Darfur situation makes a mockery of Ban Ki-Moon fatuous optimism (2)

Darfur Assessment by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, July 2, 2007,
Part 2

“…credible and considerable progress in helping resolve this Darfur
situation”—
Both truth and the people of Darfur and eastern Chad have now been
abandoned to an obscene political expediency (Part 2 of 2)

By Eric Reeves

July 10, 2007

“During the last six months, we have made slow but credible and
considerable progress in helping resolve this Darfur situation,’ [Ban]
told a news conference in Geneva.” (Reuters [dateline: Geneva], July
2, 2007)

In judging the merit of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s
extraordinary claim of July 2, 2007, the first part of this analysis
sought to provide an overview of the security conditions in Darfur and
eastern Chad, based on the most recent assessments by humanitarian
organizations on the ground, both UN and nongovernmental. This was
meant to serve primarily as a supplement to my recent comprehensive
overview of security issues as they affect civilians and humanitarians
(“Human Security in Darfur and Eastern Chad: An Overview,” June 11,
2007:
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article172.html
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article171.html)

The second part of this analysis assesses the diplomatic efforts around
a still merely notional “peace process,” as well as the likelihood
of efforts to negotiate a cease-fire (or at least a cease-fire more
effective than the present meaningless agreement). No doubt most of
what has been done in this arena has been done behind the scenes. But
the available evidence is dismayingly persuasive that not nearly enough
has been accomplished; that the “peace process” is hopelessly
chaotic; and that despite the very recent effort (July 8, 2007) by UN
special envoy Jan Eliasson to declare that “the moment of truth has
arrived,” diplomatic confusion abounds and the Khartoum regime has
been obliged to do nothing to make peace talks sufficiently attractive
to Darfur’s rebel leaders. Cleaving insistently to the Darfur Peace
Agreement—a thoroughly dead letter for all non-signatory rebel leaders
of consequence—Khartoum is using the disastrous results of last May in
Abuja to set the stage for indefinite delays.

The present analysis concludes with a survey of military options for
near-term improvement of civilian and humanitarian security on the
ground in Darfur and eastern Chad. The emphasis falls heavily on urgent
deployment of civilian police to the most insecure IDP and refugee
camps, on a rolling basis and with provision of necessary military
protection.

THE PEACE PROCESS AND EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A CEASE-FIRE

“…credible and considerable progress in helping resolve this Darfur
situation”—

Since UN Secretary-General Ban cannot possibly point to “progress”
on the ground in addressing the security crisis in Darfur, or to
improvement in the terrifying humanitarian picture in Darfur and eastern
Chad, he is committed to the claim that the international community is
moving ahead with a “peace process,” and that efforts are underway
to provide protection in the form of a UN/AU “hybrid force”—a
make-shift substitute for the large and robust force outlined almost a
year ago in UN Security Council Resolution 1706 on the basis of UN
Department of Peacekeeping recommendations. But given the poverty of
actual achievement in improving security during Ban’s six months in
office, we may reasonably have expected that concrete security
agreements would be in place in the near term; that a clear schedule for
deployment and command of security forces had been negotiated; and that
a well-organized, decisively led negotiating team was prepared to work
full-time in securing from the obdurate Khartoum regime a meaningful
peace agreement.

Of course none of this exists. As Reuters’ exceedingly well-informed
Opheera McDoom reports from Khartoum (July 7, 2007):

“Seven months into their mission, UN peace envoy Jan Eliasson and his
AU counterpart Salim Ahmed Salim have made scant progress in bringing
fractious rebel groups to the table, drawing accusations of foot
dragging from aid groups and observers. [ ] The envoys have set a
self-imposed August deadline to launch peace negotiations and have
called an international meeting in Libya for July 15-16 to discuss their
progress.” [ ]

“Those working in Darfur’s aid operation—the world’s
largest—complain the envoys are only doing a ‘part-time job.’
Neither are based in Sudan and even Eliasson’s special assistant Pekka
Haavisto, appointed to make up for his absence, does not live in the
country. ‘One of the main concerns is the little time spent in country
by the key players, considering the scale of the conflict,’ said one
source in the aid community in Khartoum.”

