envoy Natsios. The
disconnect in basic assumptions is at times so striking that it is
impossible not to believe that a willful ignorance is at work. The UN
News Service (March 7, 2007) declares that,

“[Secretary General] Ban has already written to Mr. Bashir on the
second phase, which includes the provision of additional personnel and
equipment, but has not yet received a reply. Ban’s Special Envoy for
Darfur Jan Eliasson noted to reporters yesterday that the Sudanese had
accepted in principle the hybrid force.”

But this is wishful thinking on the slippery Eliasson’s part, as is
Eliasson’s assertion that Khartoum has halted “aerial bombings of rebel
positions since February 11, 2007” (Agence France-Presse [dateline:
UN/New York], March 6, 2007). There has been no such cessation, and an
extremely reliable regional source reports to this writer (March 8,
2007):

[edited for clarity] “Antonov was over the area of North Darfur on
March 6 and 7 [2007]. It was hovering over its targets—Berdi,
el-Hosh, Wadi Hawar, and el-Wakhaim—for two days. We reported this to
the UN Mission in el-Fasher, security department.”

There have been other highly credible reports of bombing subsequent to
Eliasson’s February 11, 2007 “cessation” date.

Of the supposed “agreement in principle” to a “hybrid force,” Eliasson
is simply in error. While Secretary-General Ban and Security Council
members continue their lengthy wait for a letter from Khartoum
concerning UN augmenting of the AU, one that Khartoum claims was signed
and sent by President al-Bashir many days ago, the Sudan Media Center,
represents the views of the regime fully explicitly:

“Presidency of the Republic confirms that implementation of the last
phase of three packages support for AU forces in Darfur should be
determined according to requirements of AU forces. Presidential press
advisor Mahjoub Fadul Badri told [the Sudan Media Center] that
government has agreed on hybrid operations with UN and AU in Darfur and
not hybrid forces. That means that there is possibility of international
technicians, experts and instructors without deployment of armed
troops.” (Sudan Media Center, March 4, 2007)

Precisely this claim has been made repeatedly, over many months now, by
a range of senior NIF officials. Majzoub al-Khalifa, who negotiated the
Darfur Peace Agreement for Khartoum, declared (January 29, 2007) that,
“‘We have agreed on a hybrid [AU/UN] operation not a hybrid force'”
(Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], January 29, 2007). The February 1, 2007
UN Bulletin for Sudan reports that,

“On 31 January [2007], local media reported that Presidential Assistant
Nafie [Ali Nafie] reiterated Government of Sudan rejection of any form
of what he described as ‘evil’ colonization, saying that the Government
of Sudan will categorically refuse deployment of foreign troops
regardless of the helmet they wear. The statement was made during his
visit to Kabkabiya, North Darfur.”

These two comments, one for international the other for domestic
consumption, are entirely consistent with many other remarks coming from
the most senior members of the National Islamic Front for months now,
including from President al-Bashir. There has been no wavering, and
certainly nothing that amounts to what Eliasson calls an acceptance “in
principle [of] the hybrid force.” Almost as if to ensure that such
fabrication as Eliasson has offered is simply not credible, Agence
France-Presse reports on the words of Khartoum’s UN ambassador
concerning the long-awaited letter from al-Bashir:

“France’s UN Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sabliere meanwhile expressed
disappointment that Beshir had not yet replied to a letter from UN chief
Ban Ki-moon on a proposed joint UN-AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur.
‘I am disappointed that we have not yet received the letter… We have
been told for days that this letter was about to come,’ he noted. ‘If it
does not come, then we’ll have to see what to do and there are some
delegations on the council thinking about taking measures (sanctions).’
[Meanwhile,] Sudan’s UN envoy Abdalmahmood Mohamad indicated that the
letter was on its way but ‘will not contain anything new.'” (AFP
[dateline: UN/New York], March 6, 2007)

The letter “will not contain anything new”—i.e., it will contain no
further concessions on either the nature of the so-called “heavy
package” of UN support for the AU, or on the “third phase,” the actual
force that will provide security in Darfur. Associated Press had four
days earlier reported developments concerning the al-Bashir letter from
a slightly different perspective:

“Al-Bashir’s letter expresses his commitment but also raises ‘issues of
operational, technical and legal aspects’ of the proposal, Sudanese
Ambassador Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem told The Associated Press. He
declined to elaborate on those concerns.” (Associated Press [dateline:
UN/New York], March 2, 2007)

But of course such “issues of operational, technical and legal aspects”
of the proposal have been retarding all progress on actual deployment
since the Addis Ababa “High Level Consultation on Darfur” of November
16, 2006—almost four months ago. This is why several days later
Ambassador Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem attempted to deflate expectations by
declaring that al-Bashir’s letter “will not contain anything new.” In
fact, there is every reason to believe that the distance between
professed UN and Western expectations and what Khartoum intends to
accede to is unbridgeably great. Associated Press reports from the UN
(March 7, 2007) that the “second phase” of UN assistance to the AU will
consist of the deployment of “more than 3,000 UN military, police and
civilian personnel, along with substantial aviation and logistical
assets.”

