Who is responsible for delays of development in New Sudan regions

Who is responsible for the delays of service delivery
and infrastructure development in post-conflict New
Sudan regions?

By John G Nyuot Yoh*

March 15, 2007 — Those who visited Southern Sudan capital Juba and
elsewhere in the states, especially during the period
between January 2006 and March 2007, would notice that
Juba and most capitals of the Southern Sudan states,
Southern Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains have not changed
in terms of development, and instead, there seems to
be no interest among the stakeholders that things
should move ahead.

There are certainly immediate challenges that are
facing the SPLM and GOSS leaders, among which are:
challenges of transforming the SPLM into a political
party; training of its cadres, preparations for its
upcoming 2nd National Convention in November 2007; the
harmonization of old and new laws in Southern Sudan;
lack of trained manpower in states and counties;
possible difficulties in integrating the former SSDF
and other armed groups in the SPLA and possible
outbursts should the integration process be derailed
as SSDF commanders negotiate high ranks with the
leadership of the SPLA; lack of functioning
administration in Abyei; delays in the formation of
vital national commissions and other host of
administrative and management challenges in various
levels of governments in the South.

The urging questions then are: why is that despite the
availability of funds in billions, since the first
budget was approved in 2005 roads are not paved in the
main towns, hospitals are not built, clean water and
sewerage systems are not in place, thousands of police
and civil servants from the SPLM liberated areas and
those from the NCP controlled towns are not yet
integrated, and schools are not built?

Who is responsible for these delays?

Is it the GOSS ministers or the lack of capacity of
strategists in GOSS ministries or is it the lack of
experience of governors and counties’ commissioners or
should the blame fall on the lack of supervision by
the SPLM leadership over these vital projects as the
ruling party?

What is the role of the World Bank as the
international financial institution responsible for
supervising the awarding of contracts in Southern
Sudan and the institution which manages donors’ funds,
and as such is responsible for disbursing these funds
in allocated five services areas: education, health,
roads, water sanitation and electricity generation in
the South?

What about GIBB Africa, the Kenyan consultant company
that is responsible for the supervision of
construction of roads, renovation of 700 government
offices and houses in Juba, and for the installation
of power plants in Juba and water sanitation and
sewerage system in the town? Has GIBB Africa been up
to its mandate, and why is it that it seems the
company, as a consultant firm, responsible for
supervision of these projects, is not interested in
finishing these projects on time, and instead, it is
accused of delaying the completion of these projects
intentionally?

What about the National Congress Party (NCP), does it
have a hand in the delays that the developmental
projects in Juba and elsewhere in the South, Southern
Kordufan (Nuba Mountains) and Southern Blue Nile
states have witnessed since October 2005 when the
government of Southern Sudan, governments of Southern
Kordufan and Blue Nile were formed? Is it true that
the NCP has been intentionally delaying release the
oil funds allocated to the south on time? Who are the
NCP affiliates in Juba, does it have influential
members in the GOSS and in Southern Sudan Legislative
Assembly, who have interest in delaying development in
the South?

I was faced with these questions during my last visit
to Juba in March 2007, and tried while there to find
some answers to them. My preliminary conversations
with some of the actors in Juba have revealed that,
leaders of Government of Southern Sudan and the SPLM
have the big share in the blame, because as the main
beneficiaries, they should take keen interest in
seeing to it that these projects are completed on time
and that funds are not wasted on unnecessary man-made
delays.

One of the pillars of the SPLM ideology is the
determination to establish of a New Sudan, where
ordinary Sudanese who have been deprived of all kinds
of development opportunities could enjoy equal
distribution of resources, equal access to power and
live in a country where leaders serve their people
with dedication and respect. The CPA and the National
Interim Constitution of Sudan have, for the time in
Sudan history, provided the framework for the
achievement of these rights. Indeed, millions of
Sudanese who supported the SPLM policies and slogans
during the twenty two years of struggle were convinced
that the movement was well-placed, given its
commitment to justice, equality and freedom, to
provide them with clean water, quality roads, health
care and education and access to sources of energy and
electrification. The SPLM, soon after the formation of
the Government of National Unity and the Government of
Southern Sudan was therefore expected to speedily
implement a comprehensive developmental programme,
particularly in those marginalized areas, where its
power and support were based.