Not only has little been achieved, but little is in prospect; indeed,
Eliasson admitted three days ago (July 7, 2007) that the August deadline
for peace negotiations would have to slip because of inadequate progress
to date in negotiations with the rebel groups. David Mozersky of the
International Crisis Group notes sharply that Salim and Eliasson
“needed to be much more proactive to unify the rebel groups,
broaden the negotiation base and get the government to agree to changes
to last year’s peace deal. ‘It’s not clear what the…mediation team
is actually doing to implement the steps they set out,’ Mozersky said.
‘The time that’s passing could have been spent more efficiently.’ [
] ‘It seems unlikely [Salim and Eliasson] will be able to have talks
in August… given the lack of progress on the rebel unification
front.’” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 7, 2007)

In fact, an assessment a good deal harsher than Mozersky’s is
warranted. There is no effective leadership of the international effort
to provide a meaningful peace process in the wake of the disastrous
agreement that emerged from Abuja, Nigeria last May. To be sure, there
has been a welter of “conferences” and “initiatives”—in Paris,
in Addis Ababa, in Accra, in Cairo, and several in Tripoli (the most
recent this past April, the next scheduled for mid-July). But there is
no plan, no “roadmap,” although a flimsy two-page document does
exist with the absurdly overstated title of “Joint AU-UN Framework for
a Road-map for the Darfur Political Process, DRAFT 10 May 2007: Work in
Progress.” But this document is nothing more than a hasty assemblage
of generalized exhortations and vague goals. It is holds no party
accountable in any meaningful way, either in observing a cease-fire or
seriously committing to peace negotiations.

It is worth remarking here the irony of Libya’s prominent place in
negotiations involving peace in Darfur and eastern Chad: no regional
actor (other than the Khartoum regime itself) has done more to instigate
and support violence in the region than Muamar Ghaddafi. Ghaddafi
certainly has no motives that bear scrutiny in attempting to insert
himself into this process. Aside from his fanciful pan-Africanism, he
wishes primarily to forestall any internationalizing of the
Darfur/eastern Chad crisis—certainly to prevent militarily capable
nations from intervening to halt genocide and ethnically-targeted human
destruction.

The mutual contempt of Libya and Saudi Arabia—another would-be
participant in the Darfur “peace process”—only highlights the
absurd lack of leadership that should be the responsibility of those who
have any serious hopes for such a process. So far, the evidence is that
this does not include Secretary-General Ban, despite his unctuous words
about Darfur’s primacy on his world agenda. Jan Eliasson, like Jan
Pronk, the former special representative of the Secretary-General for
Sudan, has proved ineffectual and ill-informed—and dismayingly
part-time, as is his US counterpart, special Presidential envoy for
Sudan Andrew Natsios.

And what of Khartoum’s response to this diplomatic bumbling? How
likely is it that these ruthless survivalists will feel compelled to
participate in a meaningful peace process under present circumstances?
How likely is it that they will move from the obstructers of rebel unity
to good-faith partners in negotiating an end to their genocidal
counter-insurgency war in Darfur? How likely is it that they will
accept and observe a credible cease-fire?

The news barely made it into the penultimate paragraph of a Reuters
dispatch from the UN (May 25, 2007), but arguably tells us most about
the subject of the dispatch: “UN-AU draw up plans for large Darfur
force”:

“Sudan stopped bombing raids at the beginning of the year but on
April 19, 21 and 23 [2007], its air force hit three towns in North
Darfur and prevented a meeting of rebel commanders [the regime] has
encouraged to take place.”

In late May 2007, the Los Angeles Times reported (dateline: UN/New
York):

“A week ago, aircraft believed to belong to the government bombed the
site in northern Darfur where a unification conference sponsored by the
African Union and the UN was to be held. There have been almost two
dozen such incidents.” (May 25, 2007)

As the Los Angeles Times report suggests, military (and other) efforts
to undermine rebel unification attempts are hardly a unique event, as
this writer has insistently noted in the face of a perverse faith in
Khartoum’s desire to see a united rebel negotiating front. Of course
the regime will declare itself ready and willing to negotiate: “‘Any
time they [the rebel groups] want the peace talks to start we have
always been ready,’ [Khartoum’s foreign minister Lam] Akol told
reporters. ‘The problem is with the other side’” (Reuters
[dateline: Khartoum], June 18, 2007).