But this “second phase” is reported in very different, indeed almost
unrecognizable form by The Sudan Tribune ([dateline: Khartoum], February
25, 2007):

“Sudan said that negotiations are going on with the African Union and
the UN to implement the second phase of the UN support to the African
troops in Darfur, the foreign ministry said that this phase includes
between 400 to 500 experts and technicians.”

“The spokesman for the ministry of foreign affairs, Ali al-Sadiq, said
in press statements yesterday that the three sides would implement the
second package after it was approved. He said the second package would
cost 45m dollars which the UN had pledged to provide. Al-Sadiq said the
second package involved between 400 and 500 experts and technicians and
would take between two to three months to implement.”

Those wondering why the letter from Khartoum is taking so very long to
arrive at UN headquarters should reflect on these completely different
understandings of “phase two” of the UN assistance package to the AU.
And this leaves entirely aside the actual force, of approximately 20,000
total troops and civilian police, that the UN and Western countries have
been assuming. The issue is not yet to the point of meaningful
negotiation, even as this is a force that Khartoum has adamantly
insisted comprise only AU troops. Further, the size and mandate of the
force are still matters completely undecided, particularly since
Khartoum insists that the issues will be decided by an assessment of
security needs conducted by the “Tripartite Commission” of which it is a
member, and with what is in effect veto power.

[This writer received at 3:30pm EST today (March 9, 2007) an unofficial
translation of the letter from al-Bashir to Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon, though not the 14-page technical annex to the letter.
Unsurprisingly, despite professed hopes by UN officials and Western
nations, this document is but another epistolary straight-arming of the
international community, of a piece with al-Bashir’s previous letter
(December 23, 2007) to then-Secretary General Kofi Annan. The present
letter declares that features of the second, “heavy” support package to
the AU “need to be clarified.” It continually, insistently cleaves to
the Darfur Peace Agreement as the only basis for discussion of the
crisis in Darfur. Indeed, the letter argues that “some paragraphs of
the Final Report [on the AU/UN Consultations on the UN Proposed Heavy
Support Package to the AU Mission in Darfur] contravene many paragraphs
of the DPA.” This leads to the inevitable and paralyzing conclusion:
“Therefore, proposals that tend to amend, nullify or suspend any article
of the Darfur Peace Agreement will not be acceptable.”

Furthermore, al-Bashir insists that “our understanding of the UN
support packages is that the UN will provide technical, logistical,
financial expertise, and civil and military consultants with ranks below
that of the military commander appointed by the African Union. In phase
three, the AU forces implementing that phase, in terms of control or
command, must remain forces of the African Union, supported by the UN as
per the two [initial support] packages.”

This is no more than has been previously re-cycled by al-Bashir and
other National Islamic Front leaders over the past four months. It
creates ambiguity where there was to be clarity; it arrogates to
Khartoum’s génocidaires veto power through the “Tripartite Mechanism”
(invoked in the concluding paragraph of the letter). The regime’s UN
Ambassador Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem is entirely accurate in having
declared that al-Bashir’s letter “will not contain anything new.”
Nothing new at all, and thus a preservation of the genocidal status
quo.

Al-Bashir also declares of humanitarian operations in Darfur: “My
government is committed to continue supporting the humanitarian efforts
and to extend all necessary and possible facilitations through an
energized fast track.”

This long-awaited letter is a nauseating exercise in mendacity and a
compelling exemplar of human evil.]

SECURITY DETERIORATING RAPIDLY IN EASTERN CHAD AS WELL

What must not be lost sight of amidst the overwhelming security crisis
in Darfur is the equally dire situation for humanitarians working in
eastern Chad. Moreover, President Idriss Déby has for political reasons
reneged on an earlier commitment to allow an international military
force to deploy to the Chad/Darfur border; he is now insisting that this
be simply a police operation. Déby has also “refused to allow an
advance team of military, police and civilian peacekeepers to visit the
country,” according to UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
Hedi Annabi (Reuters [dateline: UN/New York], March 6, 2007).

A purely policing presence is not a tenable alternative and ensures
that no force will be deploying without robust international pressure on
Déby to accept the force outlined in February 2007 by Secretary-General
Ban (approximately 11,000 troops and police). As Assistant
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Annabi recently emphasized: “‘We need
a military force that creates an environment in which the police can do
their work'” (Reuters [dateline: UN/New York], March 6, 2007).