It is this understanding of the SPLM historical
mandate that informed my discussions in Juba regarding
the challenges of implementation of developmental
projects in the South:

Firstly, it seems that GOSS developmental projects are
not coordinated; each ministry seems to concentrate on
its projects. The ministry of roads for example does
not coordinate its activities with the ministries of
housing, education, and health, which means that the
same contractor or consultant company that supposes to
carry out or supervises these projects, in the same
city/town/state, is accountable only to the ministry,
which signed contract with it. The fact that the
ministry of finance pays these companies regularly,
even when they have spent over a year without having
completed any of these projects, meant that the
ministry of finance does not coordinate with other
ministries, which are beneficiaries in these projects.
GOSS as the voice of Southern Sudanese people should
work as a one unit, and that is why there is a Council
of Ministers, which meets every Wednesday to discuss
all aspects of governance and service delivery
throughout the South. The question is: what do they
talk about whenever they meet, if the resolutions of
their meetings do not have effect on the ground.
Governors of Southern States up to this time have not
started building schools, clinics and other service
oriented projects, simply because the majority of them
believe that GOSS will take care of these projects.
Did GOSS give these governors and commissioners some
funds for developmental projects, if not, how do they
expect them to carry out their duties, given that they
are living among 90% of the Southern Sudanese
population, on whose behalf the struggle was waged and
are expecting rewards and dividends for their long
struggle?

It is difficult to understand for example that without
an integrated comprehensive economic and developmental
programme for the whole Southern Sudan, which should
be supervised and implemented by the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning, the GOSS, states and
counties can not pursue any substantive developmental
programme. Each ministry, state and county, can only
implement its allocated portion within this
comprehensive economic and developmental policy. That
is why it is only natural that organizations such as
the World Bank and United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) can come in and become the
developmental agents and planners for the economic
system of Southern Sudan because there is no
comprehensive economic policy for the south. Economic
policy of any nation is informed by the ideology,
historical and economic realities and capabilities of
that nation. The South for example has fought against
marginalisation and underdevelopment in the old Sudan.
Its main goal was to address and does away with these
evils. If today, after over two decades of struggle,
GOSS found itself managing $1.7 billion dollars, as an
annual budget, it is only natural that such a budget
is spent before the end of the budget year, because
the needs of the people in the South are enormous. To
hear that hundreds of millions of dollars were
returned to the treasury because they were not spent
in 2006 meant that GOSS as a government has no unified
and central agency responsible for ascertaining what
has been spent and what was not. This is the work of
the minister of finance and the treasury (Central Bank
of Southern Sudan). The Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS)
was a demand by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
(SPLM) during the negotiations in Naivasha, for it to
act as the treasurer where the money is kept, while
the ministry of finance was supposed to supervise the
balance sheets: how much has been spent, on what and
how much remains unspent in the treasury. Instead,
what we hear today is that the ministry of finance
keeps the money as well as disbursing them. It has
taken over the work of BOSS. This explains why, when
the financial year came to an end in January 2007,
some ministers were surprised to learn that they have
not spent 80% to 90% of their budgets, because no one
told them that they were under-spending, because they
assumed that they committed huge funds to projects
which were underway. These are simple realities that
the undersecretaries and director generals of
ministries and governors can deal with on regular
basis. GOSS is therefore responsible for the lack of
implementation of projects, which its ministries
signed contracts to handle.

Imagine a minister telling his colleagues in a cabinet
meeting recently that the ministry of finance has
incurred a lost worth of $131 millions US dollars
because of fluctuation of exchange rate of dinar and
dollar. The question asked was why informing the
cabinet only now, and not a year ago, when GOSS could
have done something about it. The result of that
unnecessary negligence was that every GOSS employee
throughout the south will receive his/her salary less
of at least %20, unless another alternative solution
is found. This is what I meant by the lack of
coordination between cabinet ministers.