But while it is certainly true that the rebels are fractious, and
increasingly irresponsible, their distrust of Khartoum is too
well-founded, the regime’s record of bad faith and reneging too
authoritatively established. Khartoum’s actions cannot be wished away
by expedient diplomats:

“Sudanese forces bombed two rebel locations in Darfur just days after
the head of the African Union’s peacekeeping force visited the area to
urge the rebels to join a cease-fire agreement, the AU said yesterday
[December 30, 2006]. A Sudanese government aircraft on Friday [December
29, 2006] bombed Anka and Um Rai in North Darfur province where Gen.
Luke Aprezi had met on Wednesday [December 27, 2006] with rebels, an AU
statement said. ‘When a bombing is made after I have visited an area,
my credibility is involved,’ Aprezi told The Associated Press by
telephone from Khartoum, Sudan’s capital. ‘To that group, I don’t have
any credibility anymore.’”

“The incident jeopardizes efforts to bring additional groups into the
cease-fire that a single rebel faction and the government signed in May
2006, the AU said. [ ] The AU obtained consent from Sudanese officials
in Darfur and the capital ahead of meeting the rebels, it said in the
statement. It called Friday’s [December 29, 2006] attack ‘a seriously
disturbing development.’” (Associated Press dispatch [dateline:
Khartoum], December 31, 2006)

For those who argue that a cease-fire is essential for progress in
Darfur, these are defining actions: they reveal the Khartoum regime’s
attitude too fully, and explain too much of why there is such deep
mistrust on the part of not only the Darfur rebels but all Sudanese
constituencies: none supports the National Islamic Front (National
Congress Party), and all have learned over eighteen years that these
brutal men will never abide by any agreement. A cease-fire for Darfur
must have robust international guarantors, militarily capable and with
appropriate rules of engagement: anything less will merely produce a
reprise of the current, completely ineffectual “cease-fire.”

How much can Khartoum be trusted on other aspects of the Darfur crisis?
The regime has reneged on at least half a dozen agreements to disarm
its brutal Janjaweed militia forces, going back to a Joint Communiqué
signed in Khartoum by NIF President Omar al-Bashir and Ban Ki-moon’s
predecessor on July 3, 2004. Countless agreements concerning
humanitarian access, delivery of equipment, and provision of visas have
been abrogated. The regime has on a number of occasions painted its
military aircraft a UN or African Union white—and then when confronted
with indisputable photographic evidence of such egregious violation of
international law by a UN Panel of Experts for Darfur, the regime simply
lies, declaring the evidence a “fabrication.” Similarly, when
Amnesty International and this same UN Panel of Experts presented
overwhelming evidence of violations of the arms embargo for Darfur,
Khartoum again simply declared the evidence to be fraudulent, contrived,
mere “fabrication.”

Such habitual mendacity pervades Khartoum’s dealings with the
international community, and would certainly do so in any “peace
process,” any negotiations over a cease-fire, and any commitment to
the improvement of humanitarian conditions and security on the ground in
Darfur. The much celebrated “agreement” by Khartoum to allow for
deployment of the UN/AU “hybrid force” is in fact meaningless,
providing as it now stands ample opportunity for re-negotiation, for the
setting of conditions (despite what has been credulously described as
“unconditional” acceptance), and for eventual refusal through the
ill-conceived “tripartite mechanism” (comprising the AU, the UN, but
also the Khartoum regime). A telling vignette was provided by Lauren
Landis of the US State Department:

“‘Although the government gives the big diplomatic “yes”…what
we get on the ground is a lot of bureaucratic “nos,”’ said Lauren
Landis, the State Department’s senior representative to Sudan, who was
in the country this month. ‘No to visas, no to leases of land, no to
equipment—the backhoes are stuck in customs.’” (Los Angeles Times
[dateline: UN/New York], May 25, 2007)

Nor has the international community learned sufficiently well the ways
in which Khartoum will either agree in bad faith, or count on the
endless possibilities that are engendered by documents expediently
crafted. The issue of command-and-control of the AU/UN “hybrid
force” provides a perfect example, one that seems destined to
compromise deployment of this force indefinitely. The New York Times
reported (June 6, 2007) on precisely the kind of ambiguity that Khartoum
will exploit relentlessly:

“The original accord [between the UN and the AU], which had been
endorsed by the [UN] Security Council, gave clear ultimate command to
the United Nations. But the African Union raised objections and asked
for ‘clarifications’ in the text. The new language, in a revised
version delivered to the Security Council and the African Union’s
Peace and Security Council, eliminates the reference and leaves vague
how power will be divided. A senior United Nations official who briefed
reporters on condition of anonymity said the indeterminate phrasing was
aimed at satisfying the Security Council that there was enough United
Nations leadership to persuade troop-contributing countries to provide
the necessary soldiers and equipment, and to convince the African Union
and Sudan that there was enough African input at the top.” (UN/New
York)

Out of such expediency, genocides are sustained.