The need for such a military and policing force could not be greater.
The BBC reported (February 16, 2007) from eastern Chad:

“The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) says the killing tactics
from neighbouring Darfur in Sudan have been transported to eastern Chad
in full. [ ] The BBC’s Orla Guerin, in eastern Chad, says at first the
Janjaweed came from Sudan; later, locals joined in—neighbour killing
neighbour. ‘We are seeing elements that closely resemble what we saw in
Rwanda in the genocide in 1994 and I think we have an opportunity here
to avoid such a tragedy from occurring again,’ UNHCR’s Matthew Conway
said.”

But the only way to avert the escalating violence and disruption of
humanitarian aid is by enhancing security, and such security is nowhere
in sight. From eastern Chad, The Telegraph (UK) reports:

“Aid agencies work under constant threat. The United Nations has
evacuated all but a handful of essential staff from eastern Chad and
declared a ‘Phase Four’ alert in the region. The next stage is ‘Phase
Five’—a total evacuation of staff and the effective end of the relief
effort.”

Nicolas de Torrente of Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres
(MSF) recently declared:

“‘We have had to pull international teams out of places that are too
dangerous and move them back into camps and cities,’ said Nicolas de
Torrente, [MSF’s] director in the United States.” (One World [dateline:
UN/New York], February 16, 2007)

This provides a rather peculiar context for the chiding press release
from MSF of March 2, 2007 (“Insecurity is No Alibi for Inaction in
Chad—MSF”):

“A number of relief agencies are claiming that insecurity is preventing
them from carrying out their humanitarian activities in Chad. ‘The
security situation in eastern Chad is indeed volatile,’ says Martin
Braaksma, MSF head of mission in Chad. ‘But balanced against the huge
humanitarian needs, we have no option but to continue to work here.'”
(MSF press release, March 2, 2007)

Even as the executive director of MSF/USA is declaring that “We have
had to pull international teams out of places that are too dangerous and
move them back into camps and cities,” MSF arrogantly presumes to judge
the courage of other humanitarian organizations by labeling their
decisions concerning security for their personnel in eastern Chad mere
“claims” and “alibis” for not working in this exceedingly dangerous
environment. MSF is certainly widely respected for being among the most
courageous of humanitarian organizations; but the organization
discredits itself by casting aspersions on the motives and decisions of
others in making decisions about what constitutes unacceptable levels of
insecurity.

“‘The shortfalls are obvious and immediate, which is why people require
more aid organizations to respond quickly,’ says [MSF’s head of Chad
programs] Braaksma. ‘We can’t understand why the response has been so
slow.'” (MSF press release, March 2, 2007)

Again, this implicit challenging of the courage of other humanitarian
organizations is arrogant and offensive. Let the French-based MSF make
its own decisions, and do what it can to provide reliable security
information to other organizations contemplating expanding their
operations in eastern Chad. But all humanitarian organizations have
security thresholds that they will not cross, risks they will not ask
their workers to incur. As MSF’s Torrente declared, the organization
itself has such a threshold: “We have had to pull [MSF’s] international
teams out of places that are too dangerous and move them back into camps
and cities.” This is no time for an aid organization to indulge in
“machismo”—the risks to lives, civilian and humanitarian, are far too
great for such behavior. Just today (March 9, 2007) the UN News Center
reports:

“The security situation in eastern Chad has deteriorated during the
past week, hampering efforts by United Nations humanitarian agencies to
help up to 105,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and more that
230,000 refugees who have fled the fighting in Sudan’s Darfur region.
Inter-ethnic violence continues to be reported, leading to the
cancellation of humanitarian activities in one refugee camp, the UN
World Food Programme (WFP) said in its latest update.”

“Earlier this week a UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff
member and a security guard were kidnapped in the Guereda region, and
WFP, UNHCR and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) decided to
reduce their presence, relocating 22 national staff to the town of
Abeche.”

MSF should spend more of its energies calling vigorously for security
to protect its operations rather than challenging the courage of
organizations that may have a different threshold defining unacceptable
security risks for its personnel.

