Darfur conflict’s connection to the North-South peace process

By Lago Gatjal Riaka

April 23, 2007 — It has now been four years since the conflict in Darfur began in 2003. In order to understand the Darfur conflict, it is important to identify its causes in context with the North-South peace process sign in January 2005. The North-South peace process came us a result of the war in Darfur meaning that if Darfur conflict did not happen, it would have been difficult for SPLA, a southern rebel to convince the Khartoum government to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement bringing an end to the longest civil war in Africa. Therefore, this paper will argue that if the Darfur conflict did not occur, the North-South peace process would have not been signed. Thus, the future of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement depends on bringing peace in Darfur.

Although the Darfur conflict has historical outcomes of famine, and domination by the Islamic Khartoum government whom had marginalized the Darfurians in Sudan’s history, there are other outside forces that need to be considered in order to understand the current crisis. It is very controversial to conclude that the current crisis in Darfur is a result of a long time marginalization which the Dafurians decided not to take anymore without consideration to outside forces in the region. Historically, the Sudan People Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/SPLM in South Sudan had been very much involved from the beginning in trying to mobilize the people of Darfur to rise against the oppressive regime in Khartoum. John Garang, the chairman of the SPLA had a vision of a united “New Sudan” in which a secular state would give all regions and ethnic groups equal social status, a share of the national wealth and political process.”1 Thus, John Garang had always wanted every region in Sudan to revolt against the Khartoum government for a long period of time so that the objective of a New Sudan would be achieved.

The beginning of the relationship of the SPLA with Darfur started in 1990 when John Garang met with Daud Bolad “a native of Darfur who had received military training in South Kordofan after joining the SPLA forces.”2 According to Gerald Prunnier, Daud Bolad was a member of fur tribe in Darfur who was very much oppose to the oppressive regime in Khartoum since in the 60s. His political criticism led him to an arrest by the “Nemeiry’s police in 1971 and severely tortured.”3 After his release in Khartoum, he went to Darfur where he resided as a business man and later in 1989 became involved in politic again. Bolad tried to raise a militia group to start a rebellion but failed, he then decided to join SPLA in Ethiopia. In 1991, Bolad led a battalion who were mostly Southerners to Darfur and attacked a military barrack however, Prunnier announced that the soldiers were not receive by the local populations with joy and were seen as foreign fighters. Again that rebellion failed and Bolad was captured and taken to Khartoum where he died in 1992 under severe torture.4

John Garang had a vision of starting another frontline maybe even three with the crisis in the Eastern Sudan to threaten Khartoum government with changes to the regime and a coming of a New Sudan, where Islamic ideologies would be out of political square. However, the fact that Darfurians were obsesses with the denial to economic opportunities and domination by the Khartoum government can not be ignored in their revolt. But, they needed help from outside to successfully stay stable. They needed training and political support; therefore, John Garang accepted the idea and offers his support to Darfurians people, a vision he had tried earlier in 1991 after sending Bolad with one battalion SPLA forces.

A review of Prunnier book by Alex de Waal, a fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University, and Programme director at the Social Science Research Council in New York reported that “until 2003-when SPLA members assisted in writing the SLA manifesto-the main SPLA role had been training Masalit volunteers who crossed Sudan’s eastern border to its camps in Eritrea.”5 After training, the Darfurian battalions were transferred to Southern Sudan, and then went back to Darfur to start a revolt. But, after a crash by the government troops, some of the battalion members gave up the fight and went back to their homes. This made John Garang to lose hope on the Darfurians.

Another report by Uwe Friesecke from Executive Intelligence Review indicated that “the current crisis in Darfur is the result of active intervention from the Sudan peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA, the South Sudanese rebel group-and its leader John Garang.”6 It is very difficult to understand the controversial issue behind this support. Many people might be asking why John Garang would start another war in Darfur while he was working in peace with the Khartoum government. In this regard, the work for Anglo American geo-political interest in the region can not be ignored as matter fact it is believed that the Americans and the British had encouraged Garang to start the current crisis in Darfur.

The objective was that starting another war in Darfur and east would threaten Khartoum government with two frontlines or even three. As a result, the Khartoum government would be willing to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the southern rebels making Khartoum government accept all the demands put on the table by SPLA. One of the demands was that John Garang would become the first Vice-president in Sudan which would allow him play more role in Sudan politic. If Garang becomes Vice-president he would helped in bringing the war in Darfur and Eastern Sudan to an end and maybe even changes to constitution, bringing the vision of a New Sudan alive to Sudan’s population.

According to reports by the Brussels based International Crisis Group (ICG), “the SPLA trained 1500 Dafurians near Raja in western Bahr el-Ghazal in Southwest Sudan in March of 2002.”7 It was these soldiers who first attack the government troops in Darfur leading to the atrocities to the present. Even if John Garang denied this report, according to the ICG, military supplies were coming in from Chad “delivered by the SPLA forces from Uganda and Kenya.”8 This could not have happen without the support of United States and Great Britain who were basically pursuing their own interests in the region.

Friesecke reported that events that led up to current Darfur conflict were not a random uprising of the Darfur tribes against the Khartoum government but were well “planned a year earlier, and is part of the broader strategy of the Anglo-American backers of John Garang and the SPLA.”9 Therefore, it is very controversial to come to conclusion about African issues without understanding the Western influences or outside forces that are involved in the causes. Furthermore, Friensecke reported that the Khartoum government was threatened into signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement unwillingly by the international community, IGAD, and SPLA because if the Khartoum government did not sign the peace “the threat was, that Garang could launch renewed military offensives in the South, fully supplied and backed up by the United States, Britain, and President Museveni’s Uganda.”10 Therefore, Bashir had no obligation to refuse to sign the peace by agreeing to all the demands put on the table by the South Sudan rebel (SPLA).

Therefore, the future of the CPA will depend on bringing peace to Darfur. Currently, the attention of the international community has shifted from South Sudan to Darfur. This change is now affecting the implementation of the CPA.

* The author is based in Moorhead, Minnesota, U.S.A. He can be reached at [email protected]

Reference

Gerard, Prunier. Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. New York: Cornell University Press, 2005

Alex de Waal. Review of Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide by Gerard Prunier. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Geneva, 25 January 2005

Western Powers Seek Sudan Disintegration: Executive Intelligence Review by Friesecke Uwe. 6 Aug. 2004. 16 Ap. 2007