Similarly, the question of the composition of the “hybrid force”
has not been clearly determined. UN Undersecretary for Peacekeeping
Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno spoke of the UN’s making “every
effort to preserve the African character of the mission” (UN Mission
in Sudan (UNMIS) News Bulletin, June 14, 2007), but later declared that
“suitable offers from African contributors will be given priority, but
if there are not enough such offers, offers from outside Africa would be
accepted” (UNMIS New Bulletin, July 1, 2007).

But of course there will “not be enough such offers from African
contributors,” as Guehenno surely knows. There can be no quarreling
with the blunt assessment of Gayle Smith of the Center for American
Progress:

“Troops should be drawn from throughout the world, not just Africa.
Given that current plans call for a mission of 17,500 – 19,500 troops
and nearly 4,000 civilian police at a time when the demand for
peacekeepers worldwide is on the rise, Africa is running up against
limitations on its capacity to supply new troops. Therefore, troops
should be drawn from anywhere, not just Africa as the Sudanese have
suggested.” (ENOUGH press release, Washington, DC, June 27, 2007)

But Khartoum has consistently declared that it will accept only
technical personnel that are not African—not troops or civilian
police. That has not changed and yet the difference between what is
needed and what Khartoum will accept continues to be papered over at the
UN. Sooner or later—but certainly at a critical moment—this
expedient failure to secure meaningful agreement will compromise human
security in Darfur in consequential ways, as will issues of
command-and-control: nations willing to contribute to a UN-led mission
will not contribute to an AU-led force. Norway and Sweden, which had
previously declared commitments of forces, have made this explicitly
clear.

With precisely this in mind, Khartoum has already revealingly construed
the ambiguous UN/AU “agreement” on command-and-control in ways that
are guaranteed to undermine troop contributions from non-AU countries:

“Sudanese Foreign Minister Akol said all sides were in agreement over
the command and control system for the AU-UN force. ‘The commander is
African, Akol said. ‘The (command and control) structures that are
followed by the UN are the ones that we have agreed would be adopted by
the African Union.’ ‘So we say the command and control structures
are the UN,’ he added.” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], June 18,
2007)

In other words, if the AU agrees to mimic UN command-and-control
structures, then they “are” UN command-and-control structures. Such
semantic sleight-of-hand will ultimately prove to be much more than
verbal disagreement. But neither Undersecretary Guehenno nor
Secretary-General Ban nor special envoy Eliasson seems interested in
these discomfiting details.

This inattention to critical details does not characterize the rebel
groups, which are increasingly blamed for the diplomatic incompetence of
the UN and the broader international community. And while there is much
with which to reproach some of the rebel groups (primarily, however, the
SLA faction of Minni Minawi, the brutal thug who was the only signatory
to the Darfur Peace Agreement with Khartoum), they are hardly open to
criticism for demanding that the UN “‘should put more pressure on
the Khartoum government and not rely on Khartoum’s statements
alone,’” (this from senior Sudan Liberation Army commander
Ahmed Abdel Shafie) (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], June 17, 2007). Jar
al-Naby, perhaps the most important and trustworthy of the rebel
commanders, was equally blunt about the issue of control-and-command of
the “hybrid force”:

“‘This is a good step,’ said Jar el-Neby Abdelkarim, leader of a
large rebel faction in Darfur. ‘Forces to protect the people are
always a good thing.’ ‘But we reject any African Union control over
these forces. They are weak logistically and inexperienced. The United
Nations has to have command and control,’ he told Reuters by telephone
from Darfur.” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], June 16, 2007)

