The Arab World and South Sudan: A case of unfairness
By Riang Yer Zuor
March 10, 2007 — In its issue No. 832 covering the period between 15 and 21 February 2007, Al-Ahram Weekly magazine published a piece of writing authored by Abdullah Al-Ashaal, former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister. The title of the article was “Splitting Sudan: Egypt and the Arab world have not understood the telltale signs that litter the road to secession for South Sudan”. In his article, the former assistant to the Egyptian top diplomat identifies three things that Egypt and the Arab world have not understood concerning the past and the current state of affairs in what he identifies as the “Arab-Muslim” Sudan. Al-Ashaal’s points include the following: partition process in the Sudan, Bashir’s political defeat and Egypt’s failure to see the signs of split. Below is the analysis.
I. PARTITION PROCESS IN THE SUDAN
According to Abdullah Al-Ashaal, the “partition process” in the Sudan “began with the Machakos negotiations” in 2003. This statement makes me wonder who Al-Ashaal’s audience is, for it is either shallow of him or self-misleading to make such a statement. He could not have made a statement further away from the truth than this.
As far as I know, the current unity between the North and the South of the Sudan began in 1946 with the Administrative Conference for North Sudan. Southerners did not take part in that gathering. Nevertheless, they were illegally decided for and their fate was tied together with that of the Northerners. This decision was affirmed a year later at the 1947 Juba Conference in which the Southerners were informed of the 1946 decision. But partition process began soon after with the formation of the Legislative Assembly in which the South was politically underrepresented by only 13 out of the 65 members. That act of under-representation was an indication that the new unity that had just been entered into was not going to be viable. It should have been known that without rectification, partition would be inevitable. Instead of reversing, the sectarian parties in the North worked harder to maintain the status quo. The following revealed what they had in mind.
1. Before Independence
After the 1947 Juba Conference, but before Independence, the following happened:
– A. In 1952, the Constitutional Amendment Commission (CAC) was formed. Only one person (Both Diew) was made to represent the interest of the South. The CAC refused to consider Both’s position on behalf of the South on the federal arrangement between the North and the South. It also refused to consider the South’s position on the formation of a special ministry for the Southern affairs;
– B. On January 10, 1953, the Egyptian-Sudanese Agreement was signed on the Sudanese self-government behind the back of the Southerners on the pretext that the South had no political party. That was not true. Southern Political Committee (SPC) had been in existence since 1947;
– C. On February 12, 1953, an Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed on the Sudanese self-government with only the northerners as observers; and
– D. In 1954, the Sudanization of the 800 civil service positions that had been held by expatriates gave the South only 6 junior positions.
2. After Independence
The January 1, 1956 independence declaration was basically a direct result of an agreement between the Southerners and the northerners that a federal arrangement in the country would be given “due consideration” after independence. However, things started to change as soon as Sudan became independent. No Northern politician had any willingness to act on the 1955 promise on federation. The promise turned out to be a deception. To make matters worse, the first military government of general Abboud embarked on uniting the country at gun point. The gunman favored a military solution to what was a political problem. In addition, the successive government in Khartoum signed and dishonored agreements on unity. Some of those agreements include the following:
– A. Round table conference of 1965;
– B. Addis Abeba Peace Agreement of 1972;
– C. Koka dam Declaration of 1986;
– D. DUP-SPLM Accord of 1988; and
– E. The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement.
All of the aforementioned events are responsible for what the former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister calls the “partition process” in the Sudan. Blaming the 2003 Machakos negotiations is unfair, unreasonable, and defenseless. And this might explain why Al-Ashaal does not give his readers facts to justify his position.
II. BASHIR’S POLITICAL DEFEAT
Al-Ashaal raised a rather interesting issue that reaching a political settlement between Khartoum and the SPLM is a “political defeat” for al-Bashir. It is interesting because I believe it reflects a thought process represented by many sectarian leaders in Khartoum. To them South Sudan is an inferior part of the country whose people should remain under their feet forever, and that conceding to even some of their demands amounts to nothing less than a defeat. I see this position as the worst case of irrationality.
