Enduring the Hazards of “Attractive Unity”: The John Garang Calling
By Elwathig Kameir
July 30, 2007 — On the occasion of the second memorial of the late SPLM Chairman, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the purpose of this brief intervention is to trigger debate with the Sudanese intellectuals and political forces on an important issue that predominantly preoccupied the mind of the late great leader for about a quarter of a century. The unity of the Sudan on “new bases” has constituted the cornerstone of Garang’s Vision of the New Sudan and to which he remained committed during 22 years of war and armed struggle and was poised to translate into reality when peace was finally realized if not for the fate of God.
Since the signing of Machakos Protocol in 2002, and later the CPA in 2005, the concept of “attractive unity” has become highly popular among both writers and commentators for whom the unity of the Sudan is a heartfelt cause, as well as those who campaign for the partition of the country, whether explicitly or implicitly. The source of this observed and rising concern with the concept of “attractive unity”, particularly among unity enthusiasts, is the fear that the South will disintegrate or, in the best of scenarios, southerners will vote for separation in the referendum scheduled at the end of the 6-year interim period. This apprehension is triggered and continuously fed by the tense post-CPA political environment manifested in the strained relationship between the two partners in power (SPLM and NCP) and between them and a disgruntled political opposition, on the other. This misgiving is further compounded by the observed lukewarm attention the SPLM is paying to national issues of democratic transformation and the Movement’s weakened relations with its former political allies in the north (NDA and Darfur). This political reality has prompted many observers, inside and outside the country, as well as leading figures of the two parties to the CPA themselves, to voice concerns that South Sudan, behind the guise of a fragile peace process, is now nearer to partition than to unity.
THE CPA AND ATTRACTIVE UNITY
The CPA is premised on a governance framework that has resolved the South’s historical grievances of political, economic and cultural marginalization, which were the root causes of a protracted armed conflict that lasted for 22 years, if we refer to its last phase only (1983-2005). The people of southern Sudan and other marginalized areas have achieved in the CPA, among other things, real power in the south, significant power in the centre, equitable share in wealth, an independent SPLA during the interim period, the right of self-determination and popular consultation, their own banking system in the south, and an agreement on the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile. Thus, the CPA bestows on the South unprecedented constitutional and institutional powers and authority in the political and economic domains, and ensures the participation of Southerners, proportional to the population of the South, in the federal system of rule. This participation has transcended the “conventionally” nominal representation of Southerners in federal ministries to encompass public service and all other judicial, security and financial institutions of the Sudanese state. Moreover, perhaps more importantly, the CPA constitutionally endorses citizenship rights for all Sudanese, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion or gender, as the basis for public office eligibility, including the presidency, public service and enjoyment of rights and duties.
Most of the analyses of, and commentaries on “attractive unity” focus on answering the following question “what should be done to make Southerners vote for unity in the referendum”? The answer is readily found in the implementation of the CPA in letter and spirit. It is, thus, hypothesized that the respect and full implementation of the Agreement would ultimately induce southerners to opt for unity of the country (Mansour Khalid, Al-Rayaam, 16/01/2007). Drawing on John Garang’s vision of “unity on new bases”, however, the question is not “what would make unity attractive to Southerners in advance of the vote on self-determination”? Rather, it should be rephrased as “what is this unity we are talking about and what are its constituent parts and parameters”?