Secondly, what is the role of the SPLM as the ruling
party and the guardian of the Sudanese revolution in
the ongoing underdevelopment policy in the South?
Developing an economic policy has always been the
prerogative of the ruling party, and has never been
that of the government. The SPLM as a mass movement
fought for a purpose, that objective was concretized
and institutionalized in the protocols of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The philosophy
and ideology of the SPLM were therefore embodied in
the CPA, particularly in power and wealth sharing
protocols and in the security arrangements protocol.
In fact, the blue prints of the SPLM economic policies
were enshrined in the wealth sharing protocol, where
service delivery (taking towns to villages) became the
point of reference for any government official. The
oil revenues were divided fifty-fifty, despite the
reservations of Southerners, because the SPLM wanted
to have access to funds and to prove to the people of
the South and the marginalized areas that
underdevelopment policies of the Old Sudan were the
enemy that ought to be fought, and more so during
post-conflict period. To achieve that the SPLM had
gain access to oil revenues and GOSS and states’
governments were to be the custodians of development
in the New Sudan. Any contractor, consultant company
or international agency, such as the World Bank, would
come in as a consultant, but the supervision of the
implementation of these projects was to be the sole
responsibility of the SPLM, GOSS and other Southern
political parties as the guardians of the development
in the South.

The above explanation was necessary in order for us to
understand, why the SPLM and GOSS should bear the
responsibility of managing, supervising and making
sure that contractors and consultants are up to their
expectations. Managing people’s expectations is the
most difficult situation a post conflict government
could find itself in. The SPLM and GOSS seem to have
relaxed and left the fate of development in the South
into the wrong hands. It is a collective
responsibility, because the Council of Ministers is a
collective, and no single person is expected to take
decisions on behalf of the collective. The same
applies to the SPLM, it is a collective, and any
decision on shortcomings facing the development
projects in the South, should be taken by the whole
leadership. Therefore, if anything is to be rectified,
it is the GOSS’ cabinet and the SPLM National Council
to ask themselves, have we given up some of our
revolutionary duties to non-SPLM members, and what can
we do to regain our sense of responsibility? The
answer is obvious: SPLM and GOSS must sit down and
remember that two years have lapsed and nothing
substantial has been done in the rural areas,
counties, states and in Juba. Someone or some people
must be responsible for this situation and something
serious must be done about it urgently, unless the
SPLM and GOSS leaders are waiting for public protests
in rural areas, payams, counties, and states against
the lack of service delivery and development, a
probability that may happen if things remain
unchanged.

There is a perception that the difference between
African elites and their Asian, European and American
counterparts is that the latter, in terms of
implementing developmental projects, make sure that,
once they receive their handsome commissions in full,
projects must be completed on time.

On the other hand, African elites receive their
commissions in full and in collusion with contractors
and consultants, make sure that projects never get
completed and these projects become the source of
living for them as long as new budgets are allocated
for the completion of the same projects each year,
even if it means one project is financed for five to
ten years.

Is this what has been happening in Southern Sudan
since July 2005?

While GOSS and SPLM may appear in the first instance
responsible for the delays in the service delivery and
developmental projects in Southern Sudan, it seems
that other stakeholders carry some blame.

Indeed, during my stay in Juba in March 2007, I was
made to believe that, while GOSS and SPLM bear some
responsibility for the lack of supervising the
developmental projects in the South, particularly in
Juba, other stakeholders equally deserve the blame for
the delay, they include the World Bank bureaucrats
stationed in East Africa and in the South, GIBB Africa
consultants and the NCP and its operatives in the
South.

From the conversations I have had in Juba, I got the
impression that the above mentioned stakeholders
somehow had something to do with the ongoing state of
stagnation in the development arena and service
delivery structures in the South.