I consider the conflicts in the Sudan as ones fought over what is wrong and what is right. For more than half a century, Khartoum has been on the wrong side that equality in the Sudan should not be based on citizenship. Rather, it maintains, it should be based on such factors as religion and ethnicity (Islamism and Arabism). It has been militarily successfully defending that position. This is wrong. Successfully defending a wrong position is not necessarily a victory, for it is a pointless, irrational, and temporary.
On the other side, it is the proposition that equality of all Sudanese ought to be based on citizenship without consideration of one’s religion or ethnicity. This is the position that the South has been representing. Conceding to it should not reasonably be seen as a defeat. Rather, it would be a victory because it would break down the barriers standing in the way of unity. I do not see why Mr. Al-Ashaal should see it as part of what he calls the “scheme” to split the Sudan.
The author of the articles also talks about the SPLM objective as “the liberation of Sudan, in its entirety, from the Arabs and Muslims, whom it would drive northwards into Egypt, thereby abolishing Sudan’s Arab-Muslim identity and making it possible to bring the country into the fold of regional alliances hostile to Egypt and to the Arab world.” This is an attempt to confuse the readers by mixing up truth and falsehood. This newly created Egyptian version of the SPLM objective can be broken up into three parts: (1) driving the Arabs and Muslims northwards into Egypt, (2) “abolishing Sudan’s Arab-Muslim identity”, and (3) bringing the Sudan “into the fold of regional alliances hostile to Egypt and to the Arab world.”
As to the first component, there is no truth to it. I have read the SPLM manifesto and heard many SPLM leaders making political speeches. None of these sources ever mentions driving Arabs and Muslims of the Sudan to any country, let alone Egypt. The whole of that component is a handiwork of Mr. Al-Ashaal who may have considered himself as a good fabricator of things of that nature.
Yes, there is some truth to the second element, though not necessarily the way Mr. Al-Ashaal wants it understood. The SPLM believes that Sudan is as an Arab as it is an African and that it is as Islamic as it is non-Islamic. Simply put, the country is diverse religiously and ethnically. Presenting this Afro-Arab country as homogeneously Arab-Muslim is a very dangerous distortion of its true identity. Its true identity should be one that reflects its diverse realities.
As to the third element, the author is not clear. He is not clear as to the regional alliances that are hostile to Egypt. He might be referring to the hydro-politics of the Nile valley. But since explicity is lacking in this area, I would rather not speculate on it.
III. EGYPT’S FAILURE TO SEE THE SIGNS OF SPLITTING SUDAN
In his article, Mr. Al-Ashaal accuses Egypt of not discerning the plan to divide the Sudan. He supports his argument by identifying seven signs that Egypt allegedly either misses or misinterpret. The following are his excerpts:
First, the SPLM’s involvement in Darfur and the Eastern Sudan crisis betrays its determination to rebel against the notion of one government over a united and indivisible Sudan, even though the SPLM attained the office of vice-president and became a partner in national decision-making processes.
First of all, SPLM as a Sudanese organization and a junior partner in the government in Khartoum has more rights and interests than Egypt to see to it that a resolution is found to the conflicts in Darfur and Eastern Sudan. Second, the SPLM does not “rebel against the notion of one government over a united and indivisible Sudan…” But it rebels against a united Sudan that discriminates against its own citizens on the basis of race and religion.
Second, the SPLM has been furnishing arms, rumoured to come from Israel, to the rebels in Darfur and encouraging other rebel movements to reject the Abuja Treaty despite the many concessions offered by Khartoum.
There is no evidence supporting this assertion. It is the author’s attempt to bring in Israel, the most hated by the Arabs, just to make South Sudan look to the Arabs as a real enemy. Also there is no evidence that the SPLM encourages rebel movements in Darfur to reject the Abuja Treaty. As a matter of fact, the SPLM chairman has been working to harmonize the positions of the parties so that the peace agreement can last.