The relation between the state and religion is one cardinal parameter of this “unity on new basis”. It was the stalemate over this issue that had originally invited the term “attractive unity” coined by the mediators of the peace process in an attempt to go round the impasse of the Niavasha negotiations over the relation between the state and religion, in particular following the GOS refusal of the confederation proposition advanced by the SPLM as early as 1993 during the Abuja talks. Dictated by the logic of negotiations, the “one country-two systems” model was, therefore, proposed with the objective of giving a chance for the two partners and the rest of the Sudanese political forces, for that matter, to rethink during the extended interim period how to maintain and sustain the unity of the country in the long-run. The real challenge facing all political forces, particularly those in the North, is to exploit the democratic transformation consequent on, and window of opportunity provided by the CPA to address the question, which the bilateral negotiations between the two parties to the Agreement failed to resolve in a conclusive manner. Thus, while the genuine implementation of the CPA provisions would constitute the motivating “mandatory condition (s)” for persuading Southerners to vote in favor of unity, it might also render this unity “unattractive” and provide a recipe for separation. It is important to note that the right of self-determination was not originally envisaged as a constituent part of “unity on new bases” concept, but was later introduced as a mere tool for achieving the voluntary unity in an adverse political environment. It was, thus, only invoked 9 years after this concept had been advocated in response to objective political conditions at the time, both in Khartoum and the South, following the Naser coup in 1991.
ATTRACTIVE UNITY: GARANG CALLING
The analysts of, and commentators on “attractive unity”, therefore, have overlooked a couple of important and pertinent issues.
I. Citizenship rights, embodied in the concept of “unity on new bases”, constitute an organic whole and are not divisible or amenable to discriminate selection. In the eyes of the late Chairman of the SPLM, the unity on which the old Sudan is based is neither viable nor sustainable. This unity is rooted in the economic, political and cultural hegemony of particular groupings, where other groups basic to the formation of the Sudanese society are excluded and isolated from effective participation in political power, from expressing their “national” and cultural identities, and from an equitable share in national wealth, all this in the context of an uneven development paradigm. Sudan has an old and rich history since the civilization of Kush, thousands of years before Christ. This is what late Garang calls historical diversity. Today’s Sudan constitutes an incomplete outcome of a long and complex historical process of interactions and transformations, as a result of which it has matured into an ethnically, culturally, religiously and linguistically, as well as socially, economically and geographically, diverse blend. This variety epitomizes Sudan’s contemporary diversity. The Old Sudan restricted unity of the country to selective parameters and elements (Arabism and Islam) from the totality of the components that make up Sudan’s historical and contemporary diversity, whereas it neglected and overlooked other key ingredients.
Unity, premised on these partial components and with all the attendant political, economic and social implications, will always be fragile and unsustainable. The constitutional and institutional arrangements, programs and policies of the New Sudan should be reflective of both these historical and contemporary realities. This is a necessary prerequisite for creating a great nation that is voluntarily united in diversity rather than divided by diversity.
2. Insistence and persistence on identifying one religion with the state, and thereby establishing a theocratic state will only lead to serious rifts in the fabric of the Sudanese society and the eventual disintegration of the country. For not only are all Sudanese not Muslims, but even among Muslims themselves there is no consensus on the Sharia’s laws. The separation of religion from the state should not be misinterpreted, wittingly or unknowingly, to mean banishing religion from society. This is not possible because religion is part of humanity. All Sudanese have beliefs, whether Muslims, Christians or believers in indigenous African religions. What is meant is simply that the state should neutral towards people of different religions and beliefs and that religion should not be exploited in political practice or used as a basis for the laws to which citizens, irrespective of their religion, are subjected, except in Personal and Family Laws, which draw from Sharia’a, customs, values and traditions as sources of legislation. All that the vision of the New Sudan proposes is that religion regulates the relationship between humans and their creator, a relation governed by religious legislation in the personal realm. Whereas the state is a socio-political institution contrived by humans and to which all belong regardless of their respective religious affiliations. In late Garang’s famous words “I have never seen a state, the state which I called a social institution, a thing, going to church on Sunday; it’s the individual who goes to church on Sunday. I have never seen a state going to the mosque on Friday, it’s the individual that goes to the mosque on Friday. I have never seen a state going to Mecca on pilgrimage; they are the individuals who go to Mecca. When we die and we meet our maker, it’s the individual who stands before Him and he will be judged by what he had done as an individual, not by what the state did”. Therefore, late Garang wondered as to why we confuse issues and divide people as a result? In the New Sudan, it is the constitution and not religion, which must constitute the sole source of legislation.