Firstly, what about the World Bank, does it bears some
blame for the lack of development and service delivery
in the South? As may be recalled, during the last lag
of the Naivasha negotiations, as part of the wealth
sharing modalities, the SPLM, NCP and the United
Nations, as represented then by the World Bank, worked
out the details of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM),
a programme which was meant to assess the needs of the
Southern Sudan and the other war affected areas in
Sudan. These needs, most of which were infrastructural
and service delivery oriented, were to be implemented
within the period of three years from the time of
signing of the CPA (2005-2007). The JAM process was
well-detailed in terms of items to be carried out and
time frames. The World Bank became the leading agency
to supervise the implementation of the JAM programme.
On the other hand, in run up to the Oslo donor
conference, which was held in September 2003, the SPLM
and the NCP agreed that the developmental funds which
were to be received from the donors, as part of the
Oslo process, were to be kept and disbursed by the
World Bank through Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). The
understanding was that all the developmental projects
which were to be financed through the MTDF, including
the awarding of contracts, must get the “No Objection
Note” from the World Bank representatives in Southern
Sudan. The JAM process identified five areas as
developmental priorities in Southern Sudan, Nuba
Mountains and Southern Blue Nile: education, health,
roads, and water sanitation and electricity
generation.

Based on the above understanding GOSS started to
invite bidders to compete for contracts in the areas
specified within JAM process and based on the needs of
GOSS. Until early 2007, about ten companies from
United Nations (UNDP), Kenya, Italy, China, Germany,
Uganda and other countries were awarded contracts,
with the blessing of the World Bank. The agreement
between the World Bank and GOSS was that every one US
dollar that the MTDF contributes to developmental
projects in the South, GOSS will contribute two US
dollars. Two years since the CPA was initialed in
Nyayo Stadium in Nairobi, Kenya in January 2005, the
contractors who were awarded contracts did not
complete their work to date, and the World Bank which
gave the blessing to these contracts has not reacted
in a manner that would suggest that it cares.

For example, while acknowledging existence of
differences with GOSS over how to go about
implementing developmental projects in the South, the
World Bank representatives argue that they were given
a go ahead by President Salva Kiir that GoSS should
continue to use the World Bank’s procedures for
procurement and financial management in order to
uphold its good governance goals. This is of course an
argument that would require qualification: President
Kiir, like other leaders in Sudan, is aware of the
shortcomings of the World Bank bureaucracies in
Africa, and would not give a free hand to an
organisation that has been largely responsible for
damaging the developing countries’ economic systems to
run a weak region that is just emerging from the war.
The World Bank might have had cordial relationship
with Southern Sudan’s Finance Minister, but certainly
some of its policies and regulations, especially those
relating to the funding of service delivery projects
in health, housing and road sectors were not
definitely welcomed by many SPLM cadres serving in
GOSS. The slowness in the implementation of some
projects, such as the renovation of houses, roads, and
construction of hospitals, despite the availability of
hundreds of millions of US dollars, has not been
encouraging.

The attempts by the World Bank representatives in the
South to encourage privatization of service delivery
projects in Southern Sudan and discouragement of GOSS
policy of proceeding with human resource capacity
development is another controversial policy that GOSS
should look into with an open eye. Indeed, Mr Ishac
Diwan, the World Bank Country Director for Ethiopia
and Sudan, in an interview in February 2007 admitted
that there are disagreements between the World Bank
and GOSS over the issues of capacity building of GOSS
staff versus contracting out (privatizing) to UN
agencies, NGOs, and consultants some of the services;
secondly, trading-off between good governance and
speed of the delivery and thirdly, disagreement over
what he referred to as striking the “right” balance
between efforts to deliver results now, and efforts
that only deliver in the medium term, but deliver big
time. Southern Sudan is emerging from war, tasked to
managed expectations of restless population and one
would not expect such an infant government to
privatize its vital public service delivery sectors,
such as health sector to UN agencies and NGOs. For
example, GOSS ministry of health was apparently
persuaded by the World Bank representatives to
contract out primary health delivery to private
operators and to award a contract for the construction
of what was referred to as “semi-permanent” hospitals
in ten capitals of Southern Sudan states. The
Norwegian company which got the controversial contract
is nowadays advertising positions for doctors, nurses
and lab technicians for these hospitals. In other
words, the contractor will be in charge of recruiting,
managing and constructing these hospitals. The pretext
which the World Bank representatives gave was that
privatizing these essential services will speed up the
delivery because GOSS does not have the capacity,
while the people of the South are desperate to get
these services. Another thing that irritates regarding
the politics of contracts in Southern Sudan is that
huge amounts are spent in projects, which could cost
less if thorough studies were carried out. For
example, the renovation of one office or house of the
Addis Agreement era is costing the Ministry of Housing
between $150,000 and 200,000 US dollars, an amount
which, some argue, could build at least 2 three-bed
new houses.