The upshot of peace and security developments over the past six months
represents nothing remotely like “credible and considerable progress in
resolving the Darfur crisis.” There is still no clear peace process,
only vague hopes and a motley crew of regional and international actors,
and part-time envoys—both from the UN and the United States. Jan
Eliasson, in declaring that the “moment of truth for Darfur is
imminent,” is largely reduced to vague exhortation:

“‘Get ready for negotiations, prepare for negotiations, and to all
others…try now to coordinate all initiatives.’” (Agence France
Presse [dateline: Khartoum], July 8, 2007)

This is hardly a “road map,” but rather a desperate hope that
simply convening some of the parties will bring a coordinated approach.
But Egypt, Libya, and Eritrea have all played spoiler roles before.
Their “initiatives” may well proliferate. And having secured
nothing from Khartoum, not even a declared willingness to consider the
most egregiously inadequate features of the Darfur Peace Agreement,
Eliasson is asking for talks to commence with no common negotiating
ground between the regime and the rebels.

At the same time, international movement towards any effective
protection force on the ground in Darfur, or eastern Chad, or the
desperate Central African Republic, is glacial. And efforts at
pressuring Khartoum to act and negotiate in good faith are failing
miserably—in no small measure because of Ban Ki-moon’s absurdly
excessive praising of Chinese efforts on Darfur. Bronwen Maddox of The
Times (London) put the matter best, declaring (June 27, 2007):

“When Ban Ki Moon, the UN Secretary-General, said that China had
played a ‘constructive role’ in the process, and that he was
‘satisfied’ with its contribution, he was being polite to the
point of dissembling, or has standards which are inhumanely low.”

China continues to deny the essential features of human destruction and
suffering in Darfur, expediently painting a grossly inaccurate picture
of realities on the ground; China refuses to countenance even the
possibility of UN sanctions to pressure a defiant Khartoum; and Beijing
engages in ever larger commercial investment in an economy that supports
primarily this genocidal security cabal, most recently in an enormous
deal to search for oil and gas on the coast of the Red Sea (BBC, July 2,
2007).

With such support from China, implicit and explicit, what is the
likelihood of near-term progress in peace negotiations between the rebel
groups and Khartoum’s génocidaires? As Reuters quite accurately
reports, “the [Khartoum] government has made clear it will not reopen
the 2006 peace deal [the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)] during new talks,
leaving little diplomatic space for the fresh peace process”
([dateline: Khartoum], July 7, 2008). The rebels who did not sign the
Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006 have made clear their strong
objection to a number of its provisions—including power-sharing,
compensation, and security arrangements—and are seeking something much
closer to the north/south peace agreement of January 2005 (the so-called
“Comprehensive Peace Agreement”). The chasm between these two
negotiating starting points is vast, and Khartoum’s insistence on
cleaving to the terms of the DPA ensures that talks, if they commence,
will be prolonged.

WHAT IS NEEDED ON THE GROUND

But even as the best diplomatic prospect is for prolonged negotiations
between Khartoum and the rebel groups that agree to participate in
talks, Darfur, eastern Chad, and Central African Republic are all poised
to tip into utter catastrophe, with potentially cataclysmic loss of
human life. Indeed, it has become inescapably clear that security
arrangements for Darfur must also take into account the dire needs of
eastern Chad and CAR. Without urgent provision of much enhanced
security, humanitarian organizations in Darfur will remain poised on the
very cusp of withdrawal or suspension. A single incident could have
massive repercussions; a series of orchestrated incidents could easily
compel virtually total evacuation. In any event, the areas inaccessible
to all humanitarian assistance continue to grow in size, and more than 1
million of the 4.7 million conflict-affected civilians in Darfur and
eastern Chad are completely beyond humanitarian reach. This number is
set to grow dramatically, as the onset of the heaviest part of the rainy
season is only now beginning.