II. The second issue missed by the analysts of, and commentators on “attractive unity” is: what is the role of the various political forces, including the SPLM, but especially those based in the North, in realizing these conditions i.e. in transcending these arrangements during the interim period? The CPA has largely been a product of international mediation and pressures and incorporates a variety of built-in mechanisms for ensuring and monitoring the appropriate implementation of its provisions. Transcending the interim dual system of laws, however, should remain the sole preoccupation and national responsibility of the Sudanese political and social forces if all are keen to sustain the country’s unity. The late SPLM leader recognized from the outset that the SPLM on its own is not in a position to achieve the task of building a viable and united Sudan that would avert the country the risk of disintegration. Indeed, the Movement’s leader was keen from the beginning to extend his hands to political and social forces in the North and was instrumental in binging them together in Koka Dam, Ethiopia, as early as March 1985. The SPLM has, thus, established alliances with all the “traditional” and “modern” political forces, within the ambit of the NDA since 1990, for moving forward the process of national formation. While the post-CPA situation has created new political realities, the SPLM is bound to interact with other political forces and enter into alliances that would serve the objectives of the New Sudan. Though the Northern political forces assume the lion’s share of this responsibility, a sizeable share lies on the shoulders of the SPLM, which claims to be a national political actor that has been espousing and promoting “unity on new bases” for nearly a quarter of a century now. Indeed, while the SPLM is the only political force with the largest base of support among non-Muslims in both the South and the North, its principled position on the relation between religion and the state has lured to its ranks a noticeably large constituency in various parts of North Sudan.
The Movement’s position on the interrelated issues of the relation between religion and the state, and unity has, however, been strongly criticized. First, the subscription to the “one country-two systems” model aroused suspicions and criticisms among some of the SPLM allies and was seen as a prelude to dividing up the country. This accusation could easily be dismissed as a misreading of the outcome of the negotiations and a failure of understanding the logic and rules of these negotiations. To start with, the CPA is neither the program of the Movement nor is it the project that the NC aspired to realize. Students of political science are taught, “politics is the art of the possible”. When it comes to negotiated settlements there is no winner or loser and no party is in a position to impose its will completely. In the particular context of the Sudanese conflict, the SPLM/A, and for that matter the NDA, has not defeated the government, a precondition for repealing the existing laws. The elected Constituent Assembly of 1986 was not even able to “freeze”, let alone abrogate Sharia’a following the Sudan Peace Initiative in 1988. How would one, therefore, expect a Guerrilla movement with a largely non-Muslim constituency to dictate its vision of a secular Sudan at the negotiations table? Even the mediators were not sympathetic to the cause of the Movement on this sensitive issue. Under the circumstances of the negotiations, only two routes were open for the SPLM to follow. One option was to insist on the separation of religion from the state all over the Sudan, thus leading to a stalemate and the eventual breakdown of the talks. This would not have looked good either for the SPLM constituency in the South or for the mediators. Even worse it would have gotten the country back to a devastating war. The second option was to seek workable solutions that would end the war, without compromising the citizenship rights of the non-Muslims not only in the South, but also in the whole country. The SPLM opted for this second route by putting forward a number of proposals, including having a National Capital free of Sharia’ and an Administrative Enclave (e.g. like Washington D.C.) where religious laws will not be applied. It is, thus, unfair to hold the SPLM responsible if these propositions did not find their way to the final outcome of the negotiations.
In fact, the concept of retaining two systems in the country was originally put forward by the SPLM in a genuine attempt of the Movement’s leader in his quest at realizing the cherished goal of unity. The challenge is, thus, for the political and social forces in the North, in particular supporters of unity, how to effectively mobilize efforts and exploit the democratic transformation subsequent to the CPA to move forward the agenda of unity. Above all, what has been lost is only a battle and not the war for separating religion from the state. Law-making, including repealing, is a process and not an event and what has not been achieved in the CPA can be revisited through elections in four years time, provided that these forces will be ready by then. Thus, Article 2.4.5 of the CPA regarding Agreement on the National Capital, where Sharia’a law and its application in the National Capital stipulates “Without prejudice to the competency of any National Institution (Parliament) to promulgate laws”, implying that parliament can promulgate any law, including secular laws.