CHINA AND DARFUR

The US administration has expediently attempted to make much of a
recent Chinese foreign investment decision:

“Beijing has left Iran, Sudan, and Nigeria off its latest list of
resource-rich countries for which it will provide financial incentives
to Chinese companies to invest in. [ ] It is not clear whether the
exclusion of Iran, Sudan and Nigeria came because Chinese companies have
no short-term investment plans in the three countries, or for more
political reasons.” (Financial Times [UK] [dateline: Beijing], March 2,
2007)

The Bush administration quickly attempted to take credit for this
decision:

“Beijing’s recent decision to remove Sudan off its list of countries
for which it will provide financial incentives to Chinese companies to
invest in was aimed to press Khartoum to accept the hybrid UN-AU force
in Darfur, the State Department revealed Monday. US State Department
Spokesman Sean McCormack said the move by Beijing ‘sends a very strong
signal to the Sudanese Government that the Chinese Government wants to
see this AU-UN hybrid force get into Darfur.'” (Sudan Tribune, March 5,
2007)

But what sort of “signal” was sent by the almost simultaneous
announcement that China and Sudan had agreed to a huge capital
investment project by Beijing? —

“Sudan and China signed 28 February, [2007] a 1.15 bln USD contract to
construct a railway line to link the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, with
Port Sudan in the east of the country. China Railway Engineering Group
Co Ltd and China Railway Erju Co Ltd unit Transtech Engineering Corp
have jointly won a 1.15 bln USD construction contract in Sudan,
according to a statement on the Sichuan province Department of
Commerce’s website. China Railway Engineering Group indirectly controls
China Railway Erju Co Ltd.”

“Inked after two years of negotiations, this contract is considered as
the biggest construction contract in the field of the railways ever
signed between China and Sudan. The total length of the railway line is
762 kilometres.” (The Sudan Tribune, March 4, 2007)

Notably, this capital investment yet again was negotiated exclusively
by Khartoum…for Khartoum. Railway transportation is desperately
needed throughout Sudan, geographically Africa’s largest country, and
yet this project will inevitably work almost exclusively to the economic
advantage of Khartoum and its immediate environs; the marginalized
people and regions of the country will see almost no benefit.

For those looking for signs that such investment comes with any
scruples about providing what is essential economic support for a
genocidal regime, it may be a good time to hear the official word from
Beijing about Darfur (via Xinhua, [dateline: Beijing], March 6, 2007):

“President Hu Jintao had clarified the Chinese government’s stance on
the Darfur issue in Sudan, one of the eight African countries he visited
earlier this year, [Foreign Minister] Li [Zhaoxing] said on the
sidelines of the parliamentary annual session. The stance was welcomed
by the people of Sudan and its neighbouring countries and by the people
of all peace-loving countries in support of justice, Li said.”

“The Chinese government has always maintained that different countries
can have friendly negotiations on an equal footing, and China is willing
to hold such dialogues with African countries and all the other
countries, he said. [ ] China, apart from seeking self-development, has
tried to assist other countries to the best of its capability. ‘Our
assistance is free of any political pressure and helps resolve specific
problems, a good demonstration of China’s peaceful development road and
constructive role in the world,’ Li said.”

“While differentiating dialogue from interference, he cited the UN
charter, which clearly stipulates a principle of non-interference in
other countries’ internal affairs. ‘It’s hard to imagine the world can
maintain harmony and peaceful development if any country or
international organization intends to interfere in other countries’
internal affairs,’ the minister said.”

The distinction between “dialogue” and “interference” is, of course,
one that permits China to do as little as it wishes in responding to
Khartoum’s ongoing genocidal counterinsurgency in Darfur. This miasma
of specious language about “peace” and “harmony” finally does little to
obscure the underlying Realpolitik, a brutal and ruthless geostrategic
economic calculus. And as this huge capital commitment in a new
rail-line demonstrates, there is as yet no pressure great enough to move
Beijing to see its investments in Sudan in any but the most self-serving
of ways.

But the host country of the 2008 Olympic Games is about to discover
just how potent international advocacy can be when the issue is
complicity in genocide. The Olympic Games, the premier international
event, cannot be legitimately hosted by a country that sees no
obligation to halt the ultimate violation of international law. The
feckless response of Western nations, the dithering and diffidence of
the UN, the indifference of the Arab League and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference—all are a disgrace to international ideals. But it
is China, which wields such enormous leverage over the Khartoum
government, that must be put to the ultimate test: just how much shame
and international opprobrium is Beijing willing endure? Will the
Chinese regime continue in its refusal to address its enabling
complicity in genocidal destruction? Will these calculating men risk
seeing these Olympic Games become the ultimate international political
platform—one relentlessly, ubiquitously, energetically highlighting
precisely this complicity?

This test is even now in the making and will if necessary run through
to the Opening Ceremonies of the summer 2008 Games unless Beijing uses
its influence to secure access for an adequate international peace
support operation in Darfur.

* Eric Reeves is a professor at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, and has published extensively on Sudan. He can be reached at [email protected]; website : www.sudanreeves.org