As Julie Flint has rightly argued in a recent opinion piece in The New
York Times (July 5, 2007), a “No Fly Zone” over Darfur is both
impracticable and potentially dangerous for civilians and humanitarians.
The same is true for any “stand-off” military response to
Khartoum’s continuing genocidal counter-insurgency campaign. But
her implicit conflation of a “No Fly Zone” and all other
“coercive” military measures is deeply misguided, and fails to
acknowledge the clear and present dangers to what she describes as the
“one bright light” in the international response to Darfur, viz.
humanitarian relief efforts. In mid-January 2007, all fourteen UN
operational humanitarian organizations in Darfur declared, in an open
letter, that they faced intolerable security risks and that their
efforts were in danger of collapsing; even the vast World Food Program
signed the letter. The following week a number of distinguished
nongovernmental humanitarian organizations released a letter very
similar in tenor. (See my “Understanding Genocide in Darfur: The View
from Khartoum,” January 26, 2007 at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article150.html)

If these organizations withdraw or suspend operations, there will
surely be unprecedented human destruction, which could easily see total
human mortality in the region exceed 1 million human beings by the end
of the year (see my two-part April/May 2006 mortality assessment for
Darfur, presenting data suggesting that approximately 500,000 people
have died from violence and war-related disease and malnutrition since
the outbreak of major fighting in February 2003:
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article102.html
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article104.html).

Ms. Flint declares self-righteously that to “endanger the region’s
humanitarian lifeline is not simply wrong-headed. It is inhumane.”
But equally “inhumane” is to allow present intolerable levels of
insecurity to “endanger” this lifeline, and here Ms. Flint offers no
meaningful suggestions. For this insecurity certainly cannot be
remedied by means of her only proffered military suggestion:
“strengthening” the African Union force currently deployed. This
force is badly equipped, badly led, internally dysfunctional, without
adequate logistical, transport, or communications capacity, and without
requisite intelligence-gathering capability. Administrative capacity in
Addis Ababa is disastrous, budgeting is opaque, and there are growing
reports of financial corruption. For all these reasons morale within
the AU force on the ground is abysmal, and all performance measures show
disastrous declines. Moreover, nearly all Darfuris now deeply distrust
the AU, and see it as having sided with the regime in Khartoum; the same
view is held by the rebels.

The African Union has failed in Darfur, and no amount of
“strengthening” can do more than modestly mitigate this failure. Of
course the AU should be supported as much as possible, and provided with
all the resources it can effectively absorb. And the AU should be
celebrated for attempting what no other member of the international
community would. But this is not a remotely adequate answer to
Darfur’s security crisis, or to the immense security crisis in
eastern Chad. To pretend otherwise is both “wrong-headed” and
“inhumane” in failing to take seriously the high level of threat
to humanitarian operations and civilian populations.

In the clear absence of international will for non-consensual
deployment of protection forces, and given the perversely dilatory
time-frame for deployment of the UN/AU “hybrid force,” some third
strategy must be sought. Unfortunately, the massive efforts to
resuscitate Security Council Resolution 1706 (August 31, 2006) in the
form of this “hybrid force” have consumed virtually all military
planning, even as there is still no real clarity about the
command-and-control or the make-up or the timing for deployment of this
force. Rarely has so much been expended diplomatically on so little.

What would make a significant difference on the ground in Darfur, in
the near term, would be urgently expedited deployment of the civilian
police units contemplated in the “hybrid force,” which is probably a
year off, perhaps more. Such civilian police units should be deployed,
with adequate military protection, to the most insecure camps for
Internally Displaced Persons: Gereida in South Darfur, camps around
Tawilla and Kutum in North Darfur, the radically insecure camps in West
Darfur, especially in the el-Geneina and Zalingei areas, as well as the
large camps around Nyala and el-Fasher.

The camps themselves are cauldrons of rage and despair—and
increasingly awash in arms. The AU civilian police are weak and quite
inadequate in number, and dare not enter most of the camps—this even
as authority within the camps is deteriorating, and internal tensions
and violence are rising. The presence of civilian police, if they were
confident of military protection, could do a great deal to restore order
in the camps and their environs; firewood protection patrols could be
resumed and increased for women and girls presently facing the terrible
risk of rape; humanitarian organizations would be working in safer
environments; security could gradually be extended and the confidence of
displaced persons significantly increased. Eventually, control of
el-Geneina could be restored to civilian authority (the Janjaweed are
currently the unchallenged masters of the capital of West Darfur), and
Nyala and el-Fasher could be made safer for residents and the
humanitarian workers who reside there.