Second, this brings me to yet another accusation of the Movement expressed in what is regarded as “an observed retreat from the SPLM’s position on unity”. This observation has been made by some intellectuals in the North in interpretation (more accurately misinterpretation) of Dr. Garang’s remark to the media, following the signing of the CPA that “the responsibility of maintaining unity rests with the Northerners”. Saddling the Northerners only with this hefty responsibility is purported to be synonymous with the SPLM absolving itself and the Southerners from such a responsibility. On the contrary, the statement simply calls on the Northerners, particularly the elite, to assume their due share of responsibility for keeping the country united. If some Northerners incessantly and consistently question the SPLM’s position on unity, why wouldn’t the Movement’s leader equally put them to task? Why should the SPLM and Southerners at large always be obliged to defend their adherence to unity, while the Northerners think that their declared allegiance to unity is sacrosanct, thus be accepted on face value? The comment of the Movement’s leader on the responsibility of the Northerners was meant to urge them to fully support the CPA and these deserved and hard-won gains for the Southerners and other marginalized people. It is necessary to assure Southerners and other marginalized people in the Sudan of their rights, of equality, and of justice. It is only then that they would vote for unity in the referendum stipulated in the CPA to take place after a 6-year interim period.
Third, a related common argument propagated in Khartoum by the skeptics of the SPLM and the CPA is that Southerners will most probably vote for independence given the immense gains in power and wealth that the Agreement has granted. By the same token, I would counter why would they opt for independence if the same gains remain intact and not wither away if the country stayed united? Besides that, Southerners and other marginalized people would further benefit from being Sudanese citizens with equal rights in all spheres of life and all over the Sudan. Some people, for instance, mistakenly think that the post of the First Vice President represents the apex of Southern Sudanese aspirations, with which they are content. Such a belief, however, overlooks the fact that it is the right of every Sudanese, whether Southerner, Northerner, or from any other part of the country, to aspire to becoming the President of the whole Sudan. Thus, it is only the full support to the CPA that would lead to the creation of the necessary conducive environment and the appropriate approach for addressing both the questions of “citizenship” and “unity”. As the Movement’s leader correctly opined, “ The CPA is a win-win agreement. There are no losers. It gives everyone their rights”.
To reiterate, what the SPLM leader implied in his reference to the “Northerners’ responsibility in maintaining unity” is that they should embrace the CPA, support and monitor its honest and serious implementation, and adjust their attitudes and behavior to fit the percepts of citizenship. This does not at all mean absolving the SPLM from the responsibility of maintaining unity. On the contrary, the Movement’s leader in his 22nd SPLM/A Anniversary Address (May 16, 2005) stated, “The CPA enables the SPLM to retain its national character and to expand all over the Sudan. The SPLM shall consolidate itself in Southern Sudan where we shall have 70% of power and in the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile where we shall have 45% of power. The SPLM shall also have 10% of power in all the remaining 15 States of the North. With the consolidation of the SPLM in Southern Sudan and its expansion and consolidation in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and the other States of the North, the SPLM clearly has the potential to become the majority party in the coming national elections at all levels – local, state and national”. Therefore, why would the SPLM relentlessly fight at negotiations for entrenching itself in the North and all over the Sudan if it harbored any hidden agenda or predetermined plans for separation?