Another important aspect which requires immediate
attention is an apparent lack of transparency in the
reports of the World Bank operations in Southern
Sudan. For example, how much funds has the World Bank
committed to projects in Southern Sudan, Nuba
Mountains, and Southern Blue during the years 2005 and
2006. The recent World Bank media reports talked about
buying 750,000 mosquito nets, medicines, school books,
but did not talk about having constructed clinics,
schools etc. Another question which requires an answer
is to who did KPMG, one of the leading South African
accountant firms, submitted its reports on the funds
that were spent during the 2005 and 2006 budget years.
KPMG was assigned, upon recommendation of the World
Bank and donor countries, to handle the accounts for
the funds which the MTDF were spending in Southern
Sudan. This was an appropriate decision because the
SPLM then, did not have the man power and the trained
accountants to handle such sensitive assignment.

These are serious issues, which GOSS should discuss
closely with the World Bank and the United Nations
agencies involved in developmental programmes in
Southern Sudan. The World Bank is an important
financial institution that the South must have cordial
relations with, but such a relationship must be
informed by mutual interests, which must be managed
transparently.

Secondly, GIBB Africa, a Kenyan consultant engineering
company, is one of the consultant companies
supervising the implementation, among others, of the
following projects: pavement of 60 Kilometer road
inside Juba, electricity plants in Juba, renovation of
700 government offices and houses in Juba, and
installation of water sanitation and sewerage system
in Juba. GIBB Africa came into contact with some SPLM
leaders during the negotiations in Naivasha, and had
shown interest in helping in developmental projects in
post-war Southern Sudan. Two years down the line, GIBB
Africa seems to have difficulties carrying out it
duties: either it is unable to push the contractors to
complete their work, or it has interest in delaying
the completion of these projects. For example,
ministers and their employees have been told to
evacuate their offices and houses, some since mid
2005, and none of these ministries and houses was
renovated. In every house or office, handful workers
are assigned to do the work, and in most cases, only
work until mid day, especially if they are Chinese
complaining about the heat. In fact, most of the GOSS
officials are complaining that they are displaced from
their houses, where some are forced to spend $250 US
dollars daily to get accommodation in the tents and
containers’ hotels in town, while they could not
employ new employees, apart from the displaced
directors, because the offices are still under
renovation since the government was formed last year.

On the other hand, GIBB Africa seems to have
difficulty in urging its engineers to push contractors
to finish work in Juba roads: the Italian company
which won the contract, with the blessing of the World
Bank, has been in Juba since early 2006. The
impression everybody has in Juba is that the Italians
are not doing their work and are taking their time. On
the other hand, the Italians seem to have difficulties
in communicating their frustrations to GOSS. According
to the World Bank contract regulations, the contractor
and the client (GOSS) have no direct communication;
they must communicate through the consultant, and in
this case the Italians are not allowed to talk to
GOSS. GIBB Africa is therefore the link between
Italians and GOSS. This is also the case with the
installation of Juba electricity, which thank God has
partially been installed and functioning and water and
sewerage system, which are still not operational. The
Ministry of Housing, Land and Public Utilities can not
communicate directly with the contractors, but through
GIBB Africa. What does this means in practical terms;
it seems that, according to this arrangement, and as
the consulting company, GIBB Africa decides when the
projects should finish. One wonders indeed, if each
consultant engineer is being paid since early 2006
between $14,000 US dollars and 29,000 US dollars every
month by GOSS, why would that engineer be in hurry to
urge the contractors to complete the renovation of
GOSS offices, houses or the roads in Juba!

GOSS and the SPLM are directly responsible for this
impasse and should take drastic measures to resolve
this problem by calling the consultants, contractors
and the World Bank officials to an emergency meeting
to explain some of these shortcomings.