There is obviously much that such a deployment of civilian police could
not accomplish. There are simply too many IDP camps for all to be
offered protection, and civilian police would have very limited
abilities to protect humanitarian convoys (although both of these tasks
are explicitly contemplated in the supposed agreement on a “hybrid
force”). Civilian police could not disarm or even confront most
combatants, and would need backup from well-armed military personnel
with a mandate to provide all necessary protection to the police. There
should be an urgent dispatch of the six helicopter gunships that are
part of the “heavy support package” to the AU that is supposedly now
underway. Deployment of civilian police, if it were to begin soon,
would have to be on a rolling basis—there is simply too much that is
required logistically even for the relatively light foot-print of
civilian police. Deployment should be in units adequate to the demands
of particular locations (perhaps the highest priority should be Gereida
in South Darfur, from which the aid agency Oxfam has just announced its
permanent withdrawal—see Part 1).

OBSTACLES TO DEPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN POLICE CONTINGENTS

Civilian police are not available in large numbers from the African
Union, and must be trained on an emergency basis. They must also be
supplemented by non-AU civilian police. In the view of one experienced
military expert, with extensive experience in Darfur and the region,

“The biggest impediment is availability of qualified personnel. This
could be offset by a crash training initiative sponsored by the UN, AU,
or even EU at one of the African training centers or perhaps even the
Center of Excellence for Special Police Units (COESPU) run by the
Italians in Vicenza. The most significant issue I see here is that a
good percentage of the police need to be African and to a lesser degree
but still significantly important must be women.” (confidential email
to this writer, received July 9, 2007)

But it is not simply training AU civilian police; the current effort in
Darfur requires a significant change in the AU view of the importance of
civilian police. A highly authoritative report by the Brookings
Institution and Bern University (“The Protecting of Two Million
Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African
Union in Darfur,” November 2005, at
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/200511_au_darfur.pdf),
placed particular emphasis on the AU’s shortcomings in this critical
arena:

“[The AU only belatedly] realized the importance of stationing
competent, well-trained police officers in and near the IDP camps. One
UN official familiar with the AU start-up mission said, ‘The AU had no
clue on police issues. They said there was no major role for police and
they never even would have considered a police component if the UN had
not recommended it.’ The AU had never had a police component before.
They had no operational plan or recruiting criteria. The UN Civilian
Police Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations offered a
concept of operations and guidelines on recruiting, training, logistics
and deployment. The UN even shared its roster of African police that had
peacekeeping experience, but the AU did not take advantage of this
valuable resource.”

“AMIS [African Union Mission in Sudan] police, who are not armed,
arrived slowly and it was only in February 2005 that a significant
number started to deploy. Coming from many different countries with
different policing traditions, forging a unified team is difficult. The
language barrier is significant. [ ] Some experts believe that the
quality of the AMIS police is not adequate. Their expertise and
experience is not what is required for such a difficult mission. There
is little screening of applicants prior to deployment, and according to
one police expert, the AU ‘has not even developed the desired profile
and criteria they are looking for in their police.’” (pages 18-19)

The report also noted that AMIS Civilian Police “suffer from severe
communications problems, which, if anything, are worse than AMIS
military must endure”; “one AMIS police sector cannot communicate
directly with another” (page 20).

These deficiencies have not been nearly adequately remedied in the
intervening 20 months; on the contrary, ineffectual AU civilian police
are now more deeply mistrusted, resented, even hated by the very
civilians they are charged with protecting. A profound shift must occur
in the nature of the civilian police force deploying, as well as in the
mandate guiding policing actions: AU civilian police have had no
independent enforcement authority, and are able only to monitor and
accompany Sudanese police, many of these now former Janjaweed militia
members.

Critically, civilian police will be able to deploy with protection, and
this is where pressure must urgently be exerted upon Khartoum. The
regime must be compelled to accept expedited deployment of large,
well-protected contingents from the almost 4,000 civilian police
contemplated in the “hybrid force,” to which Khartoum has nominally
given its consent. It there is refusal to accept these civilian police
contingents, and the necessary protection forces, then it will be clear
now that these génocidaires never had any intention of allowing for
deployment of the “hybrid force.” However belated such recognition,
it will be highly salutary for the international community to confront
this reality now rather than a year from now.