These clearly stated stances of the SPLM on the question of religion and unity, however, pose a number of important and pertinent issues that are worthy of debate among the Sudanese intellectuals and the various political and social forces in the country:
If Southerners (particularly non-Muslims) genuinely felt and believed that they could equally and freely compete for the premier constitutional position in the country in the absence of any constitutional constraints, wouldn’t the insistence on religious-based laws in the north act as a deterrent and pose institutional and socio-cultural barriers that would make the constitutional right of nomination and running the election a mockery? On a different level, doesn’t the subjection of non-Muslim Southerners to Sharia’a-based laws in the North, while applying non-religion-based laws in the South (even to Muslims), compromise equality of citizens of the same nation before the Law? Would Southerners vote for a unity based on the permanency of the CPA interim arrangements that combine two different systems of legislation, when they have the option of creating an independent state that does not discriminate between its citizens before the law on the basis of religion? What logic would lead ordinary non-Muslims to voluntarily accept the possibility, even if theoretically, of being lashed or amputated? What is tempting about this kind of unity that would make citizens with different religious beliefs, and who have another option, to pay such a price?
All the northern Sudanese political and social forces that aspire to the unity of the country, albeit on new bases, are faced with the challenge of how to effectively mobilize efforts and exploit the space and democratic transformation provided by the CPA for fostering a Sudanese commonality during the interim period towards creating “Transformed Democratic Sudan”, thus avoiding the split into two independent states or the disintegration of the country, in the worst of scenarios. The former allies of the SPLM in the NDA, as well as its partner in power, the NCP, are not exempted from the national responsibility of reaching a consensus on the relation between religion and politics for forging and cementing the kind of unity that would ensure equal citizenship rights for southerners and non-Muslims at large. The question of religion and the state has continued to be on top of the agenda of the various rounds of negotiations between the SPLM and the government, on the one hand, and a hot issue in the dialogue between the SPLM and its allies in the NDA, on the other. Ironically, a breakthrough was achieved on both fronts, though of a different nature and with varying implications on the unity of the country in each case. The first was the resolution on Religion and the State in the Sudan adopted by the NDA at the Asmara Conference on Fundamental Issues in 1995, which was an advanced and refined statement of the earlier resolution of the NDA on the issue in Nairobi in 1993. The second breakthrough occurred in 1994 when the SPLM and the government agreed to the DOP proposed by the IGAD mediators. Though the NDA’s Asmara Declaration affirmed the right of self-determination to the South, the resolution on religion and the state was grounded on the principle of the non-exploitation of religion in politics. It was also premised on constitutional arrangements that would guarantee full equality in citizenship rights and conformity of all laws to international human rights conventions. The DOP, however, granted the Southerners (and various peoples of the Sudan) the option of self-determining in the absence of an agreement on a package of similar principles, including the establishment of a secular democratic state and the separation of the state and religion. It was the failure of reaching an agreement on this principle in particular, which laid the basis for the adoption of the “one country- two systems” arrangements in Machakos in 2002 and later enshrined in the CPA and the interim constitution in 2005. If the unity of the country is at stake, what would prevent the Sudanese political forces from arriving at a third breakthrough at this critical juncture of the country’s history? We can even draw from the experience of neighboring Egypt in striking the balance between basing equality of rights on citizenship and the aspirations of the Muslim majority in the country. The recently approved constitutional amendments in Egypt (March 2007) retained the controversial Article (2) of the Egyptian constitution, which stipulates “the principles of Islamic Shari‘a as the principal source of legislation”. Though the article aroused the fears and suspicions of the Copts, it was embraced by a wide spectrum of the Egyptian political forces and supported by the Patriarch of the Egyptian Orthodox Church, as long as all Egyptians, regardless of religion, remained subjected to the same civil laws of the country, except, of course, those pertaining to the personal and family domains.
