Will UN peacekeepers really be allowed into Darfur?

By Eric Reeves, The New Republic online

June 14, 2007 — Last August, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1706 authorized the rapid
deployment of a robust force of 22,500 U.N. troops and civilian police
to Sudan, with an explicit mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian
operations and attempt to staunch the spreading genocidal violence in
the Darfur region. Had it been deployed, such a force could have done
much to avert the massive human displacement and destruction of the past
nine months. But the Sudanese regime refused to allow the peacekeepers
into the country, and the United Nations declined to intervene without
Khartoum’s approval.

That approval seemed to come on Tuesday, as the Khartoum regime agreed
to allow a joint peacekeeping force comprising U.N. troops and African
Union forces into Darfur. Noureddine Mezni, a spokesman for the African
Union, called the announcement “a breakthrough moment.” By now, however,
there is a long history of such breakthroughs on Darfur–each of which
has proved worthless.

It has been almost three years since the regime made the first of
numerous agreements to disarm the deadly Janjaweed militia. Yet, last
September, a U.N. panel of experts found that Khartoum was arming the
Janjaweed more heavily than ever. Three years ago Khartoum also agreed
to grant unfettered access to aid organizations operating in Darfur.
Today, humanitarian workers continue to face threats and obstructionism
in their struggle to provide succor to the 4.7 million people affected
by Khartoum’s relentless war of attrition. Key terms of the January 2005
peace agreement that ended 22 years of North-South conflict, such as
equitable wealth sharing, establishing a legitimate North-South border,
and disarming regime-allied militia forces, have similarly not been
implemented, threatening to reignite the conflict. And Khartoum has also
failed to follow through on security commitments made under the Darfur
Peace Agreement, signed in Abuja in May 2006.

There is no reason to suppose the current agreement will be any
different. Key issues, including the critical matter of
command-and-control for the deploying force, have been left deliberately
vague in an expedient effort to prevent disagreement between the U.N.
and the AU. The composition of the force and the role of non-AU troops
have also not been addressed seriously. Like all other “agreements”
Khartoum has made, this one will prove vacuous–subject to reneging,
re-interpretation, dilatory review, and obstructionism. Indeed, Khartoum
has already suggested that it may attach certain conditions to the
agreement that will curtail its effectiveness.

Rather than a real solution to the crisis in Darfur, Tuesday’s agreement
is very likely little more than a way for this canny regime to undercut
the impending U.N. Security Council meetings in Accra and Addis Ababa,
which seek to address a range of troubling issues in Africa.

But, even if Khartoum were sincere, there is reason to doubt the
effectiveness and urgency of the new hybrid force. Since last year,
fewer than 200 U.N. technical personnel have deployed to assist the
crumbling and badly demoralized African Union mission in Darfur. This
small force was to have been the first of three “phases,” vaguely agreed
to in the document that emerged from a meeting of Khartoum’s
génocidaires, the U.N., and the AU in Addis Ababa last November. The
hybrid force now being so widely touted was to have been the “third
phase.” But “phase two” of the Addis plan remains unimplemented, without
any sign of the support personnel or logistical resources critical to
the on-the-ground success of the large hybrid force. Indeed, until phase
two is completed the hybrid force cannot deploy.

The earliest this force could deploy, then, is 2008. That could be
hundreds of thousands of deaths from now, especially if international
aid organizations are forced to withdraw becauinsecurity. The urgency reflected in Resolution 1706 is nowhere in
evidence. And the latest “breakthrough moment” will likely hit yet
another wall.

Eric Reeves is a professor of English Language and Literature at Smith
College and has written extensively on Sudan.