The key player in exerting greater pressure on the Khartoum regime is
of course China, which has gone through various diplomatic motions, but
is still deeply complicit in the Darfur genocide. Indeed, there is a
ghastly congruence in the view from Khartoum:

“[National Islamic Front President and Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir]
insist[ed] that ‘most of Darfur’s region is safe.’ ‘The situation
on the ground in Darfur is improving. Now IDPs [internally displaced
persons] are voluntarily returning to their villages.’” (Agence
France Press [dateline: Khartoum], July 1, 2007)

and the view from Beijing:

“My general impression is that the current situation in Darfur is
basically stable, the local government runs normally, the refugees camps
are well managed with sound health conditions and the basic living of
refugees is guaranteed. [ ] According to the local people, the security
situation in Darfur is generally improved, especially after the signing
of the Darfur Peace Agreement and crimes decreased considerably.”
(Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun on his trip to Darfur, transcript
from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Beijing, April 12, 2007)

If Beijing will not acknowledge the massive humanitarian and security
crisis in Darfur, it is hardly likely to pressure Khartoum to allow
expedited deployment of civilian police and the protection they would
require. This in turn makes clear the importance of international
grass-roots efforts to confront China with a stark choice: “Use your
unrivaled leverage with Khartoum to secure immediate and verifiable
improvements in security on the ground, or face the prospect of hosting
what will be known historically as the ‘Genocide Olympics.’”

Indeed, the need for pressure on China could not be more conspicuous,
something recognized by former UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian
Affairs Jan Egeland:

“‘We should have had a wider coalition in the beginning [in
pressuring Khartoum over Darfur] and I blame myself for not going to
Beijing more and less to [the US] Congress.’” (Reuters [dateline:
UN/New York], May 22, 2007)

But instead of accepting the logic of Egeland’s excessively
self-critical assessment, Ban Ki-moon pronounces himself “satisfied”
with what he describes as China’s “constructive role.” Such
“satisfaction” will no doubt please Beijing, an obstructionist
force on the UN Security Council; but for Darfur, it works to convince
China’s rulers that they need do little more than continue with their
diplomatic minimalism. Certainly there will be no support for more
aggressive efforts to pressure Khartoum to accept expedited civilian
police deployment.

Such deployment would necessarily be on a rolling basis, as resources
and appropriate personnel were committed or trained; they should deploy
first to those camps and locations where civilian policing could do most
to protect civilians and humanitarians. Again, Gereida in South Darfur,
camps around Tawilla and Kutum in North Darfur, the radically insecure
camps in West Darfur, especially in the el-Geneina and Zalingei areas,
as well as the large and increasingly unstable camps around Nyala and
el-Fasher should have the very highest priority.

Further planning and operational details of civilian police deployment
will be articulated in subsequent analyses. A similar deployment of
civilian police and military protection is equally urgent for eastern
Chad. And in the absence of extremely urgent action, Central African
Republic is likely to tip into complete chaos, with immensely
destructive consequences (see the recent Amnesty International Report,
“Central African Republic: Law and order collapsing as civilians
flee violence and killings,” June 26, 2007, at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR190022007).

But decisions about human and humanitarian security in Darfur cannot be
put off; they cannot be held hostage to what will inevitably be
prolonged peace negotiations, if such ever begin; and they must not be
allowed to be rejected by the very regime that is directly responsible
not only for genocidal destruction, but for the ongoing security crisis
that continues to claim lives and livelihoods by the tens of thousands.

To be sure, it will be difficult to move a UN Secretariat that is
content to believe that there has over the past six months been
“credible and considerable progress in helping resolve this Darfur
situation.” And the countries that have postured most shamelessly on
Darfur—particularly the US and the UK—will be difficult to engage in
serious commitments to provide resources for improved security in the
near term. Just as difficult will be overcoming the deliberate
conflation of various attempts to address the security crisis in Darfur,
efforts such as those by Julie Flint and Alex de Waal (Justice Africa),
who seem incapable of imagining that any sort of force on the ground in
Darfur will provide protection to those most desperately in need. But
the voices from Darfur, from the camps, from eastern Chad, from
civilians throughout the greater humanitarian theater, now including
Central African Republic, are all urgently one: “Protect us, protect
us and our families!” The cry is painfully simple, direct, anguished.
A fifth year of genocidal counter-insurgency warfare proceeds, and
still this cry is not heard.

* Eric Reeves is a professor at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, and has published extensively on Sudan. He can be reached at [email protected]; website : www.sudanreeves.org