After two years in power, the SPLM is equally required to clarify its position on the country’s unity and play the role expected of it by the public, and abandon holding the stick from the middle. Even when the Islamic laws were not practically applied in the south (since their inception in 1983), the SPLM, as a liberation movement has consistently been calling for a transformed, democratic and united Sudan. The issue of religion and the state remained a major concern for the Movements’ leader and a cardinal ingredient of his thesis of “unity on new bases”. Besides, the Movement’s manifesto and constitution have defined the conflict in the country as the problem of the Sudan and not of the South. Indeed, whenever he was asked “how come you claim the movement is national, while your base is in the South”, late Dr. John’s favorite anecdote was “a French gentleman was asked; why do you kiss the lady on the hand, and he said; you have to start from somewhere!”. The arguments, expounded above, in response to the accusations and suspicions of the critics following the signing of the Machakos Protocol and the CPA, now seem to have lost their power and logic in convincing a skeptical cadre and grass-root members of the SPLM regarding the Movement’s position on the intertwined issues of unity and the relation between religion and the state. These arguments were compelling and persuasive at the time of negotiations, when the SPLM was still a guerrilla movement that only possessed the power of the gun. Now, with 26% of executive and legislative power in the center, 45% of power in each of the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, and 10% of power in the rest of the 15 States in the north, as well as a considerably large political constituency in all of these states, where does the SPLM stand regarding its commitment to a) engage all the political forces in dialogue with a view to expediting the implementation of the CPA, national reconciliation and democratic transformation; and b) initiate a process of political discourse with all political forces with the aim of arriving at a social contract that encompasses issues of CPA, national reconciliation and democratic transformation as a basis of national consensus? (Interim National Council Resolutions, Yei, February 2007) For that matter, what are the main features of the Movement’s electoral program and the nature of its envisioned political allies that would serve the objective of making unity attractive?
The CPA, particularly the Machakos Protocol, obligates the SPLM, as well as the NCP, to make unity attractive so that the people of south Sudan eventually opt freely for unity. So, while Southern politicians, outside the SPLM, are free to mobilize during the interim period, support for separation, the SPLM and its cadres are obliged to work towards making unity attractive. This is an obligation that the SPLM cannot shun without seriously flouting the CPA. The demand of the SPLM for an effective presence in legislative and executive institutions throughout Northern Sudan, and its participation in the governance of those states for the duration of the pre-elections period, was made with the objective of making it possible for the Movement to advocate, on an equal footing with the NCP, unity of Sudan on new basis. It is, thus, astounding to see some SPLM adherents inclined to abandon the support the Movement was able to garner in the North in the course of two decades of clandestine work, or relinquish the political gains it succeeded in wresting from the NCP through skillful negotiations lasting almost two years. The mid-term elections are on the horizon, two years from now there shall be, in accordance with the CPA and the Constitution, national general elections from the state levels to the Presidency. The outcome of those elections shall be disastrous for the SPLM in case it decides to politically decamp from the North, while allowing the better-equipped and funded competitor play a pivotal role in the North and an active one in Southern politics. (Khalid 2007)
The forgoing discussion hypothesizes that; first, the honest and genuine implementation of the CPA provisions, without reaching a consensus on the question of the relation between religion and the state, would most probably lead either to partition of the country in two, in the best of circumstances, or total breakdown, in the worst of scenarios. Thus, unity would stand a better chance if the full implementation of the CPA (the obligatory conditions) were coupled with the success in transcending the CPA “transitional” arrangements of the dual sources of legislation to a unified system that guarantee the equality of all the Sudanese citizens before the law (the necessary conditions). Rather than the apparent preoccupation with “what would make unity attractive to Southerners in advance of the vote on self-determination?”, the focus of the debate should be on “what is this unity we are talking about and what are its constituent parts and parameters”? Second, maintaining the country’s unity is contingent on the role of the SPLM, in collaboration with the rest of political forces (including the NCP), which is both imperative and instrumental for bringing about this transformation into a democratic and united Sudan. One important caveat to note is that there are other conditions outside the scope of the CPA that would have to be satisfied if unity were to be attractive. How the Darfur crisis is resolved is critical for this to materialize. Southern Sudanese will ask the legitimate question as to why they should remain in a country that is already disintegrating from within and a government under international siege? They would say: Why should we share our wealth (oil) at the time when we were denied wealth sharing since Sudan’s independence?
The author is a former professor of Sociology and consultant with for numerous regional and intl organizations, He can be reached at [email protected]