Third, the vast arsenals being accumulated in the south by groups falling under the SPLM umbrella are further indication of the movement’s resolve to secede, by any means, beneath the façade of a local government that is being surreptitiously equipped for statehood.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) allows the SPLA to serve as the South Sudan army during the interim period. In order for it to be an effective army, it has to be armed. So, why would the Egyptian expect an army not to accumulate arsenals? The point of keeping the SPLA armed is not to guarantee secession. Rather, it is to protect the agreement so that Khartoum, which is known for dishonoring agreements, does not unilaterally abrogate the current one.
Fourth, it is suspiciously odd that the SPLM vice- president of Sudan should adopt stances diametrically opposed to those of the president, especially as pertains to the presence of an international force in Darfur. Obviously, the US and Israel are using every means possible to weaken the position of the Sudanese government, including the tactic of encouraging its vice president to break ranks.
First, the CPA provides that the President and the Vice-President should work together. But since the government in Khartoum came into being, the president has been acting unilaterally. He opposed the presence of the international force in Darfur without first consulting his partner. He also evicted Jan Prong, the UN General Secretary’s envoy to the country, without consulting the SPLM for its opinion. Basically, the President’s position is that of the National Congress Party (NCP), and not necessarily that of the government. On his part, the SPLM chairman has a right and an obligation to express his party’s position on those issues. The SPLM should not be expected to be a partner without inputs in designing government policies. After all, the President has failed to protect the people of Darfur. In fact, he is believed to have been arming those killing and maiming in that region. Salva has a duty to oppose Omer because the international force has the capacity to stop what Omer has miserably failed to stop since 2003.
Fifth, the south has established full-fledged embassies in more than 25 countries and has invited countries to establish consulates in the capital of the south. Although the government of Sudan approves these consulates, it will be only a short step to elevate them to embassies in the event the south declares its independence. In addition, a southerner heads the Sudanese embassy in Washington, in deference to the demands of various international powers, thereby facilitating the smooth coordination of the conspiracy with the US and its unsubtle projection as policy officially sanctioned by the Sudanese government. Little wonder, therefore, that when clamour erupted over the establishment of an SPLM mission in Washington alongside the already existing Sudanese embassy, the Sudanese ambassador stepped in to voice his approval and to deny that that mission enjoyed diplomatic status. His simultaneous silence on the legal status of similar SPLM missions in 25 other countries was very telling.
The author uses a double standard when it comes to judging South Sudan. Yes, South Sudan government has established mission stations in a number of countries. But, these are not “full-fledged embassies” as he calls them. I call it a double standard because these offices that the author condemns are not any where near diplomatic missions established by the Palestinian authority. He should have started by condemning the Palestinian authority for establishing embassies throughout the world. The allegation that “a southerner heads the Sudanese embassy in Washington, in deference to the demands of various international powers, thereby facilitating the smooth coordination of conspiracy with the US…” is not true. Khartoum badly needs that portfolio to go to its internationally trusted partner. It is for the same reason that the ministry of foreign affairs went to a Southerner: Khartoum wants its tattered image repaired.
Sixth, the south’s media and official rhetoric leaves no shadow of a doubt that they have made secession their only option. Furthermore, they more than hint that there is a conspiracy afoot in support of this objective, towards which end Darfur and the Eastern Province are being incited to revolt against the central government.
What are the evidence supporting the charges that the media in the South “have made secession their only option”? What does Al-Ashaal say about the Arab media regarding their coverage of the events in South Sudan? Concerning the assertion that the South’s media incite the peoples of Darfur and Eastern Sudan, there is no truth to it. The South is not inciting any one to revolt against any government whether central or peripheral. In fact, the conflicts in those regions precede the formation of most of the existing media in the South. The truth is that Darfur and Eastern Sudan are responding on their own to injustices done to them by Khartoum.