Finally, is there any role for the NCP and its
operatives in the delays of the implementation of
developmental projects in Southern Sudan, Southern
Kordufan and Southern Blue Nile? In Sudan, conspiracy
theories abound when talking about whether NCP has a
hand in any negative development in Southern Sudan or
not, especially things that directly affect the
well-being of the Southern Sudanese and the
marginalized areas. Since the CPA was signed, NCP has
presented itself as partner to the SPLM, however, soon
after GOSS was formed, it became clear that the NCP
has decided to either penetrate the SPLM through some
of its cadres; compromise some SPLM cadres; use local
militias to destabilize the region or delay the
release of oil revenue funds on time to GOSS. Access
to telecommunication system in the South, despite the
installation of three national cell phone networks,
Sudantel, Mobitel and al-Sudani, is almost
non-existence, as Sudan security agencies use
sophisticated technology to jam these networks. It is
difficult to access these networks in Southern Sudan,
thus making communication between and with Southern
Sudanese impossible. It is much easier to call any
town in northern Sudan, than to call someone within
Southern Sudan. Allegations abound that if you happen
to be a politician or a senior SPLM member, it is most
likely that you will never receive a call through one
of the three networks mentioned above and even if you
do, it is most likely that your phone is bugged. This
might explain why the SPLM had opted to permit the
Gemtel mobile network to operate in Southern Sudan, to
at least assist the GOSS, SPLM leadership and Southern
Sudanese to communicate among themselves and with the
rest of the world.

In Abyei, Southern Kordufan (Nuba Mountains) and
Southern Blue Nile, the situation in the South, in
terms of developmental projects is much better,
because at least there are developmental projects
underway in some towns/cities in the South, while in
the three areas mentioned above nothing has been done
since the CPA was signed. In Abyei example, up to
date, the administration, which supposes to run the
daily affairs and implement developmental projects and
deliver services to the citizens of Abyei during the
interim period, is not yet formed. For two years the
NCP has refused even to consider the idea of
establishing an interim administration until the two
partners come to agreement over the status Abyei
Boundary Commission Report which was compiled by the
international experts. In recognition of this
devastated situation the GOSS cabinet had to approved
in March 2007 the release of $10 million US dollars to
assist the Abyei people meet some of their immediate
needs. Instead of sending health care and educational
facilities to the area, Sudan army soldiers and
members of popular defense force are sent to Abyei in
sizeable numbers monthly, thus raising tensions and
insecurity in the area.

In Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, the NCP had
made it a point to creating internal conflicts among
local communities in these two states, while making
sure that there are no developmental projects
implemented there. Although the CPA has stipulated
that 28% of the manpower of public servants in various
government departments in these two states will come
from SPLM members, up to date, the whole bureaucracy
is still under control of the NCP affiliates. In fact,
areas such as Kurmuk and Kauda, which were under the
control of the SPLM before the signing of the CPA, are
deprived of services or developmental projects, hence
making it looks like the SPLM has neglected people of
these areas. The CPA is clear in terms of who will pay
the salaries of the civil servants and develop these
areas: the Government of Southern Sudan would pay
allowances to and maintain the SPLA soldiers, which
are not part of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), and
that is why, SPLA soldiers from Nuba Mountains and
Southern Blue Nile are paid as part of the mother
SPLA. As for the civil servants, police, correctional
services and wild life soldiers in these two areas,
the CPA gave the responsibility of their maintenance
to the Government of National Unity.

Moreover, the NCP representatives in the governments
and parliaments of the two states have been
frustrating their SPLM counterparts, making it
difficult for them to initiate developmental projects,
let alone implementing them. Imagine the offices of
Governor of the Southern Kordufan and the Deputy
Governor of Southern Blue Nile, both senior members of
the SPLM, have no access to internet, functioning
telephone lines, fax machines, and two years down the
line, they still use Thuraya satellite phones, which
they were using when they were still in the struggle.
There is no doubt that as a result of the NCP
activities in the marginalised areas an impression
developed among some of the local population in Nuba
Mountains and Southern Blue Nile that the SPLM has
given up some of its responsibilities towards its
supporters in these areas.

The leadership of the SPLM will have to take serious
steps in order to explain to its supporters in Abyei,
Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile that it is aware
of the NCP activities in these regions and that it is
doing something tangible about some of these
challenges.

* John Yoh is a Lecturer in Department of Political
Sciences, University of South Africa in Pretoria. he can be reached at [email protected]