Seventh, despite the fact that the government of Sudan gave the French-owned Total petroleum company exploration and drilling rights in the south, the government of the south concluded an exploration and drilling contract for the same area with rival British firms. Nothing could constitute clearer proof that the south intends to secure control over mineral resources in the south, and, undoubtedly, water resources there as well.
The South has a government of its own that controls the land. It follows that it controls the minerals found on and below the surface. Khartoum signed an agreement with the French-owned company at a time when it was in animosity with the SPLM. Likewise, the SPLM signed its agreement with the White Nile at the same time when it was at war with Khartoum. Now that the two parties are at peace with each other, al-Ashaal tells us that the difference should be resolved by canceling the SPLM’s agreement with the White Nile so that the agreement signed by those in Khartoum should be maintained. Why should agreements signed in Khartoum supersede those signed in Juba? Is that the perpetuation of the old mentality that any thing Northerner is superior to any thing Southerner? What is is wrong with the South controlling its minerals and water resources?
In light of the foregoing evidence, it is difficult to imagine that SPLM leaders have not already commissioned feasibility studies with the purpose of assessing the repercussions of secession, especially with regard to prospective relations between an independent South Sudan and its neighbours.
Again, the question should not be whether the leaders in the South have started forming commissions for feasibility studies to assess the repercussions of secession. It is a question of whether they have started forming those commissions for the purpose of assessing the repercussions of either unity or secession, whichever the outcome of the 2011 decision. Both choices are legally there in the documents. It is in the best interest of the SPLM to know beforehand what to do with either secession or unity after the decision is made. I would even find it incompetent of the SPLM leaders not to have started commissioning feasibility studies regarding the repercussions of either unity or secession after the referendum, whichever might come out as the result.
Conclusion
There is no drop of fairness in Mr. Al-Ashaal’s analysis of the situation in Sudan. His main goal is to shed a false light on South Sudan. It is even worse that the position that he takes is not supported with facts. For those well-informed Arabs concerning what is going on in Sudan , this particular article is nothing deserving of a serious look. The only goal that it would achieve would be to incite the ignorant elements in the Arab world to act in a way that would help the government in Khartoum to dishonor the CPA.
There is no truth to the assertion linking the partition process in Sudan to the 2003 Machakos negotiations. Events causing the current conflicts in the country are even as old as the country itself. There is also no rational reason that the author should call reaching a peaceful settlement of one of the region’s deadliest conflicts a political defeat.
Al-Ashaal is also wrong in blaming Egypt and the Arab world for having failed to understand “…the telltale signs that litter the road to secession for South Sudan.” What could Egypt have done other than what it did when it attempted to derail the IGAD peace process by proposing an Arab version of the process that came to be known as the “Libyan-Egyptian Initiative”. Is he suggesting that Egypt and the Arab world should just have gone to the battlefields in South Sudan to help Khartoum to destroy the SPLA militarily? Well, Egypt and Libya have done that one time or another by bombing the people of South Sudan. However, this has changed nothing in the struggle.
My advice to the Egyptians as well as other Arabs in Africa is that you should approach the Sudanese conflict with caution. It has a potential for destroying the African unity, for there are black Africans on one side and Arabs on the other. Blindly supporting the Arabs of the Sudan would only precipitate blind support for the black Africans by the sub-Saharan Africa.
There is no doubt that you are the same ethnicity as the Arabs of the Sudan. Nor is there any doubt that black Africans in the country are of the same ethnicity as the rest of the black Africans. However, we are all united geographically as Africans. It is in our best interest that we remain united. African unity is very important because without it, the world will keep not taking Africa seriously. So, I suggest that when we look at the Sudanese conflict, we should look at it with geographical integrity of Africa in mind because geography, not ethnicity, unites us. Therefore, let us all promote what unites us over what divides us.
The author is a South Sudanese. He is the author of a book titled, Modern Sudan: Its History and the Genesis of the Current Crises, and co-authored another book with Dr. Hoth Giw Chan titled, South Sudan: A Legitimate Struggle. He can be reached at [email protected].